

Carriers of Democracy
The Global Social Movement System

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Introduction

This book was born in a discussion in the Stockholm branch of the Swedish Environmental Federation (now Friends of the Earth Sweden) in the 80s. We were fed up with a political climate that considered only state and capital as actors of the society's stage and condemned all others to being spectators and cheers – “left” if they cheered the state, and “right” if they cheered capital. We wanted to cheer ourselves and people like us. And we wanted to present stories and material that showed that social movements, or people's movement (which is the same thing) really are actors in their own right and not younger brothers of illustrious NGOs.

In describing what popular movements are, what they have been, and what they have done, we wanted to contribute to a strategy discussion for new and old popular movements. We also wanted to contribute to the global discussion that goes on in society about social movements, which seems to find it difficult to tell the difference between a social movement and a war or a drunken brawl, lumping it together under the heading “contention”.

There is yet another theme of the book. We were annoyed by political debates where matters were overrideologized so that most ways of posing the questions were excluded. The possibilities were constructed as frozen “isms”. After having inquired into the original forming of positions we were convinced that the forming in most cases had been done quite pragmatically to satisfy casual needs, but had been petrified afterwards as the original needs were forgotten. So we saw a point in describing the pragmatic origins of ideological concepts to, if possible, dissolve them and teach popular movement society to continuously formulate and throw away ideologies according to needs.

All this, accordingly, is the purpose of this book.

Readers may notice that I vacillate between the three terms social movements, peoples' movements, and even popular movements. Peoples' movements/popular movement are the old popular concepts, still going strong in Sweden, but in the international scene they were badly damaged by the Cold War notion that anything “popular” must be infected with Communism. Social movements is a somewhat academic concept with an uncertain scope, possibly not covering everything I will write about, and with an uncertain popular coinage. In indiscriminately alternating between all I hope to make the three terms coincide and perhaps widen the scope of all.

A first version was published in Swedish in 2010. It can be bought from www.folkrorelser.org, where you can also read a full text html version of this book. Perhaps it took such a long time because we spent our time in a lot of movement activities both at home and globally. But also because we had our regular paid work to attend to. Peoples' movement activists can't as a rule live from activism, they must make a living in the market.

This English edition is somewhat amended from the Swedish one. A lot has happened since 2010, and while I don't want to change too much I have learnt from reactions and from further reading that there are stories it would be a shame to let out. I have also tried to make the book somewhat more truly global – any book written by a European

is perhaps doomed to have a European bias, not least because s/he knows the European environment better than the others, but one at least has a duty to combat that tendency.

The sources of this book is primarily stories of different mobilizations around the world. There are thousands of these, I have tried to focus on those who have mattered most for the development of a movement tradition and/or global history. But I have had to depend on what exists in libraries or the internet, in languages I can read (Scandinavian, English, French, German and Spanish). This contributes to the bias: there is pitifully little written in (or translated into) these languages about for example movements in India and China, at least before Europeans begun to show a predatory interest in them in the 19th century. And they together make up a third of the world. I will have to leave to next generation to weave most of these stories into a future book of even wider scope.

As the original book was written in the 1990s-2000s few events after that date are chronicled here. Or rather, few events after the 80s are, since I have tried to avoid a journalistic perspective, with its unavoidable gaps and omissions. I have tried to rely on “peer reviewed” academic books as much as possible and use reports from participants (like myself) only for colourful details. And academic research takes time, if it is serious. For that reason I haven’t dealt with for example the mobilizations following after the 2008 collapse; nothing of what I have read so far convinces me.

But since I am also a participant I haven’t even tried to suppress my aim to ordering all the scientific details into a perspective that may guide other participants. In this topic I am not objective and uninterested. I share however Prosper-Olivier Lissagaray’s opinion, printed out in his study of the Paris Commune from 1876, which means that I register blunders as well as successes:

“He who tells the people revolutionary legends, he who amuses therewith sensational stories, is as criminal as the geographer who would draw up false charts for navigators.”

The plan of the book

The first two chapters deal with actors and scene – who can do anything in our world, and what is our world? These chapters may be somewhat theoretical, but the following chapters of more straightforward storytelling will be more difficult to understand without them. There are presented some concepts I use over and over again like center and periphery, world market system, peoples’ movement, direct producer, and so on; you will understand the stories better if you have read these first two chapters.

Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the world before about 1800. After that date chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 deal with movements grouped together after their focus – labour, territory, agrarian, gender, “pariahs”, peace, environment. Since one and the same mobilization may have several focuses the same mobilization may be found in several chapters. Chapter 10 then tries to tie together them into a whole again.

There is also an Appendix where the most theoretical elements from chapter 1 have been stuffed in. It is not strictly necessary to read it to understand the book, but if you really want to be able to see a mobilization from as many angles as possible, I recommend it strongly.

Chapter 1:

The actors: states, capital and peoples' movements

WHEN DESCRIBING A COURSE OF EVENTS, Kenneth Burke advises us to see it as a drama with act, actors, scene, means and ends. The five questions you have to answer is what?, who?, when and where?, how? and why?. If you forget to answer any of the questions you are guilty of reductionism and misrepresentation of your description [1].

In this chapter, I will describe which collective actors who appear in the play. The play itself begins in chapter 3.

The actors are three. Each is a representative of, or is based in, a certain type of organisation or structure with a certain kind of built-in aim or driving force, which differs fundamentally from each other and to a high degree directs the acting of the actor. The actors may be called State, Business or Capital owners, and Popular Movements. Possibly one could add a fourth kind of actor, one we may tentatively call the intellectuals.

The three kinds of actor are organised around the three possible distributional mechanisms for goods and services: redistribution, market and reciprocity [2].

Redistribution implies that an authority collects tributes from the direct producers to distribute them according to some norm. Market implies exchange of goods and services to prices that are set according to demand and supply, between parties that are free to make the exchange or not. Reciprocity implies that people give each other things or do each other services because they are tied to each other or wish to be so, or because of "spontaneous expressions of life" – a concept I hope to return to because it is essential for the understanding of social movements.

Redistribution can be organised through communities or clans – groups who claim a common biological descent. The actors who organise most of the redistribution in our culture, and win a good deal of legitimacy therewith, are called States. They can be described as administrative apparatuses that are tied to certain territories, consisting of hierarchies of functionaries. Their primary aim is to be fed by taxes, and the means to do that, except managing the redistribution, is to maintain the stability in the system [3].

Administrative apparatuses tied to territories is an old phenomenon – the first ones appeared in Egypt six thousand years ago. But states with pretensions of total administrative control over a uniform territory appeared about 1450, synchronously with the ap-

[1]. Kenneth Burke, *A grammar of motives*, University of California Press 1945, related in Johan Asplund, *Teorier om framtiden*, Liber Kontenta 1985.

[2]. Karl Polanyi, *The great transformation*, Henry Holt 1944. There is also a short summary in Paul Bohannan, *Social anthropology*, Holt, Rhinehart and Winston 1969. Susan Strange: *States and markets*, Pinter 1988, insists on the role of intellectuals as an actor, and also divides capital into productive and financial, with very diverging interests.

[3] About the rise of the state, see Charles Tilly, *Coercion, capital and European states*, Blackwell 1993. About its way of working, see Bo Rothstein, *The Social Democratic State: The Swedish Model and the Bureaucratic Problem of Social Reforms*, Univ of Pittsburgh Press 1995. Göran Ahrne, *Agency and Organization*, Sage 1990, deals with the states in their capacity as compromise brokers.

pearance of the word "state". And a state system covering the whole earth didn't appear until the twentieth century.

The European states which are the seeds of the present global state system began their existence a thousand years ago as aristocratic bands living by selling "protection" to peasants, artisans and merchants, in a never-ending competition with other aristocratic bands. These conflicts have been the strongest factor in the creation of states; wars have formed their inner organisations even more than they have formed their territories. The conflicts between the aristocratic bands, each coveting eachother's resources, led to two developments. Firstly, it forced them to a more stable organisation, which after five hundred years had begun to resemble what we are used to today. Secondly, it made each state dependent of support and participation from its own "clients", its own capitalists and population. According to John Hall, the difference between the modern states and their predecessors is that the former is well rooted in ruling class while the latter were only a dynasty which even the upper class did its best to evade, mostly with good result [4].

The states have been forced to buy the participation of their clients to survive and assert themselves. The participation of the capitalists has been bought with facilitating their capital accumulation, for example through protection of monopolies (patent rights, police, in the last resort war) and through rationalizing and disciplining of peoples' behaviour to fit in with world market principles (repression and remuneration systems, schooling). The participation of the popular majority has been bought through concessions in the shape of social integration, i.e. recognition of popular demands and rights through politically defined redistribution of resources (social policy, public consumption of collective goods) and a certain degree of influence and democracy. Which of the two actors that will make its need most heeded by the state depends of course of which of the actors is the strongest. But also the strength of the state contributes to the result. The weaker and poorer the state, the less it can afford to buy support and the more it has to rely on brutal force – this is the reason why civilized institutions have found it difficult to survive in poor countries. Violence as the most important way of solving conflicts is a sign of poverty, a demonstration of failure to build a stable state [5].

The necessity to buy support is a restriction for the state functionaries that impedes their own desires. Except being an actor for itself, the state is also a battleground for others. For that reason, the state is also a broker of compromises between the two other actors, and a confirmer of the balance of strength of these. But functionaries can also, within limits, act independently. Particularly if the others balance eachother evenly, state functionaries may, thanks to their monopoly of violence, play them against eachother and win a scope for action.

But cooperation between states and capital is the more typical case, which will be elaborated in chapter 2.

Stability in the system is maintained, according to some, by the fact that the states

[4] John A. Hall, Powers and liberties, Basil Blackwell 1985.

[5] Charles Tilly, Coercion, capital and European states.

are many. They co-exist in a state system – a new state actually gets its certificate as a state from the other states. In the state system there are different positions; states are strong or weak according to its position, this will also be elaborated in chapter 2. The fact that they are many gives the capitalists great liberty of playing states against each other, which is a way for capitalists to maintain their independence. But theoretically it should also be a way of maintaining the independence of popular movements.

Business, or capital, is a kind of actor that is built around the market. It deals with organising some kind of production with the aim of selling the product. The purpose is to get the capital to grow. The means is to make business with a profit that can be added to the capital [6].

In this context I don't pay attention to the organisation's level of abstraction, i.e. how far it is removed from the production. I make no difference between an agrobusiness farmer and an international financier. The crucial fact is that the core in what capital does is to accumulate capital, not produce for subsistence. Those who produce for subsistence, they may work for others or on their own, are called direct producers.

Expressed this way, business is an old thing. Markets where commodity producers have sold to each other have existed for thousands of years. Production in order to accumulate a capital is a younger phenomenon but has at least existed since antiquity. Capital as an actor of greater scope depends on international markets and in principle a child of the ninth century when such markets began to appear, according to Abu-Lughod [7]. Business as large-scale organiser of production is an even later phenomenon.

What distinguishes capital from other historical organisers and/or exploiters of direct producers' production, like classic landowners, and which make them so extremely powerful in their endeavour to exploit people and nature, is their unconditional need for growth. The need for growth depends on that business actors compete, and constantly need to outflank each other to survive. In an industrial context, where success lies in economies of scale, see chapter 2, they constantly have to search for new resources, new markets, new methods – or die.

It is capital's direct contact with the organising of the all-important production that normally makes it to the key actor, even if it at certain circumstances may be outflanked by the others.

During the age of the world market system, the most important actors within business have always had a global reach. The international bankers and trading houses constructed the system in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, in cooperation with the states [8]. In these times, business dealt little with regular production, and trade concerned few products. As the world market system has developed, business has increased

[6] The classic account of capital is of course Karl Marx, *Capital*, part 1-3, innumerable editions, e.g. International Publishers Company, 1982. But capital as an actor is actually better related in Joseph Schumpeter, *The theory of economic development*, Harvard University Press 1935, or Alfred Chandler, *The visible hand*, Harvard University Press 1980, and *Scale and scope*, Belknap 1990.

[7] Janet Abu-Lughod, *Before European hegemony*, Oxford University Press 1989.

[8] See for example Fernand Braudel: *Civilizations and capitalism 1400-1800*, Harper Collins 1982-84

its part of society's total production – production has been commercialized and also increased its control of the direct producers.

It is not completely correct to say that business has organised wholly around markets, if a market implies that parties are free to exchange commodities according to their wish. Firstly, as labour movements have always insisted, selling and purchasing of labour is hardly free; those who sell have to sell to survive as persons while those who buy only risk their existence as organisations. Secondly, some businesses have also succeeded in monopolizing resources in such a way that they can pose terms themselves, or in cooperation with other businesses. Some businesses also cooperate intimately with states to guarantee that their terms are to their advantage. Some researchers, for example Fernand Braudel, talk for that reason about three levels as structuring in society, rather than three mechanisms of distribution: reciprocity, market and capital – capital then meaning the level of hierarchies, violence and coercion, states and big business, that is. In the same way that states have wrecked the redistribution of communities and clans, big business has wrecked the market. If one pose it this way, the societal actors live in the level of capital [9].

Both approaches have a lot to be said for them; which one that is most productive depends on what you are looking for. The first one is most productive when you identify the actors, the second one when you let them interact with eachother. I return to this in chapter 2.

Reciprocity implies that necessities and prerequisites of life are distributed according to a symmetry, between people who are roughly equals, at least for the moment. It is not ruled by organisations but by culture and, as indicated above, by spontaneous expressions of life belonging to humans as a species. The aim is to survive at decent conditions.

The mechanism that rules reciprocity is that the participants participate to be accepted by their equals, an enormously compelling motive [10]. The means they use it to give eachother gifts, both things and services. The gifts can be given to persons, collectives and even to "ideas" or ethical principles [11].

The aim of gifts is to set up and maintain relations between people, in order to create stability, pooling of resources, trust and meaning in an insecure world. This is the way people, like all social animals, have developed; cooperation is always more rewarding than hunting alone and has for that reason probably become hardwired into our DNA [12].

[9] Fernand Braudel: *The wheels of commerce*, Harper Collins 1983.

[10] See for example Amitai Etzioni, *The moral dimension, towards a new economics*, Macmillan 1989.

[11] David Cheal: *The gift economy*, Routledge 1998, and Jacques Godbout, *The world of gifts*, McGill-Queen's University Press 1998. Cheal deals only with elementary gift economy as played out within family and between friends while Godbout also describes institutionalised gift economies like blood banks or non-profit organisations. Cheal and Godbout refer to a social anthropology tradition going back to Marcel Mauss, but the phenomenon was actually described more than a hundred years ago by Piotr Kropotkin, *Mutual aid*, many editions, e.g. Freedom Press, 1993.

[12] That cooperation is more profitable than hunting alone, not to talk of cheating one's way through life,

The transactions are founded in moral economy, that is, they are regulated by the socially desirable rather than by maximal profit. Relations should according to gift economy be prolonged over time, they should be characterized by multifaceted feelings and significances not tied to the individual transactions, as they are in commercial exchange; they should create a long-standing "claim-and-love culture" where gifts and return gifts together creates a reciprocal "we" for sharing the necessities rather than exchanging them with each other.

Gift economies prosper of course within families and among friends, but may to a certain degree be institutionalised in for example blood banks, or in whole cultures like local communities, communities of interest, scientific research – and peoples' movements.

I will call the sum of rites, routines and customs that are organised around reciprocity to consolidate it "civil society". I know that this is an ambiguous concept that has got a rather loose meaning in the public debate. But when Adam Ferguson introduced it in the eighteenth century he had in mind the rapidly shrinking part of human relations that weren't ruled by markets or hierarchies, and I give myself the right to do that also, since I haven't found anything better [13]. I don't refer to some particular "sector" or "space"; civil society is everywhere where people act reciprocally, and if civil society will assert itself against state and business – capital in Braudel's term – it depends on how much it is defended.

Around reciprocity, and also around the markets and redistributions that may from time to time support reciprocity, an actor is organised to protect them against harm caused by the actors of capital: peoples' movements.

State functionaries and capitalists are interested in having their apparatuses controlling an ever growing part of the world and of human life; this creates favourable conditions for them as classes, that is, as categories of people having their particular role to run and be fed by state and business respectively.

This wouldn't necessarily be a problem except for two things. Firstly, which is trivial, that they run their operations to feather their own nests and exact a maximum fee for it. Secondly, and more important, that state and business are such routine-bound phenomenons [14]. The actions of states are to a dismaying degree conditioned by the

was shown mathematically by Robert Axelrod: *The evolution of cooperation*, Basic Books 1984, and was thematized further with respect to evolution by Matt Ridley: *The origin of virtue*, Viking 1996 and Frans de Waal, *The bonobo and the atheist*, W.W. Norton 2013.

[13] A source in English is <http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/ferguson/civil.html>. I rely on Torben Hviid Nielsen, *Samfund og makt*, Akademisk forlag 1988, and Per Forsman, *Det kluvna samhället*, Carlsson Bokförlag 1995. A popular comparison between social society, state and market is given by Erik Sigsgaard, *Relationer i förskolan*, KRUT 73.

[14] I prefer the metaphor routine to the one of structure, the later concept calling forth visions about immovable buildings of steel and concrete. After all, people have choices, even if there is a pressure to act in a certain direction, and all laws in social sciences are conditional. A concept that can be used with the one of routine is inertia, which is not the same as the hardness of structures. One definition of routine could be "what is done if there is no decision of the contrary". The theme has been elaborated by Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of dialectical reason*, NLB 1976, related in Inger Jensen & Flemming Vestergaard, *Praxis och*

need for stability and the actions of businesses by the need for growth. The more they drag along into their magic circles, the less consideration can be given to peoples' other needs. None of them put any value at people's needs per se; the market can only value purchasing power and let rich people's frivolities cut out poor people's necessities, and redistribution at least consider status and hierarchy as very, very important.

Other priorities and other needs have to be defended by peoples' movements.

Peoples' movements are created by the classes and groups of people who are mainly hit by the routines of states and businesses, that is, primarily the direct producers. Peoples' movements are the carriers of democracy. Their foremost aim is to defend the civil society, everyday culture or life-world of the direct producers, infringed upon and lived upon by states and businesses. They defend the interests of the participants, defined as broadly as possible, particularly when these come into conflict with the interests of states and businesses and their personifiers. The interests may look very different at different times, among other things depending on which projects that the other actors pushed for the moment and depending what consequences these have for common people. The means of popular movements are the contributions of their participants. Popular movements are the theme for this book – although I can of course not tell about all but a section of those who have mattered most in history.

All three actors are tied to their aims and their means and can not leave them or they will die. A capital that doesn't aim at growth at the market will be outcompeted by other, more zealous capitals. A state that doesn't aim at stable hierarchies will break up or be conquered by other states, in our days quite informally. A social movement that doesn't aim at satisfying its members' needs will lose its members and therewith its resources to act.

The three actors are completely equal concerning possible power, but they work under very different conditions. States and capitals have a comparably easy task. Their aims and means are given. They are ruled by routines that very directly prescribe for their functionaries what they should do. The results may be horrible for others but that is of no consequence for capitals and very little consequence for states, as long as the routine is followed.

The peoples' movements have the particular task to put things right when routines have messed up things for people, and sometimes to prescribe new and better routines.

Peoples' movements don't build on routines in the first place. Their nature is rather the breach with routine. Therefore, their work is always awkward, risky, and dubious, and their success as a total actor depends much more than the success of states or capitals on skill, luck, and good theories. They may do great mistakes. They have more than once thrown spanners in their own works. They are often slow to take action. They are seekers, creators, chaotic in terms of chaos theory. But sometimes they can, with presumably small means, create very great results, when the need is big and their strategy

tröghet, Korpen 1979. Standard science use the word "institutions" which however refer both to the routinized world of states and capitals and to the more chaotic one of civil society, see for example Douglass C. North: Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, Cambridge University Press 1990.

fits the circumstances.

The task of peoples' movements, to "put things right" when the routines messes up, may suggest that they are exceptions while states and capitals represent the normal. In some meaning this is true; due to their routine nature states and capitals can often maintain a strong presence more continuously than peoples' movements. But since the routines of states and businesses always hurt people, social movements are at least as normal in the world market system as are states and businesses.

The possible fourth actor, the intellectuals, or the professions, or the manipulators of symbols, are of particular interest from a social movement point of view, irrespective of their being equal with the other actors or not. They are not easy to put under any of the other labels even if they may be either state functionaries or businessmen, because their aim is to exercise a preferential right of interpretation, or thought control [15].

Peoples' movements are, due to their relative lack of safe routines, extremely dependent of usable strategies. Because they arise from the need to defend people against hostile actors and circumstances, they are also dependent of good interpretations of what their enemies do, why they do it, who they are themselves, and generally of what happens around them, so-called ideologies. Even if professional intellectuals are skilled in such work, and occasionally can use their skill to the benefit of social movements, they are as often an obstacle for social movements as a help.

The obstacle is both beyond the social movement and within them. For because of their dependence of intellectual careers and their curiosity of new thoughts, professional intellectuals are often interested in successful social movements and do often undertake to be interpreters and PR agents for these. This interest is of dubious value for the peoples' movements. Sure, intellectuals have many times contributed to strong and efficient languages for peoples' movements. But they have as many times contributed to their disorganisation.

For they are not primarily interested in the aims of the movements, but exactly in their own role as interpreters. The result is for example that they sooner will organise in professional NGOs [16] or clubs of professional revolutionaries than they take part in popular organising. The result is also that they jealously look after their preferential right of interpretation and do what they can to thwart other people's attempts to take part in the creation of popular movement ideologies. And finally their interest is often transitory and dependent of the relative supply of other careers [17].

Intellectuals have existed in all societies and perhaps have been more important

[15] The classic here is Pierre Bourdieu, who deals with the aim of intellectuals to dominate "intellectual fields". For example in *The corporatism of the universal: the role of intellectuals in the modern world*, Telos 81.

[16] NGOs or Non-Government Organisation is the name according to the United Nations of all organisations that are not governmental agencies or, after ca 1990, businesses. Those who use the expression about themselves are primarily organisations that exclusively consist of an employed staff, for example scientific institutes. But in public the term is increasingly used for peoples' movements too, which creates confusion among peoples' movement organisations about their own identity. More about NGOs in chapter 10.

[17] A source in Swedish is Jan Lindhagen, *Ett mått av prövning*, Zenit 1980.

for the system in older societies [18]. I will not deal with them more here because they properly don't belong to the preconditions of social movements. Instead, I will call them forth in the narratives, when they have played an important role for the actions of the peoples' movements. A positive one, or probably as often a negative one.

<i>Actor</i>	<i>State</i>	<i>Capital</i>	<i>People's movement</i>
<i>Power base</i>	Redistribution	Market	Reciprocity
<i>Aim</i>	Stable hierarchies	Profit	Protection
<i>Social carrier</i>	Functionaries	Capitalists	Direct producers
<i>Form of action</i>	Routine	Routine	Chaos

Properties of the three kinds of actors

Is there a social movement theory?

Peoples' movements are possible to theorise about and describe in principle, in the same way as one can describe the principles of the state or of business. There is a considerable academic research about social movements, even if not as extensive as the research about states and business. It is not as systematised either. According to Veit Michael Bader there are at least five traditions or schools of social movement research who hardly can communicate with eachother. Bader's conclusion is interesting: peoples' movements are such an ambiguous phenomenon that an integrated theory about their functions is not possible, except for trivialities. Since peoples' movements, unlike business and state, does not represent a routine, they are chaotic, they are constantly floating and an interference in one place will not have a calculable result. Before you have accepted this, you can not say anything valuable on social movements [19].

This doesn't impede the formulation of partial theories. Bader suggests a number of starting points for such partial theories, of which I relate the three I find most important.

1. Popular movement emanate from the civil society, that is, what isn't ruled by the sub- and superordination of the state or the market mechanisms of business, but by peoples' "social responsivity" or their ability to answer eachother's appeals.

Between the civil society and peoples' movements there is a continuity. If there are laws for the civil society they are more or less valid also for peoples' movements. Which these laws are, and about civil society as a concept, there is much disunity in the debate. The limit between civil society, state and capital is not demarcated, and state and capital tend to win space from the civil society. Moreover, space is perhaps wrong word; in a business company, eminently a part of capital, the relations between working mates is a part of civil society. The relevant concept is perhaps power.

One law, ruling both civil society and peoples' movement may be that reciprocity is

[18] According to Samir Amin, Eurocentrism, Monthly Review Press 1989, which compares medieval systems and their clergies. I think though that he disregards too much the ongoing industrialisation of words and meaning, the so-called information society that puts creation of thoughts within the power of intellectual hierarchies as never before.

more important than hierarchies and buy-and-sell relations. Hierarchies and buy-and-sell relations are expressions of the imposed routines of state and business, respectively, while reciprocity is a spontaneous and pristine expression of social responsivity and more or less a property of humans as a species. Peoples' movements defend the spontaneous expressions of reciprocity – truth, trust, compassion – against the artificial routines. But peoples' movements may also, in their efforts to obtain hegemony and societal change, loose the spontaneous expressions of life out of sight and construct new hierarchies and markets [20].

Another law is that popular movements are at least as rational as individual people. People organise in social movements to assert their collective interests, which is not essentially different from other collective organising like for example a village common. But peoples' movements are, like individual actions, defined in a cultural context. And what one culture consider rational may be unintelligible seen from the viewpoint of another [21].

2. Peoples' movements express conflicts between groups. If there is no conflict – which is of course extremely hypothetic – then there is no peoples' movement. The conflicts are economic, political and cultural, simultaneously. No peoples' movement can be reduced to a pure "interest"; it is simultaneously a worldview and a way to think and feel. A peoples' movement defends nothing trivial, it defends the civil society, the life-world, its reciprocities and spontaneous expressions of life against fundamental threats.

So there are no "one issue movement"; the movement is existential, no matter how limited the focus of mobilization is.

3. Popular movements are, at least theoretically, dissolvable into a successive process, a sequence consisting of

- existence of a stricken group, category or class, whose limit of exploitation or repression is about to be reached;
- development within this group of a collective attitude to the surrounding world or a "habitus" [22];
- development of a collective identity and a conscious interest, a "we" which stands against a "them"; often this is tricky because there are so many possible "we" for any one person to identify with;
- articulation of this interest linked to the formulation of alternatives to the present conditions; this implies a "program", which is tricky to construct since it must break through the everyday articulation that makes conflicting interests invisible, it must appeal to all concerned, and it must not be so over-theoritized that the program takes the place of the

[19] Veit Michael Bader, *Kollektives Handeln*, Leske & Budrich 1991.

[20] The concept "spontaneous expressions of life" has been formulated in a Christian discourse as a concept for "the good", before all ideology. One source is K.E. Løgstrup, *System og symbol*, Gyldendal 1982. I have got it from Henry Cöster, *Om gen-etikens innehåll*, *Ord & Bild* 3/1985.

[21] There was in some older literature, and still is in much vulgar debate, a tendency to write off popular mobilization as expressions of irrational gush of emotions. This has been proven false by for example Charles Tilly, *From mobilization to revolution*, McGraw Hill 1978.

[22] The habitus concept has been developed by Pierre Bourdieu, in for example *Distinction*, Routledge 1979.

interests in outlining the group;

- organising of the collective, to articulate, to mobilize and to plan its actions; this is also tricky because any conflict involves many concerned groups which all must have its voice – there is an inherent conflict between the power concentrations that make quick action possible and the broad participation that makes the group grow and ripe, and because any one organization tends to exude an administrating elite whose interests differ from the members of the group;

- mobilization of resources, which are always smaller than its adversaries but nevertheless must lead to victory; this calls for intelligence, smartness and understanding – just bluntness won't do;

- development of relations to the surrounding world, which should preferably be of better quality than the adversary can achieve; here it is perhaps particularly important to guard the movement's authority and integrity against superficially sympathizing "shadow movements" of elites like political parties or intellectuals;

- action, the goal of which is to make it cheaper for the adversary to concede than to continue the fight while at the same time make it cheaper for oneself to continue fighting than to give up [23];

- result, which is always ambiguous; even a "defeat" changes the world and will probably make the adversary less intransigent next time, at least if his "victory" is hardwon, and a "victory" is just a challenge to advance one's positions of strength.

The stages grow out of each other, but it is no linear course, rather a cyclical one. An acting social movement recreates unceasingly the acting group and the preconditions for further action. Or as it was expressed by E.P. Thompson: the working class created itself, through the labour movement [24]. A successful movement must work its way through all these stages; an unsuccessful one won't even get that far. And when it has reached the endpoint it all begins anew.

I will not get too far into this here, since it is rather theoretical and not the way of beginning a book of interest for a social movement activist. The reader will find a summary in an appendix after chapter 10. I would recommend you to read it after you have read the other chapters; it shows the incredible amount of dimensions there are in peoples' movement, and it will probably make you a better movement organizer able to use all these dimensions to the advantage of your movement.

In the light of this, the traditional Swedish definition of a peoples' movement – more or less "big organisation" – appears as trivial, while many of the organisations that try to freeride on the good reputation of peoples' movements, like sport clubs and charities, hardly belong [25].

[23] One way to make action cheap is to routinize participation. Charles Tilly has formulated a theory of repertoires which develops slowly through the time and make participants find at home – from tax rebellions in the 16th century, over bread seizures in the 18th, to strikes in the 19th, and so on. See e.g. *From mobilization to revolution*, McGraw Hill 1978, and *The contentious French*, Belknap Press 1986.

[24] E.P. Thompson, *The making of the English working class*, Victor Gollancz 1963.

[25] The Swedish definitions and their change over time is instructive for a culture where peoples' movements have been extremely influential. Early twentieth century definitions resemble mine: "participation from the popular classes in opposition to the authorities" (*Svensk Etymologisk Uppslagsbok* 1928), while

So what belongs? I am not interested in excluding any who feels a part of a social movement, but yet you can not make yourself understood if you don't keep to fairly strict definitions. The most reasonable definition I have seen so far of a social movement has been formulated by Joakim Raschke:

"A social movement is a mobilising collective actor that, with a certain continuity and grounded in a high symbolic coherence and weak role specialization, through different organisational and action forms work for the realisation or prevention of fundamental societal changes, or reestablishing earlier societal conditions" [26].

Raschke's definition is controversial on three accounts, at least in Sweden. It seems to be more commonly accepted in Germany.

Firstly, through its emphasis on "weak role specialization". This implies that the more a movement establishes new role specializations, that is relies on employed functionaries, the less it is a social movement. Role specializations and division of labour may be problematic additions to peoples' movements, additions that may choke them if they are carried too far.

Secondly, through the plural form "different organisational and action forms". This hints at the notion that a movement always is larger than an organisation, and that an organisation that is not a "mobilising collective actor" is not a part of a peoples' movement.

Thirdly, through its aim at "fundamental societal changes". This fits well with Bader's interpretation, but it excludes many leisure activities and activities for organisation of the civil society that have passed as peoples' movements in Sweden: these are counted as belonging directly to the civil society [27]. This doesn't mean that they are not perfectly respectable, and sometimes even may use the same organisations as popular movements, sometimes to mutual gain, sometimes to mutual inconvenience. According to Bader, peoples' movements emanate from civil society to defend it. Social movements are no ends in themselves; civil society is.

Raschke's definition is quite long. I think most of it can be covered by a shorthand version: A peoples' movement is a collective, organised and action-bent expression of will against societal routines, from those who are put in an inferior position through the same routines. But if there is a conflict between the definitions, it's safer to keep to Raschke's.

Prisma's Lilla Uppslagsbok 1977 gives the typical late century definition: "Term for an all-national organisation with large geographical dispersion, a program founded on an ideological community, independence from state and authorities, voluntary membership and durable activities".

[26] Roland Roth & Dieter Rucht (hrsg), *Neue soziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Campus 1987.

[27] This way of looking at peoples' movements solves a theoretical problem for the official Swedish social movement research. In the report *Framtida folk rörelser* (Future social movements) from the Swedish Institute for Future Studies the authors were surprised that few people took an active part in movements for societal change; they were however active in organisations without such aims (Sigbert Axelsson & Thorleif Pettersson, *Mot denna framtid*, Institutet för framtidsstudier 1992). This didn't fit with the traditional image of the importance of "ideas" in a social movement. But if all associations without relation to "fundamental societal change" are characterized as parts of the civil society, all problems disappear. To take part in such associations isn't any more odd than keeping a birthday party.

Even if actions of popular movements are not always enough to make society more endurable for the direct producers they represent, they are at least the best opportunity the direct producers have. Those who assert themselves have better opportunities to affect the world than those who yield. And at the societal level, the great aggregates assert themselves most.

It is in this sense peoples' movements are the carriers of democracy.

Peoples' movements have contributed in a decisive way to the world we live in. The world is a result of struggle between exploiters, between exploiters and peoples' movements, and between peoples' movements mutually. The aim of this book is among other things to show how. Those of you who think the result is not much to be happy about may reflect what the result should be if they weren't present. Peoples' movements are always defences against destructive forces, and successes are always relative.

As both Ho Chi Minh and Michael Collins, two very different peoples' movement strategists, have expressed it: To win is to not acknowledge defeat.

The peoples' movement I depict in this book have evidently gone through all the steps Bader talks about. I can only regret that I can not represent this fully. The authors of the sources I have used haven't read Bader, and the literature do not always compare. But I hope all steps are there in the totality.

I hope the omissions may inspire the readers to their own thoughts and questions. This is the principal aim of the book – to contribute to the discussion about peoples' movements strategies and future.

Chapter 2:

The stage, the world

IF STATES, BUSINESS AND PEOPLES' MOVEMENTS ARE ACTORS one may visualize them acting at a stage or place. This place is the world. But the world is of course tricky to describe. It is hard to describe something that constantly changes depending of the actions of the actors, in such a way that it doesn't look like actions by the stage or place. And it is also almost impossible to make a description of "everything" that hangs passably together in a narrative. A theory is needed for the world, of such a nature that the actors have roles in it.

I can see two such theories for the working of the world, two main perspectives on the world's development, which struggle with each other for the favour of social scientists.

The first, by Björn Hettne called the modernization paradigm, and by Wolfgang Sachs called the development paradigm, presupposes that the Western history is natural and norm-giving. The world consists of developed countries and under-developed. The developed ones have also at some time been under-developed, and the under-developed till some time get developed, if they only leave their traditional patterns behind and modernize, or develop [1].

The modernization paradigm may according to Hettne be summarized in four points.

1. Development is a spontaneous, one-way process inherent in all societies.
2. Development implies a differentiation of the societal structure, different part-structures developing for specific purposes.
3. The development process may be subdivided into different stages, passed through by all societies and displaying what level this society has attained.
4. Development is stimulated through external competition or threats, and through measures for supporting modern sectors and modernizing traditional ones.

The core is point 2: modernizing or development is equal to differentiation or labour division – with the differentiated parts linked together through commodity relations.

The modernization paradigm likes to put up opposites; the society is supposed to move from the one to the other. From tradition to modernity, from status to contract, from particularism to universalism, from inheritance to career. These opposites come from an interpretation of the history of Western Europe/Northern America, which are supposed to describe a natural development that sooner or later will be copied by the whole world.

The modernization paradigm lacks actors, in so far as development seems to wheel forward by itself along a predestinated trajectory. It gives however room for "servants"

[1] Björn Hettne, Development theory and the Third World, Sarec Report R2:1982; Wolfgang Sachs, The development dictionary, Zed 1992. A more thorough critique of the perspective is found in Charles Tilly, Big structures, large processes, huge comparisons, Sage 1984. To the most representative researchers of this perspective belong, in rising aggressivity, Talcott Parsons, Daniel Lerner, Bert Hoselitz, Walt Rostow, and Samuel Huntington. But they date back to nineteenth century scientists like Émile Durkheim and have strangely enough developed from a conservative resistance to "development" to an enthusiastic acceptance.

who may speed up the process. The modernization paradigm is strongly pregnant with value: development is Good. Inherent conflicts are missing, or are written off as a result of the foolishness of traditionalists. The model is rewarding to take in for categories that are favoured by the process. Since there are several of these, varieties have appeared – liberal development theories expressing the self-understanding of capitalists, socialist development theories expressing the self-understanding of state functionaries, etc. They agree about what is happening, as about the desirability of development – even if they quarrel about the ways to speed up the process.

The background of the modernization paradigm in the development optimism of the nineteenth century is easily tractable, even if its apparatus rather spring from the development critics of the age. It is the most well-spread perspective, particularly in simplistic political debate. It is the perspective of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and it is a professional dogma for the ministers of finance in industrial countries. Development is not only immutable and one-way; it is also natural and morally imposed.

Scientifically, the model began to meet trouble when people in the sixties observed that modernizing according the recommendations of the model often caused more misery than wealth, and that the gap between the rich and the poor grew. Not least, the model fell in dispute because the Vietnamese peasant movement show emphatically that the advices based on modernization theory was more of American middle class prejudices than science [2].

Critics have directed their attacks to four points.

Fistly, the non-existent empirical ground of the model. It is not true, says for example Tilly, that there is a continuous differentiation in the world. A few trade marks in each business supersede innumerable local producers, small languages die off, giving place to bigger languages, thousands of small principalities and tribal territories have given room for less than two hundred states. During the nineteenth century Europe, the showpiece of modernization, most areas were de-differentiated in so far that they were de-industrialized to the advantage of a few big industrial cities. Social anthropologists add that the cultures of the so-called pre-modern world were quite as differentiated as ours, and may point at “modern” Hollywood as an example.

Secondly, the arbitrariness of the stage concept. To which stage do countries like South Africa or Kuwait belong, or a free trade zone in China, or a banana plantation in Honduras? What is the characteristic of a stage? Most often, a GDP standard is used, but there is properly speaking no particular reason to do that, and still less to use the “nation” as a unit.

Thirdly, the idea of development or modernization, words that doesn’t mean more, according to for example Wolfgang Sachs or Thomas Wallgren, than a moral approval beforehand of what is actually happening. The development ideologists presuppose, they

[2] Noam Chomsky, American power and the new mandarin, Pelican 1969, depicts leading representatives of the modernization paradigm like Walt Rostow and Samuel Huntington considering bombing as a charitable action to the peasants since they would thereby be forced to the towns where they had to embrace modernity if they wanted or not.

say, that Western Europe, or perhaps rather the USA, represent the highest culture, a culture that has taken them a few hundred years to reach, and for that reason others have to move in the same direction. It is pathetic, says Sachs, that when there are empirical proofs of the misery this causes, the developmentalists have no other offer than more of the same [3].

Fourthly, and most important, the weakness of considering the development of each country separately, without considering the global context. The conditions for Britain's industrialization were hugely different from that of Ghana. In the first case it was a leading financial, military and political great power, in the other a country that is weak just because the other is stronger and richer. The world market is a mechanism that affects the whole world simultaneously, but affects different parts of it differently. What develops is not different countries, but the relations in the whole world.

The deficiencies of the modernization paradigm began, together with the global peoples' movement boom of the sixties, to induce people to look for other explanations. The tradition that seems to be most advanced in building a coherent alternative is the one that starts from the different effects of the world market in different parts of the world. As a viewpoint it is called "the world-system perspective" [4].

The structure of the world

This part is rather theoretic. It is not absolutely necessary for the understanding of the peoples' movement narratives that start with chapter 3, so you can skip over it and start again with the part The history the world 1450-2050. But since I will use some concepts picked up from the world system perspective, for example center, periphery and link, not to speak of world market system, these terms are explained here if they cause trouble.

According to an article by Immanuel Wallerstein, who may be said to personify the world system perspective, the world and its changes may be described as a system consisting of three patterns [5]. These patterns are

1. The system has a spatial dispersion in form of center and periphery, where the center deals with capital intensive production and the periphery with labour intensive. The center gains from the system while the periphery loses.
2. Its development is characterized by temporal cycles of expansion and stagnation, so called phase A and B.
3. The power relations within the system change between periods of hegemony when one center controls it, and rivalry when several centers struggle for control.

[3] Wolfgang Sachs, The development dictionary. Thomas Wallgren, Ohållbart om hållbarhet, Miljöförbundet 1989.

[4] The best books about this is Immanuel Wallerstein's Historical capitalism, Verso 1983, and World system analysis, Duke University Press 2004. Another pedagogic book is Thomas Shannon, The world system perspective, Westview Press 1989. It also contains a review of the criticism of the perspective. I also recommend Peter J. Taylor, Political geography, Longman 1989. Christopher Chase-Dunn has also written a heavy volume, covering most: Global formation – structures of the world-economy, Blackwell 1989.

[5] Immanuel Wallerstein, The 'discoveries' and human progress, Estudos e ensaios 1988.

The driving forces can be described through two mechanisms.

4. The central form of production in the system is commodity production for the world market. All economic relations within the system, all production of necessities are linked in long global chains of tasks, while every exchange between the links of the chain takes the form of purchase and sale. The conditions for the links vary vastly, and these variations give the system its dynamics.

5. The pattern is created and maintained by capitalists' ambitions to simultaneously create markets – make everything to commodities that can be sold and bought – and destroy markets to rise a monopoly.

Since production for the world market is the core function of the system, it is called the world market system.

The division of people into classes – exploited direct producers and exploiting owners/controllers – is implied. But each of these are stratified.

In some links, a few capitalists have succeeded in monopolizing a capacity, a technical advantage or a resource. In some links the conditions more resemble the perfect competition of the schoolbooks. The center is the geographical area where most monopolized links are localized. And a monopoly in one link carries with it control of the whole commodity chain.

Because the links are assembled to chains of purchases and sales, owner relations and threats of violence, surplus can be transferred from competition links to monopolized links, from periphery to center. Since these transfers are one-way, winners and losers are created within the system.

In the core of the system there are owners who have monopolized control over global finance. Other owners are hierarchically subordinated to this one. Control over finance is the most important monopoly but there are also other important monopolies, for example monopoly of the leading technology or the leading logistic methods of the age.

To own a monopoly is attractive. For that reason other actors try to get into the monopolized niche. Sometimes they succeed, and then a so called overproduction crisis arises in this business. The sales prices have to be decreased to make all the products marketable and the monopoly profits disappear. When this happens contemporaneously to several monopolies a phase of stagnation appears in the world economy. During the 1980s and 1990s there is such a stagnation phase because the earlier monopolies in auto industry and electronics have been broken.

The method to come out of stagnation is to create new monopolies through so called innovations, and outsource the demonopolized links to the periphery, or rather to the semiperipheries and create "new industrial countries".

The semiperipheries are areas of both center and periphery characteristics. The semiperipheries are the most dynamic areas within the system, where most things happen, both in terms of system development and popular revolts.

In peripheries and semiperipheries lower salaries prevail, for reasons I come back to, so non-monopolies may survive there. It's the low salaries that make a periphery, which is the purpose of peripheries. Today, accordingly, old businesses like auto and electronics are localised out to the new industrial countries while the center invest in new monop-

lies within information and genetics.

Technical innovations that may give rise to new phases of expansion take place in the center, because the higher salaries there make it attractive to replace labour with technology.

A full cycle of stagnation and boom usually takes about 50 years and is called a Kondratiev cycle after a Russian economist [6]. Upswings are called Kondratiev A while downswings are called Kondratiev B. Kondratiev cycles have been traced throughout the history of the world market system, i.e. for thousands of years; the most obvious are the four cycles of industrial society 1794-1815- 1848, 1848-1873-1894, 1894-1913-1945 and 1945-1973-? The first dash in the combination of years corresponds to A, the second to B.6

I will sometimes use this terminology when I describe the setting of a peoples' movement, and the outcomes of it.

Innovations, as well as monopolies, are protected by states, which are nurtured in their turn by allying with monopolies. This implies that states in the center are strong while states in the periphery are weak. There is always a power struggle between states to be sites for profitable monopolies, which are always promoted and enticed in every way. If the most important monopolies are dispersed between several geographic areas we will have several equal states struggling with each other about the opportunities to monopolize new sectors. If the monopolies are assembled to the domain of one state we will have a hegemonic power that will dominate the world.

So far, conflict periods have been more common than hegemony periods. Hegemony is self-destroying. Firstly, the hegemonic power tends to overinvest in unproductive military to protect its position. Secondly, it tends to take out too much of its surplus in luxury. Both take resources from the capacity to create new monopolies, which makes it easier for competitors to sneak in. This is what happens now when China begins to challenge the US.

"Development" is equal to the spreading of this system. Extensively, that is spreading to new parts of the world. And intensively, that is incorporating evermore of the human life and society into the commodity chains of purchase and sale. In the beginning of the system, the chains comprised spices, metals and a few luxurious textiles. Today, the world market system is busy incorporating the genes and the human communication.

At each step of the spreading process, conflicts arise. For subjection to the world market system is a painful and blood-stained process that destroys social systems and impoverishes the people that depend of these. It is these conflicts that give rise to the anti-systemic peoples' movements of the modern time.

Wallerstein's approach has been criticized by other scientists within the world market tradition for giving too much attention to economic factors and not enough to political and cultural. Albert Bergesen, for example, has emphasized that the system as a matter of fact has arisen and been spread through violence and colonial conquest, and is main-

[6] the best books about them are Carlota Perez: Technological revolutions and financial capital, Edward Elgar 2002; and Chris Freeman & Francisco Louçã: As time goes by, Oxford University Press 2001.

tained by global class organizing. André Gunder Frank has pointed out that center and periphery are more of social and political concepts than economic – Scandinavia belongs to the center while Africa belongs to the periphery although both are wood exporters, he says; the explanation is that salaries are higher in Scandinavia [7]. Giovanni Arrighi tries to integrate both approaches, using Fernand Braudel’s metaphor of three levels: The world is like a building with three storeys.

In the basement is the civil society’s ”non-economic” level ruled by reciprocity. Next floor is the level of the market, ruled by exchange of goods and services between equals. But the top floor is the capitalist storey, ruled by hierarchies and power relations; this is the level of both monopolies and states. While Wallerstein (at least superficially) depicts the world market system seen as from the level of the market, it can also be depicted from the level of capitalism. And then it looks different, more ”political” [8].

Arrighi describes the world market system’s development as cooperation between a succession of financiers and state hierarchs in their endeavour to get advantages over their competitors and control over popular movements. Through control over both violence and capital, each cooperation project has conquered new bases of strength outside the system, which have been used as resources in the power struggle within it, and invented new, effective methods for control of markets and society.

When such a finance/violence alliance is successful in its thirst for power, this results in a wave of successful and profitable production and commerce, so successful that after a while there is no use for all collected capital. Then a period of stagnation appears within production and commerce with real products; instead pure money dealing and speculation becomes the most important. After all, the aim of both production and commerce is profit and capital accumulation, if that can be arranged without productive efforts, so much the better.

But this changes the preconditions for the model of dominance the alliance has built. The political acceptance for the power of the power alliance decreases, both among the direct producers and among the ”middle class” of non-hegemonic exploiters. Peoples’ movements get more interest and greater opportunities to sap the power monopoly of the leading alliance. These weaknesses favour new alliances between finance and violence who get opportunities to challenge successfully. Historically, these new challengers have also been obliged to offer something to the leading social movements of the age to get their aspired hegemony.

Arrighi sees four such ”system cycles” where a finance/violence alliance have taken control over the world market system, expanded it, degenerated into speculation and become a victim of peoples’ movements and challenging finance/violence alliances.

[7] Albert Bergesen, *Turning world-system theory on its head*, in Mike Featherstone (ed), *Global structure – nationalism, globalization and modernity*, Sage 1990. André Gunder Frank, *Dependent accumulation and underdevelopment*, Monthly Review Press 1978. Another author that has emphasized the political, in protest against Wallerstein’s too economic view, is George Modelski, *Long cycles in world politics*, Macmillan 1987.

[8] Giovanni Arrighi, *The long twentieth century*, Verso 1994, referring to Fernand Braudel, *The wheels of commerce*, Harper Collins 1983.




Fig 2:1. Dominance cycles according to Arrighi.

The years mark end points; the control has been strongest a few decades into the age, after which it is slowly decreasing (the grey-marked indicates a speculation phase).

- Genova's bankers and Spain's armies ca 1480-1620
- The Dutch merchants and the Orange dynasty ca 1620-1780
- The British capitalists and state, ca 1780-1930
- The US big enterprises and state, from ca 1930 on.

Arrighi sees these cycles as more important and more signifying than the Kondratiev cycles. In other words, the market is less important and less signifying than power.

With the growth of the system, the leading power has got greater and more resourceful. Each new hegemony has built its power on integrating some new aspect of production, society and life into the world market system chains of purchase and sale relations and into the power sphere of the power alliance. The Dutch power built on integration of violence [9], the British on integration of production, the US on integration of what Arrighi calls transactions that is management, marketing and product development.

In the next part there is a more detailed description of which the power positions were and which peoples' movements they challenged and to a great degree were victims of.

Other authors have used other metaphors and focused on other factors; I will return to some of these in due time. What is common to them is that they see a world market system consisting of a gaining center and a losing periphery, through an organizing building of classes exploiting other classes. It is also the contrasts between center and periphery that has contributed with most of the intellectual energy in the attempts to describe the development of the world [10].

[9] The Dutch state was the first in Europe to organize warfare as a bureaucratic apparatus; all previous states had bought armies on the market from military contractors or trusted feudal levies, says Jan Glete: War and the state in early modern Europe, Routledge 2002.

[10] One of the roots to the world system perspective is found with East European Marxists in the early

Of course the world system perspective has been criticized. According to Shannon there are two kinds of criticism [11].

One kind is focusing on the lack of scientific credibility in the world system perspective. According to them too much is founded on assumptions. There are for example no clear figures proving that the center plunders the periphery, at least not at the scale that the theory suggests. To which the defenders of the theory answer that social science theories can not be proved, usually it is enough to be able to produce credible arguments that cover the facts and can not be counter-proved. The critics also say that some points in the theory are so vague that they can never be either proved or counter-proved; for example they point at the Kondratiev cycles [12]. And David Gordon et al have contended (without expressively attacking Wallerstein) that they are more political than economic and depend of the smooth functioning of a class compromise. Rise would imply a working labour peace while stagnation would mean that some of the parties have given notice, trying to push for a better agreement [13]. I will return in chapter 10 to this view since I think there is more in it than even Gordon seems to be aware of.

The other kind of criticism is rather ideological. People have for example accused the world system perspective of overemphasizing economic forces to the expense of political and cultural, and overemphasizing the importance of the center to the expense of the periphery. Here, of course, there are not "rights" and "wrongs", just more or less reasonable interpretations. And, as Arrighi has shown, it is possible to emphasize more the political factors without changing theories much.

But there is also a two kinds of criticism Shannon doesn't mention.

The first would be that it is impossible to deny that there is some kind of "development" inherent in the human species – we began as apes and went on to an ever increasing control over our environment. This would be, for example, the criticism from much of the more recent development economists like Erik S. Reinert and Ha-Joon Chang [14]. The more we can tame natural forces to our advantage, the better deal we will have. To which one may reply that many "developments" in human history have been

nineteenhundreds, for example Rosa Luxemburg and Nikolai Bukharin, who were the first – together with the Indian Dadabhai Naoroji – to recognize the different results of capitalism in center and periphery. Those who coined the terms center and periphery were the economists at the UN Comisión Económica para América Latina, CEPAL, primarily Raúl Prebisch, Fernando Cardoso, Osvaldo Sunkel and Celso Furtado. Among historians who have studied the development of the world market system may be mentioned Karl Polanyi and Fernand Braudel. Those who have introduced some strictness into the perspective are André Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, Terrence Hopkins, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Giovanni Arrighi and foremost Immanuel Wallerstein.

[11] Thomas Shannon, *The world system perspective*, Westview Press 1989.

[12] Joshua Goldstein: *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age*, Yale University Press, 1988, makes an attempt to sort out and find the reasonable.

[13] David Gordon, Richard Edwards & Michael Reich, *Segmented work, divided workers*, Cambridge University Press 1982.

[14] Erik S. Reinert: *How rich countries got rich – and why poor countries stay poor*, Carroll & Graf, 2007, and Ha-Joon Chang (for example) *Bad samaritans*, Random House 2007, are perhaps the best books on development economics today. Their focus is that there is economies of scale only in industry, not in agriculture and raw materials extraction. Thus it is only when a country has industries, and the most "modern" industries at that, that it can be rich.

dead ends and there is no reason to presume that the present one will be different [15]. Furthermore, even the mentioned development economists seem to agree that "development" favours those leading it while those who follow in the trail will mostly see the downside.

The second criticism is this: the world system perspective, with its simple stipulating of the rich parts of the world as center and the poor parts as periphery is only a description of the routine-bound structures work, i.e. state and business. The world market system is the sum of the routines of state and business.

The center of peoples' movements is rather the mobilizations that serve as examples of others and even more mobilizations that have most power to affect the system as a whole to the advantage of people's movements. But these centers of peoples' movements are seldom in the center of the world market system. They tend to be situated in the semiperiphery and sometimes even in its periphery, and moreover move fast between sites. An over-explicit case was the peasant movement in Vietnam that made the system quiver around 1970.

And the civil society, which is the principal of the peoples' movements, has no center at all.

And if one then one-sidedly decides that the world has a center, the center of the world market system, one decides simultaneously that state and business is more important than the civil society and more worth considering.

For me, who depicts the world from a peoples' movement point of view, this should be a mortal sin.

But yet, it is difficult to understand why peoples' movements appear from the civil society to defend its people and its culture against state and business and the system these are parts of, if one have no reasonable picture of the functioning of this system.

So, waiting for still better theories, I will assume a worldview based in the world system perspective to describe the scene or background for peoples' movements actions. Meanwhile I will try to balance, not to make the system to a principal protagonist. And if I have to use the terms center and periphery, I am aware of the imperfection of the terms. But I have not found any better, and I can just remind my readers now and then that in using them I will only talk about the center and periphery of the system that the social movements are mobilizing against, not of the world.

The history of the world 1450-2050

The system described above has functioned like this for about five hundred years, starting in one of the smaller centres of the then world market system. It has a history of development that can be summarised in five points. [16].

Earth, work, wealth and all relations and life spheres have been increasingly commer-

[15] About some of the disasters caused by flawed developments see Joseph A. Tainter: *The collapse of complex societies*, Cambridge University Press 1988. Tainter argues that a society may be too complex, which causes nothing but transaction costs too heavy for its members to bear.

[16] Christopher Chase-Dunn, *The world-system since 1950 – what has really changed*, in Charles Bergquist (ed), *Labor in capitalist world-economy*, Sage 1984.

cialized. Social anthropologists have called this an increasingly monocentric economy; while all other human cultures have managed different needs in different terms, the world market system has included them all as exchanges of money [17]. The aim of commercialization is to make it easier to make a profit at the purchase-sale relations that are the core transaction of the system. But since such a procedure is extremely insensitive to the difference between vital and trivial needs it is also extremely conflict breeding.

It is of particular importance that work has been commercialized, either by spreading of wage labour to evermore sectors of the economy, or by making work dependent in other ways on the world market, for example as non-waged service to wage labour.

Capital intensity in all activity has increasingly grown, that is, ever more accumulated labour and raw material is needed to give preconditions for production; the reason for this is economies of scale. The bigger, the more profitable [18]. This implies that concentration of ownership and wealth is concentrated at increasingly fewer hands. The size and life-length of enterprises increases with time.

Capital is increasingly internationalized, in the sense that the localizing of investments is increasingly independent of where the investor is sited.

States and enterprises, that is, formal, routine governed organisations, for that reason get increasingly more power over people, collectives, and local communities. A trivial consequence of this is that the routines get more power to repress the spontaneous expressions of life. Another less trivial is that this forces people and collectives to organise better, for defence. A third, more dismal one, is that peoples' collectives' and local communities' understanding of the world and their own situation decreases, and need increasingly more elaborated ideologies to cope.

The system expanded increasingly to new territories and populations until about 1900 when it covered the whole earth, primarily in search for new raw materials and new cheap labour.

As mentioned above, the system began to develop in one of the smaller centres of the then world market system, in Western Europe in the fourteenth century, to dominate the world from around 1800 [19].

[17] Paul Bohannon, *Social anthropology*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1969.

[18] Stephen Bunker and Paul Ciccantell: *Globalization and the race for resources*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005, have pointed at the quest for economies of scales inherent in capitalism as responsible for the growth of the system. More and more raw materials and labour have to be drawn in if the at any one point in history dominating capitalists should be able to prolong their dominance.

[19] See the above-mentioned books by Giovanni Arrighi, Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein, as well as Braudel: *The Dynamics of Capitalism*, Gidlunds 1988, and Eric R. Wolf: *Europe and the people without history*, University of California Press 1982. The latter has the advantage of being the most comprehensive in describing non-European cultures – some historians might prefer to say “transformed” rather than “born” or “emerged”. See e.g. Andre Gunder Frank & B.K. Gills (ed): *The world system*, Routledge 1993, and Andre Gunder Frank: *Re:orient*, University of California Press 1998, who argue that the Eurasian economic system emerged 5,000 years ago and has since only gone through hegemonic shifts. For example, George Modelski & William Thompson: *Leading sectors and world powers*, University of South Carolina Press 1996, traces the economic rise and fall of hegemonic powers back to Sungepok China, and Bas van Bavel: *The invisible hand*, Oxford University Press 2016, goes all the way back to Abbasid Iraq. In the context of popular movements, however, this is splitting hairs - although it does highlight the shortcomings of historiography, where too little

The late middle age was in Europe an age when peasants and lower classes generally succeeded in strengthening their position. There were several reasons for that. There was a shortage of labour after the Black Death, so the direct producers could raise the price for their participation. Decreasing yields in agriculture caused that the parts of it that could go to the exploiters also decreased. And the power structures went into disarray when the international trade system of the High Middle Age went to pieces about 1350. This caused an increasingly desperate struggle within the upper classes over the surplus, to the detriment of their internal coherence and political leadership.

These internal antagonisms within the upper classes were utilized quite well by the lower classes for some while. The living standard rose; according to Braudel, the level in the late fifteenth century wouldn't be superseded until the 1920s [20]. Authority was dissolved. Democratic ideologies, with Christian overtones, got popular, thanks to the incompetence of the upper classes and the mobilization of the direct producers. Keeping the old restrictions in power met with increasing difficulty.

About 1500 the authorities succeeded in surmounting their internal disagreements and concentrating for a counter-offensive.

The strategy was not to go back to the old system. During the early middle age the power had been local. The economy was redistributive, that is, the surplus was distributed according to custom, governed by political power relations. The local land owner was also a judge, warlord and political boss in his community.

But now, the ruler strategy was changed. Since the popular movements were so effective in gaining power at the local level, the new system was built up at the national and international level. A combination of military dictatorships – "the renaissance state", "absolutism" – national market and transnationally connected commodity and finance chains, shattered the negotiating power of the direct producers and forced down the living standard below the hunger line for the majority within a few generations. Meanwhile, power and pomp was concentrated to a minority to a degree that hadn't existed since antiquity.

The leaders of the attack were an alliance of the Spanish military monarchy and the Genovese high finance, where both managed their part of the agreement to the advantage of both.

The military monarchy took responsibility for violence. It conquered South America, enslaved their inhabitants and plundered them for silver. The Genovese bankers used the silver to get control over the European economy, and in due time it would be used by the Europeans to get control over the world's economy. In return, the Genovese bankers financed the Spanish armies.

Other European dynasties tried to the best of their abilities, and in self-defence, to imitate the Spanish-Genovese model. But lack of capital condemned them for a long time to inferiority and forced them to use even more brutal force against their own sub-

attention has been paid to popular movements on continents other than Europe before Europe became dominant around 1800.

[20] Fernand Braudel, *The Structures of Everyday Life*, Harper & Row 1982



Fig 2:2. The world market system around 1550. Western Europe, a former minor centre, has begun to develop into the eventually dominant one, in alliance between the Spanish military monarchy and the bankers of Genoa. Together they built a power structure based on conquering parts of the Americas and, thanks to American silver, dominating European credit. In Eastern Europe, the upper classes have begun to enslave peasants for raw material exports to the Western European centre. The peripheries are small and much of the burden has to be borne by the direct producers of the centre.

*However, the Eurasian system remains the overarching one, with China, India and West Asia more economically dynamic than Europe; its centres are marked with *.*

jects than the Spanish had to. Thought-control, ideological indoctrination, exterminating of independent organisations, death penalty for everything from political opposition to begging, incarceration, forced labour and witch-hunts helped to force down wages to a tenth of the fifteenth century level and create a surplus to use for capital accumulation, warfare and luxury [21].

In the new system that was being constructed there was one center, Western Europe, and two periferies, Eastern Europe and South America. Between them there was a division of labour.

The center comprised financial and military control. There were also the activities

[21] The control mechanisms are described in Sheldon J. Watts, *A social history of Western Europe 1450-1720*, Hutchinson University Library 1984 and Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison*, Knopf 1978. Bronislaw Geremek, *Poverty: a history*, Blackwell 1994, describes the terror against peasants who were evicted from their land by the new market mechanisms. The witch-hunts is a theme for a whole literature, for example Hugh Trevor-Roper, *The European witch-craze of the 16th and 17th centuries*, Penguin 1969. According to Trevor-Roper, the splinters of medieval radical Christianity as well as popular ideology in general was included in witchery.

that demanded capital and for that reason was possible to monopolize. In the early world market system era this applied primarily to arms and naval technology, according to Braudel the businesses that enabled Europe to conquer the world. But other advanced industrial products were also produced in the center.

In the periphery, a still more repressive labour regime was applied than in the center. In eastern Europe servitude was introduced in the sixteenth century, in South America there was no legal protection at all. So products from there – food, raw materials and labour – were cheap for the buyers in Western Europe. In the beginning of the era Eastern Europe was specialized on grain and South America on metals.

The low prices of peripheral products linked to the center's monopoly of violence resulted in the accumulation of surplus in the center, which made it still easier for the center to finance its accumulation of power.

So what was it that gave the European system centre the power to grow and eventually - from about 1800 - to subjugate the whole world? Braudel points to a number of technological inventions, but this does not seem enough to me. What was it that created this technological superiority?

This question has been the subject of intense debate, with Wallerstein and Andre Gunder Frank pointing to the huge financial advantage provided by control of American silver, which allowed Europe to buy up the rest of the world, not to mention invest in new technologies. Frank also argues that the formerly most dynamic centres of India and China had fallen into recession towards the end of the 18th century, partly due to rising inequality, and were vulnerable to the ravages of competitors; one can compare this to how Europe/North America is today being overtaken by China for the same reasons. But other historians have other candidates. Some, such as William McNeill, tend to put the explanation in terms of the state system, i.e. that within the centre there were roughly equal states all dominated by a well-integrated ruling class rather than a dynasty. This construction gave an advantage. Competition between states forced co-operation between states and capital, giving an advantage over models where such co-operation did not exist. In this way, technological and organisational efficiency, not least military efficiency, was promoted. The armies that conquered rich and powerful Bengal in the 18th century were small, but well organised and armed. Compare this with the fabulous technological breakthrough of the so-called Warring States of China in the 300s and 400s BC, when cast iron, steel, mass production of metal goods and modern stains were used [22].

[22] The literature on the rise of the West is abundant. Those cited in the text are Andre Gunder Frank: *Re:orient*, University of California Press 1998; William McNeill: *The pursuit of power*, Blackwell 1983; Douglass C. North: *The rise of the Western world - a new economic history*, Cambridge University Press 1973; Jack A. Goldstone: *The divergence of cultures*, Mercatus Centre, George Mason University No 10-73, December 2010; David De la Croix, Matthias Doepke & Joel Mokyr: *Clans guilds and markets - apprenticeship institutions and growth in the pre-industrial economy*, *Quarterly Journal of Economics* vol 133, Feb 2018; Margaret Jacob: *Scientific culture and the making of the industrial west*, Oxford University Press 1997; Ken Pomerantz: *The great divergence*, Princeton University Press 2000; Prasannan Parthasarathi: *Why Europe grew rich and Asia did not*, Cambridge University Press 2011; and Jeffrey Williamson: *Trade and poverty - when the Third World fell behind*, MIT Press 2011.



*Fig 2:3. The world market system in 1750. The peripheries of the European subsystem have grown somewhat, with the VOC's cautious colonisation of Southeast Asia, with British and French settler colonies, with slave-hunting areas in Africa, with Bengal, with parts of Russia. As a result, the burdens of the centre's direct producers have been eased somewhat. Amsterdam remains the financial centre but London has begun to compete. Of other centres, only the lower Yangtze seems to be alive and well, marked *. The rest have begun to be subsumed into the European-controlled one.*

Others, such as Joel Mokyr, have attributed the rise in industrial efficiency in Europe compared to the stagnation in India and China to superior institutions for the diffusion of technological knowledge. Still others, such as Douglass North, have pointed to less arbitrary legal institutions in Europe than in Asia. Jack Goldstone has suggested that the European classical ideological literature was too rigid to withstand the pressure of new knowledge around 1500 which created a revolutionary spirit in Europe. Margaret Jacobs has mapped how this operated in English and French artisan and middle-class circles where, from the seventeenth century onwards, there was an organised demand for more scientific and technical types of knowledge than those traditionally cultivated in universities.

The most elegant explanation is probably Ken Pomerantz's: that cheap and readily accessible coal reduced European cost of energy and that almost infinite land in America reduced the cost of food and made it possible for Europeans to under-sell the whole world. However, Prasannan Parthasarati has argued that coal hardly came into widespread use before 1840, but that European states, especially England, uniquely pursued industrial development policies to strengthen their tax bases, becoming world leaders in the textile industry as early as the 1760s. The latter two explanations have been fine-tuned by Jeffrey Williamson who has demonstrated how low cost for industry in Europe

almost unresistingly turned Asian capitalists' interest to raw materials instead, thus making them unable to take part in an increasing industrial efficiency.

With that in mind, the whole colonizing project would seem unnecessary. But of course it was a matter of prohibiting non-European countries from developmental policies of the kind the European states practiced themselves.

In the late sixteenth century, the opposition against the system grew. Peasants and local upper classes revolted against the dictatorship of the state and against the increasing taxes used for financing the repressive apparatus. Meanwhile, Spain's competitors – France, England and not least Sweden – banded together in their ambitions to get a part of the benefits of the system. In the early seventeenth century this resulted in the devastating war called the Thirty Years War.

The most successful of the revolts broke out in the industrial center of the age, in the Netherlands, and was directed against the Spanish empire. It was run by an alliance of merchants, local upper classes, and artisans, it lasted eighty years and coincided in the end with the Thirty Years War.

In 1648 all social forces in Europe agreed that the system had to be reformed to avoid a common extinction. The leaders of the reform were the Dutch merchants, who had by now achieved an enormous prestige. They were, through their rebellion, pioneers of the national autonomy coveted by all challenging states, they had financed the winning side of the Thirty Years War, they had instructed their allies in a new and effective war technology, they had, through their grain trade with "the other periphery", Eastern Europe, their spice trade with India and Indonesia, their superior shipbuilding industry based on mass-production and log-driving on the Rhine, and their successful piracy against the Spaniards become the most liquid capitalists in Europe. Meanwhile, they were passable as representatives of the Peoples' movements since their rebellion was directed against royal taxation.

The new Dutch system built on two principles. The European societies was organised in a state system, where all center states were formal equals. And private citizens were excepted from responsibility for government actions; in other words, merchants were allowed to trade with all warring parties.

The last principle favoured the Dutch merchants. They were also favoured by three other keystones of the Dutch system.

A social invention, the limited company, with the attached stock exchange. Through these, capital could be directed towards the Dutch trade, and Amsterdam could be the center for all financial transactions in Europe.

A particular limited company, the United East India Company, VOC in Dutch. It was equipped with military powers and set to conquer the trade routes of Asia. In applying a touchstone of strict profitability for its violence – it limited itself to annihilating competitors and terrorizing subcontractors – the Dutch could make the system much more effective than what the Spaniards and the Genovese had succeeded with.

A new attitude to the direct producers of the center. Since the Dutch revolt had been made possible by support from the lower classes, the merchant aristocracy had to yield some of their profits. Compensation, or integration, had to supplement for violence as




Fig 2:4. The world market system 1900. Almost the whole world has been covered by the system, after the extreme growth of the 19th century. The core is still London, and Britain is a hegemon in decline, challenged by the US and Germany. The system has gotten strength enough to expand the center to almost all Western Europe and big parts of Northern America. Eastern Europe has advanced to semi-periphery as has Japan and some coastal areas in South America. The rest is now periphery.

a method of disciplinatio, and this tendency was strengthened by the English revolt against the royal dictatorship in the 1640s. The rulers met with increasing difficulties in their ambition to keep people down; historians has called this "the crisis of the seventeenth century" [23]. Of course they made up for this in the periphery; Arrighi thinks that the Dutch were the implementors of European racism on a grand scale, since they were the first to apply radically different norms of behaviour in center and periphery.

The Dutch hegemony was undermined from its inception. Other states began to practice nationalist economic politics, or used their power to promote Dutch methods in their territories and tried at the best of their ability to exclude Dutch merchants. One method, practiced by Britain and France, to get control over the world trade, at Dutch expense, was settler colonies with slave labour. VOC was also increasingly ineffective and corrupt, privileged as it was, and vulnerable to British and French piracy.

During the eighteenth century wars were waged between Britain and France about the leftover from Dutch trade. But what broke the Dutch hegemony was the systemic chaos that resulted from the wars, primarily that important groups refused to fall into line. Settler colonists in North America, slaves in Haiti, and direct producers in France rose in the late eighteenth century and upset the game.

The capacity of the British finance/violence alliance to reorganise the system in the

[23] Trevor Aston (ed), Crisis in Europe 1560-1660, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1965.

early nineteenth century gave hegemony to them. The capacity was based in control over the so-called triangular trade – the Atlantic trade with slaves and sugar as main ingredients, the military conquest of the immense wealth of Bengal, and control of the coal mines. But an ideological leadership was also needed, and this was based in the struggle against Napoleon's imperial plans in the name of national liberty.

The British system reform offered several news.

The revolutions that had helped Britain to hegemony couldn't be undone. So popular influence on states was recognized; the states were not seen any longer as the private property of dynasties. The settler states of America were also admitted to the state system.

A new principle was formulated to be superior to the state interests that popular majorities had gotten such a fatal influence over: free trade, or the market. The whole power of the hegemonic state was used to promote the monocentricity of the economy and commercialize things, labour and land/nature [24]. This market was controlled by London's high finance, by force of its control over a far-flung colonial empire.

For after the rather discriminating use of violence of the Dutch, the world was now rapidly opened by British, and after that also by other European colonial armies. In 1800 European states controlled 35% of the world's land, in 1914 they controlled 85%.

Production was integrated in the capitalist control in the form of enterprises where workers were ranged in a disciplinary system of command, powered by steam engines fired with coal. The direct producers lost what autonomy they had had when they owned tools and workshops themselves, and became increasingly wage labourers. Coal was also used to build up an efficient communication system of railways and steamships.

While the Dutch hegemony had survived for a hundred and fifty years, the British was worn down at a quicker pace. For the popular movements had begun to learn how to struggle against the system.

In the center, labour movements arose to catch control over important links of the system. Both labour and agrarian movements turned violently against the corporate liberalism the British supported, because it destroyed both labour and land [25]. The market, which was now definitely superordinated to the civil society, knows no difference between the vital and the trivial, and the demand of the rich can easily cut out the survival of the poor, the nature and the local communities with no other excuse than it has the power to do it, according to Polanyi. And in the peripheries, national movements organised to resist the colonial system.

But as in earlier systemic crises, the direct cause for a hegemonic shift was conflicts between different state and capital combinations.

As early as in the 1870s, two center powers appeared which in many ways were more advanced than Britain. Meanwhile there was a deep recession, or Kondratiev B, so continued growth was only possible at the others' expense.

The new center powers were USA and Germany. Both had potentially bigger home markets than Britain. Both were busy building a more effective industry than Britain's,

[24] Karl Polanyi, *The great transformation*, Henry Holt 1944.

[25] Karl Polanyi, *ibid.*



Fig 2:5. VWorld market system 2000. The system hasn't been able to grow, the world not being bigger than it is. It has deepened however and integrated the whole world culturally. Also Japan and parts of coastal China belongs to the center. New York is the core but the US is losing its position as unchallenged hegemon, China being the challenger. In Europe Eastern Europe/Russia's effort to advance into the center has been effectively blocked by heavy defence costs. In the midst of peripheries new semiperipheries have appeared: East Asia, Southeast Mediterranean, and parts of South America.

based in large-scale enterprises instead of family businesses [24a].

It became apparent that USA was the most effective of them, both at utilizing the advantages of the large-scale enterprise and utilizing the global power balances created by the increasingly strong peoples' movements. So it was USA that after two devastating wars reorganised the system under its leadership in 1944 in Bretton Woods, therewith guaranteeing its hegemony to the end of the century.

Indeed, the resources of the United States in the mid-nineteenth century were enormous compared to any conceivable competitor. It was the largest industrialised country, and it was the one where new technologies and efficient institutions had been most vigorously exploited to achieve scale and low unit costs, with government support [26]. Thanks to its remote location, it had long avoided military costs, which had helped to make productive investment extremely profitable. As a result, capital was attracted from all over the world, and by 1945 the United States was the world's largest creditor and dominant producer, accounting for more than half of world output. To this was added ideological leadership: USA was the only possible hegemonic power that had anything

[26] Alfred D Chandler: Scale and scope, the dynamics of industrial capitalism, Belknap/Harvard 1994. Michael Lind: Land of promise - an economic history of the United States, Harper 2013 has shown how the US was indeed the home of state capitalism.

to offer the peoples' movements, thanks to its New Deal and its rather positive view on decolonization.

The US system built on the following news:

The labour movements of the center were acknowledged as junior partners in power, insofar as mass production for mass consumption was the dominating social and cultural principle in the system center. The precondition was of course that the labour movements abandoned other social and cultural aims.

The national movements were acknowledged insofar as all peoples were admitted to the state system. The states were also, as a concession to labour and agrarian movements, granted the right to break, to some degree, with free trade and run a finance, welfare and development policy of their own. Not least the US itself took, as a state, responsibility for its finance via the public Federal Reserve System, instead of relying on private banks.

But the states were denied the right to secede from the system. The US managed it so that American businesses were granted right to operate in all countries, based on its huge size.

A number of supranational institutions were created to look after the law-abidingness of all. Some of these institutions – the International Monetary Fund and later the World Trade Organisation – have much more resources than most states, particularly states in the system periphery.

The US hegemony was worn down even faster than the British.

For it appeared that the American big corporation as a model was a rather transient asset that was impossible for the US to keep as a monopoly. When developed it spread rapidly in the system, which resulted in a rapid drain on the US liquidity. In the mid seventies London began to show tendencies to regain its old role as the world's financial center.

Moreover, the peoples' movements appeared quite as militant, despite the USA's formal acknowledgement of their rights. About 1970 the Vietnamese agrarian movement succeeded in seriously undermining USA's economy, while labour movements, agrarian movements, and the American civil rights movement together called the legitimacy of the system in question, the Iranian revolution following ten years after. Meanwhile, the USA had constant problems with national movements in Latin America.

These, and other more pedestrian popular movements, have during the twentieth century succeeded so well in forcing the system to concessions that the ruling class began, in the seventies, to call in question if these concessions were tenable. From the Dutch war of liberation and on, states and business have seen it as advantageous to integrate peoples' movements who might otherwise cause trouble for the system, with higher salaries, social policies, and from the nineteenth century, citizenship and suffrage. The costs for this have been recovered in the system peripheries.

But from the late nineteenth century, peoples' movements in the system peripheries have also become effective enough to force the system to concessions. Together the peoples' movements had become so effective that the twentieth century was the first century in the history of the world market system when the average living standard

didn't decrease. No one was left to pay for integration, which was discovered by the finance/violence alliance during the Thatcher-Reagan era. The destruction of integration mechanisms most people see as a sign of the strength of the rulers is rather a sign of the system's weakness and failing solvency.

Around the century shift we are in a phase when the system is dominated by finance and speculation instead of trade and production, a phase that is becoming increasingly chaotic. This is a sign that the US hegemony is approaching its end. The question is what will come next.

According to Arrighi, hegemony is conquered by a finance/violence alliance which has firstly greater financial resources than all contenders, secondly greater violence resources, and thirdly a proposal for surmounting the systemic chaos and establish a new order. It is also an advantage to be ideologically leading, insofar that the proposed order to some degree is seen as good by the leading peoples' movements of the age.

It is hard to see anyone performing that role.

Neither Japan nor the EU is strong enough [27]. They don't have greater production capacity than the US. They don't control any violence at all. And they have nothing to offer to surmounting the growing systemic chaos. On the other hand, China will in 2020 have a greater production capacity than any other state, and offers at least a different kind of order which so far looks less chaotic than the dominating one.

Others don't think that anyone can challenge the USA, which will accordingly have to struggle on, increasingly unable to keep control, increasingly unable to withstand a growing systemic chaos [28].

There is a possibility that the problem can not be solved within the world market system we are used to since more than five hundred years. In that case there are two possibilities [29].

One possibility is that the rulers of the system take initiative to a system shift, like their predecessors did five hundred years ago. What a new system would look like is barely imaginable. Experiences from the last time suggest that such a shift would be immensely brutal for the direct producers.

The most likely outcome of such a shift ought to be one or more transnational empires, perhaps in the hands of a combined IMF, WTO, NATO and Security Council. Such a step wouldn't be new; there are many thousand years' tradition of empires. An empire would be authoritarian, inegalitarian, but safe [30].

[27] Giovanni Arrighi, *The rise of East Asia and the withering away of the interstate system*, 90th annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, aug 1995. See also Giovanni Arrighi & Beverly Silver, *Chaos and governance in the modern world system*, University of Minnesota Press 1999 or William R Thompson & Leila Zakhirova: *Racing to the top – How energy fuels systemic leadership in world politics*, Oxford University Press 2019.

[28] For example Samir Amin in a number of articles; see for example *U.S. Imperialism, Europe, and the Middle East*, *Monthly Review* Nov 2004..

[29] According to Arrighi, *The long twentieth century*.

[30] Probably, it is an outcome like this that is depicted in Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Harvard University Press 2000 – even if they somewhat confusedly believe it to be already accomplished.

An empire would immediately end the autonomy of transnational corporations. One possibility is that these, in self-defence, would establish a system of their own, that would dispense with states. Such a system might perhaps also appear as a default consequence of state insolvency. It would be most similar to the feudal anarchy of the tenth century and offer great possibilities and massive risks.

One last possibility is that the rulers fail, thanks to powerful peoples' movement mobilizations, and the system with its hierarchies crumbles. Hopefully, this will lead to a more democratic and egalitarian society.

All that can be said is that future is more uncertain than it had been for five hundred years. But we know also from chaos theory that unstable conditions are easy to affect with small means. For that reason, perhaps the peoples' movements have a strategically easier task than it has ever had, and that their possibility to affect development in a democratic direction is greater than it has been in five hundred years [31].

So far we have considered the world from Braudel's two top floors, market's and capital's. Perhaps one should evaluate what the results have been for the first floor, the floor of civil society.

Such an evaluation is not easily done. But the following contentions are not unreasonable:

The power of bureaucratic structures has increased, and the power of individuals and groups has decreased during the world market system. States and great corporations have infinitely greater possibilities to influence development to their advantage than had their predecessors five hundred years ago. Uncertainty for people and local communities has increased as a consequence, and their negotiation power has decreased.

The world's majority probably works harder today than it did five hundred years ago. The reward for this work diminished successively until about 1900, and then increased somewhat. But nobody has ever demonstrated that the average income is higher today than in 1450.

The living standard has in many instances diminished even when the direct reward has increased, because the access to necessities from commons without the market has been destroyed and can not be made up with by money. While people before the world market system could live in frugality and still live rather well, their descendants live in poverty as soon as they don't consume as much as the global upper class [32].

Due to the constant transfers of surplus from system periphery to system center, the chasms between rich and poor has increased during the era of the world market system. While the upper class of the system is richer than any upper class has ever been, most people live at the same subsistence level as they have always done.

The gap is also been intensified and embittered by a structural racism, as a method to school different geographical categories into attractive or unattractive assignments.

[31] This discussion is elaborated by Immanuel Wallerstein in a number of essays, for example *Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy, 1990-2025/2050*, in Geir Lundestad (ed), *The fall of great powers – Peace, stability, and legitimacy*, Scandinavian University Press 1993

[32] This has been discussed by Wolfgang Sachs, *The development dictionary*. Also Karl Polanyi, *The great transformation*, treats the strange fact that misery may increase in the midst of increased wages.

Structural racism didn't exist before 1450. Perhaps one should add that a comparative gap between sexes have also been permanented, although there were old traditions to start with [33].

The endeavour to create markets and innovate has multiplied the capacity to exploit nature and labour and turn them into products. This exploitative capacity, linked to the inability of the monocentric economy to differ vital needs from trivial ones have created an environmental crisis that threatens human life with annihilation [34].

Are there any plain positive merits to set up against this? One would like to mention that the opportunities have increased technically speaking to get all needs met for the majority of people, and to abolish all poverty. One would like to mention that there is an opportunity for the first time for all people to communicate with eachother and take part of eachother's culture. But these are only unfulfilled promises, not reality. One would also like to point at the perhaps only social progress that has reached a mass scale, the reduction of epidemics, as the only success of the world market system. But we don't know if the methods it is attained with are tenable in the long run.

The chapters of this book will deal with the history of this first floor. For the assignment of the peoples' movements is to protect the social society against systems and routines that grow inhuman and choking, against irrational exploitation, repression and discrimination, or with other words, the destructive consequences of the world market system. So the history of the civil society is also to a high degree the history of social movements.

[33] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The discoveries and human progress*, and Kathryn Ward, *The economic status of women in the world-system*, in Albert Bergesen (ed), *Crises in the world-system*, Sage 1983.

[34] See chapter 9, part *Defense of the resource base*. See also Vandana Shiva, *Ecology and the politics of survival*, Sage 1991.

Chapter 3:

Peoples' movements before the world market system

DURING THE ERA OF THE EUROPEAN-DOMINATED world market system, most social movements of any importance are directed against instances of the "development" or "modernization" of this system. Most social movement scientists seem to agree about that [1].

But there have been categories struck by exploitation, repression or discrimination in all class societies. Therefore, there have been bases for peoples' movements in different systems. Some of these have attained such an intense identity that they still live as traditions and identities, and their languages can be used by present peoples' movements, as well as their adversaries. The difficulties they have met are not unlike the difficulties met by contemporary peoples' movements.

Peoples' movements against the classical empires

During the last millennium before our era, great empires appeared on the Eurasian continent. Small, independent peasant republics with a strong tribal solidarity were victims of centralised, bureaucratically ruled empires, around the Mediterranean, in West Asia, in India and in China. A cosmopolitan city culture replaced the local rural cultures. The political centralization and the new metropolitan economies reduced violently the influence of local collectives over their lives and favoured great floods of wealth, accentuating the division of people into classes, and not least accumulation of debts to pay for increasingly violent wars [2]. The national political pattern – the good city, maintained by citizens in the spirit of the locally developed tradition – was turned meaningless as answer to the new issues of mass misery and indebtedness.

The task to protect people and civil society against these empires was settled differently in different parts of the Eurasian continent.

In the west, around the Mediterranean, the Jewish-Christian movements took upon itself to protect human dignity in a society ravaged by political projects. Christianity grew successively out of four concrete conflicts [3].

The first conflict, the one that created the Jewish people as a collective, was fought

[1] According to Veit Michael Bader, *Kollektives Handeln*, Leske & Budrich 1991.

[2] The enormous importance of indebtedness as a mover of social movements in ancient society is underlined by David Graeber: *Debt, the first 5,000 years*, Melville House 2011, by G.E.M de Ste Croix: *The class struggle in the ancient Greek world*, Cornell University Press 1989, and by Michael Hudson: *History of debt and property from the Ancient East*, in David Landes et al (eds): *The invention of enterprise*, Princeton University Press 2010, and his *The lost tradition of Biblical debt cancellations*, <http://michael-hudson.com/1992/03/the-lost-tradition-of-biblical-debt-cancellations/>

[3] The history builds on research accounted for in Ulrich Duchrow, *Alternatives to global capitalism – drawn from Biblical history designed for political action*, International Books 1995. Other sources are Henry Cöster, *En levande själ är alltid en kropp*, in Bröd men också rosor, Rabén & Sjögren 1985, *Skriften i verkligheten*, Verbum 1987, and *Kyrkans historia och historiens kyrka*, Symposium 1991; H.G. Kippenberg, *The role of Christianity in the depolitization of the Roman Empire*, in S.N. Eisenstadt (ed), *The origins and diversity of axial age civilizations*, SUNY Press 1986. Finally I have looked in two old books for inspiration, Max Beer, *Socialismens historia*, Fram 1926 and Hjalmar Holmquist, *Kyrkohistoria*, P A Norstedt & söner 1928.

between the Egyptian cities in what is today Palestine and the exploited country people. In a period of weakness for the Egypt state, the latter succeeded in destroying the cities and establish a society built on equality and collective security, in a conscious contrast to the hierarchical rule of the surrounding empires. It was this equality that later reform movement up to Jesus defended.

The second conflict arose with an increasing trade and class differentiation, between on the one hand the proletarianized and indebted Jewish peasants and artisans, on the other the merchants of the cities in the eastern Mediterranean and the surrounding imperial powers. The merchants argued that economic growth was the aim of society, and that class differentiation was necessary. Against this the prophets, representatives of the peasants and artisans, maintained that wealth was meaningless without justice, and that debts should be forgiven. From that position, the Jewish people could for some time force through a national social policy and a protection against impoverishment.

The third conflict occurred between the Jewish society and the Assyrian empire in the sixth century BOE. The state ideology of the empire was social-darwinist: might is right, and development is inevitable. As a self-defence as a small nation the Jews formulated the position that nobody needs any particular excuse for his existence. Life is given by a principle, higher than both empire and development. From that position they were able to offer resistance against the claims of the empire.

The fourth conflict arose when the Jewish national state once more had perished for an empire, the Roman. This was the time Jesus appeared. He broke with the nationalists, those who maintained that solidarity only was valid within the collective, and asserted the solidarity and equal value of all, irrespectively of nationality. Furthermore, he maintained that the aim of life could not be a political project, or to build the perfect state to protect justice, or to maintain the perfect routines. Instead, Jesus insisted contrary to those who waited for a political "saviour", the good life can only be uphold through the practical solidarity of all, in everyday life.

Around this program, a strong movement grew, primarily based in the urban middle classes of artisans and traders, and in women who used Christianity as a way of escaping the Mediterranean patriarchy. The movement differed from competing movement in that it asserted universality: it was no association comprising members and excluding non-members; all humans were implicated in principle, and all had an equal value. Contrary to other movements the didn't claim any particular secrets or knowledge. Solidarity in practice was placed at the core. Communes created a nucleus. Together, they constituted parishes. The model of action was organising of common, non-bureaucratic friendly societies safeguarding security – necessary in a society where there was just a small step between a modest prosperity and poverty – and organising a public: to eat together, to keep festivals and rites marking the equality of all, and to reflect over the principles of the movement through telling stories to eachother.

According to Rodney Stark, it was these principles that won a majority for the Christian movement instead of any other of the many heterodox movements that were flowering at the time: when the great ancient epidemics struck Rome in the 160s and the 250s the Christians survived better than the heathens because of their social security

system [4]. And this was a mighty attraction.

There were others as well. Christianity offered protection to wives who were threatened with lethal abortions not to splinter the families' heritages. And Christianity offered an access for poor people into the Roman potlatch culture [5].

With time, a need for functionaries appeared. The first functionaries were the deacons who run the friendly societies and social works. Next category was the supervisors, or episkopos in Greek, as the chairmen of the parish.es Finally aldermen – presbyter in Greek – were appointed among those who were considered particularly skilled in interpreting the common ideology. Originally all these were elected by the members.

From the first centuries, the dynamic Christian movement attracted many of the most competent intellectuals of the Roman empire. It was considered natural that these took on to be ideological interpreters and external representatives for the movement. After some hundred years, this layer had liberated itself from the restraints of being elected by the members, and replenished themselves through cooption. Kippenberg suggests that this power concentration in the movement as a whole depended on their control over the welfare bureaucracy and its resources.

When the movement grew and more and more categories joined it, internal conflicts appeared, conflicts that sometimes turned violent.

One conflict, that runs through the whole history of the church, is the conflict between those who interpret the demand for solidarity as justice for the poor, and those more wealthy members who don't make any such demands.

This conflict is intersected with the conflict between functionaries and intellectuals who like to imagine that the core of the movement is the perfect ideology, and those, primarily laymen, who primarily are interested in practice.

The first great conflict was won by the laymen. This was the struggle about gnosticism, a tremendously elaborated system of theory, which during the late second century got popular among many intellectuals, among other things because of its insistence on knowledge as a criterion for human value. Against this theoretical system, laymen set up tradition as conclusive; only what had been tried in practice and in discussion could have any significance.

But the victory had a price. It forced through an argumentation along the opposite party's, the intellectual elite's, conditions. Instead of being marked off in practical solidarity, philosophical doctrines became what signified Christians from their opponents. For that reason, the power of the intellectuals got a long-run boost; their issues got more marked in the self-understanding of the church.

Another price had to be paid; the victory for the laymen had to be paid by the lay women. They had to a great extent stood by the gnostic knowledge hierarchies as an alternative to the patriarchy of the Roman world; they set power of the mind against male power. The defeat of gnosticism was also a defeat for women, and the functionaries

[4] Rodney Stark: *The rise of Christianity*, Princeton University Press 1996.

[5] Peter Brown: *Through the eye of a needle*, Princeton University Press 2012. According to Christian principles, the penny of a poor widow is as much worth as the gold of a millionaire if offered as a gift.

[6] Riane Eisler, *The chalice and the blade*, Harper & Row 1988; Jo-Ann McNamara, *Mater Patriae, matres*

fortified their position in building a patriarchal hierarchy of male bishops [6].

The conflicts between rich and poor tended to be played out about the demands for devotion, a puritan way of life, and collectivism, where the poor made tougher demands than the rich who had their privileges to defend. This conflict was constantly smouldering but flared sometimes up violently.

The first of these conflicts, dividing the movement, was the struggle about donatism, which concerned how functionaries should deal with the state.

The attitude of the state towards the Christian movement had varied according to circumstance. The Roman state was tolerant in principle, as long as people paid their taxes and obeyed the laws. But the regime liked control. For that reason it demanded now and then that the Christian functionaries should register name-lists and protocols. Some did so, and got their names on the list. Others refused; they were sent to the quarries and some of them were killed.

Donatism was a refuser's front centered on North Africa, which emphasized devotion and a puritan way of life. They had support from rebellious peasants warring against Roman tax-collectors. But had also a substantial support in the whole church. When it was finally defeated on a bishop's meeting in 411, it was defeated with the figures 286-279, under government pressure.

The struggle between donatists and compromisers played a crucial part for the Christian movement's "assumption of power" in the 310s.

Behind the alliance between state and church was the government's need for organised support. Fewer and fewer were inclined to pay for the top-heavy Roman empire, and the whole system run risk of falling to pieces in civil wars and rebellions. But there was one strong organisation covering the whole empire, with 15-25 percent of the population involved: the Christian movement. It was not sectarian, it claimed all humans to implicated. The Roman imperial candidate Constantine concluded that the Christian church was an effective power-base, and this was correct.

The church, in Constantine's mind, was the compromising functionaries, and he cooperated intimately with them. Since their names were listed, it was easy for the government, when Constantine had won, to begin paying subsidies to them, subsidies they used to strengthen their hold in the internal power struggle [7].

The alliance with the state was favourable for the movement's functionaries. The got huge privileges: tax exemptions, exemption from conscription, legal immunity, and government support in internal conflicts. Their position within the movement was strengthened.

However, the conflicts went on. Within the church as ruling party, there was a marked tendency for national conflicts, masked as doctrinary ones. Opposition tended to concentrate in Syria and Egypt, regions that by custom were bitter over Roman or Byzantine

ecclesiae, in Renate Bridenthal et al, *Becoming visible*, Houghton Mifflin 1998.

[7] A.H.M. Jones, *Constantine and the conversion of Europe*, Macmillan 1948. The state-church alliance was according to Abraham Léon: *Jewish Question – a Marxist Interpretation*, Pathfinder Press 1970, a part of a general alliance between non-commercial landowners and lower classes against the traditional Roman upper classes that exploited both. I have not been able to corroborate the contention.

sovereignty and taxation.

The privileges for the church had to be bought at a price. Firstly, the church had to subordinate its policy to government dictates, as long as the Roman empire survived. Secondly, the distance in interest between members and functionaries grew.

The core of the first Christian movement had consisted in parish members living in communes. When the church grew, and also rich people joined, these communes lost their importance. But with the increasing corruption in the Christian leadership an aspiration arose among many Christians to revive the old spirit, to get away from the mundane world and create alternative societies, new communes founded in a puritan way of living and devotion for the cause. The first monastery was established in Egypt in 321, less than ten years after Constantine's alliance with the church.

The monastery movement soon manifested itself as extremely successful. It was supported by the state and by the Christian leadership, insofar that it was the only lawful way of expressing one's discontent with the growing social disparities within the church. But the monasteries were also, thanks to their puritanism, their devotion, and their collective, disciplined work, much more effective as producers than others in the Roman empire. For that reason, they were soon, apart from being cultural centers in the Christian world and distributors of new effective technologies, very rich. And for that reason they soon lost their appeal as utopias for the poor; they began to limit their recruitment to the upper classes and even hire labour, which wasn't better treated than other labourers in the Roman world.

Through a thousand years, this remained a typical problem. Through a thousand years, demand for new, more severe monastic rules remained the standard remedy, despite its constant failures. In such a way were established the Benedictines in the sixth century, the Cluniacs in the tenth, the Cartusians in the twelfth and finally the mendicant orders in the thirteenth century.

Despite the fact that the monasteries were established and replenished by the most devoted laymen within the movement, they were the base for the final functionary takeover of the church in Western Europe during the tenth century. The means was a monastery reform like the ones mentioned above, with the aim of strengthening the discipline among the functionaries [8].

The backdrop was discontent with upper class power within the church. The church was, in the ninth century, not an organisation in our sense – a juridical person with a clear identity, clear limits and clear lines of command. It was, according to Henry Cöster "a function within society" [9], a part or an aspect of civil society. But for that reason nobody had enough authority to speak for it; the usual powers tended to take that function.

Two categories reacted to this in the 10th and 11th centuries.

First, the common people, the direct producers, began to use Christian-coloured language in their opposition to the landowning aristocracy and its, as they perceived it, pur-

[8] This was restricted to the West, where the church regained its autonomy with the fall of the Roman empire. In the East, the empire lasted, and so did government control over the church.

[9] Henry Cöster, *Kyrkans historia och historiens kyrka*.

chased clergy. Simony, or commercialisation of religion, became their most commonly used slogan. They were most active in the most commercialised area of Europe, namely the cities of northern Italy, where the downside of commercialisation, the widening class divide, was at its worst. Their enemies dubbed them *la pataria* after an artisan neighbourhood in Milan.

Secondly, the monastic community, spearheaded by the monks of Cluny in France, began to organise a reform movement within the Church. It assumed that if the Church was organised as a separate legal entity in which only the ecclesiastical functionaries alone had decision-making powers, it would be possible to free itself from the selfish exercise of power by landowners. They succeeded in achieving this goal, this 'Bolshevisation' of the Church in a hundred years, supported by the popular movement in northern Italy [10]. The result was that the power of the professional functionaries became even greater. The power they increasingly used to enrich their organisation, which became more and more like a business, and thus create privileges for themselves. They jealously guarded this power. In the twelfth century they began requiring university degrees for access to the top positions.

The popular movement that had formed the basis of the reforms gradually disintegrated; alongside the trade in clerical services, the increasingly heavy bureaucracy began to be perceived as the main problem. The Church, on the other hand, but also the increasingly bureaucratised taxing kingdoms, fought their popular competitors in terms of heretic trials; it is only now that the heretic trials and heretic fires are beginning to ravage Europe [11].

The anti-clerical movements emerged both as reform movements within the Church and as local associations of laymen. Typically, what begins as reform movements without strict external boundaries soon are pushed into sectarianism and parallel organisation by church and state functionaries militantly guarding their monopoly.

One example may be the Valdensians, a lay movement that in 1179 asked for permission to agitate for Christianity in Lyon. But instead they were mocked by the church leaders because they couldn't talk correct Latin, and didn't even get an answer to their request. When the Valdensians went out agitating all the same, they were expelled from the church, persecuted and killed for six hundred years. Only after the French revolution they appeared from their hide-outs – with their disdain for intellectual conceit intact [12].

Similar movement with similar destiny were Beguines, Lollards, Hussites and the movements spearheading the Reformation in the sixteenth century.

There were also movements that for a long time succeeded to balance on the bor-

[10] This was the decisive cause for the eastern church to break with the western.

[11] R.I. Moore: *The formation of a persecuting society*, Blackwell 1987. Moore describes how the functionaries managed to bundle 'heretics', i.e. critically thinking people, Jews (who were hated as competitors because of their usually higher education) and lepers into an 'out-group' that was persecuted as 'unclean'. In *The war on heresy*, Harvard University Press, Moore goes even further, arguing that the heresy trials were the "Moscov trials" of the time - the violent assertion of power, using conspiracy theories, by newly established bureaucratic elites against a community that remained relatively unorganised.

[12] Amedeo Molnar, *Historia del valdismo medieval*, Ediciones Aurora 1981.

der between exclusion and absorption. One of these was the Franciscans. Francis also, like the Waldensians, asked for permission to agitate in 1210. But this time, the attitude of the church leaders was more tolerant: Francis got his permission, provided that he established a monastery order under the leadership of the Pope. Despite this disciplining trick, the Franciscans remained for four or five generations, thanks to the participation of laymen, a radical and saucy organisation that the church hierarchy looked upon with distrust and often tried to break. They seem to have succeeded about 1320 [13].

Other movements dissociated themselves fiercely from the church and articulated their own ideologies, sometimes founded in gnostic ideas about the impurity of the material world, as with the Cathars [14].

Yet other popular Christian movements played down the theoretical debates and concentrated on solidarity in practice. The most famous was the peace movement. It was founded officially at clerical initiative in a meeting in Charroux in Western France, July 1, 989, and the aim was to prevent landowners' and great lords' internal feuds. In the beginning, the movement had a support from the church hierarchies, but soon it went its own way. The activists soon could see that an organised power was needed to force the robber barons to keep peace. One faction saw the answer in authoritarian hierarchies and worked for strengthening the king as a counterpoise to the aristocracy, while another saw it in popular power and organised peasants and artisans to pull down the barons' castles and strip them of their resources [15].

This faction gave rise to the communal movement when it in 1077 gathered all inhabitants in Cambrai in Flanders around a vow to prevent, in solidarity with each other, the aristocratic fighting in the vicinity of the town. The communal movement spread and took on more and more responsibility in the service of peace. So much that the established church hurried to excommunicate it – but it couldn't prevent the movement to establish a tradition where equality and citizenry challenged the super- and subordination of feudal society.

The anti-clerical movement grew, participating in the late medieval democratic revival. Anti-clerical thought kept together the democratic movements. Hussites won military successes against the powers in East Germany on an anti-clerical and radically democratic platform, and beat the imperial armies repeatedly during twenty years. The church was forced on the retreat and promised to reform during a series of crisis meetings in the

[13] For novel readers, these struggles are the backdrop of Umberto Eco's novel *The name of the rose*.

[14] The appeal of gnostic thoughts in lower class movements is worth a footnote. Why are poor people so prone to intellectualist positions? One clue is the core of gnosticism – that theory, ideals and ideas are more important than reality, which may be tempting if reality is repressing. A short account about gnostic thoughts in peoples' movements is Per Frostin, *Martin Luther and Thomas Müntzer, a Marxist perspective, in Reformation – frihetskamp och överhet, Folkets Historia* 1986

[15] Told by Marc Bloch, *Feudal society*, Routledge & Kegan Paul 1961, and more extensively by Thomas Head & Richard Landes (ed), *The peace of God*, Cornell University Press 1992. The link to the communal movement is given by H Platelle, *Le mouvement communal de Cambrai de 1077 et ses destinées ultérieures*, Société Académique de Saint-Quentin 1980, and Albert Vermeesch, *Essai sur les origines et la signification de la commune dans le nord de la France*, Heule 1966.

early fifteenth century.

Not much come out of these reforms. The leading clerical hierarchy, completely adapted to be a ruling hierarchy like all the others to survive as a juridical person according to the Cluniac prescription, was too far removed from their members.

During the revolutionary era when the world market system rose to power, the anti-clerical movements organised popular opposition against the new order. Wherever the Spanish armies didn't held sway, they also triumphed momentarily or permanently, in the form of Reformation which stripped the clergy of much of its power.

In both the Netherlands and England, Christian egalitarianism, built on lay power, tied together the movements that overthrew the royal military dictatorships and begun the integration of the direct producers (see the part Tax rebellions and Puritans below). In the regions which the world market system converted into backwaters and peripheries – Germany, Scandinavia – the anti-clerical and reformatory peoples' movements were exploited by the states as a nationalist ideology of defence against the center states.

Christian churches still have a potential, that has exposed itself in liberation theology among shanty-town dwellers and rural workers in Latin America, and in struggles against dictatorships in Poland, South Africa, the Philippines and Korea. The potential is the Christian insistence in human equality, an equality founded in the view of life as given equally to all, by a principle above all human hierarchies and class differences.

But there are obvious weaknesses. Through the Christian history an over-emphasis on ideology have always been the functionaries' and the intellectuals' power source.

Even in reform movements, aiming at abolishing the power of functionaries, this fixation at ideology has in the end created new functionarian power. And when ideology and language are the core of a movement, and not the concrete conditions of a social category, this easily makes a foundation for false solidarities.

Peoples' movements of the drybelt

The Islamic movement was, like the Christian, born to assert equal human value. But contrary to the Christian movement, directed against political projects, Islam itself was a political project. To build the Good State has for fourteen hundred years been the unattainable goal of the movement. But meanwhile, and casually, the movement has created a civil society of great resilience.

Like Christianity, Islam was born in the disintegration of an old society; in this case the dissolution of the Arab clan society faced with Byzantine and Persian empires and their increasing trade. Like Christianity, Islam was an answer to class stratification, indebtedment and the increasing uncertainty caused by the new order [16].

Islam was founded as a community to replace the degenerated clans, a community founded in equality, justice and integrity as the clans of the desert had been. Like in Christianity, which has provided much to the language of Islam, equality had its motivation in the life given without counter-gifts in return, by a principle above everything else.

[16] Maxine Rodinson, Muhammad, New York Pantheon Books 1980, and Ira M. Lapidus, A history of Islamic societies, Cambridge University Press 1988.

In the politically fragmented Arabia, Islam got state power in less than ten years. In 622, their leader Muhammed was elected mayor in Yathrib, the Medina of today, which was going to pieces in internal feuds. Here, Islam got a chance to practice its principles in a position of power.

From the beginning, Islam was a brilliant success. Out of the shattered Yathrib, a successful army was created. In 630, Mecca was conquered. The success bred enthusiasm and within a few years Syria and Iraq were annexed, while their inhabitants greeted Islam as a liberator from the Byzantine and Persian empires, respectively.

The easily captured state power has impressed Islam ever since. Social revolution was the aim, and the government power strategy, to be in government and carry out reforms from there, was seen as reasonable way to the goal. The good state remained an object for a long time, and has now been revived in the Islamist movements. This has come handy to a movement that has tended to see maintenance of the Islamic law, or the perfect routines for human action, as the ultimate goal. While the Christian movement in principle was sceptic to regulation, the Islamic movement considered rules as inevitable tools for maintaining the good society.

One of the most essential rules – at least for the direct producers – was the definite prohibition of interest, a deathblow against ancient indebtedness.

The first serious conflict within Islam thus immediately caused civil war and revolution. A hundred years after the conquest of Syria and Iraq, these lands were governed by an Arab tribal aristocracy, descendants of the first conquerors. They considered late-comers to Islam as worth less than themselves and discriminated them in many ways, regardless of the egalitarian principles of Islam. The natural reaction among the discriminees was to appeal to "real" Islam, organise in sects like shi'a and kharij, and revolt against the aristocracy. In 750 they contributed to a new regime, the Abbasids.

This pattern was repeated through a few hundred years. The Abbasid regime couldn't live up to the Islamic principles either. New Islamic sects were constituted by peasants, workers, slaves and other repressed within the empire, with the aim to resurrect the good Islamic state. These sects – the muqanna, the Babak, the Zanj and the most successful of them, the Ismaili movement – had all the same characteristics as Muhammed's original community; equality and justice between the members, but no obligation to outsiders. All principles only applied within the sect. The Zanjs, for example, a revolutionary movement of slaves in the salines south of Basra 869-883, kept slaves themselves; this was permissible since they were infidels and didn't belong to the movement.

Most of these movements never went beyond being challengers, revolt movements that could keep a part of the empire for a while. But the Ismaili movement, a breakaway from the shi'a that maintained that only a Communist community of property would guarantee equality, founded a stable government in Yemen, Bahrein and Tunisia just after 900, and in Egypt a few generations after. The Ismaili state, a rigidly centralized and hierarchic bureaucracy with the aim of creating the good society through administration, degenerated gradually into a military dictatorship as the movement that created it collapsed.

The greatest Muslim social scientist, Abd-ar-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, has described

how Maghreb during the thirteenth and fourteenth century went through several similar waves: a peoples' movement, ideologically fortified in an Islamic revival, captures state power and establishes itself as a military bureaucracy. After a generation it has been corrupted, and a new peoples' movement, ideologically fortified in an Islamic revival, revolt and capture state power [17]. To establish the perfect routines for social life turned out to be self-defeating.

After a few hundred years the pattern changed. The perfect Islamic state appeared impossible to achieve through the state – each government turned inevitably corrupt and saw more to the own clique's interest than to the interest of the Muslim congregation. So the Muslim activists withdrew their support for the Caliphate, which had two consequences.

Firstly, the opportunity opened for warlords to occupy state power, since the state hadn't any Islamic legitimacy to protect it. Iran was governed by military dictatorships from the tenth century, Iraq, Syria and Egypt from the eleventh. They didn't just take power over the provinces of the empire, they also shattered its ruling classes – landowners and merchants – and created chaos in the civil society.

Secondly, the common people was forced to organise in the midst of confusion. Only now, a majority of people in West Asia and North Africa turned Muslims. The groups that took the part of organising the civil society – and most of redistribution – were the Muslim activists, of which there were two kinds.

One kind was the academically educated, 'ulama. They developed the legal parts of Islam and took on to regulate the principles of civil society in villages and town quarters. They had great success with that; even today criminality is low in Islamic countries. But they left politics and social structures aside. As far as the power holders protected the people against conquerors and bandits, politics was allowed to be as it was; it was to be perceived as beyond the Islamic law. Meanwhile, they gave up Islam's egalitarian spirit as unattainable. "Thus, all Sunnis accepted the world as it was, yet abandoning their full acceptance as they refused to take part in politics", Lapidus sums up their attitude.

The 'ulama's legalist way of looking at things was a strong support for the intellectualization of the movement, laying latent in the same way as in Christianity – when ideology, language, focuses on the nature of existence instead of the practice of the movement, the result is likely to be a demobilisation of the laymen and more power to the intellectuals. Conflicts between classes and interests were increasingly expressed as conflicts between legal schools which organised the laymen behind themselves.

There appeared however no real cleavage between functionaries and laymen, since the functionaries never organised any unitary and disciplinary organisation to defend their power. They remained linked to local legal schools, madrasa, and local traditions, often in dispute between themselves. These disputes could be exploited by peoples' movements who allied with one or the other of the legal schools. From the fifteenth century they were also exploited by the Ottoman empire into an increasingly fraudulent

[17] Abd-ar-Rahman Ibn Khaldūn, *An Introduction to History. The Muqaddimah*, f.ex. Princeton University Press, 1981.

government bureaucracy in the Muslim core region in Western Asia and Northern Africa.

The other kind was the engaged laymen. They organised in Sufian brotherhoods where the spirit was more important than the legal forms, not unlike the European radical Christian movements. The Sufian brotherhoods were the communities that organised all popular movements which went beyond the local within Islam. They organised sick-care, education, hotels and support for the poor, a kind of alternative society which never challenged the official one. The informalist approach didn't imply that Sufism was heretic in religious terms. Within Islam, lay initiatives were always possible, since the professionals couldn't agree on protecting any monopoly on interpretation.

In Iran, a Sufi brotherhood, the Safavids, made a last attempt to realize the idea of the perfect Islamic society through a peasant-supported revolution in 1501. The Safavids were close to Shi'ism and eager to support this tendency they contributed to an organised clergy, which is otherwise missing in Islam. The Shi'ite 'ulama got resources to establish an independent hierarchy, an independent financing, and an independent power. But like all earlier attempts, the Safavids failed to live up to their pretensions of "the perfect state" and turned increasingly corrupt. The 'ulama were however, thanks to their independence, able to keep their prestige while the Safavid state collapsed.

In Sahel, south of Sahara, Islam was also used as a language for peoples' movements. Islam was taken there by merchants who established trade towns for intercontinental trade during the trade boom of the high middle age, and was adopted by local upper classes who wanted to keep up with the development. Only when the clan societies were exposed to pressure from European slave trade, Islam turned into a concern for the majority. Particularly, threatened cattle-raising and farming communities used Islamic language to express their demands for justice, against traditional aristocracies which they branded as un-Islamic. They established Sufian brotherhoods, which sometimes were successful. They sometimes established states, sometime able to carry through real reforms to the benefit of the majority, but as often they degenerated into new elites, exploiting peasants and cattle-raisers.

When the world market system spread in the Islamic region, Islam was the organising force in what there was of resistance. The resistance was organised as reform movements, where the aim was to weed out later corruption of Islamic practice, like the Christian reform movements in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The ability to resist was greatest in the Islamic peripheries, in Maghreb, in Sahel and in Indonesia, and least in West Asia. The explanation is, according to Lapidus, that the 'ulama in the Ottoman empire allowed themselves to be used as state authorities and lost their popular legitimacy. In the periphery they kept it, and with it their popular base. Expressed the other way, in the Ottoman empire, the popular Sufi movements didn't get any support from the functionaries when they tried to resist, and found it more difficult to use Islam as a mobilizing power. See further in chapter 4 [18].

Not until the late twentieth century, Islam has become a mobilizing force in a big

[18] Bruce Lincoln (eds), *Religion, rebellion, revolution*, Macmillan Press 1985, and Rudolph Peters, *Islam and colonialism*, Mouton Publishers, 1979.

way against the power pretensions of the center. One reason may be that states usually haven't got any pretensions of using Islam for their needs. So the Islamists are free to recall the original Islamic strategy, to capture state power to change the world. But since the state in the world market system primarily is a guarantor of stability, this is a rather ambiguous strategy if change is what you want. More of this in chapter 6.

Indian local communities

The social movements which shattered the empire in India in the eighth and ninth centuries differed from the western movements in a crucial way: they had a much weaker focus on equality and equal value. They struggled for autonomy from the state for the existing civil society and didn't care about that this civil society was built up around class relations, client networks and status hierarchies [19].

To be sure, as early as about the year zero there appeared a close parallel in India to the Christianity and Islam of West Asia. This was the Bhakti movements, broad lay movements among the urban lower classes, based in traditional popular religiosity.

The Bhakti movements were directed against the class and status hierarchies of civil society as much as against the officials of the empire. They condemned for example the traditional rituals which emphasized the importance of the hereditary guild of intellectuals, the brahmins, and which the poor in any case couldn't afford. They were also hostile to the powerful and state supported Buddhist orders which had detached themselves from civil society to organise trade with China or exploit peasants [20].

Buddhism was in itself originally a gnostic protest movement against class and power. But it let itself be coopted early by the state with gifts and authority positions; this was easy because it in the gnostic way emphasized knowledge instead of equality.

The Bakti movements succeeded less well than Christianity and Islam to keep intellectuals' shadow movements in check. I suppose this is because the Indian intellectuals had a strong internal coherence within the brahmin guild, which their western counterparts lacked. The Bhakti movements also didn't dissociate itself as strongly as Christianity and Islam from the tradition where these intellectuals were rooted. For that reason, the brahmins had a comparatively easy task to join the movements in a superficial way, and use their status and traditional powers to take control. They did this emphasizing two elements on the Bhakti program: struggle against the imperial bureaucracy, and suspicion against the Buddhist monasteries. Of course they rejected the Bhakti movements' egalitarianism. Instead, they emphasized the local community's and the group's right against the state and even against society – all to keep the existing hierarchies in place.

The brahmins organised the civil society through the castes, a complex and pragmatic combination of clans and guilds, that now was systematized for the first time. Those who the brahmins couldn't use were excluded, as were those who wouldn't accept the

[19] John A. Hall, *Powers and liberties*, Basil Blackwell 1985.

[20] Herman Kulke & Dietmar Rothermund, *A history of India*, Routledge 1990; Liu Xinru, *Ancient India and ancient China*, Oxford University Press 1988; Romila Thapar, *Ancient Indian social history*, Orient Longman 1978.

brahmins' hierarchic organising. They were declared casteless and refused citizenship in the civil society of the brahmins.

The Bhakti tradition has, in spite of its relative failure, remained alive and functioned through Indian history as a popular form of organising, like the radical Christian movements in medieval Europe and the Sufi movements in the Islamic belt [21].

The Bhakti movements organised around a personal experience of God, like modern Christian nonconformism. Organisatorily, they were sects, and made a sharp distinction between "within" and "without" the organisation. Most of them rejected brahmin claims of superiority, as they rejected caste, or at least refused to acknowledge it. Many Bhakti movements got openly political under pressure, like what developed into Sikhism in Punjab under pressure of struggle against the Moghul bailiffs in the sixteenth century.

Hinduism succeeded with its immediate goal. It succeeded in shattering the empire in India, its taxations and bureaucratic control. After the seventh century, power was local in India, and was exercised through the civil society's reciprocity rather than through bureaucratic hierarchies – though it was the brahmins who manipulated reciprocity in a blatantly unequal way.

But the lack of interest in equality in Hinduism and popular control over overarching social processes would have dire consequences for Indian culture.

The Indian society the brahmins wanted to protect proved unable to resist or even control imperial projects carried through by foreign occupation armies, Central Asian from the eleventh century, and European from the eighteenth. The focus was on the local community; state violence was seen as irrelevant and unimpressionable, like the weather, something for others to care about.

The Indian civil society also developed to one of the most class-ridden in world history. European visitors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – when equality wasn't very developed in Europe either – were amazed at the contrasts between rich and poor and the non-existent public spirit in Indian guilds and castes which readily sold out their countrymen to the occupants. Caste borders not only limited solidarities between peasants and/or artisans, they positively prohibited solidarities between peasant/artisans and the "unclean", those who were not included in the system. [22].

Not until during the common resistance against the British empire during the twentieth century, movements transgressing caste and guild could be built up, see chapter 6. And Indian politics is still dominated by extremely violent group competition, "communalism", which doesn't consider any overarching interests or even principles, since such things have a low standing in the Hindu tradition [23].

[21] J.F.T. Jordens, *Medieval Hindu devotionalism*, and Hew McLeod, *Sikhism*, both in A.L. Basham (ed), *A cultural history of India*, Oxford University Press 1975. Arun P. Bali, *Organisation of the Virasaiva movement*, in M.S.A. Rao, *Social movements in India*, Manohar Publishers 1979.

[22] Fernand Braudel, *The perspective of the world*, HarperCollins Publishers, 1984. About difficulties of cooperation see Ranajit Guha: *Elementary aspects of peasant insurgency in colonial India*, Oxford University Press 1983, and Irfan Habib: *Forms of class struggle in Mughal India*, *Essays in Indian History*, Tulika Books 1995. According to Branko Milanovic: *The haves and the Have-nots*, Basic Books 2011, India was one of the most inegalitarian societies ever, with up to 100 % of the exploitable taken by the upper classes.

[23] See for example Atul Kohli, *Democracy and discontent*, *India's growing crisis of governmentability*,

Christianity, Islam and Hinduism, like the anti-bureaucratic Chinese Taoism, are all called religions, universal ideologies, ideologies about the totality of the world. They are examples of peoples' movements with great aims, which have been forced to answer the ultimate questions to formulate a language forceful enough to meet the oppressors of their time and their self-righteousness with, or – in a traditional language – express themselves in religious terms [24].

They are also examples of the way heavily ideologized movements easily lose their own focus, are caught by unessentials and knit irrelevant bonds of solidarity with new oppressors because of an ideological rather than a social identity.

The tensions between the need for a total language and the danger of false solidarities have continued to guide the peoples' movements after a somewhat straying course, and no solution to the problem has been formulated so far, what I know. The Marxists of the labour movements tried a hundred years ago to come to terms with the trap of false solidarities, with scant success, and for the present it seems that the old ingrained total ideologies are advancing again. Perhaps the problem is insoluble. Perhaps it is necessary for a social movement to use so strong ideologies that they defeat the movements themselves – as it may be necessary to use so strong organisations to protect the civil society that they destroy parts of the civil society. Perhaps liberation always carries a cost. But this is nothing compared to the cost of the alternative.

For the outcome of these movements was very productive. The ancient indebtedness disappeared also – most thoroughly in the earlier Roman empire where it had been most ensconced (Roman law, alone of ancient law systems, gave claims the same protection as all other private property) [25]. And in China, the empire had to reform, to adopt a paternalist stance, in the competition with Taoist and Buddhist inspired movements of which not much is known except in the scripts of their enemies. Slavery faded. And the wars became less exacting. Post-imperial structures were on the whole less oppressive, less inegalitarian, less insecure than the empires had been.

Late medieval democracy movements

The centuries preceding the world market system was an era with very powerful peoples' movement mobilization. One may say that the world market system organised as an

Cambridge University Press 1990.

[24] S.N. Eisenstadt, *The origins and diversities of axial age civilizations; the more modern update* Daniel Hoyer & Jenny Reddish (eds): *Seshat The History of the Axial Age*, Beresta Books 2019; or Ainslie Embree, *Utopias in conflict*, University of California Press 1990. Religions are, according to Émile Durkheim: *The elementary forms of religious life*, Allen & Unwin 1982, first edition 1915, primarily a way of holding together the “group”, the tribe, the clan, the people, through common rites and common sacralization of what is worthy of protection. However, they tend to be intellectualized by pretending things to be “true”, these “truths” are also sacralized and later, when some of them can be shown to be false, cause conflicts and divisiveness. According to Joel Mokyr, *The lever of riches*, Oxford University Press 1990, Christianity was particularly vulnerable to the latter because of the volume and rigidity of these sacralized “truths”.

[25] David Graeber: *Debt, the first 5000 years*, Melville House 2011; Michael Hudson: *Entrepreneurs: From the Near Eastern takeoff to the Roman collapse*, i David Landes et al, eds: *The invention of enterprise: Entrepreneurship from ancient Mesopotamia to modern times*, Princeton University Press 2010.

answer or reaction to this mobilization.

From the ninth century an international trade economy developed on the Eurasian continent, with the trade routes protected by the great Islamic empires. The economy had four cores: China, India, West Asia/Egypt, and Europe. China was the most advanced, technologically and organisationally; Europe, which was a part of the system only in the twelfth century, was the most backward [26].

Both merchant and industrial capital accumulated. Primarily, the trade dealt with expensive goods like spices and gems which weren't too bulky for the available transport means. But meanwhile, there developed a more voluminous trade in textiles, and in China there was also an industrial production of metals and porcelain.

The traditional kind of power based in ownership of land in this way got a competitor, and a support. New hierarchical structures supplemented the old ones. To the aristocratic warlords' claims for day-works, tribute and jurisdiction was added merchants' new, and in the eyes of the people strange ability to make tricks with prices and interests.

Those who suffered from this development were primarily the peasants. While the nodes of trade routes, the cities, grew in affluence, and the surplus was built to cathedrals and mosques, misery increased among the direct producers. Land with decreasing yield was increasingly used for commercial production for solvent markets, for example to graze sheep or cultivate wine, and decreasingly for food for the growing population of poor people. In Europe, mass undernourishment began to appear in the early fourteenth century [27]. In the cities the budding mass production for export led to proletarianization of the direct producers; in the textile towns of Flanders and North Italy no longer independent artisans wove and span, but propertyless workers. China's and West Asia's artisans made it better according to Abu-Lughod.

The economic growth was accompanied by a more authoritarian pattern of power. In West Asia and India warlords took power. China was occupied by Mongols for whom trade and protection of their own privileges were the foremost interest. In Europe state and church began to centralise their power. It was now the church began to burn heretics, almost always poor people who tried to find explanations to and salvation from the misery they had fallen into [28].

In the mid fourteenth century this international structure perished and the trade was broken. Why? There are several theories.

Political theories point to the fact that the trade route over Central Asia couldn't be supported when the Mongol empire split between warring clans and bands of robbers. But there were other trade routes which also dried up without any internal Mongol controversies to explain it.

Demographic theories points to the Black Death, which itself followed the new trade routes, and which killed 25-30 percent of the Asian and European population and hit the trade centers worst. This is the explanation Abu-Lughod prefers. But the great crash was

[26] Janet Abu-Lughod, *Before European hegemony*, Oxford University Press 1989.

[27] Perry Anderson, *Passages from antiquity to feudalism*, New Left Books 1974.

[28] Friedrich Heer, *The medieval world*, , Sphere Books 1974.

in 1340, nine years before the Black Death [29].

Perhaps it was also economically untenable in the long run with an international economy which couldn't export its costs to a periphery but had to be paid by the direct producers in each center separately. Perhaps the increasingly impoverished agriculture couldn't carry such a dazzling superstructure any longer.

Irrespectively of the cause, the lively trade dried up in the mid fourteenth century and the system fell. Immediately, a struggle for the inheritance broke out.

Among the upper classes there was bitter fighting for the shrinking surplus, particularly in the earlier most commercialized areas. In France and Flanders the so called hundred years war broke out between rival groups of aristocrats. In North Italy heavily armed mobs made war to each other with cities as booty.

In the short run – about 150 years – the peoples' movements got the best of it.

The exploitation that followed in the tracks of the international trade had given rise to a popular resistance that grew through the whole middle age. The resistance turned successful as soon as the economy had crashed and the upper classes had lost their instruments of power. The late middle age was an era of democratization, carried by peoples' movements, and an economic resurgence for the direct producers, particularly in Europe and China.

In Europe, the movements were divided but succeeded all the same to maintain a contemporaneousness where the parts strengthened each other. From a scattered beginning in the early fourteenth century they grew to a wave in the mid-century, another one generation later, and a third that lasted the whole fifteenth century with the Husite movement as a climax [30].

For technical reasons I will break up the narrative in peasant rebellions, urban movements, and radical Christian movements.

Villages against landowners

Peasants are, according to for example Eric Wolf "cultivators whose surplus is transferred to dominant ruling groups who use the surplus both to support their own living standard and to redistribute the rest to groups in society who doesn't cultivate but have to be supported for the sake of their particular goods and services". In a social movement perspective it is quite as rewarding to define them as members in agricultural villages or parishes. As villagers or parishioners they are interested in deciding collectively over the rules for work, life and consumption, but they regularly come into conflict with others who think they have the right to do this, particularly the groups of rulers Wolf talks about, for example aristocrats, states and capital wanting to push forth the positions for their exploitation [31].

[29] According to Giovanni Arrighi, *The long twentieth century*, Verso 1994

[30] The medieval rebellions are described by Michel Mollat & Philippe Wolff, *The popular revolutions of the late middle ages*, Allen & Unwin 1973, and George Holmes, *Europe – hierarchy and revolt 1320-1450*, The Harvester Press 1975. Bernard Guenée, *States and rulers in later medieval Europe*, Basil Blackwell 1985, has a chapter about rebellions. All books are narratives with not much analyses.

The villages or parishes – villages are more important in densely populated agricultural districts and parishes in more sparsely populated stock-raising districts – give the peasants access to a public and an organizing with a huge symbolic strength and coherence. Since the peasant is dependent on his village for survival, it is literally impossible for him to desert the village in a conflict with outsiders. But the organisation form has also limitations: it is often difficult for villages to cooperate.

The conflict between villages and outsider upper class elites or routinized institutions always concerns each village separately. Only in a few, but well-told cases, villages have been united over regions or countries in a struggle against a common enemy; this has exclusively happened because the enemies have behaved in consort, or because other movements have created a foundation for contemporaneousness for the villages' struggles.

Since peasant movements are defences of the village against the demands of outsiders, they are always led by the villages' greatest and wealthiest members. These peasant leaders have often been described as rich. But to be rich according to the principles of peasant law is to exercise representative power and have commitments to the village. According to peasant law every right implies a duty, and ownership implies a trust, like power within a peoples' movement in general. For the authorities, on the other hand, ownership and position is just rights, without any claim for returns. The conflict between these two principles, peasant law's ownership-as-a-duty and Roman law's ownership-as-a-right, the struggle goes on up to this day.

During the middle age, the conflict was primarily between the peasants and the aristocrats or nobility; armed mobsters who considered they had the right to seize the villages' surplus and decide over their matters as a reward for the "protection" they offered. During the whole middle age there were constant, strictly local, conflicts between villages and aristocrats about the limits between the autonomy of the villages and the self-assumed rights of the aristocrats. The conflicts were often violent, because there were few institutionalised forms to settle conflicts. The peasants were often successful, by force of their numbers, to keep the aristocrats' claims at an endurable level, but they succeeded less and less well during the trade boom of the thirteenth century.

After the mid-fourteenth century crisis, the conflicts turned more manifest, since the aristocrats tried to compensate for the losses they suffered through overexploitation of the land, through decreasing trade, and through the Black Death, and they increased their demands on the villages. The villages answered with rebellions which in total were rather successful [32].

[31] Eric Wolf, *Peasants*, Prentice-Hall 1966, Victor Magagna, *Communities of grain – rural rebellion in comparative perspective*, Cornell Univ Press 1990.

[32] About medieval peasant rebellions, see Rodney Hilton, *Peasant revolts and disintegration of 'feudalism'*, in Henry A. Landsberger, *Rural protest – peasant movements and social change*, Macmillan 1974. A short summary of the methods is given by Mark I. Lichbach, *What makes rational peasants revolutionary*, in *World Politics* 46/3, 1994 – although the article has an absurdly anachronistic economist bias. Ranajit Guha: *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India*, Oxford University Press 1983, also makes numerous references to European insurgencies that make clear that there were not too much difference.

The demands of the peasants were right to the commons, low and fixed leases, and abolishments of capricious fees. These demands were linked to "freedom", that is legal equality and right to negotiate. The demands were founded in what some have called moral economy, that is, the right for all to at least subsistence and the duty of the society, the village and external elites, to observe this right [33]. The methods were primarily occupation of commons, and sacking and burning of the aristocrat's manor or at least his archives where the duties of the peasants were registered – all local. Ritual insults were also important, says Guha, as a way of paying back and "turn the world upside down". Of course, the peasants didn't always have to use violence, an implicit threat was sometimes enough to make an agreement of some kind. Often, the peasants also resorted to lawsuits but they were not very successful with this.

Another demand that grew in importance was reduction of the state's taxes. This was the main reason for one of the most bitter peasant rebellions of the whole middle age, the one in Flanders 1323-1328, where the peasants in the end lost the issue although they united over the whole country and even allied with the towns' artisans.

A new tax was also one of the triggers of the most well-written peasant rebellion, the English rebellion of 1381. Another was a new law, "Statute of labourers", which gave government support to land-owners who cut down wages and increased burdens. This rebellion was one in a revolutionary wave in Europe that in about 1380 stroke terror in the authorities. Although this rebellion was defeated after having besieged London it is by tradition considered as the driving force behind the freeing of the English peasants from serfdom [34].

In other cases capricious treatment was the trigger. The Jacquerie, the rebellion in Ile de France in 1358, was triggered by military ravages during the Hundred Years War, when the villages' attempts to defend themselves were escalated to a mutual war of annihilation.

The model and source of inspiration for the late medieval European peasant rebellions was the South German mountaineers, who had as early as in the early fourteenth century succeeded in beating off the new aristocratic claims. The mountaineers had, contrary to most peasants, resources since they controlled the passes of the alps, and they were considered by trading towns like Zurich and Bern as valuable allies. When they in 1315 annihilated an aristocratic cavalry, this resounded in all Europe. After that, the mutual movement of peasants and towns were able to liberate the alp valleys from aristocrats

[33] The most famous account is E. P. Thompson, *The moral economy of the English crowd in the eighteenth century*, in *Past and Present* 1971. Another more exhaustive account is James C. Scott, *The moral economy of the peasant*, Yale University Press 1976. The concept moral economy has been and is still controversial. For doctrinary liberals it is offensive that people may have other conceptions about economy than the individualist profit maximising, and for example Samuel Popkins, *The rational peasant*, University of California Press 1981, denies that moral economy exists. An empirical evaluation, to the benefit of moral economy, is made in Nathan J. Brown, *Peasant politics in modern Egypt*, Yale University Press 1990.

[34] There is a whole literature about this. For example one may choose R.H. Hilton & T. H. Aston, *The English rising of 1381*, Cambridge University Press 1984. There is also a chapter in Landsberger, *Rural protest* about it.

and were spared of royal military dictatorships in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. With time however, conflicts grew between villages and towns, the latter's burghers willingly invested in land and considered peasants to be lawful subjects to exploit, so the movement subsided after a while [35].

The Swedish agro-historian Janken Myrdal has mapped where and when the most successful peasant rebellions in Europe occurred. The countries that stand out are Scandinavia, the Alp countries, the countries around the North Sea, and Catalonia. No common criteria tie together these countries. To be sure, peasants have appeared strong and effective in lands where aristocratic war technology was at a disadvantage, for example in the swamps of Ditmarsken and the forests of Sweden. But primarily, says Myrdal, it's about successively developing traditions. In some lands, people came to conceive it as necessary to rebel, while in the others they only conceived it as dangerous [36].

The organisatorically best developed peasant movement, and also one of the most successful, was the Catalan Remensa between 1448 and 1483. It began as a collective negotiation about redeeming some aristocratic caprices, partly using a conflict between the king and the aristocracy. When the aristocracy ruptured the negotiations, the peasants forced their view with arms, supported by country-wide peasant meetings, elected representatives and general conscriptions "one soldier per three families".

The last and biggest peasant rebellion of the era was the German Peasant War, which in 1525 spread from Baden over the whole South Germany. It was the climax of a series of peasant rebellion and it was contemporaneous with radical Christian artisan movements in the towns, which was a reason why they spread over such a large area. Another reason was the fact that it was directed against the government and not only against aristocratic encroachments. For at this time, the German princes were busy creating mercenary armies, imposing Roman law, rising taxes and abolishing the peasant representative concept of ownership. The peasants' demands, as they are summed up in The Twelve Articles, were autonomy of the villages, i.e. right to the commons, right to elect representatives, right to their own law, and freedom from unilateral duties [37].

The German peasants were defeated, but in the lands of the rebellion many of their demands were realized all the same, until the great disaster of the sixteenth century befell also them some generation later.

Artisans against merchants

The communal movement of the towns had two aims. Like the peasants' movements they aimed at maintaining the autonomy of the municipalities against outsider authorities, against aristocrats and against the state. But the same movements also aimed at asserting the internal equality of the municipalities, to maintain the artisans' and workers'

[35] E. Bonjour, H.S. Offler & G.R. Potter, A short history of Switzerland, Oxford University Press 1952. Michael Howard, Wars in European history, Oxford University Press 1976, confirms the decisive achievement of the Swiss peasants in wrecking chivalry, at which "the moral, i.e. social factors" decided the matter.

[36] Janken Myrdal, Medeltida bonderesningar och bondekrig i Europa, Folkets Historia 2-3/1995.

[37] Victor Magagna, Communities of grain, Cornell University Press 1991.

position against the rich merchants [38].

The communal movements of the towns had an origin in the radical Christian peace movement. The core of this movement was the egalitarian treaty between townsmen mutually guarding their town. But during the boom after 1150, the rich merchants were able to usurp increasingly more of the power of the towns. Town after town fell under domination of a few rich families who monopolized the municipal offices and used them to exempt themselves from taxes and give themselves advantages. Instead, they laid the burdens on artisans and wage labourers, of which the latter grew in numbers.

The urban movements were organised in guilds and was strongest and most successful in the most urbanized regions of Europe, in Flanders and North Italy, where the proletarianization was most developed. As early as in the early thirteenth century, Franciscans had to mediate between merchants and artisans in Parma, Bologna, Vicenza, Verona and Milano, resulting in tax reforms. In mid-century the labourers strove in Douai, Rouen, the Brabant towns, and primarily Liège which developed into the revolutionary center of the north Sea coast for fifty years. In the late thirteenth century the movement spread to the towns at the Rhine and to South France. About 1290 the artisans of Flanders rose at one time and demanded democratic rights and egalitarian taxes. This time they were defeated militarily.

Twenty years later, the weavers of Brugge took the initiative to a common Flemish urban rebellion against the French king, resulting in admission to the town councils for the Flemish artisan masters. About the same time, the artisans made revolution in several Italian towns, for example Florence and Siena, and won a place in the council at the side of the merchants. In the mid fourteenth century, the Rhine towns followed.

These partly very successful movements favoured the artisan masters, the urban middle class, who after some fifty years of strife reached their goal in great parts of Europe: power sharing with the merchants. A possible explanation is that the merchant aristocracy had to yield for a strong movement through coopting the moderate part of it. The labourers were left out; they led in the mid fourteenth century as miserable a life as ever and hadn't got more from the artisans masters than these had been forced to give. Their struggle for equality filled the rest of the middle age. Journeyman companionships began to separate themselves from the guilds that so far had organised the movement for the artisan cause.

In two waves, about 1350, and about 1380, the journeymen of Western Europe rebelled against high prices and poll-taxes, and assaulted the town-halls. They had the advantage that the Black Death had reduced their numbers and the supply of labour. Their identity as a separate group had been accentuated by attempts from the masters to close the guilds to new members and made it impossible for journeymen without family connections to get a master's certificate.

A revolt that usually serves as example of worker's rebellion was the Ciompi rebellion in Florence in 1378, a general workers' rebellion against poll-tax, food prices and

[38] Holmes, Europe – hierarchy and revolt; Mollat & Wolff, The popular revolutions of the late middle age; Perez Zagorin, Rebels and rulers 1500-1660, Cambridge University Press 1982.

wage ceilings. In Florence, the merchants had not invited the artisan masters into the council. When they onesidedly raised taxes and prices after a war, the masters hurried to get support from the journeymen to oppose the merchants; these came armed to the hustings of June 18 and turned it into a rebellion.

The palaces were burned, the monasteries were sacked, the prisoners were liberated and the town council was forced to let the masters in. Two weeks later, the journeymen and general workers demanded representation, and when the council refused, the workers sacked the town hall, burned the archives, hanged the executioner and added that the debtors' prison should be closed and the forced loans should be abolished. The council yielded and left power to representatives of the rebels. These introduced a moderate reform policy and demobilized the movement that had brought them to power.

A month later, the general workers led a demonstration to the new council to demand the fulfilment of the program. After a few days of negotiations the reformists let the army loose on the demonstrators. Therewith, they shattered their own power base and the merchant aristocracy took back their power. To avoid repetitions, however, they were careful ever after to keep good relations to at least the more prosperous artisans through a welfare program.

Between 1378 and 1382, the artisans revolted in all urbanized areas of Europe, in Italy and Flanders, and even in peripheral towns like Montpellier and Braunschweig; in Swabia the towns united against the princes, and it was now the Swiss union turned effective. The backdrop was the ruin of trade which made revolts both necessary and possible to carry through, but the triggers were always local.

In Flanders, the confrontation was provoked by a struggle between Brugge and Ghent which threatened the work of Ghent's dockers. They revolted, carried along the textile workers, burned the bailiff's castle, and the local conflict was converted into a struggle between upper and lower classes in both Ghent and Brugge and surrounding towns.

The tie was the solidarity of Flemish weavers. But the exclusivity of the weavers' guild was also the greatest weakness of the movement. Nevertheless, Ghent's artisans were able to reach a compromise in 1358, meanwhile setting an example for other workers and other towns in Netherlands and northern France. The demands were higher wages and lower food prices, taxes weren't paid, in Rouen the merchants, the bishop and the bailiffs were attacked, in Saint-Ouen feudal titles were abolished, in Paris tax collectors and officers were killed, and even small towns refused to pay taxes.

In every town, the movement was spearheaded by journeymen, who forced more wealthy artisan masters and merchants to choose side – but the more the movement went beyond Flanders, the more the focus was on the municipalities' struggle against foreign powers and the less it was on the journeymen's struggle against the burghers. Everywhere, except in Ghent, the burghers succeeded in making themselves leaders of the rebellion to make it into a tool for their own interest. This in its turn disillusioned the journeymen who tended to desert the movement and make it easier for the state to choke it. But the journeymen's struggle for the egalitarian commune went on during the fifteenth century, to conclude in due time in the labour movement – see chapter 5.

The ideological cement – Christian equality

The ideological motivation for the struggles of the late medieval European lower classes was given by Christian egalitarianism and was most lucidly expressed in the radical Christian movements [39].

The core of the radical Christian movements was a protest against the separation of the church from society into a privileged caste. From the twelfth century Cathars and Waldensians, through the thirteenth century Minorites, the fourteenth century Begards, fifteenth century Husites into the sixteenth century Protestants, what gave the identity and popular strength to the movements was the resistance to the luxury and affluence of the clerical hierarchies. As an ideal and an alternative was posed apostolic poverty.

The radical Christian movements were often born within the organisational center of the church. Serious Christians, often people within the hierarchy, reacted against the egoistic praxis of the church and expressed seeking for alternatives. Their initiatives caused debates on reforms, provoking response from lay people who were shocked about the clerical exploitation, life of luxury and siding with temporal powers. The laymen supported the quests for reform, engaging in lay movements for a more serious life, but the more success these movements had, the more they provoked hostility within the clerical hierarchy, which answered with bans and stakes. Standpoints which were answered with canonization when they were expressed by St Francis were answered with death sentences when they were expressed by his imitators. What was considered heretical was not theories but practice: the independent action, the refusal to bow down to the hierarchy.

The stigmatization as heresy usually forced the heretics into growing opposition and radicalism, to forging of radical democratic ideologies and refusal to recognize the authority of the clerical hierarchies in any form. Instead, they raised old documents as authority, primarily the Bible. Some movements, like the Cathars of the twelfth century, cherished gnostic thoughts, while the Franciscan opposition of the thirteenth hunted up alternative revolutionary authorities, for example Joachim of Fiore who talked about the New Era of spirituality and supremacy of the poor which was to break out in 1260.

While the core always was opposition against the privileges and luxury of the organized clergy, many radical Christian movements developed ideologies of their own as legitimation for their opposition, ideologies that set them in a conflict with each other which was as great as their conflict with the established church. The Cathars of southern France and northern Italy considered everything material as sinful and thought that only sacraments administered by sinfree priests were valid – which caused a growing headache since sinfreeness always may be doubted by anyone. The Franciscan Minorites, which succeeded them as a movement, thought that all should be poor since Jesus and the Apostles had been poor – which caused embarrassment when somebody pointed out that the Bible spoke of their "common money fund". The Lollard turned against the Holy Communion as being a needless magic, while the Husites thought it to be necessary.

[39] Gordon Leff, *Heresy in the later middle age*, Manchester University Press 1967; Malcolm Lambert, *Medieval heresy*, Blackwell 1977.

Only the Valdensians avoided hair-splitting theories and kept to the core: the harm and needlessness of a privileged clergy.

The culmination of radical Christian movements was the Husites in Bohemia during thirty years in the early fifteenth century.

The material foundation of the Husite movement was that the church owned half the land in Bohemia, thus challenging both peasants and aristocracy. Another source of conflict was the privileges of the German minority.

The reform movement in Bohemia originally refrained from all extreme standpoints, concentrating on condemning some of the most obvious abuses of the church. This created a broad support but didn't reduce the hostility of the church, particularly since the movement encouraged lay participation. When Jan Hus, the most prominent leader of the movement, was burnt at the stake [40], almost the whole society was thus united in breaking with the pope and organising a church of their own.

The Husite alliance consisted of four actors: the aristocracy, the reformist church hierarchy organised in the Prague University, the artisans of Prague, and the two internally divided lay movements Taborites and Orebiters. What gave the Husite movement its explosive power was the lay movements, offshoots of the Valdensian tradition that had been strong for a few hundred years in southern Bohemia. Their disciplined organisation was well suited for violence; four times it slew the imperial armies dispatched to repress them, and once they slew their equivocal aristocratic allies. For the alliance was brittle. That the aristocrats and university dignitaries in their own interest wanted to check the abuses of the church didn't mean that they favoured the demands of the Taborite artisans: abolition of the hierarchy and nationalisation of the church's land.

In 1433 the emperor and the pope capitulated to the Husite movement and accepted the demands of the moderates. The Taborites were politically isolated and could be repressed a year later by the moderates. With that, the core of the movement was gone, and the position of the moderates was successively undermined to the benefit of the imperial power and other hierarchies.

The late medieval radical Christian laymen were primarily artisans. In France for example, tixerant, weaver, was turned into a synonym of heretic, and in Germany, artisans were also drawn into the radical movements of the Reformation. Only townsmen could create new collectivities and formulate new ideologies to keep these together. This didn't mean that peasants passively adjusted themselves to the views of the hierarchies. Peasant movements referred to enthusiastically as artisans to Christian equality and refused as merrily as artisans to pay tithes. But their tight village communes didn't need any new ideologies to single out and survive, so they didn't need to engage in particular lay movements.

While the radical Christian movements of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries trusted internal or popular reforming of the church, the movements of the fourteenth and

[40] It is illustrative for the mentality of the clerical hierarchy that Hus was executed for stating that the pope must not be obeyed – by a Church Meeting in Constance in 1415 that just had deposed a pope. Disobeyance as such was not heresy, only when it was practiced by lay people and lower clergy like Hus.

fifteenth centuries tended to place their trust in the king, i.e. the state, which should carry through the reform. This was the program Marsilio de Padova put forth for the radical Franciscans in the early fourteenth century, this was the demand Wyclif raised for the Lollards in England in the 1380s, which was taken over by the Husites in the 1410s. And this was the demand that Luther raised in Germany in the 1510s, as if the demand had become a routine at that time. Partly, it was a reasonable conclusion, given that the church should be a function of society and a congregation of all Christians, instead of a separate self-interested corporation. But raising the demand, the movement opened the road to its own political ruin; the royal dictatorships could easily exploit the demand of the movement to create resources for its own self-assertion in the new world market system, without having to care about the egalitarian part of the movement's program.

The late medieval rebellions in Europe were successful for a long time, although they were almost all superficially beaten. Economically – the wages were raised relative to the prices of necessities, favouring artisans and workers, while leases were reduced, favouring peasants. Culturally – the popular dialects prevailed over Latin in most of Europe, as the written language of the church and other public institutions. Politically – the notion that the authorities are a representative of the people was increasingly contemplated even among the authorities themselves, and aristocratic birth was not any longer an imperative of higher offices. And most importantly: the aristocratic claim of owning the peasants was shattered in western Europe. The peasants were acknowledged as legitimate negotiation partners and legally independent persons. For the movements were strong enough for the direct producers to make themselves respected. In Sweden for example, the peasant movements were a necessary ally for any political party aiming at state power – but Sweden was admittedly one of the countries where the peasants were strongest [41]. During one hundred years, the authorities were disposed to compromise, rather than risking violence – until they found the catastrophically effective new strategy that made it possible for it to establish its supremacy anew: the world market economy.

We may speculate about what may have happened if the late medieval movements had been strong enough to resist this social disaster. And we may speculate about what they had needed to do to succeed. But we still suffer from their final failure.

The Chinese revolution

The most successful and unitary movement during the late middle ages however, was Chinese: the Ming revolution of 1368. It chased away the Mongol occupants, it gave back the land to the peasants, it repaired the irrigation systems and planted a billion trees. It discontinued the Chinese participation in international trade – it was a peasant revolution that didn't need such luxuries! – and gave the death-blow to the international trading system. Instead, it initiated reclamation of the Chinese land, and increased

[41] Dick Harrison, *Uppror och allianser*, Historiska Media 1997.

farmed land with 200 percent [42].

Thus it is not unreasonable to say that the successful rebellion of the Chinese peasants liberated the peasants and artisans of Europe and made the late medieval democratization there possible.

The Chinese empire was distinct from its European counterparts. It survived the onslaught on empires in the post-ancient era; it did this in compromising with oppositional movements. The Chinese empire developed a welfare state more than a thousand years ago and took responsibility for the needs of the majority. When the ambition slacked peasants duly organised tax rebellions (against unfair tax practices) or bread seizures (against rising prices) [43].

The backdrop of the Ming rebellion was the hard and racist exploitation the Mongol aristocrats exposed the Chinese to, in the interest of themselves and of the international trade. But the crisis around 1350 also hit the Mongol government, which reacted with increased taxes for the peasants, and harder surveillance of their villages. In addition, high prices had ravaged China for half a century.

The opposition came together in secret societies. The secret society is the traditional of Chinese conflict organizing, that may be followed back to the third century. The secret society was an egalitarian, anti-state organisation where not only peasants but also marginal local notabilities and labourers took part; it organised mutual aid, smuggled salt and other highly taxed necessities, and in times of tension it was a recruitment base for peasant rebellion. The inspiration was Buddhist or Taoist as well as democratic and often anti-sexist. The secret society that led the rebellion against the Mongols was named The Red Turban, Hongying Qiyi [44].

The Red Turban was however never a centralised organisation; it was an ideological movement which encouraged all to rebel against an evil government, and it took part in local rebellions. Many followed its calling and established themselves as social bandits in more or less organised cooperation with the villages [45]. Some of these were more successful than others and took control over whole regions while internal conflicts paralysed the Mongol government; one band based on the coerced irrigation workers of Hoangho took control over Honan in 1351, another conquered Jiangsi and Hunan the same year, another took Sichuan three years later.

The bandit armies were increasingly centralised by the most effective ones. Zhu Yuanzhang, who would established the Ming dynasty, begun as a soldier in one of them, and gained trust within the movement due to military prowess and an uncommon ability to communicate with both peasants and intellectuals. The former were won for the

[42] Jacques Gernet, *A history of Chinese civilization*, Cambridge University Press 1982; *The Cambridge History of China*, Cambridge University Press 1988; John Dardess: *The transformation of Messianic revolt and the founding of the Ming dynasty*, *Journal of Asian Studies* 29, 1970.

[43] R. Bin Wong: *China transformed: Historical change and the limits of European experience*, Cornell University Press 1997.

[44] Jean Chesneaux (ed), *Popular movements and secret societies in China 1840-1950*, Stanford University Press 1972.

[45] About social banditism see Eric Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1969, and below chapter 4.

movement with methods copied by the People's Liberation Army six hundred years later – respect for the rights of the villages and for the peasants' work. The latter were recruited as tightly controlled administrators over the growing dominion of the bandit armies, lured by Chinese nationalism against the Mongols. This willingness to take responsibility and administrate conquered regions gave Zhu's army the edge over other Red Turban inspired bands.

With the transition to a regime in 1368, the movement was petrified. The democratic tradition from the secret societies had already been shredded, to please the intellectuals. The leading Ming functionaries' anxiety for a takeover by these however resulted in a centralised and distrustful terror regime, which paralysed the government within two generations. While the court cliques watched and fought each other, local strongmen strengthened their power at the peasants' expense – while the peasants resorted to their rebellious tradition again. When taxes began to rise again and bigger landowners began to crowd out the smaller in the 15th century, peasants began to turn to irregular trades half outside the law, and increasingly turn to secret societies prone to revolt. Barely legal miners' societies in the mountain were particularly rebellious, and they occasionally united with peasants [46].

But yet – of all the Chinese regimes, Ming taxed the peasants least. Also for that reason, the peasant rebellion was successful.

[46] Jacques Gernet: A history of Chinese civilization, Cambridge university Press 1982.

Chapter 4:

Communities' defence against the world market system

IN THE LATE FIFTEENTH CENTURY, the upper classes of Europe began to forge their new method to take back the control after the late medieval peoples' movement boom. They organised the power internationally and nationally to hit against the popular power which was predominantly local. The method was to accumulate strength through global and national markets and to organise an autocratic state [1].

Since business/capitals/merchants were the kind of authorities that had been most left alone by the medieval social movements, their position within the upper class had been enormously strengthened. This was primarily reflected in the fact that capital accumulation and commodification played a more central part in the new system than in any system ever.

The organisation of the world market system implied great changes in the lives of the direct producers. Capital accumulation was superordinated all other aims. The encroachment of exploiters increased. Their control over work was more direct. Custom was replaced by rules which were stipulated by entrepreneurs and by a state which didn't see any limits for its terrorist power [2]. Popular organisations were forbidden. Death penalty was introduced for innumerable offences, from political unreliability and thought crimes to theft and begging. Moreover, the world market was superimposed as an ultimate, completely unimpressionable power. The working hours were extended while the reward was reduced. "The deterioration was intensified the more one leaves the 'medieval autumn' and continues into the mid nineteenth century", says Braudel. "In some regions in Eastern Europe, particularly in the Balkans, the decline continues far into the twentieth century" [3].

But not only the direct producers suffered. Even states of the Eurasian continents were grinded between rising costs and stationary incomes. Traditionally, taxes were from land which was economically stagnant, while the modern riches came from trade and industry which had better opportunity to shirk taxing. Frank also argues that most of the Eurasian system, with the exception of Europe, had suffered a Kondratiev B phase, partly because rising wealth had been accumulated by too few while the majority had become more impoverished, so there was no demand for all that could be produced [4]

Which may be the reason for the harshness mentioned above.

We Europeans are well aware of the Dutch, English and French revolutions which were all triggered by state bankruptcies or irregular taxation to avoid state bankruptcies. But almost all the big empires – the Ottoman, the Persian, the Mughal and the Chinese – were shattered for the same reasons. The result was not the same, however. Accord-

[1] Charles Tilly, *Coercion, capital and European states*, Blackwell 1990. Karl Polanyi, *The great transformation*, Henry Holt 1944, is primarily about the violence the state uses to prepare the way for markets.

[2] The philosophy of the "renaissance state" has been shortly and succinctly described by H.R. Trevor-Roper, *The General Crisis of the 17th Century*, in *Past and Present* 16, 1959.

[3] Fernand Braudel, *The structures of everyday life*, Harper & Row 1982.

[4] Jack Goldstone: *Revolution and rebellion in the early modern world*, University of California Press 1991. Andre Gunder Frank: *Re:orient*, University of California Press 1998.




Fig 4:1. “The starvation curve” according to Braudel. Wage per hour for a worker in Strasbourg, expressed in hg wheat, between 1400 and 1950. The thickness of the curve marks the difference between good and bad years. The horizontal line marks the starvation limit. Note that the scale is logarithmic – the incomes fell to less than a tenth between 1520 and 1570. Some people have questioned the figures – Geremek consider the figures of the fifteenth century refer to educated artisans rather than workers. But nobody can deny the disaster of the sixteenth century [3].

ing to Goldstone the European revolutions were unique in that popular movements and marginalized, disaffected elites came together in a common, organized quest for a more equal society as a result of the financial crisis. In the empires further east there were both marginalized elites and popular movements, but they rarely acted in common. Rather, the marginalized elites were quite happy to take the place of the rulers, and change what needed to be changed to leave the structure of society as little changed as possible. Accordingly, European societies were strengthened by the revolutions while in Asia the revolutions left societies weakened enough to let the Europeans take over.

This is not to say that there were no popular movements in Asia. There were even movements that were able to change history.

India was admittedly a poor place for popular movement, says Irfan Habib. Not only that ‘peasants’ varied enormously in wealth, there were also the castes which formed more stable identities and solidarities than did the material conditions of the direct producers. The presence of an unintegrated subproletariat of ‘unclean’ ‘casteless’ also prevented poor peasants from defending themselves, about the same way as the presence of Black people in the American south made poor whites a prop of the system rather than defend themselves. But the financial crisis of the Mughal empire left not much choice, from the mid sixteenth century local rebellions multiplied against increasingly avaricious

[5] Fernand Braudel, *The structures of everyday life*, Harper & Row 1982; Bronislaw Geremek, *Poverty: a history*, Blackwell 1994.

tax collections. Successes were few, and rebellions didn't spread much, however [6].

But sometimes caste links could be useful. The numerous Jat caste in the upper Jamuna region around Delhi dominated among the peasants but had also got a small hold among the bailiffs or zamindars; these begun increasingly to recruit their caste brethren as soldiers to eke out their power as the empire waned. Like noble reliance on peasant support served the peasants in Sweden, see chapter 3, it also seems to have done so in India since Jats rose in status and wealth from the 18th century on.

The same Jat peasantry also tried another route. Already in the 16th century Bhakti movements – see chapter 3 – first the Satnamis and then the Sikhs, was formed in the same area. They preached egalitarianism and the uselessness of caste rules like most Bhakti movements, but they also preached presence in the world instead of withdrawal into holiness. And they also practiced communion and common security. Like the Calvinists in the West, whom they were strangely alike, they soon established themselves as an economic power [7].

While the Satnamis tried a revolt in 1672 and were beaten, the Sikhs were first rather encouraged by the state, which saw them as good taxpayers. But with the devolving financial crisis they began to be seen as a threat to royal supremacy. Sikhs began to be persecuted – and Sikhs armed themselves in self-defence.

It was not however the Sikhs as a community who took the militant road, but Sikh adventurers on their private account, who eventually established themselves as petty rulers while the empire fell to pieces. After a while, infighting had centralized a Sikh empire in Punjab – which fell to British guns in 1849. The individualist militarism of Sikh adventurers wasn't more efficient than other military exploits in the end – even if Punjab today is the most prosperous state of India, much thanks to Sikh thrift.

A third revolt, by the Maratha Confederation in Maharashtra, was apparently not a popular movement but dynastic career-making, which utilized nationalist appeals to get a popular following [8]. It will for that reason not be treated here.

The three thrusts, together with regional governors who increasingly established themselves as independent, slowly made the tax-hungry Mughal empire to disintegrate.

The fall of the Ming in China in the 1640s was another result of financial distress. It will not be treated here since what dealt the deathblow was not a social movement proper but an unpaid army – even if the rebelliousness mentioned in the end of chapter 3 continued down to the end of the Ming era and hampered the resisting power of the empire [9]. On the other hand, the replacement, the Qing, was nearly deposed by a huge

[6] Irfan Habib: *Essays in Indian history*, Tulika Books 1995; Ravinder Kumar, *Essays in the social history of modern India*, Oxford University Press 1983. The extreme inequality of the Indian society, and the brake on poor direct producers' self-defence produced by the presence of a huge sub-proletariat of 'unclean' 'casteless' is confirmed by Angus Maddison: *Class Structure and Economic Growth: India & Pakistan since the Moghuls*, Allen & Unwin 1971.

[7] J.S. Grewal: *The Sikhs of Punjab*, Cambridge University Press 2008.

[8] Gail Omvedt: *Reinventing revolution*, M.E. Sharpe 1993.

[9] John Dardess: *The late Ming rebellions – peasants and problems of interpretation*, *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 2, 1972.

movement, and forced to a retrenchment that began the downward slope of Chinese power in the world [10].

In the later part of the 18th century, financial distress forced a tighter bureaucratic control than ever to get the taxes in. Traditional secret societies of heterodoxy and mutual aid were not only outlawed but actively persecuted, not to offer centers of resistance. The policy was successful in the centers of the empire, even if increased ruthlessness from above also promoted increasing corruption among the officials who carried it out. But in the mountainous uplands of the Yangtze tributaries, members of the White Lotus, or Bailian Jiao society succeeded in raising impoverished settlers to mutual defence in 1794, supported by the similarity between Bailian and poor settler worldview and the absence of local gentry or upper-class power. Mutual defence implied tax resistance as well as defence of smugglers and coin counterfeiters, and of course violent clashes with soldiers sent to keep the new order of direct and tight bureaucratic control.

The challenge to the state was as much the greater since meanwhile pirates in collusion with the Vietnamese had begun to haunt the south coast.

Three armies sent to suppress the Bailian inspired movement were defeated, making the weakness of the state visible for all. Not until 1805 a combined military and social strategy succeeded: the empire backed down from its too ambitious bureaucratic program and left much of the local administration to local people.

Which of course in the end did not much to temper the financial distress of the empire – but nevertheless made China less overloaded and more able to survive the European onslaught in the very long run.

European early modern movements

While the living standards decreased and the need for revolt grew, the requirements for success were thus reduced because of the better organised power machine of the exploiters. This caused a crisis for the movement methods which had had their heydays in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, i.e. peasant and artisan rebellions for autonomy, against local authorities and against royal taxes, ideologically fortified with Christian egalitarianism. Braudel even thinks he can find evidence of an evaporated understanding among the poor about their own repression. While many manifestations of conscious identity among the lower classes are documented from the fifteenth century, they disappear almost completely in the sixteenth, doubtless because the new society was difficult to understand and even more difficult to act upon, because of its dependence on international conditions [11].

But the question is whether the political bankruptcy of the radical Christian movements didn't play an even more important part. For the radical Christian program was rendered unusable as a language for creating an identity for the lower classes of Europe when it, deprived of its social content, was used by north European state leaders for nationalist ends. And therefore it was also rendered unusable as a mobilizing language, and the late medieval peoples' movement boom ended in confusion.

[10] Wensheng Wang: White Lotus rebels and South China pirates, Harvard University Press 2014.

Of course, people tried to defend themselves all the same. Primarily by lying low – with tax dodging, sabotage and/or bad work. Direct rebellions were only attempted if the demands of the states threatened survival, if peoples' experience of rebellion was good, if people had allies within the power structure, and if the states for some reason appeared weak, for example after a lost war.

There are three great differences between the early rebellions against the world market system and the late medieval rebellions.

Firstly, peasants and towns are not any longer defending themselves against local aristocracies, but only the actions of the central state and the force of the world market. The struggle is for local autonomy.

Secondly, the implicit class content is almost completely lacking, as is any discussion about what a better society would be like. The aim of the movements are always limiting the encroachment of the state and the world market to the old order (which is generally posed as an ideal). They are rebellions against the novelties of the world market system. They are completely defensive, and the actors are broad class alliances.

Thirdly, the result is uncomparably worse. Collectively, the popular resistance begins to show some positive result only after a few hundred years, as Braudel says, and then only in the richest parts of the system center.

Two principles stood against each other when these broad alliances encountered the new world market system.

On the one side was the autonomy of the local community and its right to its own resources. There was also the right to subsistence for all, and the duty of the local community and its notabilities to guard it against both natural disasters and encroachments from without.

On the other side was the abstraction of the world market, with the new claims by capital owners and states of absolute, "Roman" ownership and sovereignty, respectively, without any duties toward the rest of the society [12].

Roman law had been introduced during the high medieval world market system, and it seemed to be even better adapted to the society of the new age. Except in its view on ownership – an absolute right with no duties tied to it – it differs from peasant law in its view on what a "good law" implies. Roman law emanates from abstract legal principles, and laws must in accordance with this be given by professional bureaucracies which are the only ones who understand these principles. Peasant law emanates from popular sense of justice and is accordingly given by democratic meetings or councils. There is also a third difference: according to peasant law commons have an equally strong protection as

[11] Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age of Philip II*, Fontana 1972.

[12] Yves-Marie Bercé, *Revolt and revolution in early modern Europe*, Manchester University Press 1987; Victor Magagna, *Communities of grain*, Cornell University Press 1991; Perez Zagorin, *Rebels and rulers*, Cambridge University Press 1982; Roland Mousnier, *Peasant uprisings*, Harper & Row 1970; George Rudé, *Paris and London in the eighteenth century*, Viking Press 1952; and Charles Tilly, *The contentious French*, Harvard University Press 1986. C Tilly, L Tily & R Tilly, *The rebellious century 1830-1930*, J.M. Dent & Son 1975 tells something about earlier periods to show the difference. E.P. Thompson, *The moral economy of the English crowd in the eighteenth century, Past and Present*, 1971, and James C. Scott, *The moral economy of the peasant*, Yale University Press 1976, deals with the concept moral economy.

private property, which they have not in Roman law [13].

The most important duty tied to the ownership, according to the peasants, was the duty of the superiors to support the direct producers in time of need. The direct producers had right to food, or reduced taxes and rents in case of a bad harvest, as they had the right to the land-owner's support against intruding foreigners. The superiors were tolerated as long as they fulfilled their duties in a patron-client relationship [14].

So from the viewpoint of the peasant community it was not rebellion when it reacted against the new principles, but protection of traditional law and justice. From the viewpoint of the peasant community the state was the rebel, as it broke the social contract, claiming unilaterally new rights. Often, the protests took the form of legal proceedings, with all ceremonies observed. The boundary line between a humble petition to the king or his representative to observe the rules and keep the law, and a downright rebellion was often drawn only when the army came to repress the local people.

The forms of the movements follow a particular rhythm. Since they are directed against the news of the world market system, these news and their appearance in time decides the form, or the repertoire as Charles Tilly have called the forms that characterize different eras of popular politics [15].

The first kind of movements was the tax rebellions, roughly 1550-1700; the era is pushed forward as the distance from the system center grows. Tax rebellions were the countryside's defence against the absolutist states' new claims for power. They were not only directed against the state's claim of the villages' and towns' surplus, even if this was an evident illustrative of the parasitism of the states; taxes was at this time exclusively used for war and for show at the court, and both were used mainly for repression. They were also directed against the state's claim of regulating what villages and towns previously had regulated themselves. The peasants reacted particularly against the introduction of the authoritarian property concepts of Roman law, but also against the governments' meddling regulation of the religious rites that kept the their identity together. The resistance could also be directed against billeting of soldiers or conscription of soldiers for the states' destructive wars [16].

In a typical tax rebellion, the peasants tried to hunt away the royal bailiff and prevent him from collecting taxes. Variations could occur. If the state leased out the tax collection to a local capitalist, a so-called tax farmer, his house could be pulled down. Or the house where the tax should be payed could be burnt. Traditional feasts, when the people of the district used to meet, were regularly used to symbolically condemn the bailiff to death before attacking him. If the balances of power were too tilted to the disadvantage of the countryside, there was also the possibility of dodging.

[13] Henry Cöster, *Kyrkans historia och historiens kyrka*, Symposium 1989.

[14] James C. Scott, *The moral economy of the peasant*.

[15] The concept is most explicitly dealt with in Charles Tilly, *The contentious French*. Tilly's periodization is tax rebellions 1550-1700, bread seizures and land occupation 1650-1850, and strikes, boycotts, political parties, demonstrations and mass meetings 1800-.

[16] Gabriel Ardant, *Financial policy and economic infrastructure of modern states and nations*, in Charles Tilly (ed), *The formation of national states in Europe*, Princeton University Press 1975.

In the towns, artisans regularly took the lead, but merchants usually followed. The villages always acted together, often with the parish priest as a figurehead. In the beginning of the period, peasants and artisans could ally with local and regional aristocrats, eager to maintain their declining power against the central state. In these cases, tax rebellions could grow to civil wars affecting whole provinces. In England, there was such a rebellions every decade during the sixteenth century. In France there was a constant and shifting civil war until the mid seventeenth century, with complicated alliances between peasants, towns and aristocrats, and the Aquitaine peasants revolted five hundred times during the seventeenth century. In Spain the Castilian towns made war against the king in 1520 to protect their autonomy and lost because they didn't care about allying with the countryside. In 1640 the Catalan revolt forced the government to withdraw from the Thirty Years war and give up its great power status. In Naples, the guilds made a revolution in the mid seventeenth century and proclaimed the Republic. In northern Switzerland, the peasants revolted against the cities about the same time. Tax rebellions triggered the Dutch and English revolutions, and in Sweden we use to remember several rebellions of Dalarna.

The Dacke revolt in Småland in Sweden in 1542-43 may be a model tax rebellion. The main cause was the increasing taxes which went to the king's new mercenary army. Added to this were the increasing bureaucratic meddling: "The Smålanders complained over other encroachments in established law and justice. They were exposed to threats and constant extortions by royal bailiffs. At the courts they were curtly rebuffed when they wanted to testify in favour of some friend or neighbour. There was no longer sanctity of churches; a peasant didn't even enjoyed the privacy of his home", Alf Åberg quotes [17]. But the triggering fact was the attack on the centers of the parishes, the churches, which the king illegally deprived of all their valuables, i.e. the savings of the parishes.

After a year of successful struggles with the king, the peasants made peace, promised by the king that time-honoured law should be kept. As soon as the king had regained from the defeats he took back his promises and attacked the peasants with German mercenaries. The peasants won two points however – they got representation in the Diet, and the king abandoned his tampering with Roman law and kept to traditional Swedish law henceforth.

Most tax rebellions ended like in Småland. The state put down the rebellion and hanged a score of peasants – but often it abandoned some of the innovations that had provoked the rebellion. The states were thus able to force through their increased control, but to a price – according to Giovanni Arrighi such a high price that it in the end turns prohibitive and forces through a system reform. But this system reform also implied that tax rebellions were made impossible. The local notabilities that had supported peasants and artisans changed sides, and the resources of the peoples' movement were cut down to a fraction of that of the state. The state was thus able to build up its bureau-

[17] Alf Åberg, *Nils Dacke och landsfadern*, LT 1960, and Michael Roberts, *The early Vasas*, Cambridge University Press 1968. The same result of peasant resistance in South German petty states is reported by Peter Blickle: *Obedient Germans?*, University Press of Virginia, 1997.

cratic control apparatus and protect its construction of the world market system.

The tax revolts are succeeded by bread seizures, about 1650-1850 in the system center; in Sweden the last bread seizures occurred in 1917 and in the South they still continue, with growing significance after 1975, see chapter 9. They were directed against the centralised market and its regulation of the price of bread according to the law of supply and demand instead of the traditional "just price" that guaranteed the survival of all. Unlike tax rebellions, that could be diffused regionally, bread seizures were always local; they occurred exactly at the sites which were just captured by the national markets, and were spread concentrically around the big cities. But sometimes, bread seizures could occur simultaneously, like in France in 1789, and be of great consequence.

The actor or organiser was the local community, and particularly its lower classes.

"In the food riot's most developed form, mixed crowds of ordinary people gather angrily before the shop of a miller, a merchant or a baker. They complain about prices, seize the food on hand, cart it off to the market square, sell it to all comers (so long as they belong to the community) at a price they declare to be just, turn in the cash to the owner of the grain or bread, and go home saying they have done justice, as the authorities themselves should have done justice", says the Tillys [18]. Good order was maintained, the aims were distinct and thoroughly discussed, plunder and other arbitrariness was forbidden, but merchants who proved treacherous were punished. Women were often leaders, because they were responsible for food purchase and kept control of the prices.

Bread seizures were often momentarily successful. Local authorities accepted the demands of the local community, reduced the prices, stopped grain exports and abolished the market price; they accepted momentarily the right of the local community to maintain welfare provisions against the market. The reason for this was simply, according to Thompson, that they had no choice. The assembled lower classes of a town had more power than any local authority could mobilize.

Meanwhile, local communities defended the villages against privatization up to the industrial age. These defences were also strictly local and were directed against commercial landowners who practiced Roman law against the traditional country law and for example treated commons as private property. The repertoire was in this case that the peasants destroyed the equipments of the commercial landowner and occupied his land – or, according to the peasants' view, took back the land the village had been deprived of. In England, struggle against "enclosures" formed the political consciousness of the peasants during the whole era after 1550, like in France where protests against privatisation became a part of the resistance against the increasing greediness of the aristocracy during the eighteenth century.

Magagna calls attention to the fact that the peasants didn't oppose the market as such [19]. In many places, such as the Netherlands and Scandinavia, the peasants were the

[18] Charles, Louise and Richard Tilly, *The rebellious century 1830-1930*, J.M. Dent & Son 1975, p 17. E.P Thompson, *The moral economy of the English crowd in the eighteenth century*, and George Rudé, *Paris and London in the eighteenth century*, are also about bread seizures. Charles Tilly, *Food supply and public order in modern Europe*, in Charles Tilly (ed), *The formation of national states in Europe*, is a more structural account.

[19] Victor Magagna, *Communities of grain*.

pioneers of marketization. But they rebelled when the market was imposed on them by outsiders in such a way that they couldn't control it to their own advantage. The market was accepted and welcomed only when its principles were subordinated to the principles of community, and increased the peasants' opportunities to survive within its framework. The market was seen as a useful tool but was not allowed to be the master.

There were other methods to show opposition to authorities or exploiters, for example to make so-called rough music outside their houses, make satiric theatre, or in serious cases, pull down their houses. Such actions were quick, direct, anonymous and, according to Thompson, very well-disciplined and well-considered. Movements with non-economic, "political" programs also turn up in the great cities of western Europe in the 1760s – in London, artisans began to speak of "freedom" in the 1760s and in the Netherlands they called themselves "patriots" in the 1780s [20].

The rebellions grow smaller and also more peaceful during the eighteenth century – but Rudé emphasizes that violence against people are always uncommon in peoples' movements. The state and the market grew stronger and more well-organised and usually caught hold of social movements before they have been really threatening for the state. Meanwhile, the local solidarity and autonomy the older social movements tried to protect began to dissolve under the pressure of the world market and the class-division that followed in its track. In the system center, the integration of the direct producers had taken some steps and the relation between them and the state had grown somewhat more civilized than before.

All European social movements during this so-called early modern era were repressed, and the "leaders" were often punished hard, but the state often yielded somewhat for a while. But in alliance with rebellions made by parts of the ruling classes against incompetent, too narrowly based dictatorships, direct producers were sometimes able to assert themselves and radicalize these rebellions far more than the original initiators thought appropriate.

Tax rebellions and puritans

The Spanish-Genovese system, and the royal military dictatorships that had made possible the suppression of the living standard of the direct producers, were annihilated by two popular rebellions – in the Netherlands 1565-1609, and in England 1640-1652. In both cases, the rebellions were led by the upper and middle classes, who also gained most by them. But the direct producers played an important part as the rank and file of the movements. They were rewarded with the beginning integration of the lower classes into society that took place exactly here and eventually led to universal suffrage and the welfare state. In both cases, the Calvinism of the burgher class was the ideological cement of the movement, which contributed to the moralizing form of the integration – bread in exchange of orderliness.

[20] Here we enter a new era with new repertoires that lead forward to our own, according to Charles Tilly, *Social movements 1768-2004*, Paradigm Publishers 2004. More of this in chapter 10.

[21] Henry Cöster, *Kyrkans historia och historiens kyrka*.

Calvinism was an offshoot of the radical anti-clerical movements of the late middle age [21]. Its leading principle was that the organisation of the clergy should be captured by the laymen but be kept intact as a particular organisation in relation to society. The principle attracted the burghers of the economically most well-developed trading towns outside Italy: in Switzerland, in the Netherlands, in France, and in England. This was a way for them to acquire autonomy and establish a collective power, not only counter to the clergy but also counter to the increasingly powerful state [22].

In the mid sixteenth century Spain was the hegemon of the world market system, with interests to watch after everywhere. The revolt of the Netherlands was a revolt against the increasingly strict bureaucratic dictatorship; the aristocracy defended its provincial autonomy, the merchants and the direct producers defended themselves against increased taxes and conscriptions. But the burghers also rose to defend their Calvinist organisation that was persecuted for the sake of bureaucratic standardization [23]. In the beginning, the different parties were not at all happy to cooperate; they learned however soon, since the opposite would have meant common annihilation.

The trigger was a new sales tax; in April 1, 1572, the opposition's pirate fleet occupied a town at the mouth of the Rhine, and town after town rose for defence of the freedom of expression and conscience. The lower burghers were initiators; this frightened the aristocracy which now made peace with the state and gave it resources to fight the rebellion with. Burghers and direct producers had more to lose and less to gain by peace, and went on with the rebellion for forty years.

The material resources of the rebellion were the wealth and navigation knowledge of the towns. They profited from all the enemies the Spanish state, as a hegemon, had to fight with disastrous effects for its treasury. But these conditions were not sufficient; the rich north Italian towns never rebelled although they were subject to Spanish taxation. An organisation was also needed: the Calvinist congregations. Only this could create a liaison between the social classes who were interested in a rupture with the dictatorship. Only this could give a vision to the movement that was deep enough to survive forty years of war. This doesn't mean that the Calvinists were particularly many. Even after forty years of successful rebellion, they were not more than a third in Holland, the core region of the rebellion.

The Calvinist front consisted in an alliance between merchants and petty bourgeoisie. From the beginning they were necessary for each other. The merchants financed the rebellion with money from trade and piracy; the artisans made up the revolutionary army. But while the war ravaged the countryside of the Netherlands, money were

[22] The Calvinist-inspired rebellions of the early modern time are depicted by Perez Zagorin: *Rebels and rulers* and by Wayne te Brake: *Shaping history*, University of California Press 1998. Brake stresses that the Calvinists were rather more important in France than in the Netherlands. They failed to win there, perhaps because they lacked the urban base, and because they were easier to buy off since they were more dominated by aristocrats.

[23] The standard work about the revolution of the Netherlands is Pieter Geyl, *The revolt of the Netherlands*, Williams & Norgate 1932. It takes social and popular aspects easy; and must be completed with Perez Zagorin, *Rebels and rulers*, and with Geoffrey Parker, *The Dutch revolt*, Allen Lane 1977.

increasingly important and the popular support lost out. So the merchants gained more and more power in the Calvinist alliance. The popular party tried to defend its crumbling power supporting different leading generals, who always left their followers to fend for themselves.

But the Calvinist front lasted until the king, worried by bad finances, asked for negotiations in 1607. Then the merchants opted for a compromise while the petty bourgeoisie and the direct producers favoured a continued struggle until the dictatorship was subdued in all Netherlands. The merchants forced through their position and concentrated henceforth in building a commercial empire with a basis in Holland. Their popular opponents concentrated, with some success, in extorting some of the wealth from the merchants, applying to Calvinist justice. This was the way the integration of the direct producers was initiated in the world market system [24].

The Calvinist movement in England called themselves Puritans because they wanted a more radical and pure Christianity. The Puritans were strong among the merchants, tradesmen, artisans and independent farmers who opposed the court and the dictatorship while they took care to distance themselves from the poor, those who were cut out by the world market system [25].

Against the depraved court the Puritans posed Justice. With belief in their own splendid qualities followed effectivity and drive. As early as in the 1620s they dominated trade as well as the streets in the City of London. With effectivity and drive followed a belief that History, or God, was with the Puritans.

The Puritan revolt began as a tax strike. When the Scotch rebelled, and the king had to call for a Parliament to get money, the Puritans dominated the Parliament. Thanks to the powerlessness of the court faced with the Scotch threat, the Puritan Parliament organised itself as an independent power. The leading officials of the dictatorship was caught and killed. Speech and print were let free. An army for protection against the Scotch was organised, but the Parliament kept control over it. The king saw the wind, fled from London and organised a royalist army, while the English Calvinists allied with their Scotch brethren

In the civil war that broke out in 1642, the king had the upper hand for a while, because the professional soldiers tended to support him. The parliamentary side relied for some time on ideologically unmotivated mercenaries, until Oliver Cromwell got his little army of disciplined, armed revolutionaries accepted as the model for a new army, the New Model Army. NMA was soon able to defeat the royalist resistance.

[24] This is the theme for Simon Shama, *The embarrassment of riches*, Alfred A. Knopf 1987.

[25] Brian Manning: *The English people and the English revolution*, Heineman 1976, tells how ordinary farmers and artisans propelled the revolution during its first ten years. Christopher Hill has written many books about the revolution, for example *The century of revolution*, Sphere 1974; his essay *The poor and the people*, in Frederick Krants (ed), *History from below*, Blackwell 1988, is about the ambiguous Puritan attitude towards the lower classes; and his book *The world turned upside down*, Maurice Temple Smith 1972, is about popular ideas during the revolution. W Haller, *Liberty and reformation in the Puritan Revolution*, Columbia University Press 1955 stresses the Puritan care for freedom of expression. Perez Zagorin, *Rebels and rulers*, has also something to contribute.

With NMA, the popular element was strengthened in the movement. The Parliament was dominated by the Puritan upper class. They were contented with breaking the dictatorship and take care of the business themselves. They didn't want any social levelling. But they wanted a top-down organised church to supervise and discipline the life of the lower classes. They organised into the Presbyterian party.

The NMA attracted primarily artisans and farmers who had taken to arms to break the tyranny. They were determined not to let the revolution stop at constitutional niceties. They attacked state-promoted trade monopolies as well as aristocratic enclosures of public lands. They would particularly not tolerate any thought control from the side of the upper class. They called themselves Independents, and NMA was their weapon.

The civil organisation of the Independents was mainly localised to London. It was called the Levellers by its adversaries, and it had been organized in a rather informal way by a few people. The Levellers were more radical than the average Independent, and they claimed an equal part of the power for all. They were the first to demand universal suffrage, even if they eventually compromised on that point, because of fear for the poor. Their main method was journalism. They wrote a countless number of pamphlets and had a weekly paper of their own; they organised mass petitions to the Parliament and demonstrations – organisational innovations that later were forgotten for more than a hundred years. They also began to build up an organisation in London consisting of quarter committees, but they never succeeded to complete it. From beginning to end the initiative belonged to a few with no other mandate than a political conviction.

In 1647 the NMA had got tired of the conservative politics of the Parliament. The soldiers elected delegates, "agitators", to a council that adopted the program of the Levellers, the Agreement of the People, which except universal suffrage contained all the now classic demands of freedom of expression and equality before the law. The unity among the Independents looked like breaking apart when the army leaders hesitated to the radical demands. But then the royalists rebelled anew, tempted by the possible disruption among the Puritans.

The war threat silenced the demands for popular democracy. Partly because the few organised couldn't cope with the tempo, partly because the poor were drawn into politics and frightened the middle class with their demand for economic equality as an addition to the political. So instead, the Independents looked for strong military leaders who should implement the middle class demands. Politics was delegated to them. Popular activities were increasingly limited to agitation in moral and lifestyle matters, and were directed downwards as much as upwards; it is from this time the term Puritan begins to smack of priggishness and self-righteousness. An activist faction of NMA was easily isolated and put down. Lower class movements, like the so called diggers who occupied common land to raise food for the poor, were isolated just as easily.

Based on their economic power, landowners and merchants soon forced the Puritans to break with a popular radicalism they in any case had got afraid of, and pursue a policy in the interest of the moneyed people. English trade was protected with wars against Holland and Spain. Ownership was maintained against the poor. The discontented were quieted with confiscated Irish land. And the wages were raised.

In 1660 the Puritan upper class had discovered that it had more in common with the royalists than with popular radicalism, not to speak about the poor. The monarchy was restored but the royal dictatorship was over. The moneyed interests would decide legislation and taxing hereafter, through the parliament. Most of them deserted Puritanism when they had reached their aims.

The Puritan sects survived as "nonconformists" – Baptists, Quakers – politically defeated but yet a space to breathe for democratic organisation and artisan's self-respect. As such they would influence the peoples' movement boom of the nineteenth century.

Other Puritans emigrated to America, where they in time would create the first democratic republic.

But the main feat of the English and Dutch Calvinists was to defeat the Spanish-Genovese model and the absolute royal dictatorship, and make way for the slow integration of the working people into society. In all Europe echos of the Calvinist revolutions was heard as peasant risings and revolts about 1650, which forced the authorities to concessions and to reorganising the world market system according to the Dutch model, see chapter 2. The price had to be payed by the peoples in the system periphery, but this didn't worry the Calvinists. In relation to the Irish as well as the Malays and the Indians, Calvinists had shown themselves as bloodthirsty imperialists with übermensch ideals (the Levellers protested against Cromwell's carnage of Irish peasants, but no others); perhaps this was easy for people who identified their own case with righteousness and God's will.

Bread seizures and the French revolution

Until the end of the eighteenth century, peoples' movements applied exclusively to tradition and to the good society that prevailed before the onslaught of the world market system. The events that, for good and for bad, would provide the world with a new language for popular revolts and popular movements were the American and the French revolutions, and the Haitian slave rebellion.

These three great revolts together defeated the Dutch system that had ruled since 1648. In all three instances, core groups in the system refused to fall into line, and reformulated the conditions for the relation between rulers and ruled. The solidarity between them was very conscious. The French revolutionaries considered the Americans as precursors and the Haitian as comrades.

The American movement is treated in chapter 6, the Haitian movement is treated below, for narrative reasons.

The French revolution was a struggle between three parties [26].

[26] The triangular drama is best described in Immanuel Wallerstein, *The modern world-system III*, Academic Press 1989. Otherwise, my narrative follows Peter Kropotkin, *The great French revolution*, many editions, f.ex. Schocken 1971, and George Rudé, *Paris and London in the eighteenth century*. C-G Ekerwald, *Frihet, jämlikhet, broderskap*, Rabén & Sjögren 1988, is a short summary with the popular movement in the center. Georges Lefebvre, *1789 The coming of the French revolution*, Princeton University Press 1947, describes the interplay between the social movement and the reformists in the early phases. By the way, Kropotkin's book is

Firstly, a court clique, parasiting and expensive according to its opponents, making the state power ineffective and expensive. This clique had the decisive power in the state.

Secondly, the reforming upper class, with a power base in global trade. They was worried over the rising British power and wanted to get rid of the ballast of the court to make France more effective. They had acted since the early eighteenth century, in the beginning as Free-Masonry, literary clubs and salons, with "enlightenment" as their catchword, and towards the end of the century they had even begun to get some influence in the government.

Thirdly, the direct producers, artisans and peasants, who disliked both of these, but for some time were able to play on the antagonism between them to assert their own interests.

There was yet another party – proletarianized intellectuals, who contributed to formulating the themes of the revolution but whose quarrelsome careerism also contributed to confusion and creating of factions [27].

The revolution was triggered by a growing systemic chaos – see chapter 2. The first great speculative period of the world system era – "Kondratiev B" – broke out after the seven years war 1756-63. The immediate cause was however a series of bad harvests, and the unrelenting decision by authorities to let the market rule the prices instead of allowing a traditional price everyone could pay; this was the origin of the famous slogan "laissez faire" [28]. According to Rudé, food prices rose from 50% of a working man's wage to 85% from 1785 to 1789, with Government applause, and bread seizures followed. Contemporaries talked of a "flour war" as early as 1775, and it grew to a revolution because the government was bankrupt after a war and couldn't afford either to integrate the resistance or suppress it. Instead, it felt forced to summon a parliament which was dominated by the reforming upper class. The game of 1789-1795 may be described thus:

The reformist bourgeoisie took immediately command from the court circles, but they wanted to keep the reform at a comfortable speed. The aim was to make France more effective and the economy more profitable. The court opposed this, from short-sightedness, and threatened with foreign intervention, which made the position of the reformists uncertain. This uncertainty was exploited by the direct producers, artisans and peasants, to force the reformists to concessions, that is, to reforms that were also in the interests of the direct producers. This was partially successful. In case it was not, peasants and artisans were not afraid of making tactical alliances with the court to fright-

an early forerunner of Thompson's, with its insistence of charting ordinary peoples' action rather than "great men's".

[27] Robert Darnton, *The literary underground of the old regime*, Harvard University Press 1982, describes how Marat, Brissot, Desmoulin and the other wellknown people were defeated in the struggle for profitable enlightenment employments and made their best to take revenge on the government.

[28] Florence Gauthier: *Political economy in the eighteenth century – Popular or despotic?*, in *Economic Thought* 4.1, 2015. Gauthier writes about the neo-liberals of the age, the so called physiocrats, and the response they got.

en the reformists. In 1795 the court was so defeated that the direct producers couldn't play on the reformists' fear any longer. The reformists then felt strong enough to take back the whole initiative, and take back some of the reforms that had favoured the direct producers. But they couldn't take all.

When the government convened the Parliament in July 1788, this was a confession of impotence. People thus felt confident to multiply the bread seizures. From May 1789, when the Parliament met, peasants began to seize castles and courts to burn debt papers and other documents where their inferior status was established. In some cases, soldiers made common cause with them. The reformists had to work in this atmosphere.

This countryside movement was directed against all landowners, irrespective if they belonged to the court party or the reformists. Often reformists were more detested because they run their estates more rationally and parsimoniously, at the peasants' expense. The movement followed the pattern from bread seizures and tax rebellions but got a tremendous strength thanks to their contemporaneousness with other rebellions [29].

Paris' artisans and workers, who would set the agenda of the revolution the following years, saw less clearly where their interest was and acted less independently; they were more exposed to influence from intellectual careerists who in many cases dominated the new revolutionary organisations, the sections.

William Sewell has described the difference between the aims of Paris' artisans and the reformists. The reformists wanted to break all associations between people and groups that prevented the competitive market to work to the full extent, and they wanted to make ownership power absolute. The artisans, educated in guilds and companionships, wanted to break all associations that maintained the privileges of the rich against the "people", the united guilds, and they wanted to make ownership responsible to the people. They had no heart for the individualist competition of the reformists; their principal demand was regulation of prices and wages to their "just" levels. Only after several years the artisans discovered that the reformists didn't mean the same thing with "separate association" as they did, and tried to win a platform of their own. But at that time it was too late [30].

In the early days, the Parisian direct producers sided wholeheartedly with the reformists, against the court. For example, the seizure of the Bastille in July 14, the event that all parties acknowledged as the defeat of the court, was an attempt from the artisans to seize arms to protect the National Assembly against a threatening coup of the court. The Paris' women's march to Versailles in October 4 was partly a demonstration against the high prices of bread, partly a direct attack against the court; the women simply brought the court to Paris to have it better under the eyes of the people.

The indirect alliance between reformists and Paris' artisans was strengthened by the activities of the common foe. The court had made Paris its main enemy, and the Prus-

[29] The revolution in the countryside is covered by P.M. Jones: *The peasantry in the French revolution*, Cambridge University Press 1988.

[30] William Sewell, *Work and revolution in France: The language of labor from the old regime to 1848*, Cambridge University Press 1980.

sian and Austrian armies which approached to help the court in 1792 bragged openly about their plans to take revenge on Paris. The result was panic. The Paris artisans made revolution anew, deposed the municipal government, and sentenced two thousand people to death in provisional people's courts for collaboration with the court and the Austrians. The reformists were completely overrun. They were also forced to the defensive because of bad finances; many of them had their main interests in the plantation economy, and this had been shattered in the meantime by the Haitian slave rebellion.

The rebellion of the slaves was thus a direct precondition to the popular movement's relative success during the French revolution. Together, they were the most advanced peoples' movement North-South solidarity ever.

But the target for the artisans' resistance remained the court.

The peasants were freer in their relation to the reformists. The seizure of the Bastille was an example to emulate, but the peasants decided themselves the direction of their politics. At first, they had allied more or less with the radical reformists, burnt tax registers and pulled down castles – but as time went on and the revolutionary governments cared more for landowners' rights than farmers' and more for taxes and military recruits than for local needs, the feeling of the countryside for the revolutionaries grew decidedly colder.

The first open rebellion against the reformists in the government broke out in Vendée in 1794, after the government had decided that the village meeting should be replaced with a municipal council with a census to stop all but the wealthiest, which would have the right to sell the commons and share the profit between them. Another reason for the rising was conscription and meddling in church matters; in Vendée, the parish was the organisation of the countryside. The rising led to a tactic alliance between the peasants and the court and to a cold war between urban revolutionaries and peasants which was to last for almost two hundred years.

The war against Austria and Prussia, that had been provoked for different reasons by court and reformists, went on badly in the beginning. The reformists had to appeal to the people, and the people demanded rewards for its help, in the form of universal suffrage, price control, and social legislation. The common effort resulted in victory, and in the escape of the court. When the reformists weren't afraid of the court and its foreign allies, they didn't need to buy support from the people. The universal suffrage, the price control, and the social legislation were abandoned (except the price ceiling for bread, that was in force until the 1970s!). The weapon they used was the tools of violence facilitated and made possible by the war. When the people tried to take back their gains, they were met by terror and by Bonaparte's military dictatorship. But the gains of the peasants, freedom from landed proprietors, would never be challenged. Even today, the French country people is the politically strongest in Europe.

The reformist bourgeoisie got a grip of development with Bonaparte's coup d'etat, and they used it to take up the fight with Britain about the system hegemony. This struggle went on for twenty years of war, and meanwhile the states' grip on people and local communities was strengthened as never before. It was now that mass armies for the first time demanded complete obedience for all, and marked the demand with standardiza-

tion of the language. Before, the states had been content if people had not revolted, now they demanded support. But this gave the majority a bargaining power towards the state for the first time, and despite the defeat of the popular party in the French revolution, popular movements would be able to assert the citizenship principle, with some hope of success. Despite the fact that eighteenth-century-like bread seizures would be the most common repertoire of peoples' movements yet for two generations, this was to be put into a new context, one that emphasized the citizenship and a demand for influence on the state [31].

For the events during the French revolution brought home the take-over of government as the core of societal change, and established the nation as the scene. Henceforth, all movements were national. Not even the labour movement succeeded to break out of this pattern during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, despite persistent attempts to drive in the principles of internationalism and "the liberation of the working class must be its own work". The problems this caused are highlighted in the following chapters 5 and 6.

The peoples' movements struggles at the side of the reformists would also have consequences during the following centuries. The popular movements would for example accept the reformists' ideological struggle for "rationality" and "development" as their own. Or expressed in a different way: it was now the "left" was formed as a somewhat confused alliance between those who were for equality and for development. In analogy, the "right" was formed by those who were against equality, for example the capitalists, or development, for example many peasants. The result of this was not only that social movements disowned their own interests, as for example when the system center's labour movements accepted "scientific" management, or when the system periphery's anti-colonial movements enthusiastically accepted western "modernity" [32]. The result was also that the social movements in the system center betrayed the social movements in the peripheries and accepted the assaults of the center as "progressive", both if this referred to the North's power over the South or the cities' power over the countryside. And the result was also that popular movements warred eachothers, many times for no objective reasons, as when the labour movements in modernist arrogance forced the peasants in the arms of the workers' enemies, to the ruin of both. One example of this is when the Mexican labour movement during the 1910s helped the bourgeoisie to make war on the peasant movements, only because they thought that the peasants were "backward" and "uncivilized".

These are weaknesses that still impede the effectivity of the peoples' movements.

[31] Charles Tilly, *Coercion, capital and European states*, Blackwell 1990.

[32] James C. Scott: *Seeing like a state*, Yale University Press 1998, condenses the themes of "modernism": since there are scales of economy in industry, everything big is good, and since top-down organizations can't deal with details and intricacies, these must be abolished. "Modernism" transgresses other ideologies, Smith tells how Soviet forced agricultural collectivization was conceived in a small-talk between Soviet ministry functionaries and an American grain billionaire. The latter impressed the Russians with stories about what one can do if only all the petty details are abolished; since they both were top-down inclined they had much to agree about.

But there were also made experiences of great value. The revolution showed that positive changes were possible through popular struggle, and it showed this over the whole system, not only in France. It showed that it is possible to formulate popular aims in new ways. The aim was no longer only the "old just society" before the world market system, an aim that had showed itself to be complete unable to protect the moral economy of the peasant law and the space for spontaneous expressions of life for the majority; it was a completely new society, based on liberty (political participation and social security), equality (down with all privileges), and fraternity (mutual help and solidarity). It showed that popular organisation is possible at the national, not only at the local level. It showed that popular movements can go beyond what popular movements have aimed at before, to demand hegemony and not just protect its local autonomy against an unchangeable authority. And with success; in the new world order that Britain organised after revolution and Napoleonic wars, countries and states were not owned any longer by dynasties but by nations, let be that in the beginning only the property owners counted.

But revolution showed primarily that ordinary people counted for something, that equality was not just a phrase the upper classes could display when they needed to take back when they didn't. Artisans, workers and peasants organising themselves and chasing back invading armies was an experience that later peoples' movements would derive advantage and inspiration from. The French revolution made a new agenda for peoples' movements over the whole world, an agenda that showed itself to be effective for almost two hundred years.

The system periphery: peasants against the colonial state

The successes for the direct producers in the system center were bought for a price that had to be paid by others.

The world market system is, as emphasized above, a system that is stratified according to class and geography. Its beneficiaries live not just by exploiting direct producers. They do it in such a way that surplus flow from the peripheries of the system to the center. Partly, it was this flow that made it possible for the rulers of the system to yield to the European social movements, reduce the exploitation and begin to buy the participation of the direct producers with higher wages and safer living conditions after the Calvinist revolutions, and even more after the French. But the precondition was that the wealth flows from periphery to center went on without impediments. It was quite natural that the direct producers of the peripheries didn't take part in the integration. And a precondition for that was that their bargaining power was weaker than the bargaining power of the direct producers in the center. And so it was [33].

Several factors contributed to this.

[33] James C. Scott, *The moral economy of the peasants*, have listed the causes I refer to. – In some cases, for example north America, Siberia and West Africa, great parts of the population were able to profit from the world market system and sell products to it, for a while. The price for that was that their economies were adapted to an increasing dependence of a capricious foreign trade. See Eric Wolf, *Europe and the peoples without history*, University of California Press 1982, and L.S. Stavrianos, *Global rift*, William Morrow 1981.

Firstly, the adjustment to the new system was carried through in a much shorter time and was for that reason more disrupting. The change from a solidary village production for subsistence to commercial agriculture for the world market, which in western Europe had taken a few hundred years, was telescoped into about a generation, at least in those peripheries which were incorporated latest. Artisanry was outcompeted by mass production in about the same time space.

Secondly, the bureaucracies of the system center were so much more effective in collecting taxes than the dynasties that preceded them in the peripheries, who mostly had relied on indirect or informal control over the villages. It was among other things – see chapter 2 – this effectivity that gave the European states the edge in the struggle about global power. For the peasants, the effectivity implied that old loopholes were stopped up and that the tributes relentlessly had to be delivered in bad years as well as good. And for the peasants, this would sometimes make the whole difference between survival and death [34].

Thirdly, the difference between peasants and authorities was so much greater in the system periphery. In the periphery, only the authorities had access to the tools of industrial society, in the form of weapons, organisation, and communication. In the system center, the resources were more evenly distributed.

Fourthly, the changes in the periphery were carried through by foreigners. This had three consequences. Firstly, the administrators of the system had often limited knowledge about the society they were supposed to govern; for that reason they acted more carelessly towards the civil society than the system demanded and caused unnecessary mischief, and misinterpreted Asian or African phenomenons according to European patterns and demanded that the people go by that. Secondly, they were not, as local rulers would be, dependent of the local people's consent; no considerations would be needed to temper the brutality, and a paternalistic rule was replaced with a profit maximizing one. And thirdly, the whole process was ruled by mechanisms that were inaccessible for the affected direct producers; while it was possible for the farmers of England to open some kind of dialogue with the merchants of the City of London, to mitigate the consequences for the former, this was impossible for the peasants of the Bengal where the consequences were spelled out to the full in the form of starvation.

As a whole, this implies that the disorganisation for the direct producers was worse in the system peripheries than in the center, and that it was tougher for the direct producers in the peripheries to defend themselves. But the differences also created different peoples' movement manifestations.

Firstly, the conflict was more intense. While civil societies in the system center were able to live with its rulers in a state of struggle and cooperation, their counterparts in the system periphery were characterized by downright dissociation. Increasingly, this disso-

(34) James C. Scott, *The moral economy as an argument and as a flight*, in Adrian Randall & Andrew Charlesworth (ed), *Moral economy and popular protest*, Macmillan Press 2000. – The consequences of the rigorously imposed tributes are best described in Mike Davis: *ate Victorian Holocausts*, Verso 2000. About 50 millions starved to death 1875-1900 due to a mixture of world market prices, colonial taxes, relinquishing of paternalist protection, ignorant colonial administration, and drought.

ciation was interpreted in national terms – see chapter 6.

Secondly, in the system peripheries the prospect of alliances were broader than in the center, since fewer profited from the system in the peripheries. In due time, it was from these broad alliances the anti-colonial movements were built up. During the opening of the era, there were many risings led by representatives of old hierarchies, risings that were built on traditional solidarities beyond village level. As in the system center, it was always possible for the colonial authorities to bribe some people in such traditional hierarchies, by letting them act as middlemen; without such middlemen the peripheralization would have been impossible. But this strategy was less successful than it was in the center.

In the system periphery, there were also other early forms of resistance that were results of the innovations coming from the outside and by violence, rather than by an internal development within the traditional ruling class [35].

One form was to take to the woods, to withdraw from the system. This was easy in the beginning; the backwoods were extensive and the new power was somewhat patchy. In time the system spread and those who had withdrawn were more pressed. Such groups were then often cores of resistance movements, since they had more self-respect and greater pretensions than those peasants who had stayed behind and been tamed by the colonial state.

Another form was social banditism. Discontented groups withdrew from control of the system but returned regularly to attack and plunder its representatives, based in traditional morals. They were often supported and helped by peasants who had stayed within the administration's realm, and if the political situation was unstable, the social banditism would expand. But as a rule, this was a resort for a small minority, a kind of vicarious activism like Greenpeace in our time [36].

A third form was the military revolt, in the early days based in traditional loyalties and, when these had spent their force, in religious awakenings. These revolts were easily repressed. They used traditional forms of conflict, i.e. traditional war, and warmaking was what the central powers were most effective at. The strategy of the revolt was always to keep the penetrating system out, not to defeat it, which meant that the world market system could utilize the local limitations of the revolts to defeat them one after another.

A fourth form of resistance, used against the forced labour that was laid upon the colonized peoples, was go-slows. Bad work, deceitful sabotage and other kinds of everyday resistance are of course traditional resistance forms against all kinds of rule. But in the system peripheries they could be used by the whole civil society, thereby obstructing capital accumulation and convincing the colonizers about the stupidity and indolence of the colonized.

Forms that were used in the system peripheries as well as in the center was tax

[35] A systematic exposition is made by Allen F. Isaacman, *The tradition of resistance in Mozambique*, University of California Press 1976.

[36] Eric Hobsbawm, *Bandits*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1969.

rebellion, bread seizure and occupation of land that had been stolen from the villages by commercial landowners.

This chapter is a systematization of early peoples' movements in the system periphery. It deals with the self-defence of the local communities. Offensive attempts at self-assertion in the world market arena is not portrayed here, it will have to wait until chapter 6.

It may be pedagogic to proceed from the successive waves of spreading of the world market system, this is to say:

- During the Spanish-Genovese era, South and Central America, and Eastern Europe.
- During the Dutch era, the Atlantic coasts or the Caribbean and West Africa, and the so-called East Indian islands or the present Indonesia.
- During the British era, the rest of the world, in the order India (1750-1850), West Asia and North Africa (1800-1850), South East Asia (1860-1900), Africa and China (1880-1920).

America

The Indian societies in South and Central America were the first to be connected to the world market system as a periphery. Their role was primarily to deliver metals. As we remember, it was with American gold and silver Genova was able to dominate the European economy during the sixteenth century.

America was terribly devastated. Most important was not that the Americans were forced to slave labour in the mines and to forced deliveries of the food that the mines demanded. It was not even that the conquerors established themselves as a new ruling class to be supported by tributes from the direct producers. The most devastating was that the conquerors replaced the horticulture in the American heartlands Mexico and the Andes with European-type agriculture and stock-farming, which reduced production per acre and resulted in starvation. Meanwhile, the American collective production and trading networks were destroyed, and the American culture was declared illegal. This is why the resisting power to the new Eurasian diseases was so much reduced that population dropped from 50-100 millions in 1500 to about 10 millions in 1600 [37].

The conquerors took over the system for tribute that had been created by the Aztec and Inca empires, and parts of the local ruling class were coopted into the Spanish aristocracy. The burn-beating peasants of Central and northern South America were hardly affected by the conquest, and if they were it was easy for them to move further out in the woods. The same applied the hunter and fisher people. If necessary, they defended themselves. The most famous examples are the Maya defence against the plantation economy at the Yucatán that went on, now and then, until the early twentieth century,

[37] Since the Americans didn't keep any national registers, the population figures before the conquest is subjected to violent speculation. Figures between 10 and 120 millions have been put forth and any consensus seems far away. The scrupulous Braudel distrusts the extremes, avoids fixing himself to a figure, and establishes the terrible depopulation (Fernand Braudel, *The structures of everyday life*). Eric Wolf, *Sons of the shaking earth*, University of Chicago Press 1959, and *Europe and the peoples without history*, are my sources for the explanation.

and the Mapuche and Araucan defences in southern Chile which carried on until the late nineteenth, supported by a selective use of European technology [38].

The great conflicts began only in the mid sixteenth century when the colonizers discovered minerals in America and imposed new forced labour. By then, immigration of Europeans had gone far enough to permit a stricter control of the population. The peasants reacted with taking to the woods and local rebellions.

During the eighteenth century some thirty local rebellions are registered in the Mexican state of Oaxaca. They are directed against new taxes, against attempts to infringe upon the village borders, and against punishments. The revolts are short. When the representatives of the authorities are chased away or killed, and when the authorities' buildings are burnt down, the peasants return to their fields. Even if the Spaniards are hated as a ruling class, there are few signs of Indian solidarity between villages; each village is a world of its own. Oddly enough, the authorities treat revolting peasants leniently. It is more important for them that they go on working and paying their taxes than to kill them [39].

Only in the eighteenth century, the revolts begin to be regionally coordinated. Most common are radical Christian movements characterized by peasant ideology, directed against the church's cooperation with the colonial authorities, and favouring the Gods of agriculture. But also movements against forced labour were able to spread. By then, the government control begins to be effective, and by then waged labour begins to create a proletarianized Indian town culture able to build links between villages. The most famous regional rising is the one that spread over southern Peru and Bolivia in 1780-82 [40].

A generation before, peasants who had taken to the woods had tried to start a greater rising in southern Peru, with the Inca tradition as unifying symbol for "the good old days" before the world market system. They had no success in the Andean valleys, where the military presence was strong, but neither were they totally repressed. They were able to keep a tradition alive in the Amazonas as a reminder that there was an alternative to the Spanish rulers.

The years 1780-82 there were two contemporaneous rebellions, triggered by a rise in the sales tax.

The rising in southern Peru built on the tradition from the 1740s, that great parts of the Indian upper class now had attached themselves to, despite the fact that they were well integrated landowners and Spanish aristocrats. The movement developed an anti-Spanish, Indian-nationalist policy; Indian culture was favoured but the needs of the peasants were seen as of secondary importance; the taxes remained but went to the rebellious army and the Indian state.

The rising in Upper Peru, or Bolivia of today, was a peasant rising. Taxes and dues

[38] John E. Kicza, *The Indian in Latin American history*, Jaguar Books 1993.

[39] William B. Taylor, *Patterns and variety in Mexican village uprisings*, in Kicza, *The Indian in Latin American history*.

[40] Steve J. Stern, *Resistance, rebellion and consciousness in the Andean peasant world*, University of Wisconsin Press 1987.

were abolished and the land of the landowners were distributed to the villages.

Conflicts soon appeared between the two risings, and the nationalist faction in Cuzco and the peasant-democrat faction in Upper Peru could never unite on any common goal. In the end, the Indian-aristocratic feared the peasants enough to support the colonizers armies and made peace, on the condition that they helped to surrender their more radical allies.

To this day, the political program of the peasant movement is an inspiration in Bolivia, and its center is the strongest center of the peasant movement of today. To this day, the blockade of La Paz in 1781 is an inspiration as an action model; in 1979 the peasant blockade of La Paz was the triggerer of the first organised cooperation between peasant and labour movements. In Peru, the peasant movement is still weak and Indian culture and Indian people are more despised than in any other American country.

The Indian peasants took almost no part in the South American independence movements in the early nineteenth century, which for that reason almost never considered peasant needs. The Latin American independence movements were a social counterrevolution directed against the Indian peasants. Indian rights as well as Indian duties were abolished during the swift commercialization of the nineteenth century. For example, in most countries the collective ownership of the land was formally abolished, the peasants had to prove their individual ownerships or be evicted. In Mexico about 60% of the peasants lost their land to plantations and ranches. The period 1870-1920 was according to Kicza the most repressive in the American history.

Central and Eastern Europe

The Central and Eastern European peasants had been the freest and wealthiest during the middle ages. They were enslaved between 1550 and 1600 by an aristocracy that saw the possibility to sell grain to the West-European system center from effective grain plantations. The peasants' villages were stolen, their rights were abolished, and their defence against this was incredibly much less effective than other peasantries'. Since the states and the towns had been weak in Poland and Germany there were no alliance opportunities against the plantation owners, says Urwin, and the resistance of the peasants was restricted to each village where it could easily be put down [41]. Besides, it was on the overarching financial control of this process the Dutch merchants grew strong enough to defeat the Spanish-Genovese supremacy, and one could say that it was because of their inability to challenge this control the Dutch direct producers remained subordinated to the merchants.

Only in Russia, peasants in the fringes of the realm were able to organise resistance,

[41] Derek Urwin, From ploughshare to ballotbox, Universitetsforlaget 1980. – Literature on possible peasant resistance in Central Europe seems non-existing. Willliam Hagen, Village life in East-Elbian Germany and Poland 1400-1800, in Tom Scott (ed), The peasants of Europe, Longman 1998, says nothing of resistance, which is a common feature in other chapters of the book. Bronislaw Geremek refers in a private letter to peasant movements before 1550, i.e. before the establishment of grain plantations, and during an era when there were few difference between East and West in Europe. It may be so frightening that the Central European peasants completely lacked defence against what befell them. I would appreciate proofs of the opposite.

half beyond the reach of the ruling class and state.

Russia was attached to the system in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as deliverer of fur, flax, and hemp. But Russia kept a distance, says Braudel, building a strong state able to rise walls around the country. Obviously, Russians had seen what happened in Central Europe and tried to avoid the same thing happening to Russia.

For the peasants, the results didn't differ much compared to what happened to their Central European colleagues [42].

The Russian state that was organised, according to European fashion and provoked by the European state system, imposed for lack of capital upon the peasantry to work for nothing for the new bureaucracy. A ban on moving was gradually imposed during the seventeenth century, to prevent the peasants to move away from forced labour and taxes. The ban on movement slipped gradually into slavery. The keystone of the building was built in 1767 when peasants were prohibited to complain about the treatment [43].

The Russian peasants answered to this development in three ways: with strikes, sabotage and risings in the villages, with escapes to the borderlands, and when the surveillance was gradually sharpened, with rebellion. Four great rebellion movements during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have become legendary; between these there were lesser tax rebellions every other year. The local rebellions were always directed against serfdom, which made it impossible for peasants even to negotiate on taxes and labours, while the great movement had more many-sided aims and were directed against the government as such [44].

The first great movement occurred in the exhaustion after Ivan the Terrible's desperate state-building. It was similar to the simultaneous tax rebellions in Western Europe so far as that peasants and aristocrats united against the regime. What differed was that the numerous social bandits kept control over the movement; the result of this was however that the aristocrats deserted the movement in crucial movement, after which the movement could be defeated.

The second movement had as a core the peasants who had fled from the central parts of the country to the unorganised region around Volga and the Don. They lived there as so-called Cossacks in independent cattle-raising communities, but were threatened by the encroachment of serfdom and state when the world market system expanded. Other participants were non-Russian nationalities and poor townsmen at the Volga. The serfs answered willingly with chasing away landowners when the Cossack army approached.

The rebellion was directed against landowners and bureaucrats as the representatives of the state. It was also directed against the world market system in the guise of western-inspired innovations and experts. The rebellion was never successful in the central parts of the realm before it was defeated by a regular army, but the rebel leader Stenka Razin won the distinction of being the most sung-about hero in the whole Russian ballad literature.

[42] Fernand Braudel, *The perspective of the world*, HarperCollins Publishers, 1984.

[43] Jerome Blum, *Lord and peasant in Russia*, Princeton University Press 1971.

[44] Paul Avrich, *Russian rebels 1600-1800*, Schocken Books 1972, and Roland Mousnier, *Peasant uprisings*, Harper & Row 1970; see also Victor Magagna, *Communities of grain*.

The third movement was limited to the Don area and its Cossacks. This happened when the state began to regulate their country, and their inability this time to organise alliances led to a swift defeat.

The fourth movement had its center in the Ural and was spread over the Volga valley. Also this rebellion was led by Cossacks and peasants who had fled from the center; religious minorities like the antistate old believers, national minorities and workers of the Ural mines and metal industry were also active. The inability to keep it all together around a program showed itself to be the greatest weakness of the movement.

This last rebellion was the first to have any positive effects, like reduced taxes, but the peasant resistance to serfdom continued. Between 1826 and 1854 official sources estimate 556 local peasant rebellions, all against serfdom as a system. Only in 1861 the interests in integration outweigh the interest in control so much that serfdom was abolished. But since Russia never was attached to the system center, there were never resources enough to solve the land question for the peasants in a way that permitted continued exploitation. For that reason, the land question is still charged in Russia. The last peasant rebellion so far in the 1930s only led to temporary concessions from a state that had no other interests than qualifying into the system center.

South East Asia

The Dutch system built on a very limited and economical use of violence. Only commercial competitors were attacked. So the control by the Dutch East India Company, VOC, was mainly financial and depending on alliances with established rulers [45].

This didn't prevent others within the local upper class to resist VOC's efforts for monopoly, if they had been marginalized in the process. In the 1640s for example, people from the Moluccas almost overcame their local patriotisms to throw out VOC and their middlemen; it took the Dutch ten years to repress them. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries VOC had to fight local rebellions at Java, and on two instances they almost bankrupted as a result. The rebellions seem to have been broad alliances but they were controlled by local upper class factions who were no longer prepared to sell monopoly rights over foreign trade. Meanwhile, the coast towns resisted the colonial rule in the form of Muslim revivals, but they never reached majorities. Only in the nineteenth century, when the Dutch had begun to meddle more direct in the administration, the peasants engaged in rebellions in the form of religious revivals.

The slave plantations

One important building stone in the world market system, perhaps the most important at all, was the Atlantic system, or the Triangular trade – the trade with African slaves and tropical monoculture crops raised by them in the Caribbean. The system was introduced by Spaniards and Portuguese in South America, but in the seventeenth century, English

[45] M.C. Ricklefs, *A history of modern Indonesia*, Macmillan 1981; Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Protest movements in rural Java*, Oxford University Press 1973, and Ira Lapidus, *A history of Islamic societies*, Cambridge University Press 1988.

and French financiers threw themselves into the opportunity to compete with the VOC through accumulating capital in slave trade and cultivation of sugar, cotton, coffee, cacao and other crops, with slave labour [46]. The main crop was sugar, whose low price and high energy content made it convenient for cheap food for European direct producers. The second crop was cotton, essential for the developing edge industry of the early 19th century [47].

The slaves were caught in commercial war businesses, organised by West African coastal communities, and were bought by European merchants. The African sellers gained much from this for a while and used the proceeds to build up elitist states and trade companies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They had to pay for it in the mid nineteenth century, when the Europeans succeeded in organising the victim peoples against them to establish their own colonial empires.

The Africans who survived the passage over the Atlantic developed several techniques to defend themselves against the mostly brutal regime at the plantations.

The most elementary method, the one all slaves were engaged in, was to guard their collective identity with an African inspired culture. They organised self-help and religious ceremonies, created music, new family relations and developed their own dialects.

Almost as elementary was to develop the everyday resistance. Slow work and sabotage are typical products of the slavery institution. To make oneself scarce, both as elementary everyday resistance, and as a kind of strike to bargain for better conditions, was developed into an art.

The most advanced kind of resistance was what in French is called *marronnage*, i.e. to run away. There were different methods and strategies. One was to utilize the rivalry between European states and to offer help to the competitor in exchange of freedom. This was sometimes successful; the problem was that Europeans didn't heed promises to Africans. Another was to take to the woods and either ask for protection from unsubdued Indians or found colonies of their own. In this way societies of runaway slaves were created some distance from the Atlantic coast; they communicated with the slaves at the plantations and stimulated slaves to run away; the slaver societies fought constant wars with them, wars that might roll on for decades. Some of the *marronnage* societies were able to grow to ten thousand inhabitants, like the famous *Palmares* behind *Sergipe* in Brazil in the seventeenth century; some of them would be recognized as municipalities under Spanish rule on the condition that they stopped help other slaves to run away, and

[46] The system is described by Eric Wolf, *Europe and the peoples without history*, and by John Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the making of the Atlantic world*, Cambridge University Press 1991. Thornton has also a chapter on the slaves' resistance forms. Monica Schuler, *Akan slave rebellions in the British Caribbean*, in Hilary Beckles & Verene Sheperd, *Caribbean slave society and economy*, Ian Randle & James Currey 1991, deals only with this. According to Richard Drayton, *The collaboration of labour, slaves, empires and globalization in the Atlantic world 1600-1850*, in A.G. Hopkins (ed), *Globalization in world history*, Pilico 2002, the slave trade was the greatest contributor to the capital accumulation at the time and created key businesses as shipping, insurance and banks.

[47] Kenneth Pomeranz: *The great divergence*, Princeton University Press 2000, insists that it was exactly those two crops that let Europe overcome its malthusian land scarcity and invest in industries.

some of them survive to this day, like the Nicaraguan Miskitos [48].

There were also quite a few rebellions in the 1730s and 1740s – for example, slaves in the Danish Virgin Island captured the castle and held it for seven months in 1733, and in 1739 slaves in Carolina burnt the houses of their masters and fled to Spanish Florida. In several of these rebellions black slaves united with conscripts from other nations, with deported Irishmen, with sailors and other proletarians of the North Atlantic economy. Few lasting results came out of these revolts, except that institutionalized racism was actively fostered by the elites, to make such alliances impossible [49].

Sailors were however also workers in a strategic position of their own right, manning the most capital intensive machinery of the age and treated not much better than slaves. They made many small revolutions during the 17th and 18th centuries, seized the ships they worked at, and went forth capturing other ships to liberate their comrades and the ill-gotten gains of the slave trade, fortified by egalitarian Christianity from the English revolution, according to Linebaugh & Rediker. This piracy has rightly been commemorated in popular traditions, but it was defeated by the combined navies of the Atlantic powers – in the Caribbean in the late 1600s, and along the African coast in the early 1700s.

The system was however finally routed in 1791 in Haiti, when slaves greatly revolutionized both the world and the peoples' movement repertoire, through their contribution to the French revolution.

Haiti was the most valuable of all plantation sites, and counted alone for a third of the French foreign trade. The Haitian society consisted of about 20.000 Europeans – officials, planters and artisans – and about as many mulattoes, economically equal to the Europeans but without any political rights. They two parties constantly quarrelled with each other. Outside society were 400.000 African slaves [50].

The French revolutionary declaration of human rights immediately stirred the mulattoes to struggle for their interests. A triangular struggle between mulattoes, planters and European artisans broke out, and in the middle of the turmoil, in August 22, 1791, slaves from five sugar plantations attacked their owners.

According to Ott, there was no plan to abolish slavery among the revolters. Some may have had this radical aim, others hoped for reforms within the system, others hoped to run away from it and establish themselves as subsistence peasants. But the rebellion had its own logic. Plantations were burned, planters were killed or forced to flee, and the slaves were very soon a power factor. When the upper classes appealed to British help, the French authorities had not much choice but to trust the slaves who had got a military genius as leader, the ex-gardener and ex-cattle-tender Toussaint Louverture. In 1793 the government had to declare slavery abolished.

After five years, the slaves had thrown out the British who had lost 100.000 men.

[48] The North American slavers' war against the Seminoles in Florida is described by Cedric Robinson, *Black movements in America*, Routledge 1997.

[49] Peter Linebaugh & Marcus Rediker: *The Many-Headed Hydra – Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic*, Beacon Press Books 2000.

[50] Thomas O. Ott, *The Haitian revolution*, The University of Tennessee Press 1972; C.L.R. James, *The black Jacobins*, Allison & Busby 1980 (first issue 1938!).

The slave rebellion in Haiti is perhaps the most powerful labour movement ever. But it is not acknowledged as such. On the other hand it had consequences for the black movement in the USA, which is to be told in chapter 8. And it was decisive to give the popular movement freedom of action during the French revolution, in depriving the bourgeoisie of their most important asset at the most decisive moment.

The Haitians didn't get much joy from their world-historic importance. After invasions and trade wars, thrust upon them by jealous European powers, only devastation and poverty remained. But it must be admitted that it is better to be a poor subsistence peasant than to be a plantation slave. And as this was the aim of the original slave movement, it must be considered to be successful after all.

India

India was conquered by the British East India Company (EIC) in the eighteenth century, apparently with the aim of gaining a bridgehead in the intra-Asian trade in which it was primarily interested. The EIC was initially not very different from the financiers and entrepreneurs who supported and were supported by the various local and regional interests that were freeing themselves from the control of the Mughal Empire in the seventeenth century [51]. But the EIC had two advantages that allowed it to triumph: the habit of handling both violence and tax collection 'in-house' by hired bureaucrats, and access to American silver, which was a major advantage in capital-strapped India.

In 1757, the EIC was able to capitalise on a local power struggle to turn wealthy Bengal into a banana republic. Since the local ruler there had relied on entrepreneurs rather than state administration, it was easy for the well-financed EIC to organise a revolt for better conditions for the entrepreneurs, with their enthusiastic support of course, and establish itself as the local ruler. Then, using its superior finances and army, it began to take over economic control of the whole of India, reinforced by political and military power when it saw fit [52].

The EIC used its power in two ways - to establish a monopoly for itself as a buyer of agricultural products and textiles - an industry India dominated globally until the Napoleonic Wars, and to break the bargaining power of peasants and artisans by coercive means, for example by forbidding them to move. In the latter, they were well assisted by traditional upper classes who had never imagined such radical measures before [53].

[51. As explained at the beginning of the chapter, the Mughal Empire fell primarily for internal reasons while the European conquest came later. However, P J Marshall: *Bengal - the British bridgehead*, Cambridge University Press, 2008, describes how the Company was able to take over the far-flung administration of Bengal simply by outbidding the governor.

[52]. C A Bayly: *Indian society and the making of the British Empire*, Cambridge University Press 1988, is the main source for this history. Kathleen Gough: *Indian peasant uprisings*, in A R Desai (ed): *Peasant struggles in India*, Oxford University Press, 1979, and Ranajit Guha: *Elementary aspects of peasant insurgency in Colonial India*, Oxford University Press 1983, list the peasants' grievances in an easy-to-read manner. Ravinder Kumar: *Essays in the social history of modern India*, Oxford University Press 1983, describes the social stratification under the British Empire but also how the downfall of the Mughal Empire was largely due to peasant insurgency. Eric Wolf: *Europe and the peoples without history*, University of California Press 1982 has a superb brief description.

[53]. Prasannan Parthasarati: *The transition to a colonial economy*, Cambridge University Press 2001.

Finally, over time, the EIC gained a global advantage in the textile business, for example by imposing export duties on Indian textiles while English imports were free; as if this were not enough, Indian textile knowledge was also deliberately destroyed by banning schools and burning libraries [54]. The new ignorance, serfdom and increased poverty also did not favour investment in technological development and India became increasingly backward in the 19th century.

Against this, weavers in particular engaged in a sustained strike movement in the last quarter of the 18th century. They had little success, according to Parthasarati, because the EIC's practices were so completely incomprehensible; weavers' incomes during this time dropped from a good European craftsman's wage down to subsistence level or less.

The proceeds were, after some wanderings, invested in industrial machinery in England.

Only in the 1830s, the EIC began to rationalize its practices and actively aim at fitting the Indian society into the role as a system periphery. A reform period was launched: strict Roman property laws were introduced, to the advantage of absent landowners in the Bengal and of the more prosperous farmers in the rest of India. Law and order was regulated after more than a hundred years of uncertainty, which implied that peasants and border peoples were disarmed and prevented from taking to the woods to avoid taxation. To a certain degree this was done forcibly through cutting down the forests. But it also implied that the property of petty urban traders was protected, which converted them into a bulwark for the British rule. The administration of justice and taxes was bureaucratized and taken away from local Muslim and Hindu arbitrators and their customary practices. Paternalist protection and collective security were abolished as much as possible, and the peasants were obliged to pay taxes during bad years as well as good.

The effect of the EIC rule was that the social structure in the countryside was made more homogeneous. In this stratification some were winners but most were losers.

To the losers belonged the majority of peasants, whose taxes increased and whose security declined. Many were degraded from free warriors to tenants without legal protection. They reacted with countless revolts, all local and based on clan networks, and all subdued – but sometimes not without some concessions from the authorities. Peripheral people like the Kols (1829-33) or Santals (1855-56), who were comparatively unassailed by Indian caste pride and were better at create alliances, showed more difficult to beat than the warrior caste peasants.

To the losers belonged also the former ruling class. Some of them could adjust to the new times and become junior partners to the British, but for many this appeared as a step downwards.

To the winners belonged primarily those who could use their links to the British to establish themselves as landowners and/or taxfarmers and/or money lenders in the countryside. This was a rather numerous group, whose younger family members often made careers as intellectuals and administrators.

[54]. Prasannan Parthasarati: *Why Europe grew rich and Asia did not*, Cambridge University Press 2011 describes how the EIC deliberately destroyed Indian industrial competences.

The opposition to India's adjustment to a periphery expressed itself mainly, as stated, as scattered peasant risings which were easy for the British to put down. The well organised social banditism – thugs, as it was called by horrified Europeans – was widely dispersed until it was repressed in the 1830s. Added to that there were in the nineteenth century an increasing number of bread seizures in the towns, because of the declining in living standards that usually accompany peripherization. But at one occasion all kinds of revolts were co-ordinated in time, which almost defeated the British. This was the so-called Seapoys' revolt in the summer 1857.

The co-ordination was created by a mutiny within the Bengal army. This was symptomatic, because the English rule primarily was military. The power vacuum released in the Ganges valley when the army was gone was soon filled by locally revolting peasants and others who sought compensation for their losses.

The revolters were arguably too many and represented too many interests to create a tenable common program. There were, except the peasants, the soldiers who sought to reestablish a status as warrior caste. There were aristocrats who sought to reestablish their lost splendour. There were religious brotherhoods who sought to reestablish the righteous society the world market system had destroyed. Unfortunately there was no agreement if this society was Muslim, as the Naqshbandi movement asserted [55], or Hindu.

The solidarity among the revolters was not improved by the peasants, who radically disregarded the Roman law of the occupants. The pre-colonial aristocracy, which in the beginning of the revolt tried to use the situation for their own gain soon saw the British rule as a lesser evil than the peasants, and supported the repression, with few exceptions.

Even if the revolt was repressed it had consequences for the future.

The British initiated a policy of broader integration, particularly of the urban middle class which got subordinated roles in the administration, in exchange of acceptance of the world market system and its culture. This was a condition they gladly accepted.

The taxes were relieved for the peasants. Instead, new sales taxes were imposed on trade, which contributed to a growing resistance in the towns.

The organisation of the British rule was regulated. Instead of EIC's arbitrary rule, an occupation authority was built up as a government agency, which in time also gave rise to a more homogeneous Indian resistance.

But a lasting consequence of the failure of the rebellion was that even many future proponents of Indian independence were caught in a British defined view on development. What tens of thousands of peasants had died for was out-defined as "reactionary", while the world market system was seen as "progressive" – probably not without connections with the policy of today of the Indian upper classes.

North Africa and West Asia

The Islamic countries in North Africa and West Asia were drawn into the world market

[55] The Naqshbandi was, or is, a sufi brotherhood which struggled against the British in the early nineteenth century, both in reforming Islam through its Deoband university, and with arms. See Olivier Roy, *Islam and resistance in Afghanistan*, Cambridge Middle East Library 1986.

system in the early nineteenth century. They were sparsely populated, poor in raw materials, and not particularly attractive. Egypt served as a cotton plantation and a strategic transport road to India; and Algeria as a wine and wheat plantation. But for the rest, the development was slow. Mostly, it was only near 1900 that the world market system was disorganizing enough to make people protest more widely against its consequences [56].

The most encompassing movements, and also the most militant, occurred in Algeria and Sudan, probably because the institutional religious lawyer corps, the 'ulamate, was less coopted by the Ottoman state there, more dependent on popular support for their living, and for that reason closer to popular political needs [57].

Algeria was successively conquered by the French between 1830 and 1851, after a tough resistance organised by a Sufi brotherhood, the Qadiriya. This had been a sleepy corner of the Ottoman empire where the rule of villages and clans had been almost complete. Now, the French confiscated the best land to give it to settler colonists. They also introduced Roman ownership to link local notabilities to themselves in corruption ties like those the British used in India.

Against this, peasant in distant regions where some autonomy persisted, rose in rebellions of which some were short but others were able to go on for decades.

Almost all risings were organised by religious lay movements. Only they had enough legitimacy to rise beyond clan and village level and be large enough to count; they were however seldom able to get support from established local powers who were afraid to lose their privileges. Only the Sufi brotherhoods were able to set a goal for the movement enough universal to arouse enthusiasm – jihad, struggle for a just society.

The most successful, for a time, of these risings was however the Mahdist rebellion in Sudan 1881-1989 [58].

Sudan was conquered by Egypt in the 1820s and together with Egypt fallen into British control in the end of the nineteenth century. This implied both British control over trade and a much stricter taxation and government administration than before. Against that, Sudanese traders, peasants and nomads from the periphery, who had never been under government control, rose; the organising power of the rising was a religious revival, the Mahdiya, which turned against the domination of infidels and perhaps as much against the official religious hierarchy that cooperated with the British.

During 1881-1885, the rising spread to all Sudan – but when the religious leader Muhammad Ahmad died in 1885 the movement changed character. Instead of liberation, it now emphasized state-building to be able to withstand the British. But the more success

[56] Some literature about the Islamic region are Edmund Burke & Ira Lapidus, *Islam, politics and social movements*, University of California Press 1988 – particularly Burke's own introduction is lucid; there is also something about Algeria in Peter von Sivers, *Rural uprising as political movements in colonial Algeria 1851-1914* – and Rudolph Peters, *Islam and colonialism*, Mouton Publishers 1979. Algeria, also in the nineteenth century, is also described in Eric Wolf, *Peasant wars of the twentieth century*, Harper & Row 1968, and in John Dunn, *Modern revolutions*, Cambridge University Press 1972. Peasant movements in Gabriel Baer, *Fellah and townsman in the Middle East*, Frank Cass 1982.

[57] This is the interpretation of Bruce Lincoln (ed), *Religion, rebellion, revolution*, Macmillan Press 1985.

[58] P.M. Holt & M.W. Daly, *A history of Sudan*, Longman 1961.

they had in this endeavour, the more they had to tax and administer, exactly what they had opposed to start with. When the Mahdists were repressed militarily, their movement had already begun to fall apart from within.

China

China was more able than India to resist the pressure of the world market system. But after the so-called Opium war 1841 – a project launched by the EIC to improve its trade balance – the Chinese government had to accept that the system knocked out Chinese crafts and that European merchants sold drugs on the Chinese market [59].

The Chinese regime, which was unpopular already because of its ethnical origin and narrow power base, lost its legitimacy, its financial strength, and its ability to maintain law and order because of the war. The period 1850-1870 was for that reason a period of rebellion. Several contemporaneous peasant rebellions almost succeeded to overthrow the regime.

The Chinese tradition of peasant rebellion is strong. Several of China's historical regimes had had a peasant rebellion origin – see for example the story about the Ming revolution in chapter 3. Like all peasant rebellions the Chinese had local causes and had local aims. But because China traditionally has a strong state, synergy effects easily appeared between many contemporaneous peasant rebellions. The same reasons tended to give rise to many local rebellions at the same time who helped each other to enfeeble their common foe. Moreover, there was the specifically Chinese tradition of secret societies, oppositional, ideologically well-formulated organisations for mutual aid, which united peasants and other lower class groups and which were able to carry on oppositional traditions for generations. One may compare with late medieval European radical Christianity. But in China also peasants took part in such traditions, which according to Eric Wolf is due to the fact that Chinese villages from the twelfth century were involved in a money economy and exposed to greater uncertainty than their European counterparts [60].

The greatest and programmatically most developed peasant movement in the mid-nineteenth century was the Taiping. It had its origin around Guangzhou, the most important trading city of China, and organized artisans, sailors and peasants who had been thrown out of work because of world market imposed restructuring of the economy. Taiping aimed from the beginning at collective welfare and security and built like the secret societies on a religiously motivated vision about communism and equality, also between the sexes.

To guard itself against attacks from an alien upper class, Taiping begun to arm itself, as secret heterodox societies used to do in China. It was soon involved in armed fights.

[59] Jacques Gernet, *A history of Chinese civilization*, Cambridge University Press 1982.

[60] Jean Chesneaux, *Peasant revolts in China 1840-1949*, Thames and hudson 1973, is the classic in this field. Eric Wolf, *Peasant wars in the twentieth century*, touches on Chinas older history. Albert Feuerwerker, *Rebellions in nineteenth-century China*, The University of Michigan, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies no 21, 1975, refers the stories of Taiping and Nien in detail – really so much in detail that the whole is almost invisible.

After six years Taiping annihilated an army sent out to repress it, and the rebellion was a fact. In January 11, 1851, the leader Hung Xiuchuan proclaimed a new regime and departed with 30.000 members to conquer China. They were close to success.

After only a year, Taiping had conquered the Yangtse valley and occupied Nanjing. On the way it had grown to 100.000 participants. Debts and taxes were abolished, houses of local tyrants were pulled down and their registers were burnt, the imperial armies sent out to stop them were annihilated and middle class people were recruited on a nationalist program to throw out the Europeans. But when Taiping had conquered Nanjing it stuck there and the movement petered out.

According to Chesneaux, all Chinese peasant movements have been forced to make the same choice. Would they go on "attacking the rich, defending the poor" and keeping the representatives of the state away? Or would they go beyond this, establishing a new "just" state? Taiping chose the latter – but this led to new difficulties. They had to build a new administration, collect taxes, discipline the peasants – and in their attempts to do that, Taiping repelled the peasants who had carried them to success. To organise a state, according to traditional Chinese conceptions, implied relying on professional administrators, not on peasants organised into self-administration or not even keeping the professional administrators under democratic control. No Chinese peasant movement had ever got round this Confucian bureaucratic conception, not even Taiping.

While the Taiping leadership under growing internal division sat stuck in Nanjing, organising its state, local landowners helped by European soldiers organised a counter-offensive. In 1863 Nanjing was stormed and Taiping was annihilated. A few escaped; a small group landed in Vietnam where they took part in the struggles against the French.

Another movement, Nien, appeared at the lower Hoangho. It was content "taking from the rich and defending the poor"; during the 1850s and 1860s it went around in the plain with in the end 100.000 men and plundered landowners and beat imperial armies. It used the same tactic the People's Liberation Army would use: hit and run; between the campaign it lived as common peasants in fortified villages. In the end it was tempted to greater ends, to organising an army to attack Beijing. That army was beaten by the same army that had defeated Taiping.

Between 1850 and 1870 half a dozen other, lesser rebellions rose. Some were organised around secret societies, others were minority people who tried to get rid of the imperial occupation. All these movements were defeated after Taiping.

The most important immediate result of all these rebellions was that the prestige of the regime was dissolved. The beneficiary was the ethnical Chinese local upper class that had defeated the Taiping. Another result was that the European powers, and the world market system, got an enfeebled China to deal with. Meanwhile, the peasant movements were forced underground. But the breakdown of all regular administration would be a challenge and a help for next great peasant movement.

The last peripherized regions

Remain Africa and Southeast Asia, which were drawn into the European ruled world

market system and were given monocultural duties about 1900, during the breakdown of the British hegemony, while the challengers amassed resources for the final struggle.

During the first phase, when the rivalizing colonial powers penetrated, the traditional leaders organised the resistance in the name of traditional order. But as John Iliffe says, the stateless societies were the most resistant. It was easier for the colonial powers to buy support and corrupt a society if it was hierarchically organised [61].

When the colonial powers were in control, resistance were organised as religious awakenings, like in the Islamic regions. In Central Africa, Christian movements turned against the occupation rule in the 1930s. In today's Congo, preachers from the Kitawala and Kibangu churches stigmatized the colonial rule as a work of Satan and urged a boycott. In today's Zambia, the so-called Watchtower movement played the same role. In Burma, a Buddhist awakening among the rice peasants almost broke the colonial rule in the thirties and demanded a lot of military violence to repress. In Java, the peasants' discontent over forced deliveries of sugar and coffee took the form of an Islamic revival which begun a jihad against the Dutch.

For only religious movements were able to achieve legitimacy over large areas and supply an organisation and an ideology for translocal peoples' movement alliances in a village and clan organised society, particularly in the vast, sparsely populated Africa. This was true even if the religions were imported like in Africa – but as Kartodjirdjo says, such movers were sometimes highly divisive within the potential base because they are over-ideologized, and not always able to talk to all concerned. Perhaps one may compare with the revolt of the civil society against the empires two thousand years ago.

It is perhaps not necessary to enumerate more social movements against the introduction of the world market system. People everywhere revolted locally against the colonial rulers' rising demands of taxes and forced labour, and against the market's threat against the moral economy of the villages. The methods were the same as they always had used against their rulers, even if some scholars like Gabriel Baer think they can see a rising frequency of opposition, see note 41. But the globalisation of the system changed the technique of the opposition.

The direct producers in the whole world achieved an increasing ability to act coordinated over vast geographical distances during the world market system. Before the sixteenth century, regional popular movements were extremely uncommon. By degrees, the resistance was coordinated trans-locally, in the beginning with religious awakenings as coordinators. From the early twentieth century even local peasant movements everywhere acted in cooperation with transregional popular movement with aims pertinent to

[61] Africa and African peoples' movements are described in John Iliffe, *Africans – the history of a continent*, Cambridge University Press 1996; Robert Rotberg & Ali Mazrui, *Protest and power in black Africa*, Oxford University Press 1970; Bogumil Jewsiewicki, *Rural society and the Belgian colonial economy*, in David Birmingham & Phyllis Martin (ed), *The moral economy of the peasant*, Yale University Press 1976; Elizabeth Ichikei, *A history of Nigeria*, Longman 1983; Donald Crummey, *Banditry, rebellion and social protests in Africa*, Heinemann 1986; and Allen F Isaacman, *The tradition of resistance in Mozambique*. Southeast Asian experiences are described in Sartono Kartodjirdjo, *Protest movements in rural Java* and James C. Scott, *The moral economy of the peasant*.

countries and continents, that exercised hegemony over other popular movements, and contributed to making the local movements effective.

In the system center, the labour movements exercised this hegemony, even if some movements disputed this. In the system peripheries, the national movements played this role, without opposition. These movements are the subjects of the two following chapters.

Chapter 5.
Wage labourers' defence against
capital owners

LABOUR MOVEMENTS ARE TOGETHER WITH national liberation movements the classical peoples' movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Together, they invented or developed the repertoires that came to be seen as "traditional" during these centuries – the permanent mass organisation with employed functionaries (created by the Irish national movement), the strike, the demonstration and the mass meeting (developed by the English labour movement). The labour movement has moreover been able to create an overarching identity and a tradition, which has grown so strong that all labour movement mobilizations up to 1968 were seen both by themselves and others as parts of the same global mobilizing. This was probably an advantage, a source of common strength for those who have been able to conform to this identity, but it has also created unnecessary gaps to other peoples' movement mobilizations.

Both labour movements and national movements have, thanks to their conflict collectives' key positions in the world market system, and thanks to the effectivity of these social inventions, had strength enough during their mobilizing phases to change the power relationships in the world and contribute to the fact that the living standard of the direct producers at least didn't decrease. Which is unique during the world market system era. Both partly abdicated to the benefit of the state during the first half of the twentieth century, which in due time led to the undermining of their gains at a time when they seemed safe.

The labour movements were born as a mass phenomenon in the world market center, as an attempt to assert the human value of those who had no capital but had to live from selling working power. It was born in the context of the organisation of an industrial mass production of non-agricultural products, and those who started it were the artisans who ousted from the market by the industrial mass production and converted to day-labourers.

Mass market and industry

In the mid eighteenth century, the integration of the West European direct producers had made some progress. The wages had risen considerably above the seventeenth century level. Meanwhile, a sizeable middle class had formed around monopolies and national bureaucracies. The purchase power had increased in the system center, and preconditions for a mass market were under way [1].

The preconditions were commercialization or commodification of food. In the traditional peasant community, the peasant had grown their own food and the opportunities for hoarding wealth had been limited. But when the purchasing power of the urban population and the national bureaucracies grew in England, the Netherlands and northern France, commercial farms appeared with on the one hand commercial agriculturalists, on the other landless and movable workers who could be directed to where manpower was

[1] The background is concisely depicted in Eric Wolf, *Europe and the peoples without history*, University of California Press 1982.

needed for the moment.

Conditions began to appear to exploit for those with a capital. And the capital was accessible in England, which was able to exploit its rule in India and North America and its control of the international trade routes. Thanks to the wealth of cheap capital and coal it was possible to invest in more capital-intensive production plants than before – in factories with complex machinery, high production and low unit costs. Thanks to the high supply of propertyless people, there were also many who could tend the machinery for almost nothing.

A production of a new kind was possible: mass production for a mass market even for other businesses than agriculture. Since a long time, sugar and other cash crops had been raised in plantations with slave labour, and this kind of production was now used as a model.

First, mass production was introduced in the textiles business 1793-1815. Next in the steel- and railway businesses 1848-1873. Then in the electricity and chemistry businesses 1894-1913. And latest in the auto and electronics businesses 1945-1973. Each period of rapidly increasing mass production within a certain business sector animated an immense energy of change; forces of nature were harnessed to production which ran into the sky, power and capital were concentrated to fewer hands, armies of propertyless people were sent to the factories and optimism ruled within politics and culture. Each period was followed by a breakdown of inactivity and remorse when the capital concentrations were broken by new constellations. The years mark the recognized limits for the four Kondratiev A waves of the industrial society, see chapter 2.

In the new mass market production capital owners took a greater part in the organisation of production than they had done before. Earlier, the direct producers usually decided themselves how production should be carried out. They had autonomy. Capital owners bought and sold their products and were, through their monopoly of knowledge, able to lay their hands on the surplus.

But mass production was organised according to lines of command. What was bought was not longer the result of work, but work itself, or rather work during a certain time. During the time the capital owner bought labour, he considered himself as having the right to rule over the worker and his work. And the means of doing this as profitable as possible for the capital owner was to organise the labour process in detail and curtail the autonomy of the worker. The areas of responsibility for the direct producers were parcelled out and shrunk, and their movements were directed in detail until, as in the lean production of today, every tenth of a second has been laid under control of a capital owner. The material basis of this form of organisation is that the machinery is so complex that many different skills are needed, and these must be coordinated [1a].

In the new mass market production, an unusual form of employment was applied. Earlier, very long contracts between workers and owners were usual, like leaseholds for life, working contracts for a year, or slavery. But in the world of mass production development was quick. The need for flexibility and market adjustment expelled legally fixed

[1a] Joel Mokyr: The gifts of Athena, Princeton University Press 2002.

contracts from use and favoured free contracts, i.e. contracts until further notice for short time wages.

About 1815 a new concept was formed in England: Working classes. The direct producers who worked for wages had become so many that a new concept was needed to cover them. But observe the plural form! Culturally and socially, the workers were of many different kinds. There was a great difference between artisan journeymen, factory workers, or day-labourers in the England of the 1810s. And the differences didn't disappear. Here was a great difference between mechanics in England and Russia in 1900, between native-born American workers and immigrant Polish Jews in the same profession 1925, or between miners in Kiruna and miners in Witwatersrand in 1995.

The differences is a product of the fact that the system consists of links of purchase and sale to make it possible to transfer surplus from some links to others. The losing links can only pay low wages; the winning can carry higher but depend on the other hand of a higher labour discipline. The production of the losing links are for that reason manned with newly proletarianized people from the countryside who have not yet learnt the secrets of unionism or even how to survive in the town or on the market; in the losing links the production is manned with semiproletarians.

Semiproletarians are people who work for wages but also support themselves more or less informally – with a piece of land, working parts of the year for wages and other parts in agriculture, for example. The point is that the semiproletarian, because of his extra contribution from other sources, can be made to work for lower wages and in this way make peripheral links under hard competition profitable [2].

The winning links employ unionized full proletarians.

As expected, it is not easy for wage earners to unite and act in a common peoples' movement for their material and immaterial interests. Labour movements are not homogeneous. Differences between workers are maintained by social schooling in different roles, with very strong cultural and conscious effects. Differentiation between functions in the system creates groups with different status, like a caste system, which obstructs the ability to build alliances between workers from different sites, see chapter 8. Also, difference follows from the fact that no worker is only a worker; s/he is also a neighbour, family member, consumer etc. During the whole history of labour movement different groups of workers have struggled against each other; full proletarians against semiproletarians, men against women, qualified against unqualified, resident against migrant, center against periphery.

In spite of these differences, the similarities are so important that you can talk about labour movements when wage earners cooperate to improve their conditions against capital owners and world market system. For the participants in labour movements, it has always been important to stress the similarities, to create alliances and prevent different groups of workers to compete. It has also been important to militate against other identi-

[2] Claude Meillassoux, *Maidens, meal and money*, Cambridge University Press 1981. Immanuel Wallerstein, *Historic capitalism*, Verso 1983, and Joan Smith & Immanuel Wallerstein (ed), *Creating and transforming households*, Cambridge University Press 1992, also deals with this.

ties and bring home that the worker identity is the important one. For the enemies of the labour movement it has been tactically sly to emphasize differences.

The core of the labour movements is the defence against enterprises who rule tyrannically over the work of the workers and take the proceeds from it. The foundation is everyday resistance, the many different methods of the direct producers to shun the control and disciplination of the rulers, take control themselves and satisfy their self-esteem as autonomous human beings. As such, labour movement consists of continuous small battles at every working site, often invisible for outsiders [3].

But as Edwards has emphasized, the defence at the worksites is not enough to create a collective worker identity; the categories that are involved in conflicts there are usually too small. Labour movements are to an equal extent constructed from the defence against the workers' subordinated and discriminated role in society in general. It is from there the workers learn that they have something in common to build an identity from. But it is from the conflicts at the worksite they learn that they have power to oppose.

Workers' ability to resist capitalist sovereignty varies depending on the way in which this supremacy takes place, that is, what the work regime looks like. And it varies over time and space.

In the childhood of the industrial society, the activities were small and were easily monitored by the capitalist himself, much like craftsmen who supervised their workshops at an earlier age. Often the capitalist was a craftsman and mastered himself every link of production, and thus it was possible for the workers to somehow identify with him. This form of control has been called despotic or entrepreneurial. Under these circumstances, it was difficult for workers to claim their right, but it was not impossible, as shown by the fact that the company and the journeymen had entered into collective agreements already in the Middle Ages. Workers' lack of power in the workplace could also be compensated by city-wide or even national-wide organization based on professional skill.

When the workshops grew in the 19th century, a more collective organization was required to oversee the workers. It was organized after traditional military principles, with officers who supervised the workers and directors who supervised the supervisors, often in multiple layers. This form of control has been called hierarchical or patriarchal. The control of supervisors was most direct because they had close contact, and often took brutal and selfish forms. It was against these brutal forms, more than against low wages and long working hours the labour movement battles targeted in the early 1900s. The resistance got a solution in the movement wave of 1905-1912, which forced capitalists to create new forms of control.

A special form of this hierarchical regime is what Burawoy calls the company state [4]. It means that the government takes on a large part of the responsibility for controlling workers both in the workplace and in society at large. This is common in capital-poor countries that aim for rapid industrialization and have been practiced in the

[3] P.K. Edwards, *Conflict at work*, Blackwell 1986.

[4] Michael Burawoy, *The politics of production*, Verso 1985.

Soviet Union and Poland as well as in South Korea, Brazil and South Africa. The workers are forced to fight the state directly, and indeed it was also the labor movement that promoted democratization in all of the above cases except the Soviet Union.

The new form of control created after the 1905-1912 movement wave has been called bureaucratic or technical. It is based on the fact that the control is built into technical structures, type conveyor belt, and in other respects consists of rules laid down in a mix of collective agreements and unilateral dictations from the management. The resistance of the workers here often seeks to change the rules and to this end manipulate the technical structure to its advantage.

Obviously, the entire business community did not develop at the same time. The despotic regime remains in small, capital-poor and peripheral companies, and the bureaucratic mode never conquered others than the leading companies in a serious way. The various concurrent work regimes have resulted in a splitting up of the working class that will be investigated more in Chapter 8.

There are clear signs that a new form of control is about to establish itself, which could be called commercial because it consists of individual purchase and sales contracts in a kind of lay-out system. In this case, there has been no permanent workforce repertoire, but some researchers associate the increased use of so-called social movement unionism, i.e. mobilization of the local community in labor conflicts, to this form of labour regime [5].

Changes between regimes reflects, according to Burawoy, changed preconditions like changed technology, changed markets, and changes in the conflict management between the enterprise and the workers about how to meet such changes. Conflicts about the assembly line carried through a transition from a paternalist regime to a bureaucratic one, and conflicts about welfare politics carried through a transition to a hegemonic regime.

Despite all divisive influences, the labour movement succeeded in developing during the period 1848-1968 such a strong identity that they overshadowed all other peoples' movements in the system center. The conditions they tried to affect was the dominating theme in the development of society, and other peoples' movement have had to relate to, or ally with, the labour movements or remain powerless. This chapter relates how the labour movements succeeded in reaching this position.

The core and origin of the labour movement

Labour movements in the form of journeymen's organisations existed from the middle age in Europe, and strikes are documented in the textile industries of Flanders and the mines of Germany at that time. But a labour movement with an aspiration for homogeneity and cooperation was formed in England in 1800-1830, as an aspiration from educated artisans to maintain their autonomy and the control of their trade skills, and to prevent that it was stolen by capital, divided and was built into the machines and the factory hierarchy [6].

[5] Peter Waterman: Social movement unionism – a new union model for a new world order, review vol 16 no3, 1993.

The early labour movement built on traditions from artisan guild organisations. In this tradition, employed workers had had their own, semi-illegal but tolerated companionships, which organised journeys, labour exchanges and social insurances, and negotiated with the masters about employment conditions with strikes as a weapon. The companionships cooperated with the guilds about maintaining the traditions and status of the profession were as anxious as the masters to attack cheating outsiders, and look down upon unskilled day-labourers. They protected or their “honest” art together and developed a pride for it as the producer of the provisions that kept society alive.

This pride was now threatened by factory discipline and division of work. It was also threatened by a repressive legislation against the workers that set in in England about 1790 and aimed at repressing all sympathies for the French revolution and securing labour for the detested factories. Components of the legislation were forced labour for the poor, sales taxes for necessities, abolishment of labour security, and death penalties for political and trade unionist activities. This repression resulted out of necessity to reduced power of negotiation and increased poverty while the business boom created a wealth unseen upto then for the middle and upper classes. This political apartheid for workers, as E.P. Thompson has called it, resulted for that reason in impoverishment among the workers, but also in a new political-unionist mobilisation of the workers as a particular category.

The pattern for the movement was taken, except from the companionship tradition, from the Puritan tradition, and from the contemporaneous revolutionary Parisian artisan milieu.

Ever since the defeat of the popular side of the Puritan revolution, Baptist congregations had maintained cultural ambitions, collective self-assertion and democratic principles among artisans. In the mid-eighteenth century this rather defensive and secluded movement was challenged by the Methodist movement, allegedly born in a moralist and authoritarian middle-class milieu but turning to factory workers and day-labourers with a message of spiritual equality. It couldn't be avoided that the workers took the equality message literally, wrested large parts of the movement from the hands of the middle class pastors, and took techniques like the mass meeting, battle song and the meeting platform with them – from this time parts of the standard repertoire for peoples' movements.

From the French revolution's Parisian artisan movement, they took the demand for radical democracy. The artisans, threatened by degradation, asserted their human value demanding citizen's rights. After the American pattern, they formed corresponding societies which organised mass meetings to demand “rights of man”, after the title of the bible of the movement, written by the ubiquitous Tom Paine, democracy and an end to

[6] The classic account is E.P. Thompson, *The making of the English working class*, Victor Gollancz 1963. William Sewell, *Work and revolution in France – the language of labor from the old regime to 1848*, Cambridge University Press 1980, shows the development from guild system to labour movement. An excellent account of the formative age of the labour movement is Dick Geary, *European labour protest 1848-1939*, St Martin's Press 1981. Per Forsman, *Arbetets arv, Arbetarkultur* 1989, describes the ambition of the workers to keep the control of the working process from the hands of capital.

corruption and anti-labour legislation.

This movement had its center among the artisans of London, and was soon repressed. But not until it had spread its radical culture to the rigorously prohibited trade unions that grew up regionally in deep secrecy. The first outbreak of militant unionism was in the Midlands in 1811 when knitters and weavers attacked capitalists who had employed unskilled people, often children, to do their work with the help of machines.

The demands were union rights, a minimum salary, and abolishment of child labour. The methods were a combination of legal petitions to the parliament and breaking of the machines.

Afterwards, self-appointed progressives have seen these machine-breakers or “Luddites” as the very height of conservatism and anti-enlightenment. In reality, the machine-breaking was unionist measures to strike at specific capitalists to drive home the unionist demands. For two years, the machinery of the most exploitative entrepreneurs was destroyed in a disciplined and well-organised manner over three counties. They were supported by the local communities and were very hard to repress, in spite of mobilized armies and agents provocateurs. Concerning the legislation demands, not an inch was achieved – even death penalty was introduced for machine-breaking. But the capitalists of the Midlands had to negotiate and accept minimum wages.

When the Napoleonic wars ended in 1814, the repressive policy was harder to defend. Unionist organising as well as democratic agitation began to utilize the more open political climate. Local trade unions organised under the cover of “friendly societies” for social insurance, and organised strikes primarily in the crafts. It is about this time strikes for higher wages (which is an old form of struggle) begins to replace bread seizure as the most important method to uphold the material living standard of the direct producers. For in the era of national mass markets it is easier to raise the wage than to reduce the food price [7].

Mass meetings for democratic reform were arranged over all England in a growing movement for five years. There was no national organising; instead it was constructed hazardously around the famous orators who performed at the mass meetings. Their popularity protected them against intervention from the authorities but their vanity created many conflicts and often prevented other initiatives than mass meetings. The organizing was predominately local.

In the struggle, a lush lower class general public was created, with education circles, book cafés, political theatre etc. Faced with the great tasks, the artisans felt a need for self-education. An alternative society of self-produced culture appeared. The leaders were often middle-class people, but the public was artisans, and locally, these dominated completely.

The well ordered and disciplined demonstration was developed by workers in Blackburn in 1819. Demonstrations had to be sure existed as a political means for two

[7] The first registered strike in Sweden occurred in the copper mine at Falun in 1665 according to Gösta Hultén, Arbetsrätt och klassherravälde, Rabén & Sjögren 1971. The word strike has its origin i hatters' jargon and is found in print from the mid eighteenth century. And the fact that the word has counterparts in many languages – Spanish huelga, French grève etc – suggests that there is a long popular tradition for it.

generations but often degenerated into street fights against authorities and upper class people. The new disciplined demonstration frightened the authorities more than violence, because it formed association with military power and demand for hegemony. But when the authorities some months later attacked a disciplined demonstration in Manchester and killed eleven people, the whole middle class went over to the opposition. The foundation of the regime floundered; only with the parliament reform in 1832 which let the middle class in, a new alliance of interests was created between upper and middle classes. The workers were left about where the whole thing started.

While the constitutional critique movement, focused on corruption, during the twenties was taken over by the middle class that begun to call itself liberal, the labour movement concentrated on cooperation in two forms, consumer and producer, between which at this time there was impossible to see a difference, as it was to see one between cooperation and unions. The artisans' "friendly societies" ought to work as well as producers as consumers. The journeymen were still educated artisans, and the machinery at this time was not expensive. It was in this era of union organizing the lodestar was "the aim of the trade union is to abolish the wage slavery".

Cooperation, launched in 1819 by the dynamic entrepreneur Robert Owen, met an enthusiastic response among the workers. While the radical movement so far had concentrated in abolishing certain abuses, now there was for the first time a proactive, positive program. Instead of the capitalist market society, an alternative was set up, built on exchange of user value. The conception of the world market system as a system possible to change, as "capitalism" as it was later called, was created for the first time.

Instead of the traditional radical rationalism, brotherhood was set at the core. As much as it was directed against the old ruling class, the bite was against the economist stinginess and narrow utilitarianism of the middle class. Against them, the labour movement maintained that the needs of the workers here and now was much more important than to organise the perfect system and a possible, future, abstractly constructed utility, as the liberal utilitarian ideologues aimed at. Against the utopian market, the labour movement posed the needs and the socially defined rights of the workers and the peoples' majority [8].

Against the middle class, the cooperation also raised class struggle as a concept for the first time. The workers saw how their earlier allies in the middle class didn't mind defending child labour and imprisoning the poor for economic reasons, and realized that workers could only trust themselves. It is during this period, the classic position of the labour movement was formulated by James Bronterre O'Brien, as a program for finally securing the priority of moral economy: political radicalism and cooperation, as leading to expropriation of the capitalists and a classless society.

As early as 1829 the first countrywide trade union was created, Operative Spinners of England, Ireland and Scotland, and it was soon spreading to others than spinners. The first wave of cooperation culminated in the creation of Grand National Consolidated

[8] The struggle of the workers against the market principle and its undermining of the workers' survival is one of the coes of Karl Polanyi, *The great transformation*, Henry Holt 1944.

Trades Union (GNCTU), uniting producers' and consumers' cooperatives, with employment exchanges. GNCTU only lasted half a year before it got bankrupt, according to Thompson because the participants had too much confidence in the power of good ideas in themselves. A tremendous enthusiasm for the cooperative ideas didn't lead to much practical organizing. The plans were too great, the means too small. Cooperation worked like salvation, appealing to religious habits and the belief in the automatic victory of reason.

So when the union and cooperative movement was built up anew after the fall of GNCTU, practical steps and small improvements dominated. The trade unions were organized as trades, cooperatives as shop associations. Changing society tended to be located outside union or cooperative movements, in a struggle to reform the state.

The parliamentary reform of 1832 created a unitary worker concept: the disenfranchised. At the same time it was evident that the new middle class regime was not any better for the workers than the old regime: unionists were persecuted, a national police was organised, the government refused to legislate on labour protection, terror laws were introduced in Ireland, and most important: forced labour was introduced for the poor. During an ideological holy war for diligence and strict economy, inspired by liberal utilitarians, workhouses were built all over the country, where the poor were locked up – men, women and children separately. Artisans could not longer keep aloof from day labourers – except in London where the artisan culture was big enough to permit such things until the end of the century.

The struggle against the workhouses demanded a political focus for the labour movement, that could unite all workers for a common aim.

Such a focus was suggested in 1838 by the London Working Men's Association, in the form of a petition for universal suffrage. Despite a certain doubt in a form some believed old-fashioned, this petition – the People's Charter – was adopted by an increasing number of labour organisations as a platform or summary of what the movement stood for. Chartism became the name for the political aims of the labour movement [9].

With Chartism as a platform, a connection was created between four repertoires that became classic during the nineteenth century.

Obstruction of the destructive functions of state and capital: Chartists organised strikes and even tried to occupy towns. The first general strike began in the coal mines in July 1842 and extended over north and middle England during the summer. They were combined with demonstrations – the strike was spread with demonstrations from town to town – and mass meetings, and the demands were both unionist and political, for example demands to free political prisoners. In other actions, workhouses or homes of particularly tyrannical capitalists were pulled down.

Alternatives to the repressive organisations of state and capital: Chartists organised everyday life in the industrial towns. They organised insurance offices, schools and agricultural cooperatives, and the still existing form of consumer cooperative was organised

[9] This section is based on Dorothy Thompson, *The Chartists*, Pantheon Books 1984, and John Foster, *Class struggle and the industrial revolution*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1974.

by Chartist weavers in Rochdale in 1844.

A general public connected the movement with everyday life. The organisations of Chartism worked locally. Its power was concentrated in the small industrial towns and boroughs in north and middle England. They were dominated by Chartists at every level; they consisted in Chartist shops, Chartist taverns, Chartist churches. They organised Chartist festivals and Chartist mass meetings. The local leaders were often women. At the national level, the Chartist press was the organiser, particularly Feargus O'Connor's paper Northern Star was the common publisher where all expressions of the movement got the same generous treatment. For want of admission to the usual parliament, peoples' parliaments were organised twice, to which delegates were elected with universal suffrage to discuss and decide about the strategy of the movement.

Infiltration in the repressive apparatus of the state was the direct aim of the charter; in this respect the movement failed almost completely concerning the state. The two petition campaign run in 1839-42 and 1847-48 got three million signatures each but were rejected without trouble from the parliament. On the other hand, the Chartists were successful for a long time at the local level where they could use the universal suffrage and vote in parish meetings which had some power over local police and poor relief.

The local organisation was the strength of Chartism. As a unified campaign, the charter could not meet the demands with its focus on parliamentarism. And it could not create a efficient campaign leadership. The peoples' parliaments in 1839 and 1848 could not lead the movement; they didn't consist of the leading activists but of middle class people who could afford to take part in month-long sessions, and they had not much to say about strategy. An attempt to create a formal membership association in 1840, the National Charter Association, was not successful, and when the strike broke out in 1842 it happened besides of, and despite this organisation. From beginning to end, the Northern Star was the center of the movement, and the newspaper was Feargus O'Connor's private enterprise.

The general strike turned out to be the climax of the movement. After this, the universal suffrage appeared increasingly irrelevant as a focus, while the unions and the cooperative movement showed small successes all the time. When the last peoples' parliament called for a mass demonstration for the People's Charter in 1848 and called it off after an official ban, the charter had been an empty shell for years.

For now, the middle class gave up its unflinching resistance to integrative reforms. The union and cooperative strategy showed themselves effective. But the solidarity and radicalism of the movement faded when conservatives and liberals vied with each other in offering the ten hour's day and some extensions of suffrage when the business boomed after 1848. For the capitalists learned to buy over the skilled workers with better conditions while the unskilled were left out for the time being; this was reflected with the fact that the skilled workers were content in organising themselves while the unskilled were left out by them also. This treachery, this genuflection to a new paternalistic labour regime, shattered the Chartist egalitarian culture and contributed strongly to the lack of ambition for hegemony which has characterized British labour movements for a hundred and fifty years.

The partial concessions were supplemented by increased control from the authorities. Local police and social authorities, which were subjects to worker control, were undermined to the advantage of state officials [10].

In countries where industrialization went slower than in England, traditional journeymen's organisations were more important than in England. Such a country was France.

Also in France, artisan workers lost status and economic level with the spreading of labour division. Also there, the workers' security was threatened by the repression of their old organisations. In the case of France, the authorities could even refer to the revolutionary tradition when they did this [11].

So the French journeymen's organisations had obvious difficulty in using the language. The printer workers took initiative to the revolution of 1830 and the journeymen's organisations took an active part in carrying it through with liberal slogans of liberty and equality. But when they asked the new regime about protection for their trades, they were brusquely turned away with the same slogans. For now, the peoples' and particularly the market's freedom from organisation was the order of the day. Therefore, they decided, tired of having to hide behind friendly societies, to take a fight about the liberal ideology and turn it from the grip of the bourgeoisie. The method was the same as the Paris artisans had used during the revolution of 1789-95: they equalled "The people" with "The working people": freedom for the people must be carried through with cooperation of the workers, and a revolution where the people take power over the state and forces equality upon the upper classes. Like in 1789-95, the borders between the trades were opened, and an integrated labour movement begun to grow also in France. A driving force was the printer workers' magazine *L'Artisan*, where also concepts like "The capital's exploitation of the workers" were seen for the first time.

In this strategy, the journeymen's traditional bargaining about tariffs played a new role. When a bargaining offer from the silk weavers of Lyon, supported by the mayor, was turned down by the factory owners (who also fired the mayor), the weavers called for a demonstration which chased away the military. For three days in November 1831, the silk weavers ruled Lyon, organising collective workshops and planned worker-ruled trading companies, until the state had overcome the shock and sent an army of 20.000 men to take the town back. Three years later, this incredibly well-organised workers repeated the achievement. This is an extreme case. But also during other strikes, carpenters, tailors and glovemakers organised cooperative workshops – "national workshops" – and the shoemakers organised an association for cooperative credits.

Cooperation was the main strategy of the French labour movement. Through self-organising of the production, the workers would avoid capitalist repression. Contrary to the case in England, this strategy was supported by a great part of the middle class. France had no labour chartism; in France, a narrow finance aristocracy ruled, excluding

[10] This is described for the town of Oldham in John Foster, *Class struggle and the industrial revolution*.

[11] The so-called *Loi Chapelier* from 1791 equalled trade union rights with privileges of nobility, and the post-revolutionary bourgeoisie was of course quick to take advantage of this. William Sewell, *Work and revolution in France*, and Bernard Moss, *The origins of the French labor movement*, University of California Press 1976

even the middle class. So workers and middle class assembled in the republican movement where cooperation was a mainstay.

The organised labour movement also played a key role in next revolution in 1848; it organised the demonstration that frightened the government to flee. The new government acknowledged immediately the trade unions as a negotiation partner and agreed to the most important of the workers' demand: work for the unemployed. A particular commission, the Luxembourg commission, with unionist leaders and state officials as participants, would organise national workshops. People talked about "the social republic, i.e. a republic with a social responsibility, as a new formulation of moral economy. On the other side of the Rhine, artisans talked about "Sozialdemokratie".

The concept "social" had originally nothing to do with organised labour. It had been launched by the French charity bourgeoisie in the 1830s, roughly with the meaning "feel pity for the poor" or as a technical opposite to anti-social. Behind this was partly remorse, partly fear of the moral degradation of the poor. The latter was the motive for Louis Blanc, the central figure of French socialism, government member in 1848 and leader of the Luxembourg commission.

The charity bourgeoisie would continue to play a fateful role in the history of the labour movement.

While the Luxembourg commission went on discussing, the trade unions grew during the year of the revolution, and forced through advantageous tariffs. A lot of insurance and other cooperatives were founded. In the center were the trade unions, according to the French artisans "moral associations and political actors". Each trade union was like a republic of its own; it was at this time the term "functionary" begun to be used for popular movement officers; originally it had denoted a state official.

In the elections to the national assembly it showed that the trade isolationism was far from overcome; each trade union supported its own candidate and few of them were elected. The new assembly immediately abolished the Luxembourg commission and rejected the notion of a "right to work". The protest demonstrations of the workers in June 22-26 were repressed by the army leaving 1500 dead as a result. The trade unions were repressed too.

After this sanguinary defeat, the labour movement concentrated again on cooperation; among other things a cooperative bank was started, and the Feminist Jeanne Deroin organised a national cooperative federation. Conflicts with the established society were shunned. Up to 1917, the vision lived on in the French labour movement of a society as a federation of democratic cooperative trade unions which took no other confrontation with the ruling class than the final one, the revolution. The climax of this tradition was the Paris commune in 1871, a defence organisation of the Parisian artisans when the state was enfeebled by the war against Germany, see chapter 9. The Paris commune was a cooperative organising of deserted workshops and of the whole city, an organising that followed the norms of civil society about trust and egalitarian rewards. The experiment was repressed by French and German armies in an even more sanguinary way than 1848.

The revolution of 1848 was the breakthrough of the labour movement in the international public. For the first time, the organisations of the workers appear as a main actor

in a grand historical process. The breakthrough occurred in the artisan milieus of Paris, and not in the English industrial districts. For in France, the adversaries of the workers were so much more divided that the labour movement looked stronger than anywhere. The first consequences of the breakthrough were disadvantageous for the labour movement; politics was polarized so that all other forces were posed against it. This was not least a consequence of the inability of the labour movement to make alliances in the countryside. Despite the fact that 60 percent were farmers in France, the labour movement conceived the farmers as an odd minority they didn't have to consider. But in the long run, the strength of the labour movement forced the established power to respect it. The labour movement's demand for citizen's rights and social security would during a hundred and twenty years be met by the established power with extended suffrage and welfare reforms.

The revolution of 1848 was also formative for the labour movements' practice during the twentieth century. From the defeat, both the labour movements and the national movements (which were the main actors east of the Rhine) learnt that revolution is not easy. The old organisational form, the local community, had shown itself insufficient, dissolved by the penetrating world market system. But both movements succeeded in turning this weakness to a strength. The conclusion of both was that long preparations were needed, as was mass organizing. For now, the permanent mass organisation began to be the set feature of the labour movement.

The permanent organisation would be an effective social invention. Only through the permanent organisation, the popular movements would gain an overview over the struggle terrain of the world market system, an ability of mutual aid, and not least an effective collective identity which not only created an authority that could be set up against paternalist labour regimes but also maintain mobilizations over the time and facilitate mobilizations at new sites. Probably, the permanent organisations were the reason why the direct producers were able to turn the average living standard upwards in the late nineteenth century and lay the foundations to a hundred years of success.

The factory workers and the Internationals

During the later nineteenth century, the industrial units grew. A growing number of workers were concentrated in bigger and bigger, more and more capital intensive factories. This raised demands for new strategies. The strategy the labour movement decided on was the government power strategy.

In 1862 there was to be a World Exhibition in London. The industrial society would manifest itself and each country was invited to make a show in the public. The emperor Napoleon III wanted, with a side-glance at the domestic opinion, to show his government as pioneers of social policy and invited representatives of the workers to the official French delegation. They used the free ticket well; they immediately contacted with the trade union federation of London to discuss international worker solidarity. The English thought this was a good idea, they had problems with imported strikebreakers. International cooperation was also natural for artisans of which many had years of learning journeys behind them. A conference was called two years later and workers and

radicals were invited from all countries.

In September 28, 1864, English and French worker leaders met in London together with emigrant workers and revolutionaries from Germany, Italy, Poland and Hungary. The meeting decided to form an international organisation, The International Working Men's Association, and elected a board of English trade unionists [12].

Concerning the program, there was immediately a controversy.

The English participants, who worked in big industry, thought trade unions were the most important method. Which the French workers didn't see the point in; to struggle for one penny more an hour wouldn't change society.

The French workers, mostly artisans in small workshops, believed more in cooperation. Which the English workers saw as meaningless; if there was no confrontation with the adversary you couldn't get the better of him.

The emigrant German journalist Karl Marx was the one who solved the controversy, representing eloquently the English experiences of the twenties: the aim of the trade unions is to abolish the wage slavery. In this way even the French would recognize the key role of the trade unions.

The aim of the International was to create sections in all countries.

The International was not the only international cooperation of worker leaders and radicals. But it is the only legendary one. This is closely linked to the practical role of the International.

From the beginning, the English trade unionists saw the clearest practical usefulness of an international organisation: to counter international enlistment of strikebreakers and to support workers' struggle internationally in other ways. The first success was when the activists of the International prevented import of strikebreakers to the English tailors' strike in 1866. This convinced all unionists of the practical usefulness of an international organising. The great breakthrough was in February 1867, when the International in an equal way served the foundry workers of Paris. Thanks to the blockade of strikebreaker enlistment and international economic support this strike was a complete success. This denotes not only the breakthrough of the International, but for the unionist idea in all Europe.

Then followed a three years wave of union organising and energetic striking. Ironworkers of Belgium, miners of Germany and construction workers of Switzerland stroke, often without strike funds or other preparations. They trusted the International. Which could of course not live up to the expectations but turned into a meeting point of frantic tactical conflicts which led to collapse in 1871. This however didn't prevent that labour movements in all Europe had achieved a common identity and ability for planned contemporaneousness which was to be of utmost usefulness in the future.

The most important conflict was whether the labour movement should organise all that shared the aims of the movement or only those who actively supported them.

[12] The story about the First International is told by K. Knudsen, The strike history of the First International, in F van Holthoon & Marcel van der Linden (ed), Internationalism in the labour movement 1830-1940, E.J. Brill 1988.

Whether one should build permanent mass organisations or organisations of militants.

Those who took the first view, and later would be called social democrats, thought that this was the best way of mobilising people, and moreover was the best way of pressing the demands.

Their adversaries, who would later be called anarchists, maintained that mass organising would inevitably create bureaucratization, and lead to the takeover of employed functionaries who would choke the organisations.

Both turned out to be right.

The spokesmen of mass organisation also supported the political party as an organisation form and participation in elections as the most important strategic complement to union organisation, instead of cooperation. The reason of this was primarily the growth of big industries [13].

For it appeared impossible to organise big industry as cooperatives without first making a revolution and use the power of the state to support it. “Without revolution, all cooperative associations build on all trade union together will be unable of the capital accumulation needed in big industry”, wrote Marx in the French labour paper *L'Égalité* in February 1878.

Moreover, the skilled artisans, with their autonomy and craft pride, increasingly became a minority within the working class. To the big industry were recruited primarily unskilled workers with no feelings for their trade, and with no competence of organising a complicated industry. To them, cooperatives appeared irrelevant compared to unionist actions for better wages, shorter hours and labour protection, combined with legal guarantees.

But other arguments also supported the social democrat strategy.

Firstly, the proportion of workers within the population grew to make a majority in the elections seem probable – particularly as universal suffrage for men had been accepted in the three greatest industrial countries England, France and Germany.

Secondly, there was a temptation in the notion that the movement would let paid government bureaucrats doing the job for them and confine themselves to giving orders.

Thirdly, there was an increasing tendency that the ruling classes used the state more actively. The free trade liberalism that was the ruling principle of the British power system created increasing conflicts between the system on one hand, and workers and farmers on the other. So it fell increasingly in disrepute. It appeared reasonable to the labour movement to get control over this increasing government activity, if for no other reason to prevent other social forces to use the state as a control against the labour movement [14].

Fourthly, the national revolutionary tradition from the French revolution haunted in the background. To compete about parliamentary power and struggle about government power seemed the most obvious way of struggling about the hegemony in society.

The party strategy was controversial in the beginning, to say the least. In England,

[13] According to Bernard Moss, *The origins of the French labor movement*.

[14] Karl Polanyi, *The great transformation*.

France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy and Spain it was rejected during the 1870s and 1880s by a great majority in the organised labour movement. The artisans still dominated, with their quest for autonomy, and they were not prepared to let themselves be disciplined by parliamentarians.

Instead, the party strategy found a good soil in the new industrial countries, in the capital scarce countries in the European semiperiphery, particularly in Germany.

In England, but also in France, the unionist strategy was relatively successful. The capital owners could afford yielding to the unionist actions of the workers, and raise the employment conditions. They couldn't do that in the semiperiphery. There, they ruled as ruthlessly over their enterprises as their English counterparts had done fifty years earlier, and dismissed all who tried to engage in union organising.

The state also contributed to the authoritarian labour regime in these countries. To the labour movement, the government repression appeared as equally important to oppose as the repression exercised at the worksite, so activities against the government got a more important place in their strategy. In these countries, industry and urbanisation was also a late phenomenon; the kind of citizens' rights movements that had softened up the British and French states were weak and the artisan tradition that would have supported their autonomy was so too.

The party strategy had a spectacular success in Germany. There, the government pursued an authoritarian policy during industrialisation, a conscious effort at "planned economy" to lead the country into the core of the world market system. There was a company state, according to Burawoy's terminology. This found expression in among other things a direct ban on all labour movement activity except parliamentary parties between 1878 and 1890; the party activities for that reason appeared very attractive compared to strikes, demonstrations, mass meetings and boycotts.

Under such circumstances, the German Social Democratic Party, SPD, grew in a way that arouse admiration in the west European labour movement. As early as 1890, SPD was the biggest party in the German parliament. The party built a gigantic machine that took care of the daily needs of the workers from cradle to grave – which seemed natural in the class-ridden Germany, and seemed even more natural for the many country people who moved into the working-class quarters with no other contacts than what the party could offer. In 1914, SPD had a million members and enough resources to feed four thousand full time officials, trade union officials not counted. It was considered natural that work for the movement should be generously paid. Very soon, the functionaries of the party formed themselves into a particular group, interested primarily in the growth of the organisation, both size and power considered, even if that should be at the expense of the labour movement as a whole [15].

[15] The German labour movement is described in Jürgen Kocka, *Problems of working-class formation in Germany: The early years 1800-1875*, and Mary Nolan, *Economic crisis, state policy and working-class formation in Germany 1870-199*, both in Ira Katznelson & Aristide R Zolberg (ed), *Working-class formation Nineteenth-century patterns in Western Germany and United States*, Princeton University Press 1986. The classic about the bureaucratization of the German labour party is Robert Michels, *Political parties. A sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy*, Free Press 1962 (first published in 1915).

So SPD was early something of a pattern for the parties in the Socialist Worker's International, founded in 1889 to cover some of the needs the breakdown of the First International had left homeless. New parties were organised, with SPD as a lodestar, in Italy, Scandinavia and other new industrial countries in Europe, parties that like the German one saw it as one of their main tasks to organise all workers. In small countries like Holland and Belgium, the labour movement was adjusted to the German pattern. German socialists appeared as the primary spokesmen and representatives of the international labour movement. The old artisan movements in England and France appeared increasingly provincial, small-minded and old-fashioned, unwilling as they were to struggle for hegemony, with parliamentarian overtones, or try to organise the unskilled workers [16].

But despite the new strategy, which supposedly was to the advantage of the unskilled workers, it took a long time until these were drawn into the movement. In most countries, also in Germany, the labour movement remained an artisan movement until the 1930s. This was partly because the unskilled had so many more obstacles than the artisans to be active – they run a greater risk of being fired since they were so much easier to replace, they had less money to put into strike funds, the big industries were able in a more planned way to pursue an anti-union policy through yellow unions, police cooperation etc – but partly it was due to a disinclination on the part of the artisans. The unskilled were not let into the strictly professional trade unions, unionist activities of the unskilled were sometimes thwarted because they didn't follow the patterns of accepted unionist work.

The difference between artisans and unskilled wasn't a disagreement on political or strategic principles. The artisan dominated French CGT belonged to the most radical in Europe between 1900 and 1909 with its general strikes for the eight hours day, while the equally artisan dominated German ADBG was reluctant to struggle at all before 1912. On the other hand there were unskilled workers among the politically most passive as well as among the dockers who took the initiative to organise the non-unionized workers in England 1889, Germany 1896 and France 1902.

During a few decades of labour movement, the artisans had simply captured a place in society, if modest, and they were not prepared to risk it for the mistakes, unsophisticated tactics and inability of the unskilled beginners to pay to the strike funds. For that reason, the mass organising was a slow matter. About 1900, about 5% in France, 10% in Germany, and 20% in England were organized. In 1914, after ten years of intense struggle, the figures had risen to about the double. Still fewer were organised into parties [17].

[16] Overviews of the labour movement during these years are Harvey Mitchell & Peter Stearns, *Workers and protest*, F.E: Peacock Publishers 1971; Walter Kendall, *The labour movement in Europe*, Allen Lane 1975; Dick Geary (ed), *Labour and socialist movements in Europe before 1914*, Berg 1989; and Ira Katznelson & Aristied Zolberg, *Working-class formation*.

[17] The conflict between artisans and unskilled workers was recognized by Friedrich Engels and Vladimir Lenin, who somewhat mistakenly attributed conservative tendencies to the skilled so-called worker aristocracy. Gunnar Olofsson, *Mellan klass och stat*, Arkiv 1979, has discussed it as has Peter Stearns, *Workers and protest*, in Katznelson & Zolberg, Hans-Olof Ericsson, *mellan dröm och vardag*, Arkiv 1991, and Karl-Heinz Roth, *Den anden arbejderbevægelse*, GMT 1976 – they all have contributed to my relation above. The figures are

Participation in the labour movement was not confined to membership in unions however. It also included participation in actions, primarily strikes. The typical organisation of the labour movement in the late nineteenth century was done this way: Workers in an enterprise strike as a protest against cuts in the wages, against the firing of a mate, or against a particularly brutal foreman. To get some organisational support and experience they turned to the nearest trade union. As a service in return they offered membership, but they would often renounce it after a while. The unions also tried to make workers interested in proactive aims like wage rises or shorter hours, but it took many years until the workers had made these aims their own.

The bigger action, the bigger contribution to the general organising of the labour movement. Each country can point at some action with symbolic significance; in the tradition of the movement it was then the organising got properly going.

These actions is the core of labour movement until this day; the typical external action its peoples' movement cycle leads up to is the strike. The strike is what establishes or rather demonstrates the workers as a power. The immediate aim of the separate strike is often trivial, seen from the outside, and is seemingly repeated decade after decade. But this doesn't matter. For the labour movement, as for any peoples' movement, it is the whole cycle that counts, and the aim of this is not trivial. And the cycle doesn't repeat itself. For while a strike supplies the necessary energy to make the cycle moving, it is the articulation and the organising that is the material the cycle is built from. And they change all the time.

If the social democrat labour movement with its center in Germany saw the organisation as the core of the movement, there were others who focused on activity. They put minimal weight on membership and tried to keep the number and power of employed officials as low as possible, through sharing out duties to local associations and local activists. They also tried to keep activities, in the form of strikes, demonstrations and mass meetings at a high level. They had no respect for parliamentary activities, since it gave the key role to the functionaries. These so-called anarco-syndicalists had, which perhaps is evident from the membership statistics above, its center in France. Both the French central organisation CGT and the Spanish CNT built on a minimum of paid staff, considered the activities of the members to be indispensable for the liberation of the working class, didn't care about strike funds and insurances, and saw the general strike as the decisive tactical goal for the activities. The organising built primarily on the local community, the informal social intercourse on the street, and in the case of France, the movement's own labour exchange, Fernand Pelloutier's genial creation. From the turn of the century, when the workshops had grown big enough to create forceful worker collectives, they too became an organising feature [18].

The tradition still lives on. The French labour movement has today a formal level of organisation below ten percent, but they are able to get millions of people in the streets when it is necessary. The force is still the informal organisation in the local community.

The labour movement in the system center grew stronger all the time and reached

a climax of mobilization just after the turn of the century, about 1905-1907. It was extremely successful and turned the living standards sharply upward for the direct producers of the center after 1875. But yet, both the anarco-syndicalist and the social democrat strategies run into troubles that began to show themselves in connection with the upturn.

The anarco-syndicalist strategy contained three troubles.

The first was that it presumed a high degree of militancy all the time, and for that reason put very high burdens on both activists and sympathisers. The French CGT discovered during the upturn 1905-07 that only a few self-sacrificing, rapidly worn out activists held on. The American anarco-syndicalist movement organised in Industrial Workers of the World, IWW, discovered the same thing ten years later. The mainly Catalan CNT was more skilful to regenerate every fifteen years [19].

The second trouble was that the repudiation of parliamentary politics didn't prevent politicians from appearing as if they represented the labour movement all the same. A shadow movement of "prominent persons", which the movement couldn't control, took the task upon themselves to define the needs of the labour movement on the political scene. The anarco-syndicalist strategy never found any remedy against this.

The third trouble turned on the difficulty to accumulate successes. The more informal the organisation, the more impossible it appears to patent a victory and use it as a starting-point for a new thrust. Particularly the IWW would experience that scores of bright victories would fade to ashes in their track because the organisation had no resources to administer them with.

The social democrat strategy contained two troubles.

The first was that when "take over the government" was the core of the strategy, this hypothetic event got an unreasonably decisive significance also at the short and middle-long run. The emphasis of the activity was even more shifted to party leaderships and political planners, to the expense of ordinary lay members in workshops and worker communities. Conflicts between the political planners about long-run strategic matters got an extremely overdramatized significance in the movement, which created new divisions and unbridgeable chasms between different factions.

The second trouble was, as the anarchists had anticipated, that the layer of functionaries over time developed their own interests contrary to the interests of the members and the movement. This conflict would be exposed dramatically when the first world war broke out.

During the week when Europe slid into war, the leaders of the labour movements in the different countries met in Brussels to agree about a strategy against the war. In the Second International there was an agreement that under no circumstances support a war, but instead strike to support the lives of the members. But when the demand to oppose the war was actualized, Victor Adler, the Austrian chairman, announced that he wouldn't do this. The government would in such a case illegalize his organisation and make their

[18] Michelle Perrot, *The French working class*, in Katznelson & Zolberg, *Working class formation*.

[19] The Catalan experience is described by Gerald Brenan, *The Spanish labyrinth*, Cambridge University Press 1960.

functionaries unemployed, he said – an argument the other delegates would appreciate during the following weeks. In the German party, all the four thousand functionaries except twenty would support the war, in spite of demonstrations of millions against it in the streets. Only the Russian social democratic party, which was already illegal, would retain its opposition to the war.

In 1919, at the end of the war, there was an even more dramatic outburst of the conflict.

When the German social democratic party swept to power by a wave of war resistance, the workers took initiatives to so-called worker' councils to protect their government against sabotage from the army and the bureaucracy. This autonomous decision frightened the social democratic government so much that it turned to freelancing soldiers, extreme rightist so-called free corps, to shoot down the workers [20].

A year later, the core of these free corps founded the Nazi party. And fourteen years later, nobody moved a finger to save the parliamentary republic the bloodbath was intended to guarantee. Both democracy and labour movement were unable to appeal to the spontaneous expressions of life that is the core of peoples' movements. They were unable to appeal morally on behalf of the direct producers. Nobody wanted to defend them. They were dead.

Hegemony in the state and local bargaining power

The government power strategy the strategists of the nineteenth century had decided on was realized to a high extent during the twentieth century. In many system center countries, worker-supported governments would establish themselves, primarily after 1945, and the system would for a time make substantial concessions. But the successes of the movements had mainly other causes – growing systemic chaos, and that the production technology grew increasingly sensitive to strike actions of the workers.

The first world war was a watershed in the history of labour movements. The war was an obvious manifestation that the world and the world market system couldn't be ruled in the old way and that it needed substantial reforms to survive.

One effect of the war was that the laymen of the movement lost their century-long struggle for autonomy. On the other hand, the war contributed to making the working class more homogeneous. Only because of the war, and its effects on the labour organisation, union organisation became a majority concern [21].

The development had begun some years earlier, but the conversion of Europe into a war economy shattered at once the artisans' power over the labour movement. The mass armies not only disciplined people in the field. They also demanded reorganisation of

[20] Sebastian Haffner, *Die deutsche Revolution 1918/1919*, Kindler Verlag 1979. There is a scene in the book when the leaders for the Workers' Council of Berlin comes to the party leadership to report that they had just beat off a military attack, but meets the leader of their military adversary who is there to report somewhat embarrassedly to his principal about his doubtless casual defeat.

[21] Karl-Heinz Roth, *Den anden arbejderbevægelse*, and Giovanni Arrighi, *Marxist century – American century: The making and remaking of the world labor movement*, in Samir Amin et al, *Transforming the revolution, Social movements and the world-system*, Monthly Review Press 1990.

the production to more disciplined forms. Mass production of standardized war material demanded rationalizations that drastically reduced the dependence of skilled workers. The methods that Ford had been a pioneer for were introduced on a wide front with the national emergency as an excuse: the work was divided in yet smaller pieces and the worker was separated from any intellectual work. Now, engineers and foremen took over the artisans' control of production in the name of a sophisticated technostructure.

But it appeared very soon that this "Fordist" technostructure was sensitive to interruptions, and for that reason vulnerable to strike actions. An assembly line can be stopped by one person. What capital gained in form of liberty from artisan control it lost in form of possible worker control. But this also implied that the semiskilled majority got a decisive weapon in their hands. The new industrial organisation principles with its increasingly homogeneous working class made the labour movement more effective; it engaged the majority the social democrat labour movement in vain had tried to organise before the war. For it is workers in big worksites that have the greatest capacity to assert themselves as a collective.

The systemic chaos caused by the war made the system sensitive to confrontations. Furthermore, the labour shortage caused by the war resulted in an excellent bargaining position for the workers while their causes for discontent were plenty, due to commodity shortage, overtime, and for the artisans lost status. The years 1916-1921 were for that reason an era of forceful strike movements in all Europe.

The influx of new participants into the movement led to a general reappraisal and to the development of a tremendous creativity. The Italian auto workers invented the factory occupation, as a development of the strike. Earlier, the big factories had been seen as a kind of prisons to be left at strikes, and not seldom assailed with stones or fire. The Russian workers invented the workers' council, a kind of local coordination of strike committees, which were spread over Europe. In the countries where government power collapsed at the end of the war, these workers' councils were for a while the only authority left. They took on themselves the administration duties the government left; most often in a not very revolutionary way, but most often competently and disinterestedly [22].

This reappraisal couldn't but cause conflicts within the labour movement milieus. Geary demonstrates how it was the young, new, semiskilled workers in the big industries that maintained the movements of the late tens, while the older artisans of the small industries kept aloof. Since the later dominated the organisations of the labour movement it is no wonder that these movements often displayed lack of understanding and often tried to choke them – generally not going to the lengths they did in Germany however [23].

The functionaries of the labour movement on the other hand got an opportunity to

[22] Michelle Perot, *On the formation of the French working class*, describes the action types. F. L. Carsten, *Revolution in Central Europe*, University of California Press 1972, describes the municipal administrations of the workers' councils in Germany and Austria in 1918-19 and the way it was deserted by the labour party officials who saw themselves more loyal to their colleagues in the state than to the workers.

[23] Dick Geary, *European labour protests 1848-1939*.

demonstrate their solidarity with the state and their willingness to participate in government on the conditions of the system. Thanks to the loss of prestige suffered by the traditionally ruling classes due to the absurdities of the war, they were forced to let the functionaries of the labour party into the government as junior partners. Great Britain, where the labour movement just some decade before had given up its repugnance to parliamentarization, got its first labour government in 1924. Germany had got one as early as 1917, on the order of the General Staff. In Russia, the biggest semiperipheral country, the utter bankruptcy of the old ruling class had as result that the labour movement could dismiss the whole government and appoint a new one, consisting of the functionaries of the national movement. These examples were emulated in other countries of the system center. Only in the USA, where the organised labour movement was still overwhelmingly dominated by artisans, the movement stuck to its suspicion of the government strategy.

The transition to a more or less downright government power strategy, exercised by an increasingly fraternal corps of functionaries changed the character of the labour movement during the twentieth century.

One result was that the labour movements turned more nationalist. Instead of seeing primarily to the interests of a local or global working class, they began to put their countries' or even their states' interests foremost [24]. Partly, this is a natural consequence of the government power strategy. The role of the state in the world market system is to struggle with other states about a place in the hierarchy. It is even possible that a state manned with labour movement functionaries is more sensitive to this role demand, since their commitment to maximal integration implies very big surpluses to be carried out without too much protests from the capitalists. For that reason, they are forced to speed up commercialization, exploitation and world market competition with all means possible. But it is partially also a natural consequence of the split between semiskilled young workers in big industry and older artisans in the small industry.

For nationalism took one of two forms, either the social democratic or the communist one.

The social democratic or reformist model was to be predominant in the system center. In this model, the movement functionaries used the monopolistic surpluses of the center to force the integration of the direct producers as far as the capitalists would accept, i.e. that as much as possible of the surplus was channeled back to the workers in the form of social insurances social wages, or welfare administered by states and municipalities. In return they got the active cooperation of the labour movement in production and its maximum contribution to the advancement of the "national" capital in the world market system. The role for the state was mainly to provide the welfare; the organisation of production was left to the capital owners, and the auto-organising of the labour movement was blocked as much as possible. This strategy was elaborated in Scandinavia in the thirties and was dispersed with more or less success to other countries in the system center after 1945. The goal was called The welfare state.

[24] Samir Amin et al, Transforming the revolution.

The communist form was developed in Russia from 1929 and was dispersed after 1945 to other semiperipheral and peripheral countries. In this model, the labour movement was subordinated completely under the functionaries of the nationalist movements, and these concentrated on advancement in the system using strict state control. The reason for this was that the strategy promised that the workers finally, when the country had arrived, would get the surplus that would permit an integration of the workers. For that aim, the workers accepted that the whole country was organised as an enterprise, i.e. accepted the corporate state according to Burawoy's terminology. The lack of surplus, which would have been used for integration, was compensated with full employment and a lot of cultural flattering. The auto-organising of the movement was repressed ruthlessly, as were all popular movements that demanded anything from the state. The goal was called Socialism in one country.

The core of the communist parties in the system center in the interwar years was the workers who had engaged in strike movements in 1917-20, while the core of the social democratic parties was the artisans and the functionaries. The split between them was biggest where the division had been biggest during the strike wave.

Both strategies built on satisfying some skilled workers more than others. This was most explicit in the communist strategy, where a system of life-employed core workers surrounded by assistant workers was developed as early as in the thirties. The aim was to weaken the worker solidarity and create a fifth column of workers loyal to the functionaries at the worksites [25].

Another result of the government power strategy was that the labour movement increasingly defined itself ideologically rather than socially. The development began with the Socialist Workers' International. As is suggested by the name, this was not a cooperation between the organisations of the labour movement based in common activities and all-round struggle within a social community, but cooperation between parliamentary parties based in an ideology [26].

The overrideologization was without doubt partly a consequence of the social stigmatization of the workers, and was a means for them to increase the mutual solidarity. It could also be a way of assertion, as it was for the early Swedish labour movement in its relation to the liberal charity bourgeoisie. But primarily it was a consequence of the social divisions within the movement, the increasingly strong position of the functionaries, and not least an increasing number of middle class adherents. These were simply not able to feel a social solidarity, they had to emphasize ideology. Like what happened within the Christian movement, it was these who were responsible for the ideologization

[25] Michael Burawoy, *The contours of production politics*, in Charles Bergquist (ed), *Labor in the capitalist world economy*, Sage Publications 1984; Moshe Lewin: *The making of the Soviet System*, Methuen 1985.

[26] The conflict was clear when the Socialist Workers' International was founded in Paris in Juli 14, 1889. For then, there were two congresses, both allegedly representing the working class, with the aim of creating an international cooperation. The one, convened by French cooperatives, appealed to trade unions. The other, convened by French marxists, appealed to socialist parties. The later was the one that got the hegemony within the labour movement, and the rivalry between them was bitter according to James Joll, *The Second International*, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1974.

and warred against heretics while the workers tried to keep together the movement on a social base. The concept “socialism” was as stated above coined by the French charity bourgeoisie, and the division of the labour movement into ideological identities like social democrats, communists, syndicalists, anarco-syndicalists, trotskyites and christians resulted to a great extent from professional intellectuals’ institutionalization of strategic and tactic discussions, carried out at some time and place, i.e. they made strategic choices into holy things.

The over-ideologized labour movements were polarized around the two national models, to which they displayed more solidarity than they did to their own members [27]. Some obvious examples of going astray in the ideological fog, or perhaps of the interests of the organisation getting the better of that of the members, is when communists and nazists cooperated about toppling the social democratic government of Prussia in 1932, and when social democrats cooperated with the US intelligence service about combating communists in the system peripheries through organising the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The authentic labour movement that appeared in spite of this during the era was without troubles integrated into either of the factions, usually into the one that was a minority in the country in question. For example, Ericsson demonstrates how the opposition against the decay of the laymen’s role in the Swedish labour movement easily was translated into communist loyalties [28], and the same thing happened to the forceful factory occupation movement in France in 1936. In the case a labour movement succeeded in keeping aloof from both nationalist factions these could cooperate in repressing it, on the best of terms. This happened in Catalonia in 1936, where the anarco-syndicalist labour movement organised a widely dispersed network of occupied, autonomous industries, in the panic following the military rebellion [29].

Government power strategy, functionary power, and overrideologization supported each other. The strategy presupposed close cooperation between movement and state, i.e. movement and state functionaries. On the other hand, the laymen were increasingly subordinated, increasingly unable to make their own decisions, increasingly subaltern, pressed by the demands for ideological orthodoxy. This frontier guard system fitted both functionaries and charity bourgeoisie excellently.

I will soon try to evaluate if the labour movements nevertheless, despite all handicaps, succeeded in utilizing the opportunities given by the welfare state or by socialism in one country. But first a short summary of the events that led to the relative discarding of both these models [30].

[27] One of the themes in Walter Kendall, *The labour movement in Europe*.

[28] Hans-Olof Ericsson, *Mellan dröm och vardag*, Arkiv 1991.

[29] The Catalan labour movement is related in for example Gabriel Jackson, *The Spanish republic and the civil war 1931-1939*, Princeton University Press 1965, Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish civil war*, Hamish Hamilton 1977, or Robert Alexander, *The Anarchists in the Spanish civil war*, Janus 1999.

[30] The description builds primarily on Giovanni Arrighi & Beverly Silver, *Labor movement and capital migration: The United States and Western Europe in world historical perspective*, in Charles Bergquist (ed), *Labor in the capitalist world-economy*, Sage Publications 1984.

The movement upturn after the first world war collapsed almost everywhere when the long recession of the twenties and thirties reduced the demand for labour. In some places, the collapse was disasters. In others, the labour movements were even able to strengthen their positions.

The most dramatic case was Russia [31].

In Russia, almost all industrial workers worked in the ultra-modern big-enterprise industry in a few cities, most notable St. Petersburg where the Fordist organisation dominated. Some were migrant workers, and most of the permanent workers were born in collectivist villages; the collectivist tradition was strong and many workers even lived in communes in town, based in place of origin or team. With the collectivist living followed an informal organisation, and with the repressive government followed a revolutionary ideology; for the workers it was self-evident that the regime and its anti-labour legislation had to go. Despite legal bans, the workers elected their “aldermen” to represent them to the enterprises, and to the society in general: the determination of the government not to tolerate any unionism guaranteed that the most limited unionist demand quickly carried political overtones. In 1905, the labour movement was so strong and so politicized that a general strike was able to force through parliamentary reforms, which were however soon revoked.

In Russia, the 1916 strike movement was strong enough to overthrow the government.

During 1916, the supply of raw materials and food to Petrograd became increasingly disorganised. As a result, soldiers, officers and workers in the army and in industry began to discuss countermeasures, and during the winter these discussions took the form of outright rebellion plans. The co-ordinating force was the trade unions, rather than political parties [32]. There were no precise action plans, however, as a strike movement had begun to develop in mid-February 1917, the women’s textile workers’ union’s demonstration on International Women’s Day, which according to the Russian calendar was 23 February, gained a strong following, so strong that even the riot police remained passive. And the government resigned.

In the chaos of the war defeat, it was necessary for the workers, especially in Petrograd, to take control of the factories in order to maintain production and get food for the day. Control was organised in factory committees coordinated by workers’ councils, which took on more and more tasks as the old state apparatus fell apart, such as super-

[31] The Russian labour movement before the revolution is treated by C. Read, *Labour and socialism in tsarist Russia*, in Dick Geary (ed), *Labour and socialist movements in Europe before 1914*. The revolution is described by S.A. Smith, *Red Petrograd*, Cambridge University Press 1983, and in David H. Kaiser (ed), *The workers’ revolution in Russia 1917, The view from below*, Cambridge University Press 1987, in a way that starts with the needs and self-organising of the workers, not from state-building party people. Rex A. Wade, *The red guards*, in Edith Rogovin Frankel et al (ed), *Revolution in Russia; reassessment of 1917*, Cambridge University Press 1992, is another source. See also chapter 6.

[32] Jason Yanowitz: February’s forgotten vanguard, *International Socialist Review* 75. Sept 2021, maps the mass organisation of the February Revolution and hopefully kills the widespread myth that it was “spontaneous”, which collective actions rarely are.

vising the operation and supply of the factories. The Red Guards, organised directly from the factories, took on policing duties in working-class neighbourhoods. Because the state had taken such an active role in disciplining the workers, the dissolution of the state was an enormous relief that the workers immediately took advantage of.

For the workers, the programme of the radical nationalists, the Bolsheviks, of state responsibility for provisioning was increasingly seen as a reasonable salvation from starvation. It was therefore strongly supported by the labour movement, and the Bolsheviks responded with unconditional support for the workers' councils as organisations. It was the Red Guards who seized power in October and handed it over to the Bolsheviks. But radical state policies were not enough. The disintegration was a consequence of the defeat of the war and the fact that industry produced mainly for the needs of the war, and the Bolshevik government was as incapable of solving the problems of the workers as the previous regime had been. But the labour movement was now left with no suggestion as to what to do about the situation. The growing resistance to Bolshevik incompetence was easily crushed militarily in July 1918, after which labour control was gradually dismantled [33]. During the struggles between different regime pretenders that followed, industrial production became impossible to maintain, due to the breakdown of communications. The whole industry perished, and with it also the working class, and most of the activists died in the armed struggles or were coopted by the state as minor bureaucrats. In the new nationalised industries, built up afterwards by the nationalist government, the workers were organised militarily and autonomous actions were repressed violently in the name of national development. All union rights were abolished and in 1939 the worker was tied to his job. The state thus took back the disciplining function it had had before the revolution, and forced it further than any government had done so far.

The power of the workers to assert their claims against the national career demands was small, apart from everyday resistance in the form of conscious ineffectivity and other quiet sabotage. Protest strikes against reduced wages and increased labour norms in the textile industry in the Ivanovo area around 1930 were for example effectively quelled and the leaders were sent to slave labour [34]. According to Lewin, their organisation was restrained by the swift inflow of new unskilled workers, by the chaotic conditions in the economy, and by the extreme inequality within a working class where the highest wages were ten times as high as the lowest [35]. But others have pointed at the fact that the chaos created by incompetent planning authorities at least gave the skilled workers the power of knowledge which could be exchanged into concessions [36].

Also in Italy, the mobilization and demobilization of the labour movement was dramatic [37]. Like in Russia the labour movement was dominated by semi-skilled

[33] William Rosenberg, Russian labour and Bolshevik power: social dimensions of protest in Petrograd after October, in David H. Kaiser (ed), *The workers' revolution in Russia 1917, The view from below*.

[34] Jeffrey Rossman: *Worker resistance under Stalin*, Harvard University Press 2005. The Communist's claim to represent the workers is effectively exploded here.

[35] Moshe Lewin, *The making of the Soviet system*.

[36] Michael Burawoy, *The contours of production politics*.

[37] Paolo Spriano, *The occupation of the factories*, Pluto Press 1975, is a classic that appeared in original as

young workers recently immigrated from the countryside and working in big Fordist enterprises in Milano and Torino. During the two “red years” 1919-20 these workers succeeded, with strikes and occupations, take control over production through workers’ councils, while they inspired their families in the countryside to occupy the land. But they didn’t succeed in taking control over their own trade unions. According to Spriano, the movement was paralysed by cleavages between laymen and functionaries with wholly conflicting views on what strategy would be best for the movement. Moreover, the recession made labour unsaleable a few years afterwards. It was thus easy for armed gangs supported by the bourgeoisie to smash all worker organisation for twenty years.

In Germany, the violence of the social democratic party leadership against its own members had divided the labour movement deeply. The moral breakdown made all claims of hegemony impossible. The two national projects fought each other more bitterly than they opposed state or capital. On the one side was the communist labour movement, organising the unemployed. On the other hand were the social democrats, organising the employed and passably able to defend the interests of the employed workers, partly at the expense of the unemployed. Despite this mean internal quarrel, it is possible to talk about a labour movement until a social democratic government during the financial crash in 1929 resorted to crisis politics, and let unemployment rise to save the currency. This left the movement so disillusioned that the paramilitary free corps without resistance were able to take government power and dissolve all labour movement organisations in 1933. During fifteen years, the workers were reduced to everyday resistance at the worksite level. But in this they were effective – their go-slows succeeded in raising the wages despite the anti-unionist dictatorship of the thirties [38].

In France, the labour movement was split in quarrelling nationalist factions when the war-induced boom ended, and working-class power slumped. In 1936 it looked as if it was possible for the workers to unite in a wave of factory occupations and strikes, which followed an anti-fascist election victory. In a few weeks they forced through considerable wage-hikes, 40 hours’ week and paid holidays. But after some year the movement had broken down and all gains were taken back.

In Britain, the labour movement was not beaten. It was defeated in a general strike in 1926 and remained weak during the thirties, but it didn’t disintegrate as the labour movement on the continent. For example, it was strong enough to throw out its own leadership when it chose to save the pound instead of protecting the workers during the crash of 1929. The membership figures didn’t fall either, unlike France, Germany and Italy.

In this gloomy enumeration, there are only two examples of labour movements that were able to strengthen their positions, in Scandinavia and in the USA.

In Scandinavia, there was historically a strong popular tradition and a weak upper

early as in the early 60s. Unfortunately it is affected by the old elitist history writing that gives party leaders predominance at the expense of lay members.

[38] Mark Blyth: *Austerity – the history of a dangerous idea*, Oxford University Press 2013, tells how the Social Democrats refused an unionist, Keynes-inspired economic program of rescuing the economy because it was “unmarxist” – upon which the Nazis immediately endorsed it.

class culture; both aristocracy and bourgeoisie were poor and insignificant by continental standards [39]. The peasants had from time immemorial governed themselves, and their self-confidence was inherited by the labour movement and other peoples' movements in the late nineteenth century. Scandinavia was commercialized late and the collectivist life forms were not forgotten in the early twentieth century. The growing peoples' movement traditions, of which the labour movement was the strongest, for that reason had an uncommon legitimacy. In the twenties and thirties, the popular movements had a cultural hegemony in the Scandinavian societies, expressed in cooperatives and self-educated politicians and cultural icons. It was for that reason not against the tradition that an alliance of labour and agrarian movements took care of the government in the thirties in Sweden, Norway and Denmark, and begun a government policy of the fastest possible integration of the direct producers. But the labour movement had also shown a drive of their own – during the twenties and thirties, the Swedish workers had the highest strike frequency in the world. Militance begun with a vast movement of bread (or rather potato) seizures in the end of the war, beginning in the small town Västervik at the Baltic coast, and organized by local trade unions. Up to five percent of the population took part, nationally, and not only strikes got a boost but also independent organizing for all kinds of local issues [40].

In this alliance there was, however, a third party: the charity bourgeoisie, middle class people sympathising with some of the aims of the labour movement, but only as a shadow movement, i.e. they had their own interpretation of the aims and they didn't take part in the collective identity of the movement. They were strangely able to make a deal with the movement leaders about a common strategy, which was to be pioneering for the whole system center.

In the USA, the labour movement was for a long time organisatorically weak and divided, and capitalists were more intransigent than in Europe where they needed the workers' support against older ruling classes. Up to the twenties, the huge immigration of European poors had made it difficult to organise the American working class. For the immigrants were more easily drawn into clientelistic networks around previously immigrated countrymen that had grown wealthy. Each time the labour movement had organised and strove and succeeded in forcing up the wages, a new wave of immigrants was heaped onto the labour market. These had often no other ambitions than working hard for a few years and return home, and were for that reason prepared to work under worse conditions than the natives. After several attempts to organise all workers in the late nineteenth century the organisers gave up, and restricted themselves to organising

[39] So far I know, the Scandinavian societies have never been explored as a diverging path of system center polity and culture. And furthermore, what I know is only available in Scandinavian languages. Knud P. Pedersen, *Den nordiske model*, Grevas 1984, is a popular but unanalytic sketch. Kjell Östberg: *The rise and fall of the Swedish social democracy*, Verso 2024, devotes some ten pages to the dominance of popular movements during the 1920-30s. A view from the Swedish labour movement standpoint is Jan Lindhagen, *Socialdemokraternas program*, Tiden 1972. The peoples' movement culture is movingly depicted in Jan Myrdal, *Anteckningar från den svenska litterära scenen*, i *Ord & avsikt*, Norstedts 1986.

40) Sigurd Klockare: *Svenska revolutionen 1917-1918*, Prisma 1967; Hans Nyström: *Hungerupproret 1917*, Zelos 1994.

the skilled artisans, who were least affected by competition from immigrants. They even helped the enterprises to repress union organising among the unskilled, and were thanked with the permission to bargain. Meanwhile, they gave up all ambitions to contribute to broader society changes, and were content with their bargaining rights. As it was expressed by the founder and perennial leader of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), Samuel Gompers: We have just one aim: more [41].

But a series of sitdown strikes in the big industry broke the pattern during the thirties. Without any particularly strong national organisation, and despite recession and unemployment, the unskilled workers at the assembly line forced the traditionally anti-unionist Ford, General Motors and US Steel to agree on collective contracts which raised the salaries, and forced the government to carry through pro-labour legislation to protect industrial peace. Unlike all other countries, the gains remained, and unlike all other countries, the wages increased more than the productivity.

This struggle was accomplished outside and partly counter to AFL. The ideological cement was as vague as always in American labour movement, and the aim was reduced to the immediate demands. It even occurred sometimes that white workers strove against black and vice versa, but this time all participated, not only the artisans. The core of the movement was the second generation immigrants in the most automatized businesses, auto, machinery, steel and slaughterhouse, and the decisive moment was the two months occupation of the auto body factories in Flint at the new year 1937 [42].

Arrighi and Silver explain the successes of the American and Scandinavian workers in the following way.

Firstly, USA and Sweden were the countries where the Fordist organisation of industry had gone farthest. Therefore, the workers in the USA and in Sweden had most local bargaining power in the world, i.e. they were the countries where it was easiest for a small group of determined workers to obstruct the production of a complete big enterprise. The partial successes in Britain can be explained by the fact that industry in Britain was more Fordist than anywhere in the European continent.

Secondly, the workers of the USA, Scandinavia, and Britain were less exposed to immigration from the countryside and foreign countries during the period.

The American workers were also unhampered by unionism and nationalist party strategy to act independently. They actually lost their creativity and fighting spirit when they were organised into unions. This fact has induced some scholars to conclude that

41] The growth of the American labour movement is described in Martin Shefter, *Trade unions and political machines; The organization and disorganization of the American working class in the late nineteenth century*, in Katznelson & Zolberg, *Working class formation. The blacklegging of AFL* is described in David Gordon, Richard Evans & Michael Reich, *Segmented work, divided workers*, Cambridge University Press 1982. Capitalist intransigence can be studied in Jeremy Brecher: *Strike*, South End Press 1978.

[42] There is a vivid and completely non-academic description of this well-planned occupation, with a great interest in the strategic and tactical decisions of the movement: Walter Linder, *The great Flint sit-down strike against GM 1936-37*, The Radical Education Project, no year. In occupying the plants, the American workers finally succeeded in finding a method against blacklegging. The occupied factories were fortified against the armed attacks of the enterprise. Nine tenths of the workers had the task of organising solidarity while only one tenth remained at the plant.

workers in the Fordist big industry don't need any unions to support each other, they are well enough organised by the production process itself [43]. On the other hand, the Scandinavian labour movements were the most creative in the world to utilize the government power strategy, for example they invented Keynesian economics before Keynes [44]. Arrighi and Silver don't tell why the Scandinavian labour movements were so creative; one may assume that it was a result of the self-confidence given by the cultural hegemony, which among other things was expressed in the slogan of their thirties, "We build the country".

The world market system, in the form of state and capital, answered the strength of the American and Scandinavian labour movements in two ways: capital export and bureaucratization.

Firstly, American (and Swedish) industries began to invest abroad to avoid the claims of domestic workers. Thus, modern industries organised in Fordist manners grew in Western Europe and Japan, and the workers' local bargaining power increased in the whole system center (while it of course decreased in the USA and Scandinavia).

Secondly, the relations between enterprise and workers were bureaucratized. The functionaries of the labour movement were given an increasing number of legislated duties. The aim was twofold. It divided the unions in giving the functionaries the duty to prevent the workers from using their bargaining power. And it laid the permission to bargain where it was least disturbing for the capital accumulation. Thus, the construction was begun of the most ambitious integration process so far pursued during the world market system, while the labour movement was subjected to a long-term demobilization which after some generation had made the laymen deeply unfamiliar to their own organisations' project.

This development is initiated through the cooperation between labour movement functionaries, charity bourgeoisie and domestic market industry in Sweden [45].

The foundation of the strategy was partly that some of the most important demands of the labour movement must be met, i.e. full employment, higher material standards, and increased security. But it was also that the democratic autonomy and movement culture of the labour movement had to be curtailed – not least all claims for workers' power over production.

The Swedish welfare state was according to Johansson and Ekdahl possible because of a political alliance, between the labour movement and the domestic market industry of which the latter needed higher purchasing power for its customers and for this reason ac-

[43] For example Lars Lindström, *Accumulation, rgulation and political struggles*, Stockholm University 1993.

[44] Sten O. Karlsson: *Det intelligenta samhället*, Carlssons 2001, is a lengthy relation about how this model grew within the labour movement and the Social-Democratic party. The inspiration was not so much Marx as the German Kathedersozialisten, the British Fabianists and the US Progressists. But the Swedish were first to get it into praxis. Also Sheri Berman: *The Social-Democratic moment*, Harvard University Press 1998, and Mark Blyth: *Great transformations*, Cambridge University Press 2012 add some puzzle pieces.

[45] This process has been subject for debate after the overthrow of it. For example Alf Johansson & Lars Ekdahl, *Den historiska kompromissen som tillfällig maktallians*, i *Häften för Kritiska Studier* 2/96; one piece they point at is the virtual disappearance of the domestic industry which was transformed to an aggressive export industry with the help of Marshall money.

cepted the demands of the labour movement. But the third party, the charity bourgeoisie, was to a great extent able to use its position as shadow movement to win the hegemony in the alliance.

Bo Rothstein has demonstrated how this charity bourgeoisie effectively succeeded in blocking all changes contrary to its interests, for example a less elitist school, while the labour movement succeeded in forcing through changes which were necessary for its members, for example an active labour market policy [46]. But the two alliance partners of the labour movement also did all they could to break the workers' faculty of mobilization and prospects of asserting themselves in the alliance in the long run.

The business organisations succeeded with their aim through the Saltsjöbaden agreement in 1938. The agreement gave a guaranteed security and wage increases in exchange for a renouncement of political and cultural claims, and giving up of the right to bargain that built on worksite power. Matters of society were defined as matters for the functionaries while the workers were relegated to a role as consumers [47].

The charity bourgeoisie went to the offensive in primarily three fields to wreck the worker culture: housing policy, nationalisation, and eugenics.

Housing policy was used to hit against the continuous working class quarters as a home for a collectively organised life, which the charity bourgeoisie felt threatened by. Instead, they offered peripheral suburbs which should be class-mixed, geographically dispersed, constructed around the family as an alternative to the worker collective, and first of all, planned in the minutest detail by the charity bourgeoisie itself [48].

Nationalisation primarily implied that state and municipalities took over activities hitherto organised by worker dominated cooperatives, like education and insurances. This was said to be more "democratic", but the consequence was that they were organised in a more authoritarian way and that the labour movement lost a resource, not least morally, and it contributed to a strengthening of the hierarchies in society [49].

Eugenics implied that the working class was split up by a campaign directed against the poorest, the "not conscientious", who were subjects to verbal condemnations as well as pure terror in the form of for example forced sterilization [50].

A driving force in all these three offensives was the spearhead organisation of the

[46] Bo Rothstein, *Den socialdemokratiska staten*, Arkiv 1986.

[47] Lena Hellblom, *Från primitiv till organiserad demokrati*, Salamander 1985, describes the way union functionaries increasingly see themselves as the movement while the members are reduced to clients.

[48] Sten O. Karlsson, *Arbetsfamiljen och det nya hemmet*, Symposium Graduale 1993, deals with the housing policy as a decisive field, where the clinic vision of the charity bourgeoisie could be forced through only when the construction workers had lost an important strike in 1933-34.

[49] Marja Taussi Sjöberg & Tine Vammen (red), *På tröskeln till välfärden*, Carlsson 1995, demonstrates the welfare background in charity. Within the labour movement there was much anxiety over the eventual result and tried to counter it with recruiting poples' movement activists to the bureaucratic functions. But of course the functions affected their occupiers more than the other way about. Jonathan Rose: *The intellectual life of the british working class*, Yale University Press 2002, shows a parallell in Britain – secondary education run by the labour movement itself was successively taken over by the state which led to lost interest from the workers and to decreasing militance.

[50] Majja Runcis, *Steriliseringar i folkhemmet*, Ordfront 1998.

charity bourgeoisie, Centralförbundet för socialt arbete (Central Confederation for Social Works).

All in all, the results of the activities of the two actors are a neat example of conflict institutionalization.

It was difficult for the Swedish labour movement to meet the offensive from its two alliance partners. It was traditionally localist – the laymen were engaged in the local kind of matters the alliance partners hit at, while they delegated the national, central and overarching matters to their own functionaries. These quite natural didn't feel particularly threatened by the plans of their alliance partners, but could even win prestige in actively furthering them. For that reason, the movement could never find a counterstrategy, and discontent could easily be marginalised into communist sectarianism or individualist artistry. For that reason, the bargaining power of the movement was enfeebled successively from the forties on, even if it took many years before the enfeeblement was manifest.

The second world war, like the first, strengthened the bargaining power in the whole world while commodity shortage and overtime produced good reasons for grievance. The time up to 1948 was for that reason filled up with strikes. But as expected, the results were not as dramatic as those after the first world war. The defeats of the thirties, the increasing power of the functionaries, and the quarrels about the national projects had drained the self-esteem of the movements. But as also expected, the labour movements in the two successful regions used the strengthened bargaining power to move up their position further, through strikes for wage rises in the USA and election mobilizing for universal social legislation in Scandinavia. Also in Britain, the movement brought forth a reformist government which begun to introduce social legislation of the Scandinavian model.

In terms of action methods however, the Japanese labour movement was the most advanced, stimulated by the political bankruptcy of the old ruling classes, in the same way as the Central European labour movements in 1919 [51].

The Japanese workers had been subject to a tougher repression than the workers of any industrial country. The only organisation was the clientelistic one – entrepreneurs who rented out workers to the zaibatsu, the Japanese big enterprises. But at the end of the war, the war prisoners who worked as slaves in the coal mines revolted, and the Japanese coal miners made common cause with them. The complaisance of the American occupation authorities encouraged the miners, who easily reached their aims in the existing power vacuum, and inspired trade unions in the whole industry.

The problem for the trade unions was that strike didn't seem to lead anywhere in the rapidly disintegrating Japanese economy. Those who solved the problem was journalists and graphics at the biggest newspaper, Yomiuri. They throw out the owner, accused him of war crimes, and run the paper of their own.

[51] Mark Selden, *The proletariat, revolutionary change, and the state in China and Japan 1850-1950*, in Immanuel Wallerstein (ed), *Labor in the world social structure*, Sage 1983; and more exhaustively in Joe Moore, *Japanese workers and the struggle for power 1945-1947*, University of Wisconsin Press 1983.

In enterprise after enterprise, the workers discovered that production control – running the production under their own management – made better effects than striking, while the kickbacks from running the business better than the capitalists provoked the workers to set higher aims. In some places, workers and peasants organised an interchange of goods that built on social needs instead of the profit motive.

The American occupation authorities, which had tolerated the movement because it turned against Japanese war interests, soon reconsidered its policy. After a series of huge demonstrations in May 1946, USA, the zaibatsu and the Japanese government worked out a counterstrategy, built on cooption. The workers' production control would be accepted but subordinated to the normal hierarchy of the enterprises – the origin of the famous Japanese quality circles. Economic demands would be encouraged and met, while political demands would be ruthlessly repressed. The integration process in Japan was the most rapid ever recorded.

During the period 1948 to 1965, the labour movement was rather passive or at least not very much moving forward in the system center. In the USA and Scandinavia it had been encapsulated by labour legislation. In other countries, the local bargaining power was yet under construction. The labour movement was on the whole contented being the junior partner to state and capital.

Despite this, a far-reaching integration process was initiated in the system center during these years. The new hegemony power the USA was able to reorganise the chaos-hit system only by concessions to the strongest peoples' movements, in this case the labour movement and the anti-colonial movements, see chapter 2. The Bretton Woods system, the United Nations and Keynesianism implied that the welfare of the citizens had to be satisfied by the different states, and the labour movement was accordingly a necessary alliance partner. The presence of the Soviet Union as an unpredictable challenger in the system was another whip for the governments to satisfy their citizens lest they not change their loyalties. Even the continental European states introduced ambitious social insurance programs after Scandinavian patterns and accepted wage increases after American.

Only in the mid sixties, the labour movements were able to pull themselves together for a new great wave of mobilization. The setting was excellent. The Fordist organising of the worksites was at its height. The demand for labour was huge, the labour reserves of the countrysides were almost used up, and the workers' bargaining power on the market was for that reason strong. The rulers of the world were pressed hard by anti-colonial movements and peasant rebellions all over the world and appeared weaker than ever, see chapters 6 and 7. It appeared possible again to begin struggling for the hegemony [52].

The movement hit first in France in 1968 when ten million French workers stroke,

[52] Colin Crouch & Alessandro Pizzorno (ed), *The resurgence of class conflicts in Western Europe since 1968*, The Macmillan Press 1978. The most relevant chapters are Ida Regalia, Marino Regini & Emilio Reyneri, *Labour conflicts and industrial relations in Italy*; Pierre Dubois, *New forms of industrial conflicts*; and Rainer Deppe, Richard Herding & Dietrich Hoss, *The relationship between trade union actions and political parties*. Lumley, Robert : *States of emergency – cultures of revolt in Italy from 1968 to 1978*, Verso 1990, is a more thorough relation of the Italian case.

provoked and inspired by the youth rebellion the same year. But it was in Italy the movement was most versatile. For it was in Italy the development had been fastest from a powerless artisan dominated labour movement to a strong movement dominated by assembly line workers in a growing transnational industry. For that reason, it was in Italy the participants in the movement were least troubled by movement functionaries which in other countries were more or less able to disorganise the members'/laymen's active participation and needs.

It was the young assembly line, first generation workers in the metal industry who were the driving force. From them, the movement was spread to businesses where the unionist tradition had been weak, for example private services businesses.

The action forms were innovative. Instead of heavy-handed business-wide strikes which cost the funds as much as they cost the enterprises, they hit selectively: short selective strikes at strategic points, rolling strikes, overtime blockades, go-slows, factory occupations as an answer to lockouts, combined with taking the managers as hostages. Such forms demanded extremely good organisation at the worksite, which strengthened the power of the laymen at the expense of the union functionaries.

In many places, the workers implemented the demands themselves without waiting for an agreement: hours were shortened, overtime was abolished. Employed in the service businesses carried through actions that didn't hurt the public, for example busdrivers refused to receive fares. In other places workers tried "strike in the reverse" – they tried to run businesses the owners tried to shut down, even if such actions never succeeded. The closest they came to success was the French watch industry LIP which was run by the workers almost a year before they had to give up to the French authorities' obstinate assertion of Roman ownership principles.

The demands were varied. Instead of just claiming higher wages, the workers demanded the same rise for all, which implies reduced differentials. This implied that the unskilled workers egalitarianism won over the artisans' professional pride. As the movement grew, the demands for control over the worksite did so too. The demands were piecework payments should be replaced with monthly salaries, that poisonous stuffs and overtime should be abolished, and that the speed of the assembly lines should be reduced and more workers should be employed. In some places, like Fiat and Olivetti, the management even acknowledged for some years that the workers had right to decide rules, routines and schedules. The power distribution was changed to the benefit of the workers.

Meanwhile, the workers to a great extent took control over the trade unions. The unions began to assert political demands, pressed by the members but also as a way of taking back the hegemony of the movement. They also began to demand social housing, better schools, health care, public transportation and regional development. Autoreduction actions, i.e. actions where users refused to pay increased fares and fees, were supported by trade unions. Since the unions in these cases came into conflict with social democratic and communist parties, what could be called a de-ideologizing politization of the unions was begun; they began to escape the control of parties to be brought more under control of the members. Where unions had been split according to party affiliations

they began to grow together, and where the struggles were most developed, in the Italian metal industry, they even merged. This de-ideologization of the labour movement, this pragmatic politization starting with the needs of the participants, had begun at the workshops, where the activists had insisted in non-partisanship and unity of all participants, beyond all separating ideological identities.

During a decade, this movement wave was successful. The wages increased greatly, in Italy about 13 percent per year on average, in other European countries between 5 and 10 percent. The governments tried to fend off with integrative mechanisms according to the Scandinavian pattern – extension of health care, social housing, higher education for working-class youth, and a strong tendency for democratic and egalitarian treatment within the public service – a direct consequence of the labour movement mobilization.

But the system increasingly succeeded in beating off the movement, in the same way that the American and Scandinavian labour movements had been beaten off a generation before. With capital export and an effective union-government functionary cooperation, the system would neutralize the workers' local bargaining power, local culture and identity as active human beings.

Meanwhile, the long Kondratiev wave ended in the early seventies, which reduced the demand for labour, while an intense immigration to Western Europe raised the supply. For that reason, the market value of labour was reduced as was the workers' market power. Meanwhile, the contributory factors that had helped the workers broke down – the hegemony of the USA and the opposition role of the Soviet Union.

From the early eighties, the labour movements were paralyzed and confused in the greater part of the system center, without either local bargaining power or market power, and their gains from the last fifteen years were taken away.

Instead, the labour movement was strengthened in the parts of the system peripheries where capital was exported to, from the seventies primarily Brazil and South Africa, from the eighties South Korea and Taiwan, and from the nineties also China.

Labour movements of the system periphery

Within the establishments of the world market system in the periphery – plantations, mines and devices for transport of raw materials to the center – germs of labour movements bred early. The workers of the sugar plantations learnt how to negotiate with the owners despite their legal inferiority, by go-slows, sabotage and marronnage; a slave rebellion at Haiti set up the second American independent republic – see Chapters 4 and 6. The first strikes in West Africa occurred in the 1890s, only some decade after the European occupation. But in most places in the peripheries full time workers remained a small minority until our age, and labour movements remained for that reason small and rather powerless. They have been able to make a name for themselves only as allies to national movements, and had had to pay for that. They have gained some weight only in the late 20th century.

This is connected with the function of peripheries.

The purpose of peripheries is to reduce the cost of labour. In the center of the system, the direct producers forced states and capital owners to begin reducing violence, replac-

ing it with integration after the great rebellion movements of the 17th century. After the French Revolution the development speeded up, and workers got an ever growing part of the economic surplus, in shape of salaries and social security. But somebody had to pay for this, and the somebody was the workers in the periphery. For workers in the periphery had two great handicaps, compared to workers in the center.

Firstly, the system peripheries weren't as politically sensitive as the center. In the center, it was not easy for the rulers to use violence without getting on the wrong side of important middle classes they were dependent on. In the periphery no such groups existed, so violence was more acceptable for the system. In reality, the relations of states/capitals and workers have always been violent in the system peripheries, from the slavery of the 16th and 17th centuries to the dictatorships and prohibited unions of today.

Secondly, and more important, the workers of the system peripheries had an inferior resistance technique and unionisation skill, at least in the beginning. The workers of the peripheries were recruited directly from the countryside and were unused to industrial conditions. Normally a generation was needed before union traditions had been developed and the workers were able to make an effective resistance against exploitation. A generation was needed before new urbans had learnt to survive in urban areas and use their terrain for political purposes.

The first generations of workers in the periphery were also not full time or full life workers, and had little interest in organising defence.

Fully proletarian, urbanised workers, who are completely adjusted to an industrial society have to be salaried so that the salary covers the whole life, including childhood, education, sickness, unemployment, and old age. Their salaries have, for that reason, to be rather high. If the family of the worker can bear the cost for child rearing, sick care, unemployment relief and pension, salaries can be reduced to what the workers need during their active time. But then, they need a base in a self-subsistent household [53].

And workers in the system periphery had this, and they still have in some degree. For few were interested in working in the center owned mines and plantations. To get someone to work there at all the colonial authorities had to use force, in the shape of tax or slave labour. Under such circumstances, work became socially degrading, something the young of the villages could engage in for a few years before they went back home. The turnover of workers was high. And the motivation to organise trade unions was low.

Instead, railwaymen, municipal workers and dockers were pioneers of labour movements in the periphery; their work called for education so the workers had to be permanent. This was the case in Colombia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Argentina and India. In some regions, where land ownership was strongly monopolised and didn't permit work migration, particularly in Latin America, a professional miner craft was also formed, which got a key role in some places [54].

[53] The system has been described in Claude Meillassoux, *Maidens, meal and money: capitalism and the domestic community*, Cambridge University Press 1981.

[54] Literature on labour movements in the system periphery is scarce – which is lamented by all its authors. About Latin America I warmly recommend Charles Bergquist, *Labor in Latin America*, Stanford Universi-

In Chile, for example, the pioneers of labour organising were railwaymen to be sure, but the miners of the nitrate mines were the first to capture a position of power in society. Nitrate was the principal Chilean export product, and in the nitrate districts in the deserts of the north there were no intermediaries between workers and the representatives of the companies. The workers could quickly construct a public identity as “the Chilean people” opposed to the foreign-owned nitrate companies [55].

The *mancomunales*, or communes, of the nitrate workers – financial, political, and cultural organisations that carried out insurances, edited newspapers and organised theatre plays – were for that reason early respected by the middle class as a possible partner.

This possible partnership with the middle class was from an early date the main strategy of the Chilean labour movement. As early as the slump of 1919 they spent much energy on getting in teachers and office staff people into street demonstrations and unions, and this strategy paid off. The state began to yield to the demands in the early 20s, but it also laid down conditions, in the shape of an intriguing labour legislation that made employed union functionaries the key people. These functionaries continued, far beyond the fall of the Union Popular, to carry on the middle class alliance that had given rise to them. The workers themselves were thereby put aside and lost most of their self-esteem.

The Bolivian tin mine workers are more well-known; they followed a similar strategy since the thirties. They were based in isolated mining towns far from urban concentrations, but Bolivia’s dependence on tin export made them nevertheless a dominating political actor. So dominating, in fact, that wide swathes of the middle class out of self-interest saw national development projects according to mine worker ideas as suspect. The miners’ strikes have made and deposed governments, and made it necessary for the middle class political parties to vie for the support of the miners or try to buy them. They were the force that for a long time made it impossible to guarantee exploitation with softer means than terrorist military dictatorships, and even that only temporarily [56].

Labour movements as junior partners

With the relocation of textile industries from the system center to the peripheries,

ty Press 1986. Sylvia Ann Hewlett & Richard S Weinert, *Brazil and Mexico; patterns in late development*, Institute for the Study of Human Issues 1982, and Edward Epstein (ed), *Labor autonomy and the state in Latin America*, Unwin Hyman 1989 may complete. About African movements, Robin Cohen has written or edited some books: Richard Sandbrook & Robin Cohen, *The development of an African working class*, Longman 1975, Robin Cohen, *Labour and politics in Nigeria*, Heineman 1974, and William Cobbett & Robin Cohen (ed), *Popular struggles in South Africa*, *Review of African Political Economy* 1987. Asia is most scantily documented. There is, for example Mark Selden, *The proletariat, revolutionary change and the state in China and Japan 1850-1950*, in Immanuel Wallerstein (ed), *Labor in the world social structure*, Sage 1983, and Jean Chesneaux, *The Chinese labor movement 1919-1927*, Stanford University Press 1968. There are also two collections edited by Roger Southall, *Labour and unions in Asia and Africa*, Macmillan 1988, and *Trade Unions and the new industrialisation of the Third World*, Zed 1988.

[55] Charles Bergquist, *Labor in Latin America*, Stanford University Press 1986.

[56] James Dunkerley, *Rebellion in the veins*, Verso 1984.

primarily to Japan, China and India, from the beginning of the twentieth century, a more extensive labour movement could be born in new industrial countries. In absolute numbers there were not many workers; the labour movement that shook China in the twenties didn't comprise more than one of China's 500 millions. But it was strategically located. Thanks to its ability to strike directly at the system center's/colonial power's exploitation, it was a valuable partner in the anti-colonial movement alliance, see chapter 6 [57].

In China, there were artisan traditions like in Europe, and artisans had been pioneers in the boycott actions against European goods in the 1830s. But the first trade unions were organised in modern industries, primarily railways, textile industry and to some degree mines. It was stimulated by the Fourth of May movement against Chinese complaisance towards the colonial powers, but it was also stimulated by the global strike wave at the end of the first world war. A part of the Fourth of May movement was inspired by the Russian revolution; it organised a communist party, which saw as its most important task to coordinate locally organised trade unions into a stable network over all China.

This was not at all easy; in the chaotic China there would be many dramatic examples during the twenties of successful strikes and energetic organising suddenly repressed by violent warlords. But the principal worker actions were relatively independent of this organising and were centered on sailors and dockers in the main base of the British Empire in East Asia, Hongkong.

In 1922, the sailors went to strike, and were successful since they got support from the dockers. They also got support from the local regime that was set up by nationalists and communists together in Guangzhou not far from there. They saw with satisfaction that the British colonialists were in trouble, and the transport workers thus developed into a kind of spearhead of the Chinese nationalist movement.

The great strike movement in 1925-26 began in the Chinese textile center of Shanghai, when female textile workers were shot at by the colonial police. But it was the sailors and dockers once more that were the backbone of the movement. When a support demonstration there also had been fired at, they declared a general strike in Hongkong. The strike was to be maintained almost a year, and it was to be the biggest strike ever, quantitatively.

The strike was incredibly well organised. It was supported by a network among Chinese emigrants in Asia and the USA; it had a police force of its own that patrolled the town, it organised schools to teach reading and politics to the strikers, it organised a boycott against British goods. It is told that Hongkong was so paralysed that the rich ladies had to buy and cook their own food. After a year the colony was almost ruined. But at that time, the Chinese merchants had got enough of it; they were also almost ruined from not being able to trade with the British. They got the nationalist Guangzhou government to arrest the strike committee and block the support funds. This, however, wouldn't have been so serious if not the workers themselves had begun to question why they should

[57] Mark Selden, *The proletariat, revolutionary change and state in China and Japan*; Jean Chesneaux, *The Chinese labor movement 1919-1927*.

alone sacrifice for Chinese national goals [58].

The Hongkong strike is a good example of advantages and disadvantages with alliances; if it fits it may bring great benefits – but the risks are obvious.

To find a compromise, nationalists and communists decided on a quick military conquest of China instead of risky union organisation. The so-called Northern Expedition begun in 1926 was very successful. It was so successful that the nationalist party decided that it was able to do without trade unions infiltrated by communists. In April 1927 it attacked the trade unions in Shanghai and annihilated them. Other trade unions were forced underground.

The strike movement which twenty years later undermined the prestige of the Guomindang government had no political goals but aimed at raising the wages to keep up with inflation. For that reason it was easy for the new communist government to make a deal with the workers on higher wages and social policy, at least for the core groups, against a promise of refraining from autonomy.

The price was paid by the casual workers, those without regular job. They have during the whole age of the Peoples' Republic amounted to tens of millions. They were one of the groups that tried to assert themselves during the Cultural Revolution. For example, they organised the shortlived Shanghai commune in February 1967. But posed against party functionaries and privileged core workers, their gains were small and shortlived [59].

Sometimes a cooperation between labour movement and national movement would express itself in labour organisations started by anti-colonialist intellectuals. In India, for example, this tradition to this day gives shadow movements from the middle class an odious influence in the trade unions of the workers.

In India, the labour movement never got as strong position in the anti-colonial alliance as in China and Latin America [60]. Actions like the railway strike in Bengal in 1906 and the general strike in Bombay in 1907 would of course emphasize the value of labour movements as an alliance partner, but didn't modify the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. In India, the central government wasn't weak as in China and the bourgeoisie was strong and assembled in the National Congress. The small working class, primarily consisting in textile workers in Bombay and migrant jute workers in Bengal, were easy to lead for politicians in the developmentalist bourgeoisie. This alliance was not too destructive as long as the bourgeoisie itself was marginalised by the colonial rule. But as early as 1930 the Indian workers began to be divided according to party and according to the interest divisions of others. These divisions have remained long after the reasons for it have ceased to be relevant.

[58] Robert James Horrocks: *The Guangzhou-Hong Kong Strike, 1925-1926; Hong Kong Workers in an Anti-Imperialist Movement*, The University of Leeds, Department of East Asian Studies, 1994.

[59] Jack Gray, *Rebellion and revoltion, China from the 1800s to the 1980s*, Oxford University Press 1990.

[60] Jaganath Pathy, *The structure of the Indian working class and conventional unions*, in Roger Southall (ed), *Labour and unions in Africa and Asia*. Sukomal Sen, *Working class of India*, South Asia Books 1977 gives some supplementing empiry, but is tiresomely apologetic on behalf of the communist parties.

The colonial Africa's labour movement had an even brittle base, in migrant mine and plantation workers and a few railway and dock workers. But in colonial Africa, they were almost the only organised force there was [61]. For that reason, the strength of the anti-colonial movements had to come from the labour movements. In Angola, the first independence movement was organised as an answer to the strike of the plantation workers in 1961, in Nigeria in 1945 and Ghana in 1950, general strikes spread the independence movements beyond the small circles of university people, and in Zambia, the coppermine workers played the same role. In the independent African countries, the labour movements have kept its central position and were able to assert the interests of the workers at least up to the IMF seizure of power in the nineties. For example, Van Hear describes the way Nigerian workers successfully were able to oppose the military dictatorships and guard the purchase power of the workers, in spite of recessions and decreasing import yields [62]. And in Zambia, the trade union central ZCTU were, thanks to its democratic legitimacy, able to leading the resistance to the autocratic government and against IMF's adjustment policy during the eighties; it was of no importance that ZCTU in formal terms organised a very small minority [63].

In the post-colonial countries, the alliance continued to live for a long time. It expressed itself in the way that careerist factions of the bourgeoisies looked to the labour movement for support for struggling against dependence of the system center. The idea behind the strategy was that a relatively wealthy working class would be the base for a domestic consumer goods industry. It was to no disadvantage that the money stayed in the country instead of being regained by foreign businesses. As compensation for the support, the labour movements would have to suffer paternalist rule. This strategy, called the import substitution model, flowered in the whole world until the end of the post war boom in 1973; more about this in chapter 6.

In Brazil, where plantation crops like sugar, coffee, and cacao were the most important export goods, the labour ministry under president Vargas which during the fifties gathered the urban workers into labour unions with the direct aim of being a prop for the government. The direct producers in the export sectors – family farmers, leaseholders or agricultural workers – were not invited, since they had the role to pay for it [64].

The most classical case of a national bourgeoisie trying to liberate themselves from dependence of the system center through cooperation with a labour movement is the Peronist policy in Argentina [65].

The Argentinian economy was based since the late nineteenth century in a profitable

[61] Robin Cohen, Labour and politics in Nigeria, and Richard Sandbrook & Robin Cohen, The development of an African working class. According to Cohen this is till true – the only alternative organisings are the labour movements and the army.

[62] Nicholas Van Hear, Recession, retrenchment and military rule: Nigerian labour in the 1980s, in Southall (ed), Trade unions and the new industrialization of the third world.

[63]. Paschal Mihyo, Against overwhelming odds, The Zambian trade union movement, in Henk Thomas (ed), Globalization and the third world trade unions, Zed 1995.

[64] Hewlett & Weinert, Brazil and Mexico.

[65] Charles Bergquist, Labor in Latin America.

meat export, luring immigrants from all corners of Europe into Argentina. In Buenos Aires, small industries for domestic demand grew up, with artisan workers organising in an Anarchist movement. But this labour movement remained feeble, for two reasons. Its participants were immigrants, and would for that reason be treated by the Argentinian middle class as something irrelevant. But more important was the difficulty to organise a labour movement in the key industry, the slaughter-houses. The workers in the five big slaughter and freezing houses were easily replaceable, as soon as they tried to enter into labour struggles they were fired and replaced with new immigrants from the harbour. For example, their most heroic attempt, the slaughter-house strike in 1918, was repressed by armed gangs which terrorized the working-class quarters for a week and killed thousands.

The meat industry wasn't organised until the second world war. The immigration was stopped by the war, but quite as important was that the slaughter-houses were then bought by North American capital, which introduced Fordist technology. The Argentinian workers soon learned Fordist strike technology as well, and during the first war years communists organised a strong trade union in the meatpacking industry. In 1943, it went out in a strike.

At that time, a nationalist faction of the bourgeoisie had seized power on a program of "national development", i.e. world market career. Since the meat export was foreign controlled, the government saw with some benevolence at the organised labour movement and helped negotiate a favourable agreement. The communist union leadership was eager not to disturb the Allied war efforts and accepted. But the workers didn't. They dismissed the communists and elected a new, non-ideological leadership, and went on with the strike. They were effective – they had discovered that it was enough if the electricity central stroke to bring the whole industry to stop.

During two years of time, the slaughterhouse workers, through north American strike methods and continuous bargaining with the labour minister, colonel Perón, improve their lot. Other unions took advantage of the opportunity. In 1945, Perón was dismissed, accused of being too worker-friendly. The slaughterhouse workers arranged a national insurrection, not too unlike the one in Russia in 1917, and Perón came back as president, as the candidate of the new Labour Party.

Now, the labour movement had given an emphatic support to the developmentalist bourgeoisie. But from then on, the yields were meagre. The center powers were not too happy with the Argentine upstart and invested in Australian meat instead, and the returns diminished. Nationalist experiments were increasingly worthless for the bourgeoisie, while cooption and labour legislation were increasingly worthless for the workers. So the conflicts grew increasingly violent until the industry was simply shut down and the labour movement was annihilated.

Through alliance with ambitious bourgeoisies, and through tying up with a global, European-inspired labour movement identity, the labour movements of the system peripheries have been able to compensate for their small number. This was not without costs. Often, workers were drawn into conflicts that were irrelevant to them, like when the Mexican labour movement let itself be mobilized against the peasants, on a Europe-

an-modernist program. But an association to a global labour movement identity nevertheless strengthened the labour movements as a collective global force.

According to Charles Bergquist, the following factors decide if a labour movement is strong in a peripheral country [66].

When ownership is concentrated in the dominant export industry, the development is favoured of a particular worker identity with a strong self-esteem, which strengthens the labour movement. Examples may be Chile and Venezuela in the forties. If industry is diversified and aimed at domestic consumption, the identity is weaker; an example may be Argentina before 1910.

If the dominant export industry is dependent of foreign capital, its workers appear as representatives for the nation and get valuable for a national alliance. Again, Chile may stand out as an example.

If there is a great supply of immigrants, from the countryside or other countries, labour movement organising is difficult. Examples are Argentina before 1940, South Africa before 1975, and Kuwait today.

If the liberal world market model has a temporary success, the middle class has no reason to ally with the workers, which isolates them politically and impedes its opportunity to act. Examples may be Taiwan in the seventies and Argentina before 1930.

There are also factors not mentioned by Bergquist. Labour organisation and indispensability of domestic elites in the great power game plays a role, as do cultural traditions. Even migrant workers have a political strength that may compensate for unionist feebleness, which has become apparent in Africa for example. For they are their home villages' links to the surrounding world and thus they may command a disproportionate political support. But Bergquist's point is that the strength of a labour movement does not only depend of numbers or market conditions.

Labour movement under export regimes

Monopoly sectors which have lost their monopoly are continuously relocated from the system center to the system peripheries. In the late nineteenth century textiles were relocated, in the mid nineteenth century steel was, and from the seventies it was the auto and electronics industries' turn. Relocation may take different political forms. In the early twentieth century, it was done as import substitution, i.e. the elites of the periphery countries aimed at more space of manoeuvre in order to advance into the system center, and tried to get control over industries producing what the countries needed themselves. In the late twentieth century, when the need for capital has grown so big that few peripheral countries are able to finance a buildup of a comprehensive industry of itself, the form is export orientation, i.e. the elites of the peripheral countries try to advance in the system through using profitable niches in the world market. For labour movements these two strategies have offered different working conditions.

Historically, import substitution, with its need for a national consumer market, has favoured more subtle forms of cooptation in national alliances where labour movements

[66] Ibid.

have got economic favours but have had small opportunities to initiatives of their own. Export orientation has demanded low wages and miserable working conditions and therefore been connected to authoritarian repression.

From the seventies, the transnational enterprises moved factories from Europe and Japan to “politically stable” countries in the system periphery like Brazil, South Africa, South Korea and Iran. Domestic enterprises and their governments borrowed money from banks in the system center to invest in their own production for export. This was also done in countries which earlier had backed import substitution like for example Argentina, Poland and India.

The end of the postwar Kondratiev wave in 1973 did not have as disastrous results for the labour movements in the periphery as it had in the center. In some sites, labour movements were able to gain impressive successes, because of their mounting numbers and because the new development strategy liberated the movements from the paternalist dependence imposed on them by the anti-colonial movements and by the import substitution strategy.

In Brazil, the labour movement’s dependence of the state was broken by a series of strikes in the transnational metal industry in São Paulo in 1978-80 [67]. This movement organized itself in the workers’ townships long before it entered the workshops, caring about public transport, electricity and water, see chapter 9.

The Brazilian military regime had during the sixties and seventies been uniquely successful in attracting transnational businesses with low salaries and a ban on all opposition. The result was a growing number of workers, from two to eleven millions during a period when the wages were cut with two thirds. The government-supported trade unions did nothing to this; from 1974 an opposition began to appear which simultaneously organised an independent network of workers’ committees and captured positions in the official unions.

In 1977, the working class womens’ movement organised a campaign against falsification of the consumer price statistics that regulated the wages, and was able to shame the shadow labour organisations into militancy. It soon appeared as a national actor with power enough to break the silence about repression, linked to demands for democratization. The year after it begun a strike movement, using all the opportunities given by automation. Within a few weeks it had reached the whole country, but the metal workers in the industrial suburbs of São Paulo appeared increasingly as leaders. The movement ignored more and more the paternalist labour laws and began to bargain directly with the enterprises by force of its local bargaining power, which was great enough to establish the labour movement as the core of a new movement for democracy, coordinating township committees, churches, intellectuals and opposition politicians.

In no country, the system of migrant semiproletarians as dogmatically modelled as in South Africa, where it was the foundation of the society – “apartheid”. Long since

[67] Gay Seidman: *Manufacturing militance, workers’ movements in Brazil and South Africa 1970-1985*, University of California Press 1994. Maria Helena Moreira Alves, *Trade unions in Brazil, A search for autonomy and organization*, in Edward Epstein (ed) *Labor autonomy and the state in Latin America*, Unwin Hyman 1989.

industry had become the principal business its workers were presupposed to “return” to subsistence agriculture during non-industrial work, despite the fact that this subsistence agriculture wasn’t even able to support the full time peasants since the white minority had grabbed almost all agricultural land.

So it was reasonable that labour movements were among the main actors against apartheid during the seventies and eighties, see also chapter 8 [68].

The migrant worker system was introduced for the needs of the mines. But from 1974, these began to rely on permanently employed workers to avoid nationalist contagion from Mozambique. This induced unionist organising and to the foundation of the Mineworkers’ Union, NUM, still an important factor in all peoples’ movement organising in South Africa. From the seventies, capital import produced results and a manufacturing industry and an industrial working class begun to appear.

In South Africa, the conditions reminded of early nineteenth century England, i.e. worker and disenfranchised was about the same thing. For that reason, the labour movement got an astounding breadth and rooting. In the working-class townships, churches, bars, and shops were parts of the labour movement organising, and rent strikes was a method as useful as mine strikes to assert the workers’ rights against capital. The black citizens’ rights organisations, ANC as well as UDF, were dominated by union functionaries. And when all other organisation was rendered useless by repression, the unions remained.

About 1990, the labour movement had made apartheid impossible as a principle. The working class townships could only be controlled militarily, which was too expensive. The local elites had to consider cooptation and integration as a more profitable way of staying in power.

Southeast Asia was the third main receiver of capital export. Labour movement had to wait here until the eighties until they got any force, for two reasons: child work, and the cold war [69].

Industrialization was introduced with production processes that demanded minimum skill. Preferably, teenage girls were employed as workers, rented out by recruitment businesses. They didn’t see themselves as workers but just temporarily working until they got married, and they were not likely to engage in labour disputes. As a matter of precaution, they were living under a pseudo-military discipline during working-hours as well as under spare time.

Moreover, Southeast Asia has been very important as anti-communist strongholds, where USA has taken care to maintain and finance authoritarian regimes.

[68] William Cobbett & Robin Cohen (ed), *Popular struggles in South Africa*, Review of African Political Economy 1987. Cobbett & Cohen also relate the way the regime has relied on a small layer of black businessmen and “homeland” functionaries, organised in Inkhata.

[69] Hagen Koo, *Korean workers*, Cornell University Press 2001; Lars Lindström, *Accumulation, regulation and political struggles, Manufacturing workers in South Korea*, University of Stockholm 1993; Frederic Deyo, *Beneath the miracle – labor subordination in the new Asian industrialism*, University of California Press 1989, and Walden Bello & Stephanie Rosenfeld, *Dragons in distress*, Institute for Food and Development Policy 1990.

So the South Korean industrialization took place under the most authoritarian conditions possible, with a despotic military dictatorship which applied almost prison camp-like conditions in the worksites. The first who revolted were women in the garment industry – usually small poky worksites. In 1976 the female workers at Dongil took over the yellow trade union and succeeded during a few years to maintain their freedom of organisation despite the hired thugs of the enterprise, primarily through cooperation with students and churches. They were finally silenced with violence and dismissals, but they bequeathed a tradition of cooperation between labour and democracy movements, which sometimes spread through the whole society, particularly after the death of the dictator in 1979.

However, a new military dictatorship took power soon, which repressed all popular movements and stimulated investment in manufacturing industries with assembly lines. After a decade of secret organisation in cultural associations and evening courses, the workers of Hyundai in Ulsan stroke in summer 1987.

They had, also partly in secret, organised prohibited trade unions in each workshop, and in August they elected a joint bargaining delegation which demanded negotiations with the combine about wages and other things – on their list of demand were free choice of hair-style. When Hyundai refused, the workers organised a demonstration of 60.000 to the city center, led by the fire engines and sand-blasting machines. The police ran like rabbits, and the labour minister came there and promised to fulfill all the demands of the workers.

Of course, Hyundai's patriarch didn't care about the minister's promises and called for more police – resulting in a general strike in Ulsan and ten days of street fighting. The work began without any of the parties giving after the slightest – but after a few years of strikes and police attacks, Hyundai in practice yielded to the all the demands, without however recognising this publicly.

Koo considers the strength of the workers had the following causes:

- the extremely humiliating despotism at the worksite left no other choice,
- the regime was increasingly isolated against both workers and the middle class, both considering themselves belonging to “the people”, or “minjung” in Korean, against the elite, thereby having the same interest to cooperate.

Iran was the most important receiver of capital in West Asia during the sixties and seventies, thanks to its repressive and developmentalist government. But the industrialization was not as radical as in Brazil and Southeast Asia. For that reason, the government terror was able for a long time to prevent a labour movement. Only when the middle class had united with the landless peasants, swept off the land by a kind of land reform, in opposition against the government that labour movements turned effective, see chapter 6. It was the strike of the oilfield workers that toppled the government in 1978, upon which a one-year strike movement caused some trouble for the new Islamist government. But now it seems to have succeeded with the usual nationalist trick – paternalist trade unions [70].

[70] Asef Bayat, *Workers and revolution in Iran*, Zed 1987.

Poland was also a great receiver of capital during the seventies, which was used for modernization of the industry for export reasons. The policy resulted in the early eighties in overcapacity, debts and a Fordist industrial organisation which was sensitive to worker mobilization just at the moment when economic austerity and cuts hit the workers. The result was one of the most powerful but also most ambiguous labour movement mobilization during the twentieth century [71].

Thanks to the centralised ownership in the Polish industry, the new independent base-democratic trade union Solidarity spread over the country in a few weeks. At the base, Solidarity was a worker organisation. But since it within a short time appeared extremely powerful, it became a resort for all kinds of discontent, where after a while the middle class dominated. The demands of the workers were successively marginalized. The military coup facilitated the process. While the repression shattered the organisation of the workers, the middle class discourse developed rather uninterrupted up to the regime change in 1990.

During the nineties, the mobilisations of these “old” New Industrial Countries have faded. The militant KCTU in Korea had not much to offer when the labour code was abolished in 1998. The Brazilian Workers’ Party, a creation of the labour movement, has converted itself to a machine in the hands of career politicians. The industry moves away to even newer localities to profit from even lower wages and even lower unionist experience. And the unions are tamed in the same way as European unions were tamed, with bureaucratization of the relations between workers and enterprises. The workers for that reason suffer, like their European and North American colleagues, from a decreasing market value of labour. Moreover, they tend to lose local bargaining power when the enterprise informalizes to production, i.e. buys semi-products from unorganised small businesses rather than produce it themselves in big, easily organised industries.

But what labour movement lose where industry is de-localised, they gain where industry is re-localised. In countries like China, Indonesia and India, the strike frequency increases, and this compensates at least somewhat from the decline in Brazil, South Korea, and South Africa, not to speak of Europe and the USA [72].

This development is too new to be fully understood. But there are at least some studies of old party-controlled trade unions in India winning a new independence and suddenly run the most successful struggles so far against economic liberalisation, against the will of their party guardians. In the transnational assembly plants in China a wildcat strike-wave began around 2005 and is still growing. In the beginning, there were great differences between old workers defending rights from the Maoist era against marketization of the Chinese economy, and first-generation immigrant workers from the countryside claiming wage hikes, but by the 2010s this is evening out: higher wages, rules about overtime and security are standard claims, and in the biggest strike so far, the Yue Yuen strike in 2014 the workers even demanded reforms in the official trade union ACFTU. The strike wave has so far succeeded in tripling the wages in a few years, raising even

[71] Alain Touraine et al, *Solidarity*, Cambridge University Press 1983.

[72] Beverly Silver, World-scale patterns of labor-capital conflict, in *Review* xviii, winter 1995.



*Fig 5:1. Distribution of industrial workers in the world 1965 and 1990 (2000?)
 Industrial workers 1965 (above) and 1990 (below). Each square indicates a million. The proportion working in the old industrial center has decreased from 45% of a total of 136 million to 33% of 177 million. In Europe even the absolute numbers of industrial workers have decreased. The biggest increase has appeared in China. – The 1990 graph should of course be substituted by a later one, if there are figures available!*



China to the class of countries industry is moved away from, it has forced the Chinese government to legislate about worker protection, and it has even sponsored a debate within the ACFTU of democratization [73].

The program for this new labour movement is unclear, so far. The welfare state lost its lustre after 1968, and socialism in one country is almost dead as a project. To abolish exploitation through a Marxist state appeared, despite its temporal successes, as more utopian than anything the utopists of the early nineteenth century aimed at. This is not only due to the fact that such national projects appear impossible in a world increasingly dominated by transnational businesses and supra-national credit institutions. It is also a result of doubtful factors in the national government strategy itself, factors that played a less important part during the long postwar Kondratiev upturn but was brought up again when the boom came to an end, and when the ability of the world market system to integrate the direct producers run across its farther limits.

Labour movements after the state hegemony

Which are the aims of the labour movements? Which strategies are possible to attain them? How well has the traditional national government strategy satisfied the aims? Are there any alternatives today? How credible are they, and what do they cost?

The social movement scholar Alain Touraine, one of the few that have paid attention to this kind of questions, has noticed four aims for labour movements:

- to revolt against repression at the worksite,
- to defend the local communities and culture of the working class, against encroachment of upper class culture and the world market system,
- to assert the economic demands of the workers against capital and state, and
- to defend the workers' right to bargain collectively, to abolish competition between workers [74].

These aims may be formulated in a more offensive way if desired: to struggle for autonomy instead of just revolting against repression, or to struggle for the hegemony of working class culture instead of just defend it.

The instruments have also, from the time of the Chartists, been four:

- to obstruct the destructive functions of the system, primarily in the form of strike,
- to build cooperative ways of satisfying needs, primarily in the form of insurances,
- to infiltrate repressive structures, primarily in the form of collective participating in

[73] Some cases are described in Ronaldo Munck & Peter Waterman, *Labour worldwide in the era of globalisation*, Macmillan 1998; Rocio Londoño Botero, *Trade unions and labor policy in Colombia 1974-1987*, in Epstein (ed), *Labor autonomy and the state in Latin America*; and E.J. Goldberg (ed), *the social history of labour in the Middle East*, Westview 1996. The Chinese strike wave has so far only been told in short essays, for example Anita Chan: *Strikes in China's export industries in comparative perspective*, *The China Journal* 65, 2011; Manfred Elfstrom & Sarosh Kuruvilla: *The changing nature of labor unrest in China*, *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 67, 2014; Jenny Chan, Ngai Pun & Mark Selden: *The politics of global production – Apple, Foxconn and China's new working class*, in *New Technology, Work and Employment* 28, 2013; and Kan Wang & Manfred Elfstrom: *Worker unrest and institutional change*, *China Information* 2017, Vol. 31(1). It can be followed though at *China Labor Bulletin*, www.clb.org.hk.

[74] Alain Touraine, *The workers' movement*, Cambridge University Press 1987.

political elections, and

- to build a working class public, primarily in the form of the permanent organisation.

Labour movements grow out from everyday resistance at the worksite. It is from everyday resistance the workers discover that they have power. It is also at the worksite that labour movements have its greatest power as a movement.

Strike is the classic method, the method that attacks the core of the world market system, accumulation of capital. Strike deals with control of work. The origin of the strike is lost in the proto-history of guilds and journeymen's associations, but it was during the proletarianization of the nineteenth century that strike became the standard instrument [75].

The strike methods have been increasingly refined over time. In the early labour movement a strike implied that you left the worksite, probably you also visited other worksites in the same business in the same town to persuade the workers there to join you in sympathy. Gradually, the method has been supplemented with factory occupations; it has been developed with selective strike, lightning strike, rolling strike, etc. The strikes have also got more participants on average; instead they have been shorter, which is a reflection of the fact that capital intensive industry is sensitive to interruption. The effectivity of strike as an instrument of struggle has made it a subject for extensive legislation, with the purpose to move the control of it away from the workers and give it to the paid functionaries of the movement. This has, however, promoted less direct conflict repertoires like (sometimes unofficial) overtime bans, application of limited efforts and other skilful collective sabotage, keeping the all-out strike as a threat in the background.

The Achilles' heel of the strike is supposed to be that they are most useful during booms, when the workers are structurally strongest. When the stocks are filled and the industries are quiet all the same, strikes have been supposed to be meaningless. But this was disproved by the American labour movement in the thirties, when the most successful strike movement ever occurred during the deepest slump. Not only the preconditions are important for peoples' movement, a good strategy may achieve a lot too.

Except the strike, other obstructing instruments of struggle like the boycott and the occupation have been less used. This primarily because they have been less effective compared to the effort. But as a supplement to strikes they have often given good results. Occupation of the worksite prevents the use of blacklegs, while it gives control over the valuable machinery. Moreover, the solidarity and organisational power of the workers are of course strengthened because they are able to assemble and discuss possible trouble at once.

As P.K. Edwards has observed, labour movements are, in spite of their strength mainly being at the worksite, completely dependent of organisation outside the worksite. An organisation that is exclusively trade unionist would probably not even develop an identity as workers, he says, because the comprised conflict collective is too small

[75] Charles Tilly, *From mobilization to revolution*, Addison Wesley 1978 deals also with strikes. Eric Batstone, Ian Boraston & Stephen Frenkel, *The social organization of strikes*, Blackwell 1978, describes the way strikes are developed out of everyday resistance.

[76]. Labour movements have for that reason been forced to defend workers against all society, the market or the state, to grow together as a movement also perceiving itself as such. This has generally been more difficult than acting only at the worksite.

Cooperation has been a less important instrument during the twentieth century. As Marx pointed out: the more capital intensive the production grows, the more impossible it is to involve oneself in it without owning capital. As consumer cooperation or insurance cooperation, it has been able to play some role to assert the working class culture and maintain some minimum control over the everyday life [77].

Infiltration has, with the government power strategy, become the principal strategic instrument of the labour movement, relegating the strike to a minor part. Infiltration has historically implied that the functionaries of the labour movement (or allies) have been voted into government or municipal offices, alternatively been placed there by a revolution, to satisfy the aims of the movement from a government position – as suggested with ambiguous results.

The buildup of a movement public has all the time been the most recalcitrant instrument of all.

In small towns, particularly when they have been dominated by one industry, there has been no trouble. And neither has it been any trouble in the Fordist big industry. In these instances the whole local culture, or the labour regime, turned into instruments for the local public of the labour movement, and an instrument for mobilizations and discussions [78]. The problems have occurred at the supralocal level, in the composed society where the workers not automatically have been a part of a dominant majority.

The classic form of public in the labour movement is the permanent organisation. It has typically taken the form of trade union – in the beginning developed to tie together the workers in the small workshop at this age – or political party. Both have had their limitations. They have often been successful in mobilizing to actions and sometimes also to get support from without. But with the predominance of the government power strategy, the public primarily becomes a way of mobilizing a voting support for the actions of the functionaries, not of mobilizing a support for the workers themselves. Partly, this is a result of the permanent organisation's vulnerability for the self-interests of the functionaries. Since they are permanent, the employment of the functionaries are also permanent, and the chasm between laymen and functionaries is given time to grow.

But nevertheless, it is reasonable to see the permanent organisation as the brilliant social invention of the peoples' movements during the nineteenth century. After all, it succeeded in putting a check on the successively deteriorating conditions for the direct

[76] P.K. Edwards, *Conflict at work*, Blackwell 1986.

[77] How it worked in England is described by Peer Gurney: *Co-operative culture and the politics of consumption in England 1870-1930*, Manchester University Press 1996.

[78] Swedish small industrial communities are like English or French mining communities the classical examples. But at least before the commercial publicity shattered the democratic one, labour movements' local public worked also in big towns, see for example Alain Cottureau, *The distinctiveness of working class cultures in France*, in Katznelson & Zolberg, *Working class formation*. Jan Lindhagen & Macke Nilsson, *Hotet mot arbetarrörelsen*, Tiden 1970 deals with the Swedish example.

producers and turn them to improvements, thanks to its ability to create strong collective identities.

The communication forms developed by the labour movements were primarily the demonstration and the mass meeting. Moreover, it tried with less success to use the newspaper, a technology developed by the citizens' rights movements of the eighteenth century.

The instruments have been combined differently in different strategies within the history of the labour movement. How well have the four aims been favoured by the different strategies?

Let us begin with trying to assess how well they have been achieved by the government power strategy, i.e. the two-step strategy that has laid the main stress on infiltration in the state to reform society afterward, and which has dominated the twentieth century. Have the aims of the labour movements been made easier when the states have been governed by functionaries with origin and support in the labour movements? Or have the efforts of the labour movements to support such governments been wasted?

The right of collective negotiation has been acknowledged in principle by reformist state functionaries, as it has been acknowledged by all system center governments after 1945. But it has not been acknowledged by communist governments, who have seen themselves as the only legitimate representatives of the workers. And also reformist functionaries have refused to acknowledge the right to negotiate about matters which have affected the central functions of the world market system. For example, the workers' right to negotiate about the aims and procedures of production has only been acknowledged during moments of very strong movement mobilization, and the workers' right to negotiate about investments has never been acknowledged anywhere. Furthermore, the right of collective negotiation has been curtailed by governments, even reformist governments, who have had their opinions about who would represent the workers in such negotiations, and generally given right to that exclusively to the employed functionaries of trade unions.

Workers have had even less support from reformist or communist governments when they have tried to defend working class culture and local communities. Governments' attempts to advance in the world market system made them ruthlessly sacrificing cultural patterns and patterns of settlement that were perceived as old-fashioned on the market, even if the workers mobilized for their defence. Labour movement mobilizations for Lorraine, South Wales or Bergslagen, or for working-class districts in big cities threatened by exploitation or gentrification, have not got palpable support from social democratic governments, and the working-class culture has generally been seen as less valuable than middle-class culture. Here, communist governments have appeared most obliging, although they have appropriated the right to define what real working-class culture is, thus putting also that into the hands of functionaries.

Labour movements revolting against repression at work had least support from governments. Such revolts threatened in a direct way the compromises between the labour movement supported governments and the world market system, and was inexorably resisted by both communist and reformist regimes. Labour party governments have in

practice been as anxious as any other to tie up the strike faculty in a formalist strait-jacket, making such revolts extremely hard to carry out. But reformist governments have shown greater resistance to use violence than other governments, if revolts have broken out all the same. Successful labour movement mobilizations have been able to change the labour regimes – they have been able to change market despotisms to paternalism in the nineteenth century, or bureaucratic regimes to hegemonic, to use Burawoy's terms. But they have only been able for short periods of mobilization climaxes to break temporarily the subordination of the spontaneous expressions of life to the routines of state and capital.

The economic demands were however well asserted in the system center during the period 1945-1973, and were supported by reformist functionaries of the state. Wages were raised, social security was extended. Labour movement supported government often took initiative to implement old labour movement demands grounded in moral economy, upgraded for world market system realities, like social security systems, paid holidays, and publicly financed health care. Even in those system peripheries where communist governments ruled, or where there was some product that was well paid for on the world market, or/and a bourgeoisie using a career strategy based on import substitution, the economic demands were reasonably well satisfied until the postwar boom ended.

Collective negotiation for better wages accordingly became the strategy that was easiest for the labour movements to pursue within both a social democrat and a communist national policy framework. For that reason, it has been the predominant one. Struggles that have originally begun for other aims have been converted into struggles for higher wages as soon as authorities and union functionaries have intervened. For example, the general strike in France in May-June 1968, originally a struggle for power, was converted by trade union functionaries into a strike for wage rises, promptly granted and promptly eaten up by inflation [79].

The government power strategy has thus been effective on the economic level, but hardly on the political or cultural, and for that reason not at the economic level either in the long run. The strategy built on the premise that the movements should demobilize the participation of laymen and delegate to the functionaries to implement the aims of the movement.

The consequences were particularly clear in Sweden, the model country of the strategy. Lena Hellblom has shown the way the Saltsjöbaden agreement in 1938, which would guarantee wage rises in exchange of the workers giving up their right to exert influence on the aim and direction of the production, not only put the initiative in the hands of the functionaries but also rendered superfluous the labour movement culture and self-confidence. It was not only that new mobilizations would threaten the agreements; the popular movement was converted into a bargaining apparatus and the laymen were converted into clients, whose meddling with articulation and program would make a mess of the bargaining [80].

[79] Edward Shorter & Charles Tilly, *Strikes in France 1830-1968*, Cambridge University Press 1974

[80] Lena Hellblom, *Från primitiv till organiserad demokrati*, Salamander 1985.

When the movement demobilized, it lost its social presence and creating power in society. As Shorter and Tilly have called attention to, the most important effect of a strike movement is hardly the economic outcome for the strikers; arguably, it rarely pays off, in proportion to the sacrifices. The most important effect is the political one. When the workers act collectively, they are perceived as strong, and this means that they are strong. Other forces in society, including state and capital, have to pay attention to them in many ways. When the movement delegate all actions to functionaries, the respect for the workers declines and with that also the attention. Not least important, the workers' self-respect declines.

When the movement demobilized, with time the power base of the functionaries disappeared and they grew less effective. They had less to sell, in the form of industrial peace, so they got more dispensable for state and capital, and also for the upper middle class which increasingly dared to assert their interests in an aggressive way. Those who first felt the decreasing ability of functionaries were the peripheral workers like women, youth, service workers and ethnic minorities. Finally in the 1980s it also hit the core, the skilled workers in the manufacturing industries of the system center.

When the movement demobilized, the movement's ability to direct its functionaries decreased, and the functionaries went their own ways according to their group interests. They began to perceive themselves as a new kind of upper middle class, obtain privileges, form a policy to the benefit of themselves and other privileged middle class people. In the end, they turned against what remained of the twentieth century strategy of the labour movement. This was most clearly demonstrated in the countries where the communist government power strategy was applied, and where the social power of the functionaries was the relatively greatest. But also in social democrat strongholds like Scandinavia, the hitmen of liberalization have been state and municipal civil servants rather than capitalists, small entrepreneurs or business managers.

Since 1968, the government power strategy has been increasingly questioned, because these weaknesses have appeared increasingly clear. Results of this have been that ties between labour movements and labour parties have been weakened over the whole world, that the belief in the possibility of attaining benefits through the state has decreased, and that the attraction of the labour movement on peripheral groups have decreased, with declining membership in trade unions as a consequence.

What alternatives are there? What advantages and disadvantages would there be of an alternative strategy?

The alternative most nearly at hand is the strategy building primarily on the local trade union strength of the workers, i.e. the local bargaining power, and emanates from the obstruction/strike as the most important instrument. Historically, such a strategy has been applied most downright in England and France up to about 1910, and in the USA up to today. There is much indicating the workers increasingly rely on the bargaining power emanating from an increasingly integrated production process at the worksite, disregarding business-wise organising in trade unions. This despite that cross-enterprise organising would be quite useful for other aims, for example organising a movement public, or pursuing the kind of political issues that traditionally are pursued by parties.

This strategy has a clear advantage. When the important thing is what the lay people do, their power will exceed the power of the functionaries. But it has also, as for example Lenin pointed out and as Edwards suggests: it isn't easy to struggle for hegemony in society purely through worksite struggles. It is impossible to struggle for hegemony without a focus, and it is impossible to get a focus in a diffusely distributed movement where different initiatives and aims appear at each worksite individually [81]. This strategy is beyond doubt an important reason of the lack of perspective that has characterized primarily the American labour movement, and it is a reason why the West European labour movement seized upon the government power strategy a hundred years ago, as it (with all its ambiguities) yet offered a reasonably common aim in the middle-long run. The aim proved unattainable, to be sure, but it was yet highly mobilizing for a long time, not least because it contributed to a strong, hegemonic identity with enough power to dominated the popular movement scene for a hundred years.

A third alternative may be to let oneself be inspired by the First International and focus on international worker solidarity. In a world where the production is increasingly organised globally, and where the enterprises outsource the production to lesser enterprises with no regard for distances or political borders, nationally organised labour movements are rather powerless. A movement which learns to take up conflicts at the site in the world where capital for the movement is most sensitive will on the other hand have a certain advantage. In the 1880s, the trade unions in Stockholm met immigration of unorganised, unassuming workers from the countryside with active organising in the whole country. In the same way, the labour movement in the system center would counter the present attempts to use unorganised workers in the south with global labour organising and global action support [82].

A fourth alternative may be to consciously build alliances to other peoples' movements for aims concerning the whole society. To rely in a co-operating "family of anti-systemic movements", to quote Immanuel Wallerstein. This is considered further in chapter 10.

An alternative strategy must probably find another reasonable common aim at the middle-long run, to get a focus, to mobilize, to create an identity and a culture that ties the movement together, to give a content to the worker identity that all the time is forced to compete with other identities, and that all the time is threatened by splitting up into full and semi-proletarians, skilled and unskilled, men and women, and workers of different nationality. And the common aim will probably have to pertain to the society outside the worksite to concern all workers, while the instrument must be at the worksite to give the movement the greatest possible power.

Today, when the century-long strategy of the labour movements has failed, the movement appears weak, and is for that reason weaker than before. But which are the conditions for the development of the labour movement in the long run?

[81] Vladimir Lenin, *What is to be done*, several editions, for example International Publishers 1973; P.K. Edwards, *Conflict at work*.

[82] Ronaldo Munck, *Globalisation and labour – the new "Great Transformation"*, Zed Books 2002.

The diffusion of wage labour, the proletarianization, is a long-run trend in the world market system, a manifestation of its tendency to convert everything into saleable and purchaseable commodities fitting to links in the commodity chains. The proportion of wage labourers increases, even if it has not by a long way reached the majority. The foundation for a labour movement is thus growing. But it grows unevenly. So far, it has grown fastest in the system center. But from 1973 it is stagnating there and grows fast in the periphery. The level of departure is however very low [83].

Marx, the great theorist of the labour movement, imagined that the workers, in a homogeneous world market, would be increasingly stronger as political actors and increasingly weaker as consumers. The workers were presumed to use their strength within production to assert themselves against a system that increasingly would lose its legitimacy because of the misery it caused.

Up to the end of the nineteenth, the model seemed to fit with reality. But then something happened. The homogeneous world market was split up in protectionist blocks whose center states had power to intervene forcefully in their own precincts. Meanwhile, the workers used their political power as producers to exert an influence on the government interventions to their advantage. One of the results they achieved was that the mass misery in the system center was drastically reduced. Another was that the spread of a numerous working class to the periphery was prevented. A third was that the working class was split up into nations, which could be posed against each other in “international competition” and war. A fourth was that the strategy of the movements undermined their organisational base and mobilization faculty [84].

Today, the faculty of intervention of the states is reduced on the market and the world is again ruled increasingly by market mechanisms. The world is increasingly as Marx saw it. Mass misery grows in the center while the workers’ social power grows in the periphery. If Marx’s model fits, the workers thus would get a greater motivation to change the world, and also greater independent power to do it than they had during the twentieth century when they have had to subordinate themselves under government functionaries with other aims.

And if Marx’s views are true, this implies that labour movements in the South rather soon will dominate. In the twenty-first century, labour movements in China, Indonesia, India and Brazil will shake the transnational enterprises while the workers of Europe will be moved to the periphery of the movement.

Another trend that has strengthened vigorously during the years after 1973 is that the

[83] Göran Therborn has pointed out that the labour movement in the periphery will probably differ from the one in the system center because there are no centuries-old artisan traditions there, used to autonomous production and intellectual activity (Göran Therborn, *Vänstern och den klassiska arbetarrörelsens slut*, *Socialistisk Debatt* 3/1993). The Therborn article sounds pessimistic, but this may be a manifestation of eurocentric arrogance. The South Korean labour movement had successes with no background in an artisan tradition, which seems to suggest that there are other possibilities than the European one.

[84] This argumentation is developed in Giovanni Arrighi, *The Marxist century, the American century*, in Samir Amin et al: *Transforming the revolution – social movements and the world-system*, Monthly Review Press 1990.

proportion of semiproletarian households has increased. The classic Fordist households of the system center, with male breadwinners and female housekeepers have practically disappeared. Instead, different forms of casual labour are spread, where the workers are presumed to have several incomes. This is the reverse of the broken protectionist center blocks – there are suddenly so many more potential wage labourers to choose among for the enterprises [85].

A third trend is that the Europe-inspired common labour movement identity burst in a world where Europe isn't the center of the movement any longer. The attributes of a global labour movement, if this is possible, is unknowable. There is much to indicate that the identity of the system peripheries is broader than the one of the system center, that it comprises all exploited, not only the formal wage labourers.

A fourth trend, which should promote labour movements, is the long Kondratiev A wave that should have come already but which seems to be delayed. So far, the industrial society has gone through four such Kondratiev As, each with about 50 years in between. Each has led to a strengthened bargaining position of the workers, since the workers have turned more indispensable, while the following downturns have weakened their movements again.

A fifth trend is that the big, easily organised mass workers sites tend to disappear and be replaced as accumulation sites by subcontracting firms, service industry and finance, not to say pure speculation. Beverly Silver points to the fact that the growing businesses today are education, real estate and transport, of which only the last is easy to obstruct for a militant labour movement [86].

A sixth trend is that the flowchart-ruled just in time production, despite its temporary disorganising effects, in the long run should favour the local bargaining power of the workers.

Three changes to favour the labour movement, two to disfavour it, and one with ambiguous effects. All imply changed strategies, though. Such new strategies usually take a long time to appear – and it is possible that the labour movements don't have it.

There is a risk that the workers let the opportunities of a whole historical era slip through their fingers because they still are emotionally tied to the government power strategy that in certain aspects was so successful during the twentieth century.

[85] Faruk Tabak, The world labour force, in Terence Hopkins, Immanuel Wallerstein et al, The age of transition – trajectory of the world-system, 1945-2025, Zed Books & Pluto Press 1996.

[86] Beverly Silver, Forces of labor, Cambridge University Press 2003.

Chapter 6.
System peripheries' defence against
the center

THE WORLD MARKET SYSTEM IS A GEOGRAPHICALLY inegalitarian system. It organises the world in centers and peripheries, where the center has the initiative and the peripheries are supposed to attend the center.

Globally, the pattern is organised through commodity chains where the center links monopolize important knowledge, resources or faculties. The system was established successively through colonial conquests, and is maintained today by ownership rights, guaranteed by a global power system where the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Security Council and NATO are important weapons. The functioning of the world is described in chapter 2.

Stein Rokkan has pointed at the three dimensions of center-periphery patterns that are of importance for the emergence of periphery defence, or national movements. There are according to him three kinds of transactions in society where the center controls the periphery to its own benefit and to the marginalization of the periphery:

- economic, i.e. control of credits, investments and transfers;
- cultural, i.e. control of codes, i.e. norms, lifestyles, myths, symbols (f.ex. languages) and rituals; and
- political, i.e. control of whom should be coopted or expelled, respectively [1].

These dimensions are valid globally and regionally as well as locally. Globally and regionally as well as locally, geographically sited power blocks aim at dominating over peripheries.

Globally, the center consists of the finance/violence alliance that has been described in chapter 2, its challengers and closest entourage. But the whole system is also a hierarchy where less powerful finance/violence alliances dominate smaller peripheries – or provinces as it is usually called at that level, while the centers are usually called capital regions (in some countries the capital functions are shared between several cities but this isn't important in this context) [2].

Provinces may according to Rokkan be of three kinds – underdeveloped peripheries like for example South Italia or Bretagne (you may probably assign the global peripheries to here, but Rokkan doesn't expressively mention them), i.e. zones whose role is to provide the center with cheap labour and raw materials; overdeveloped peripheries which have happened to develop a strong economy but is deficient of institutional political power to defend it with like for example Catalonia, or Slovenia before 1990; and interface peripheries, zones at the border between two strong centers like for example

[1] Stein Rokkan & Derek Urwin, *Economy, territory, identity*, Sage 1983. For an original description of the ways a center controls the periphery in the economic sphere, see Jane Jacobs, *Cities and the wealth of nations*, Vintage Books of Random House 1985.

[2] "Hegemony is more than just a hierarchy of power among states. It is a complex pyramid of actors operating at many levels of social organisation. At the apex of the hegemonic pyramid are the elite classes in the hegemonic coalition, classes located both in the center and in the periphery, i.e. dispersed throughout the pyramid at key points." Barry K. Gills, *Hegemonic transitions in the world system*, in A.G. Frank & B.K. Gills (ed): *The world system*, Routledge 1993.

Alsace or South Tyrol, which the center distrusts, starves and discriminates against.

National movements have during earlier historical systems defended local community alliances against outsider empires. Such national movements have been treated earlier in this book – in the chapter about Christianity, which had the Jewish defence against Assyrian and Roman empires among its roots, in the chapter about the Ming revolution against the Mongol empire, and the whole chapter 4 about local communities' defence against the world market system and its central states. Such national movements for defence of the local community continue to grow during the age of the world market system, but they are then forced to strengthen regional ties and solidarities to get the power they need to manage.

The national movements of the world market system are produced by the system itself, as defence of territories threatened by subordination in a center-periphery relation within the framework of the system. The history of the world market system is for that reason teeming with national movements, and they are increasingly common as the time goes on. For the system is continuously creating centers and peripheries.

National movements consist of people in peripheries who aim at defending the peripheral territories against the marginalization and the blocking of a reasonable development that are caused by the transgressing and power wielding of centers. The aim of a national movement may be more or less far-reaching – do away with the cultural stigmatization caused by the centers' control of norms, demand resources from the center as a compensation for its taxes and pillaging, and demand more or less local and regional autonomy from the control of the center. Since the states are only actor in the world market world that are permitted to defend a regional interest, a "sovereign state" of their own is a reasonable demand for any national movement that judges itself as having the power to reach it.

As we will see however, a state of their own has not always been the natural aim, and perhaps this tradition is drying up now in the early twenty-first century, in the light of the increasing paralysis of states.

The unit for a national movement is the peripheral territory. But to mobilize all its inhabitants it is necessary to organize them as a collective. It is necessary to create an identity, common for all inhabitants that can outvote other identities like class identities or local affiliations.

In the global peripheries, this was easy. There, the colonial powers maintained a caste-like division between themselves and the colonized, which made the other identity differences trivial. The third world nationalists of today can easily continue to build on this division.

In the regional peripheries, the identities are more ambiguous, and a strategy is often needed to establish the identity cutting the most effective way. In many peripheral territories the language may be identity-shaping; for different reasons this was the typical case for the East European national movements during the nineteenth century, and the tradition from that is still strong. In other cases, this doesn't work – for example Scottish nationalists are highlighting the common exploitation from London and the common historical institutions since there are two languages in Scotland. Other national move-

ments may highlight popular traditions or legal customs for the same reason. For others, religion is the most effective cement – Catholicism in Ireland, Shi'a in Iran, Hinduism in north Sri Lanka. Often, it is hard to find such identity-shaping characteristics with any emotional appeal, and the history of national movements is full of examples of casually effective compromises, put together during the struggle, but afterwards turning into matters of bitter conflict within the territory when the movement had won. The peripheralized social categories create a language, a national ideology, which afterwards gets its own life to the detriment of the identities of the social categories themselves.

Territorial self-assertion and territorial autonomy may be more or less important for different actors, different classes or different groups within the territory. It may also be more or less easy for different classes or groups to act. In the following exposition I will show the way aims, instruments and results have varied according to which actor has dominated the movement.

Systematic descriptions of national movements as a phenomenon are extremely few, and in my opinion mistakenly focused. Most of the literature edited during the last fifteen years of flaring interest put the nationalist ideologies in the focus, showing very scant interest for the movement who have formed them and for their reasons, aims and action forms. They are also mingling national movements and states, which also use national strategies to promote their interests as states [3]. This chapter builds for this reason on literature about each nationalist movement separately, which is fortunately plentiful. The disadvantage of this is that the narrative may appear incoherent. But I can't do much about this, it's the research that is incoherent, and I can only mirror it.

The Creole revolutions

The national theme was invented by the so called Creole revolutions – movements among European settlers in America to assert their interests against the colonial powers, resulting in the independence of the American states between 1776 and 1826. They may be seen as examples of the difference in results depending of the carrier of the movement. In North America, it was carried by farmers, artisans, urban middle classes and capitalists in common and resulted during a few generations in the arguably most egalitarian society that have existed within the world market system, at least in the north and north-west. In Latin America it was carried, with few exceptions, by local export capitalists, resulting in that the repression of the direct producers turned worse than ever.

In neither case, the actors were interested in independence as such from the beginning. They defended their local interests for different reasons, and only successively, independence was seen as a reasonable aim.

The legal role of the North American settlers was to provide the center with raw materials like timber, fish and tobacco. Most of the settlers were subsistence peasants

[3] For example, there are E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780 : Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge University Press 1992, and Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso 1996; the latter tends to write off all nationalism as groundless. Anthony D. Smith, *The ethnic origins of nations*, Blackwell 1986, states however that no ideologies are possible if there are no interests to warrant them. The best survey in my opinion is Øyvind Østerud, *Hva er nasjonalisme*, Universitetsforlaget 1994.

though, who had emigrated from the land-scarce Europe. Most had their origin in puritan congregations with strong community solidarity, and both peasants and townsmen had considerable experience in defencing their communities. The representatives of the state were few and weak and could never discourage the Americans to hunt away taxmen or customs officers [4].

Although the English policy towards the colonies had as its foundation that the colonies were there to make England richer, the settlers were not too exploited. They also, or at least the leading of them, had some advantages of England as a protected market and of cheap English goods, and they knew how to protect themselves against the claims of the state. It was only in the 1760s, when the British state out of rationalist zeal tried to stop up the loopholes in the taxing system, that the conflict flared up.

The budding nationalist movement organised as a coordination of local resistances against a new stamp duty on legal documents. The fee, and the compulsive registration, were seen as attacks on the local autonomy, and became a focus for resistance to the British state and authorities in general. The wealthy burghers, who not only feared remote control from London but also the autonomous activities of peasants, artisans and sailors – the most well-organized proletarians of the age –, hurried to lead the movement, called Sons of Liberty and organised as local corresponding associations. “Liberty” in their parlance meant liberty from interference in the local community; it had nothing to do with independence from England.

While the peasants chased away the government’s representatives from their villages and sailors chased authorities in the ports, the Sons of Liberty supported peaceful means like petitions, reinforced by boycotts against British commodities, and intervened forcefully against all violence against authorities. The boycotts did very soon induce the British merchants to demand a repeal of the stamp fees, promptly executed by the British parliament. Instead, it increased the customs.

The Sons of Liberty, that had been dissolved, praising the British government, was thus reorganised to pursue new boycotts. Boycott committees were organised in the towns with participation of as many organisations as possible, and in towns like New York and Boston they began to resemble parallel governments. As the movement grew, the lower middle class got prominence in it.

When most of the customs were abolished, the merchants thought that the costly boycotts should be so too, but peasants, artisans and sailors continued to run the movement’s base, strengthened by a feeling that they defended themselves against a tyrannical upper-class.

Two factors contributed to change the struggle about a factual matter to a calling in question the whole British regime: the ravages of the regime towards the democratic

[4] Joshua Miller, *The rise and fall of democracy in America 1630-1789*, Pennsylvania University Press 1991, describes the inheritance from the Puritan local communities as strongholds against the central power. Pauline Maier, *From resistance to revolution*, Alfred Knopf 1972, relates the action methods of the local communities and the way they successively fused. There is also a short conventional description in M.J. Heale, *The American revolution*, Methuen 1986.

opposition in England, and its arrogant and prestigious attempts to teach the Americans lessons it hadn't the power to carry through.

Particularly there were two local actions, and the excessive British reactions to them, the provoked the Americans to set independence as an aim.

The first was when the inhabitants in Providence captured a customs ship and the authorities tried to hang them for treason without finding anybody to hang.

The second was when a group of young Bostoners captured a ship and threw the cargo overboard, and the authorities closed the assembly of Massachusetts without being able to prevent it from meeting.

As late as 1775, the aim for most politically active Americans was a common popular movement in England and America against the authoritarian regime. But in England, the democratic movement was weak, and it was soon clear to the Americans that they had to struggle alone. In 1776, independence was seen as the reasonable aim.

The following war began as a war against the soldiers accompanying the taxmen. The greatest burdens were taken by the peasants, taking part in the voluntary army of the united American colonial assemblies. For that reason, it seemed reasonable that the independent North America satisfied the most important of the peasant's desires, breaking up of the landed estates – of course with exception of those owned by independists – local autonomy and cheap credits. The North American state was made weak; the peasants were not more eager to relinquish autonomy to an American government than to a British one.

But after just some ten years, planters and merchants were able to take back the initiative. The backdrop was a struggle about the cheap credits.

After the war there was a recession and many peasants got into debts to merchants; market relations are not easy to see through for subsistence peasants. But the peasants had not made war to let merchants take over their land; they occupied courthouses and burnt the debt notes; they liberated violently peasants from debtors' prisons and refused to pay [5].

Faced with this threat to ownership, merchants and planters were able to mobilize the marketized artisans of the towns on their side to wreck local autonomy, and push power upwards, to a union with a strong government, army, and right to taxation. With the help of this union, the peasants were repressed and the rights of the merchants was maintained [6].

Despite these concessions made to the trade interests, the peasants succeeded rather well in maintaining some of the popular democracy in the USA, and be a source of inspiration for popular initiatives in the rest of the world for a hundred years – although

[5] David P Szatmary, *Shay's rebellion*, University of Massachusetts Press 1980.

[6] Joshua Miller, *The rise and fall of democracy in early America*, also describes the trick the American upper class used to repeal democracy under full democratic respectability. They introduced a mythical "people", incarnated in the elected authorities, which at any time would be mobilized against real popular initiatives, with the motivation that real popular initiatives never can live up to the claims one may lay to the mythical "people: absolute majority from the beginning, expressed at particular occasions and under specific, by the authorities defined forms, for example general elections.

most of the popular democracy perished in the civil war in the 1860s. In 1831 Alexis de Tocqueville used the USA as a model for democratic society, and related among other things the way duties that in other countries were carried out by the state or by notables, in the USA was carried out by a democratic civil society [7]. Particularly in the west, at a distance from the Atlantic merchant aristocracy and the southern slave plantations, peasants had some reasonable freedom to develop their autonomy and for that reason also guarantee some popular hegemony in the American culture.

The American national movement began as a democracy movement. The next national movement, the Haitian one, began as a slave rebellion, see chapter 4 [8].

The rebellion had no intention to claim independence from France. On the contrary. For a long time, the rebellious slaves saw the French revolutionary government as an ally against the planters. But successively, they got less and less support from there, and after Bonaparte's coup d'état, the rumour spread that slavery was about to be re-established. Nevertheless, independence became a necessity only when a French army was sent out to repress the rebellion.

In the Spanish Latin America, with few exceptions, no popular movements were involved in the struggles for independence. These were instead a social counter-revolution, engineered by the local upper class to assert its power over the Indian peasants when the French armies invaded Spain in 1809 and the Spanish power system collapsed [9].

This was most obvious in the Andean, where the Indian peasants are plentiful and potentially dangerous. The domestic Creole, i.e. Spanish descendant, upper class traditionally acted with the utmost moderation in their conflicts with the colonial authorities, and backed always out when they were emulated by Mestiz artisans and small tradesmen. The independence movement in most of the Spanish America mirrors faithfully this pattern: the initiative was taken by planters, scary that the Haitian example would be contagious when the Spanish state fell, while the Spanish colonial army got support from the lower classes which were afraid of the power of the planters.

There were fewer Indians in the La Plata countries, so the European settlers were more courageous there. In Buenos Aires, artisans and clerks took the initiative to the independence movement on the South American continent after having defeated an English occupation army. In May 22, 1810, their citizen militia occupied the city hall and proclaimed the independence of La Plata.

The merchants of Buenos Aires, who dominated the city, were however more interested in free trade with the world and in controlling the trade of the surrounding provinces. These provinces hurried to proclaim their independence of Buenos Aires; in Uruguay and Paraguay they succeeded because the notables made concessions to the people in the form of land reforms, while other provinces had to give in after some compromises. Attempts to conquer Bolivia, Chile and Peru failed however.

[7] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, many editions, for example Random House 1954.

[8] Thomas O. Ott, *The Haitian revolution*, The University of Tennessee Press 1972, C.L.R. James, *The black Jacobins*, Allison & Busby 1980 (first issue 1938).

[9] John Lynch, *The Spanish American revolution 1808-1826*, W.W. Norton 1986, Leslie Bethell (ed), *The independence of Latin America*, Cambridge University Press 1987.

There is only one region where the pattern of social counter-revolution doesn't apply – Mexico, the richest and most densely populated country in America. Here, the Indian peasants and workers were able to capture a share in the independence and the citizenship through a rebellion which began in 1810 and never was fully repressed.

The Creoles in Mexico had more reasons to hate the Spanish regime; the Spanish state had confiscated all money in 1804 and used it for armaments; the indignation even spread over the race divides. In the Guanajuato mining district the middle class turned to the Indian miners for support; they responded willingly but didn't differ between Creoles and Spaniards, for them all lords were the same. Their rebellion developed into a popular liberation movement with demands for a land reform, equal share in the wealth of the cities, and an end to the world market system.

The Creoles hurried to ask the Spanish army for help, but the war turned out to be expensive. In 1814 the Spanish state resurrected, demanded dictatorial power and raised the taxes. A Creole general mutinied, compromised with the Indian-Mestiz peoples' movement and was supported by the Creoles. All would have a part: ownership was kept as it was, Spaniards were allowed to stay but not to govern, and Indians got citizenship in the new Mexican state and got their rebellion acknowledged as the mother of the nation. It would take a long time until the Indian peasants were able to assert their social interests, but in contrast to for example Peru they were not subjects to a racist contempt. It was even possible for Indians to be presidents in Mexico [10].

Economically and politically, a local export bourgeoisie – land owners, merchants and mine owners – controlled the independence movement in Latin America. It was also they who got their aims satisfied. Their main aim was free trade, and independence thus led to the annihilation of what existed of local production for local consumption, to the benefit of English import. Latin America's position as a periphery was affirmed.

In North America, peasants and artisans had been the most important proponents of the independence and democracy movement. They were for that reason able to form a political block with local capitalists to defend the interests of local production, with the help of a program for national development. Successively they were also able, in struggle with planters and raw materials exporters, to lift North America from the periphery role to be the absolute center of the world market system. Their model – national ventures for infrastructure and favouring of domestic production as a replacement for import, so-called import substitution (see chapter 5) – would be emulated by all other national movements when in government position [11].

[10] Symbolically, the different cultural climates in Mexico, La Plata and Peru can be inferred from the identity of the equestrian statue at the main square of the capital, says J.H. Perry in *The Spanish seaborne empire*, Pelican 1976. In Mexico it is Cuauhtémoc, the last Indian king. In Buenos Aires it is the Creole hero San Martín. In Lima it is the Indian-killer Pizarro.

[11] The strategist behind the program was the same man who invented the trick to repress the local autonomy of the peasants, finance minister Alexander Hamilton. It would later have its theoretical formulation by Friedrich List, *Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie*, many editions, latest in English as *The National System of Political Economy*, Createspace 2017. The fundamental concept is "productive force", not "market". Cristóbal Kay, *Latin American theories of development and underdevelopment*, Routledge 1989, has indicated influences from Hamilton through List and East European economists like Rosa Luxemburg and Constantin Stere, to the Latin American propo-

National movements in the European semi-periphery

The Creole revolutions didn't in a direct way inspire the national movements that followed immediately after. The French revolution was much more forceful as a model. Its concept of a nation of citizens would appear as the reasonable answer to the centralizing, increasingly penetrating power over people that the European states, and not least Napoleon's French state, pursued. It was the reasonable answer because it created a solidarity that could be set up against the arbitrary encroachments of the state. It was the centralization of the French empire that provoked the first national movements in the European countries that were demoted to the role as periphery and province.

The Spanish popular resurrection against the occupation 1809-1814 was perhaps the most successful one in an immediate way, and the most popular one. It was this movement that launched the concept Liberal, as a designation for those who wanted to base power with the people instead of in the royal bureaucracy. And it was this movement that coined the concept guerrilla to characterize their own method of struggle against the Bonapartist armies.

But the German and Italian national movement were those who began to thematize national liberation to the European public.

The German case was very special. Since the French occupants had been chased away, the question was about the need of the bourgeoisie for a strong state to assert German interests internationally in a way all the small German principalities couldn't do. In the Italian case this was important, but even more important was that the Italian territories, like the territory of Bohemia, Poland, Croatia and Finland, were peripheralized by a bureaucratic empire.

The nineteenth century was an era of increasing government encroachment on the life of people and communities. Conscription and compulsory school attendance were introduced, which demanded standardization of language. A national police began to superintend the behaviour of people. Food was commercialized also in Eastern Europe, and everyday life got increasingly dependent of international food prices as well as national economic policy. And not to risk popular bread seizures, the states began to institute a food distribution policy. As a reflection of this, the bureaucracies grew. The national markets grew also, and so did the centralization of finance [12].

Eastern Europe and Italy were dominated by three great trans-national empires, the Austrian, the Russian, and the Ottoman. The first categories who raised the national cause in these regions were the educated urban middle class – lawyers, teachers, journalists – who had suddenly discovered that their opportunities to assert themselves in the era of centralization was limited by their speaking the wrong language. Particularly, the growing surplus of university graduates began to agitate for the value of the peripheral

nents of import substitution in the so called dependency school, see chapter 2. Early Indian economists like Dadabhai Naoroji thought in the same categories, and they also influenced Japanese governments after the Meiji Revolution and, through them, Chinese governments after 1949; see Alice Amsden: *The rise of "the rest"*, Oxford University Press 2001, and Yi Wen: *The making of an economic superpower*, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis & Tsinghua University, 2015..

[12] Charles Tilly, *Coercion, capital and European states A.D. 990-1992*, Blackwell 1992.

languages and peripheral cultures, and after a time for autonomy or an independent state [13].

The educated middle class used the methods they were used to. In Italy, art, literature and music became important instruments for asserting the national values, and Italian operas became a symbol for liberty in the whole Europe. In Bohemia and in the Baltic provinces, it was a national duty to catalogue the dances and dialects of the peasants and edit heavy books about it. There was no question about mass politics before 1900. In Italy some of the younger and more radical nationalists tried to mobilize the artisans for a program of social justice – but the majority within the movement thought this was too adventurous and preferred trusting the pope or the king of Sardinia [14].

Yet, this pro-artisan policy, pursued by organisations like Young Italy, Young Poland, Young Germany and Young Ireland, was not completely without a trace. It was they who succeeded in launching the concept of national social reform or republicanism among the urban lower classes. Popular demands were, much because of their activities, successively conceived as national, despite the principally cosmopolitan attitudes of the early labour movement.

The majority, the peasants, remained sceptical to the enticements of the nationalist middle class. In Poland the peasants supported the empires during the national risings in 1830, 1846, 1848 and 1863 – the empires had abolished the serfdom while most of the Polish nationalists were landlords who were suspected of wanting to reintroduce it. According to Norman Davies, it wasn't until the German terror of the second world war that the Poles in general became nationalists. Not even earlier German forced purchases of land, indeed opposed by the Polish peasants, or forced German or Russian schooling helped to produce a nationalist mass movement, and during the interwar Polish independence there was almost a state of war between the peasants and the nationalist Polish government [15].

And to wind up, the Hungarian nationalism was a business of Hungary's numerous petty landlords, the Croatian by Zagreb's bourgeoisie attempting to guard its interests against first Hungarian political centralization and then against German industrial competition, and the Catalan by Barcelona's bourgeoisie. The latter had some success in allying with the farmers in their opposition to the Spanish government's national centralization. On the other hand they provoked, with their authoritarian patriarchy, the strong labour movement of Barcelona to programmatically use Castilian in their publications; the first Catalanist political manifestation by the way was a protest against

[13] Miroslav Hroch, *Social preconditions of national revival in Europe*, Cambridge University Press 1985.

[14] Adrian Lyttleton, *The national question in Italy*, in Mikulas Teich & Roy Porter (ed), *The national question in Europe in historical context*, Cambridge University Press 1993. The more democratic faction and its complete inability to communicate with the peasant majority is related in Clara Lovett, *The democratic movement in Italy*, Harvard University Press 1982.

[15] Norman Davies, *God's playground*, Clarendon Press 1981. Ironically, the peasants were indebted to this aristocratic nationalism for their freedom since the abolishment of serfdom was a government policy to counter it with. Maciej Bartkowski: *Recovering nonviolent history: civil resistance in liberation struggle*, Lynne Rienner 2013, claims however that Polish nationalists began to extol peasant virtues as early as after the Polish revolt in 1863.

Madrid's attempt to abolish child labour [16].

It is perhaps not surprising that these rather authoritarian traditions so easily capitulate to the contemporary empire building of the European bourgeoisie.

Wasn't there any popular nationalism in Europe during the nineteenth century? Oh yes. Take the Estonian one. The Estonian national movement wasn't so much directed against the Russian state as against the German landlords who owned the Baltic provinces until the mid nineteenth century, and justified their rule with an alleged cultural superiority.

During the first half of the century the old forced labour was gradually replaced with a more manageable tenancy system, which gave more liberty of action to the peasants, yet without giving them so much economic benefit. Meanwhile, inequality increased because the more substantial peasants could afford buying their land [17].

Since the German landowners legitimated their power in culture, the peasants made their first thrust there. In the 1870s and 1880s musical associations were established in almost every parish. To be sure, the organisers were the educated people in the villages, teachers and priests, but the peasants were soon very active. They sang, arranged dancing for the youth, founded libraries and staged theatre. In the 1890s when the landlords were getting suspicious against the cultural associations, a temperance movement followed, with a strong cultural streak. The political demands of the Estonians were directed against the landowners, they hoped that the Russian state would help them, and no thoughts of separation were aired before the Russian empire broke down in the first world war. Typically enough, the first move of the Estonian state was to seize and share the estates among the peasants; when this was done the energy split in dozens of political parties.

Perhaps the most successful example of a national movement during the nineteenth century was the Norwegian one, which was the most popular of them all. It began as a democratic peasant movement against the Norwegian government and its maintaining of Norwegian interests in the world market, and was converted to nationalism only through the logics of the struggle [18].

The backbone of the movement was two categories.

The first was the peasants in the mountain valleys and fjords. They lived in egalitarian subsistence villages which had to some measure begun to open up to the market. They had no interest in paying taxes to state officials whose most important duty was to assert export interests. They struggled for local autonomy to break the power of the state. They had some success with that, in electing a majority of peasants to the parliament to legislate on local autonomy and a democratic jury system in the courts.

The other category was the fundamentalist Christian fishing communities in the south

[16] About Croatia, see Mirjana Gross, *The union of Dalmatia with modern Croatia*, in Teich & Porter, *The national question*; Ivo Basic, *The national question in Yugoslavia*, Cornell University Press 1984 isn't very lucid but gives about the same picture. About Catalonia see Gerald Brenan, *The Spanish labyrinth*, Cambridge University Press 1960.

[17] *Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis, National movements in the Baltic countries in the 19th century*, 1983.

[18] Trond Nordby, *Det moderne gjennombruddet i bondesamfundet*, Universitetsforlaget 1991.

coast. They had since the eighteenth century tried to break the trading monopoly of the merchants and protected their interests through a cooperative alternative society of such strength that it still partly exists.

The adversary of the peasants and fishermen, the Norwegian state bureaucracy, tried to protect itself through appeals to the king, who was primarily the king of Sweden, to block the decisions of the peasant majority in the Parliament. For these, it was an irresistible point that the government had to support itself on foreign interests. Peasants, fishermen, and later also workers, got an opportunity to pose themselves as the nation, in contrast to the government, and use the national day May 17 to demonstrate their demands.

The democratic alliance was organised through farmers' associations and peoples' high schools, an invention by the Danish farmers' movement that emphasized the link between the farmers and the nation, or simply stated that the nation was the farmers (Grundtvigianism, after the leading ideologist of the Danish farmers' movement, see chapter 7). The movement launched the peasant dialects as a national language through an organised language movement – unlike the middle class movements on the European continent which launched a standardized city language. It succeeded in deposing the bureaucratic government and in 1905 it had mobilized the whole people to proclaim the independence of Norway.

The national alliance in Norway remained, unlike all other countries, popular, democratic and anti-bureaucratic, based in the autonomy of the local communities and not in the career interests of the urban middle class. The mountain and fjord farmers, and their ambivalent posture to the world market society is still to a high degree setting the tone in Norwegian culture, making it able to organise the most powerful opposition to the imperial project of the European elites. “Norway, the different country”, a slogan of the EU resisters, has still some truth in it, to the annoyance of the sophisticated urban middle class.

The importance of these national movements in the European semi-periphery is perhaps primarily local. But particularly the East European movement succeeded, primarily through tactic skill, to establish the principle of local political autonomy as self-evident; in 1917 it was acknowledged by the representatives of the state system at the conference at Versailles.

The European national movements that influenced the global spread of national movements and the practice of these movements were however the Irish and the Russian ones.

Ireland was England's first and nearest colony, established through military conquest in the seventeenth century. Its role was to provide the English industrial towns with cheap food to allow the wages to be low. The way the system worked was that Irish tenants raised cereals and cattle for English landlords, for with they got the right to cultivate potatoes for subsistence. The efficiency of the system is best demonstrated by the famine in 1845–48 when about 800.000 Irish peasants starved to death without affecting the food export the least [19].

[19] A standard work about the Irish national movement and Ireland generally is Robert Kee: The green flag – a

At least from 1760, when the commercialization of agriculture began, a great peasant rebellion is registered about every decade, all the small risings uncounted. Some of the rebellions would last for years. With the time, they established an organisational tradition, with uniforms, secret passwords, fancy names like “Oakboys” and “Ribbomen”. Typical actions were occupation of pastures to plant potatoes, refusals to do forced labour, attacks on peasant-evicting landlords, and refusal to pay tithes – a popular way of uniting Catholics and Presbyterians against the English Church.

Over time, a middle layer of wealthy tenants arose, who pursued commercial agricultural methods. By then, particular movements for land workers and cottagers developed which turned against these commercial tenants with bread seizures and occupations; the tenants answered violently and real wars were waged in the early 1810s.

The towns were also hit as the English produce was able to outcompete Irish burghers. It was they, and the commercial tenants, who established the first Irish national movements. To them belonged the United Irishmen which tried to use the discontent with high war taxes to raise an Irish rebellion in cooperation with the French army. It had difficulty in communicating with the peasant movements, partly because so many Irish nationalists were themselves peasant-evicting landlords and subject to peasant disgust. For example, members of the United Irishmen took part in the pursuit of land worker organisations, and a generation later the Young Ireland called off its resistance to the starvation disaster, according to the labour leader James Connolly because they were afraid to provoke a peasant rebellion against the landlords.

But sometimes, they were successful. The movement that invented the modern peoples’ movement organisation with mass membership and employed functionaries, the Catholic Association, was a mobilization to end the discrimination of Catholics, i.e. the majority of Irishmen. It was preceded by a Christian awakening among the peasants in Munster and it collected a million members, arranged mass meetings and demonstrations over all Ireland. It succeeded in a few years, 1823-1829, to get the British parliament to revoke the laws prohibiting Catholics to own land and be civil servants. The Irish middle class was the main beneficiary, but the campaign was all-Irish and strengthened the common resistance to the colonial power. But the Presbyterian smallholders in Ulster, hitherto a driving force in the national movement, dropped off and supported increasingly the British rule. Resistance was increasingly a Catholic concern – one example of the difficulty to form exact and effective identities serving the whole peripheral territory.

The starvation disaster and the mass emigration to America that followed raised the price for labour and strengthened the bargaining power of the tenants towards the landlords. Meanwhile, the land workers were enfeebled politically since they almost disappeared. For that reason, the nationalists began to approach the peasants more wholeheartedly, and in the nationalist peasant organisation Irish Land League they took

history of Irish nationalism, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1972) Penguin 2000. It can be supplemented by F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland since the famine, Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1971, and James Connolly, Labour in Ireland, At the Sign of the Three Candles, no year, first published in 1910, which is a scathing critique of the “official” national movement from a labour movement perspective. The often ambiguous relations between peasants and nationalists are highlighted by Samuel Clark & James S. Donnelly (ed), Irish peasants, The University of Wisconsin Press 1983.

up a common struggle for ownership of the land. After a few years Land League dominated the local politics and unofficial justice particularly in west Ireland. It was now the concept boycott was coined, when the Land League boycotted the manor steward John Boycott from September 23, 1880. The boycotts against recalcitrant representatives of the landlord class was combined with refusals and going slow in paying the rent, and parliamentary horse-trading, see chapter 7, and the aim was reached: the British state began to buy the rapidly value-losing land of the estates, and sell it off cheap to the tenants. This also led to a growing respect for the Irish national movement in England.

But primarily, the result was that the majority of peasants began to perceive themselves as nationalists and act increasingly self-confident in the local politics, where the English rule was perceived as increasingly irrelevant.

The parliamentary horse-trading dominated the Irish political life in the late nineteenth century. The aim was Home Rule, and the strategy was to support the British political party that promised most.

Farmers and urban traders grew more prosperous from 1890, and tended to link their prosperity to the nationalist cause. They began to develop a culture inspired of Irish myths, the so-called Celtic renaissance, which also appealed to some degree to anti-imperialist Englishmen [20]. They began to cultivate ideas of Irish economic development built on cooperative self-reliance, protectionism and Irish autonomy in partly voluntary forms – Sinn Féin, as this tendency was called. They began to do well about 1905 when it was evident that the English parties would rather do business among themselves than with the Irish, and that parliamentary horse-dealing led to nothing without popular activities.

The prosperity didn't reach the propertyless workers, who were forced to either emigrate or gather in the militant labour movement of Dublin and Belfast. It had more immediate needs than Irish autonomy – Dublin had at this time a higher mortality than Calcutta – and 1907-1914 it pursued an almost continuous strike movement for decent working conditions. The national movement didn't care or was vaguely hostile because the workers "spoiled Irish industry".

The increasingly tough attitude shown by the capitalist towards the strikes caused the labour movement to build up a citizen's guard. It also led to an increasing nationalist attitude among the workers – the biggest capitalists were English, and labour leaders like James Connolly thought that the workers would get nowhere if the Irish economy wasn't directed from Ireland. The participants in the notorious Easter Rising in 1916 belonged to a large number to the workers' Citizens' Army.

There was another category that was, to say the least, sceptic to Irish home rule – the industrial class in Ulster that lived from selling products to the British market. They saw themselves threatened by ruin by Sinn Féin's self-reliance policy, and threatened with rebellion in 1914. Their agitation instrument towards Ulster lower classes was Anti-Catholicism.

[20] Declan Kiberd, *Inventing Ireland*, Jonathan Cape 1995. As a curiosity, the initiator of the Celtic renaissance as an organised movement, Augusta Gregory, was inspired by the Arab revolt in Egypt in 1881 and by different Indian syncretist religions popularized by the so-called Bengal renaissance, see below.

These so-called Unionists and the inclination of the British government to submit to them played over the initiative to the most radical faction of the Irish independence movement, Irish Republican Brotherhood, IRB. They, a rather small group from the lower urban middle class, had all the time argued for an armed rebellion, and the arming of the Unionist made this strategy stick. During the last prewar summer, some 150,000 Irishmen gathered in the Irish Volunteers to protect Home rule with armed violence. The movement now spread quickly and broadly in the countryside. Primarily, it appealed to the young men who had had the duty since the days of the Ribbonmen to guard their villages against bailiffs and policemen.

In these quarters, IRB got a great appeal.

IRB's and Citizens' Army's failed rising in 1916 left the Irish rather cold. The indiscriminate British revenge turned the opinion however. But the issue that united all (Catholic) Irishmen behind the national movement was the war resistance. From 1915, a spontaneous resistance against conscription began to spread, and it was skilfully organised by IRB. The British government was forced to give up its plans to send Irishmen to the trenches of Flanders.

In the elections in 1918 the Irish thankfully elected a great majority of IRB-Sinn Féin candidates. Also conducive was, according to George Boyce, the ability of the radical nationalists to engage the priests for their cause – a consequence of the anti-catholicism of the Unionists [21]. To the optimism for the nationalist cause contributed also the support for national autonomy expressed by the peace conference at Versailles. The newly elected parliamentarians declared themselves swiftly as the parliament of the independent Ireland, and began to attack English police pickets, relying on the English indiscriminate reprisals to radicalise the opinion. They counted right.

The war-weary Englishmen had no energy to repress the rebellion. Moreover, they were forced to consider their American ally and the many Irish immigrants in the USA. The Irish nationalist were able, exclusively through perfect planning and hitting only at the weakest points of the British, to force the British to acknowledge Irish independence in 1921, however with conditions [22].

The weakness of the movement was immediately apparent. For two years a civil war raged among the nationalists about which conditions they would accept. Did the opportunistically shaped identity exclude the Presbyterians of Ulster or didn't it? The militarized atmosphere created during the insurrection contributed to the heating of the conflict; during the insurrection political considerations had little influence on the proceedings which were run almost exclusively by the village youth in a decentralized way.

As government, the nationalists pursued for a generation a politics founded in Sinn Féin's ideas about industrial development through self-reliance. Their success in breaking away from British economic dependence was modest, and in the seventies they opened the doors for the transnationals, which were enticed with tax exemptions.

[21] D. George Boyce, *Nationalism in Ireland*, Routledge 1982.

[22] Ryle Dwyer, *The man who won the war*, Mercer Press 1990, is one of many biographies of the resistance organiser Michael Collins and his strategy.

In 1973 Ireland joined the EEC and accepted the same free trade dictatorship that had led to the starvation in the 1840s, confidently assured that Ireland now was a part of the system center and didn't have to risk things like that.

The national movement in Russia is buried under a morass of myths. But despite their pretensions of representing repressed classes it should be clear that the different middle class movements that shaped the Russian revolution ideologically, and finally also took government power there, were primarily national and aimed at asserting Russia's independence towards the system center. Their aim was to advance. The support to peasant movements (in the case of the Narodniks) and to the labour movements (in the case of the Bolsheviks) were alliance politics and were never allowed to infringe upon the main course [23].

The mainstay of these movements was the intellectuals. In Russia, where ordinary politics was forbidden, the only public life was the literary one, and its representatives got for that reason a key role in representing the needs of different groups and the needs of the generalized Russian society.

Unlike the East European nationalists, the Russians could not blame a centralist state to repress a regional periphery. And unlike the Irish nationalists they could not blame a foreign occupant. They had an eminently independent state; they had to attack the world market system as such. It was this that made the Russian revolution such an effective example for other national movements. And they had to attack their own upper class for neglecting national development needs in their own corrupt interest. For that reason they had to ask which interests within the country they needed to cooperate with if they wanted to replace the present rulers, and they also had to appeal to them in some way.

There were two alternative partners, apart from the middle class the intellectuals were closest to, the peasants and the workers.

When the Russian peasants were liberated from serfdom in 1861, the landlords kept about a sixth of the land, including a requirement to get paid for the rest. The peasants had no means to pay. But the power of the village communities was now in the hands of the peasants, and they were determined to take it all. The landlords, on their part, began to run their estates more businesslike, evicted tenants and were increasingly strict in recover debts [24].

When the Russian state lost the war against Japan in 1905 the peasants saw an opportunity. While the workers in the towns went into a general strike, the peasants attacked the manors and burnt buildings and papers. They also attacked the representatives of the government, refused to pay taxes and liberated conscript soldiers. According to official sources, 3000 manors were attacked. The owners were usually spared, though.

[23] An introduction to the demythologization of the Russian revolution, informed by new research about the actual conduct of people during 1917, are given by Edward Acton, *Rethinking the Russian revolution*, Edward Arnold 1990. – The description of the Russian communist party as primarily nationalist is not unique; Immanuel Wallerstein hints at it in several articles. And Lenin was fairly outspoken, in for instance *What is to be done*, many editions, for example International Publishers 1973, about that what he really objected to was Russian backwardness rather than the bad conditions of the workers.

[24] Victor Magagna, *Communities of grain*, Cornell University Press 1991.

The counterstrike of the government was to dissolve the collectivist village communities and favour those peasants who were able to establish themselves as commercial farmers. This policy had scant success. Locally, the collective pressure of the peasants towards rich members big enough to ensure that only 14% had been detached by the outbreak of the war. And wealthy peasants were also dependent at times of communal support against the state bureaucracy, according to Magagna. So probably only the very rich, or the very ruthless, had resources to break away; those were the so-called kulaks, the bad reputation of which was later to be so important.

The movement of the peasants was thus rather successful. But the parts of the intellectual middle class that tried to appeal to them for support for their modernization program, the Narodniks, had very little success. The rebelliousness of the peasants didn't imply that they had any national development aims. Their greatest desire was that the state and the urban middle class would let them alone. Their understanding of "modernization" according to world market system terms was perspicacious. They were against it.

The Russian labour movement is described in chapter 5. It was to this labour movement the Bolsheviks appealed. The Bolsheviks was a faction within the Russian social democrat party, a party dominated by intellectuals – workers kept aloof from party politics except in 1905 and 1917, since they couldn't control it. The method was to help organise trade unions, organise insurance funds, which gave them effective direct contact with their audience, and defend workers facing repression. The idea behind the choice of the Bolsheviks was that workers was the only category in society except the educated middle class itself that would possibly have anything to gain from modernization.

To keep the control of the movement firmly in the hands of the intellectual middle class, the Bolsheviks consciously broke away from the democratic peoples' movement tradition developed during the nineteenth century, and built up a secluded organisation of functionaries, appointed from above. The pattern was developed in radical middle class movements like the early nineteenth century revolutionary small groups, the Freemasonry, or the Catholic church which was organised in this way in the eighth century for roughly the same reasons, see chapter 3. The organisation was financed with business, crime, and gifts from developmentalist capitalists. An organisation like this had, as Lenin confessed in 1905, scant capacity to contribute to the rise of a popular mass movement. But it turned out to be exceptionally competent in getting hold of an existing movement and give it a certain direction.

The Russian government broke down in 1917 because its incompetence and jealousy had turned out to be a disaster in the war and alienated all classes. While the front and the economy went to pieces, politically inept burghers, officers and bureaucrats tried to organise a coup d'état to save the country when they were anticipated by workers and conscripts in Petrograd, whose respect for the government had dwindled even faster than the respect of the middle class. When February turned into March, when the factories were closed for lack of coal, the female workers organised demonstrations against the shortage of food. And the first of March the soldiers mutinied rather than shooting at the workers. The regime fell, and the hitherto powerless parliament, the Duma, reluctantly took responsibility [25].

In the economic and political confusion, it was necessary for the workers to take control over the supplies to the factories. Such a control was not completely unprepared; as soon as 1915, unionists and capitalists had begun to cooperate for this aim, even if the unionists had been thrown into jail because of their insolent meddling into government business. Liberated by the revolution they took initiative to the Petrograd Soviet to coordinate the supplies. In the Soviet, the educated middle class people from the socialist parties got an advantage because of their superior organisation.

When the market and the communications stopped working and starvation was near in Petrograd and Moscow, only the Bolsheviks took a responsibility for the supplies. The provisional government of the Duma was very unwilling to “exceed their responsibilities” which they interpreted narrowly, and moreover it seemed incapable of giving up old expansionist war aims that everybody else had lost interest in. For that reason, the support for the Bolsheviks grew during the summer of 1917 to a mass movement where the educated middle class could only lead through standing by the demands of the majority.

In October the majority of Petrograd and other industrial towns supported the Bolsheviks and their demands for bread, peace and government responsibility for the food supplies. The rising that carried the Bolsheviks to power was organised by the red guards, i.e. workers responsible for street order. Almost nobody supported the Duma government.

Meanwhile, the peasants took initiative in the countryside again. They got help from returning peasant-soldiers. Now, they took over the estates for good. The government administration was shattered and the land of the kulaks was forced back into the village communities. Contrary to later assertions, the kulaks were liquidated as a class in 1917. Of all competing political groups only the Bolsheviks accepted the actions of the peasants, and for this reason they got support, or at least benevolent neutrality from the peasants too.

But as related in the chapter about the Russian labour movement, it didn't help with a Bolshevik government to reorganise the national supply. It was caused by the war, and the peace only aggravated it in the short run, because the industry was geared towards war production. The German occupation of Ukraine also stopped food deliveries to the cities. The workers' support for the Bolsheviks ended quickly and the party dwindled again to a party of functionaries. And the forced requisitions of food to the cities turned the peasants into enemies.

Paradoxically, the civil war saved the Bolshevik government. The revolt by a collection of discredited politicians and generals with foreign support, and the disintegration of the country, placed the radical nationalists in a role they were better suited to than the role as labour leaders – as the saviours of the fatherland. Now, the support began to flow

[25] There are whole libraries of books about the Russian revolution. Among the newer works starting from the actions of popular movements rather than well-known persons are Daniel H. Kaiser, *The workers' revolution in Russia 1917*. Cambridge University Press 1987; Edward Acton, *Rethinking the Russian Revolution*, Sheila Fitzpatrick: *The Russian revolution*, Oxford University Press 1994, and Edith Rogovin Frankel et al (ed), *Revolution in Russia, Reassessment of 1917*, Cambridge University Press 1992.

in from all national groups like for example the military.

The war liberated the Bolsheviks from the need to court the favour of the workers. It almost finished the industry, and the workers left towns for the countryside, they became peasants again, or soldiers, or – if they were safe politically – lower government bureaucrats.

On the other hand, the power of the peasants grew. They controlled the food production. In the absence of regular state administration, they had the local power. They weren't interested in what happened at the national scene. To village organised peasants state and bureaucracy are always incarnations of repression that should be kept at a distance. For that aim, they tried as well as they could to play off different power pretenders against each other and supported sometimes Bolsheviks, sometimes other parties, according to local criterions.

With the workers out of the picture, the ruling nationalist middle class party had to look for support, or at least neutrality, from the peasants. During the twenties they accepted the local autonomy of the peasants, politically and economically. They were forced to that by a series of rebellions, the most serious by the sailors of the Baltic Fleet in 1921. But they could not achieve their great project, advancement in the world market system, through concessions to the peasants. For this project they needed investments in industry, and the only ones who had resources to invest were the peasants. Accordingly, the peasants had to be broken and plundered. This was carried through in 1929-1932 with military means, under the pretext of liquidating the kulaks that no longer existed. In 1933 serfdom was reintroduced. As a precaution it was also introduced for the working class in the new industry [26]. The reply from workers and peasants was a continuous go-slow that grew increasingly effective with time. The peasants also resorted to sabotage, social banditism and murders of government employees; to get a reasonable peace with them, the regime had to give back some of what it had stolen and get rid of some of their most brutal tools, which it did during the purges of 1937-39 [27].

Henceforth the modernist Russian bourgeoisie ruled in the interest of the nation's world market system career, and of course in their own interest. Those who still advocated some class alliance were killed, as were those who expressed some popular demands contrary to the national interest. This affected not least the old Bolsheviks who had

[26] This process has been described in hundreds of books, arguably best in Moshe Lewin, *The making of the Soviet system*, Methuen 1985. Lewin explains the increasing brutality of the regime with its combination of (relative) incompetence and excessive ambitions; again and again it started huge projects without a hint of how to do it, let it drag along for a while, and then tidy it up in panic. Also the forced collectivization in 1929 was a panic action caused by the non-existent book-keeping according to Lewin; the government suddenly discovered that the money to pay the state officials would run out within months. But there may also be other motives; James C. Scott argues that the communists, as good modernists, believed in economies of scale everywhere, even in agriculture where it doesn't make sense, as well as assuming that top-down management was the only thing that was effective. see *Seeing like a state*, Yale University Press 1998.

[27] According to Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's peasants*, Oxford University Press 1994. Unlike the more famous trials in Moscow, the countryside trials were serious and built on evidence from the peasant victims. Fitzpatrick, however, also points in another book, *The Russian revolution*, Oxford University Press 1994, at the disappointment of people who had taken part in the revolution and its aftermath because they thought that life really would be better; when it didn't they turned their fury against bolshevik party apparatchiks and demanded their removal or annihilation.

believed in such alliances. But concessions to the direct producers at the expense of the market career were seen as treachery by a middle class that thought Russia's backwardness as a greater evil than the powerlessness of Russian workers and peasants.

The Russian industrialisation strategy was therefore not based on the needs of the majority of the population but, like all other national development programmes, on those of the world market, i.e. capital accumulation. Resources for integration were scarce. The social base on which the world market career was built was narrow; it was mainly the technical cadres, the engineers, who benefited from industrialisation and who in turn supported the nationalist regime, and political integration in general was mainly based on top-down paternalistic networks. This was inevitable, given the total bureaucratisation of politics that the Bolsheviks assumed was necessary for industrialisation to be effective. In time, this weak base, and this bureaucratised policy, would lead to the fall of the nationalist regime in 1989-92 [28].

But there was one alliance, one solidarity that the Russian nationalists didn't desert: the solidarity as a peripheral nation. The revolution in 1917 proclaimed all peoples' right to self-determination, and four years later the Russians united with all anti-colonialist movements in the whole world at a congress in Baku. Henceforth they gave, wholeheartedly in the beginning but later with some glancing at their self-interest, political, economic and sometimes even military support to movements who aimed at liberating their territories from colonial repression, in China, in Vietnam, in India, in South Africa, in West Asia, in Cuba.

However, they didn't take seriously their posing as labour movement, and never supported a labour movement against capitalists anywhere. This falsehood would cause much damage by creating false identities in the labour movement, a tradition that is not fully overcome yet within the peoples' movement system. Like four hundred years earlier, careerist semi-peripheral states' theft and corruption of a underclass language has left the underclass silent, without tools for interpreting its own conditions.

But fear of contagion from the Russian example did help a lot to force the world-system powers to behave in a serious way after 1945 – focusing on production instead of the speculation economy that had caused the breakdown of 1929.

If the Creole revolutions successfully introduced the regional self-determination as a principle, and if the east and south European movements got a global support for their ambiguous principle of nations as a reasonable organisational method for the state system, the Irish and the Russian national movements created an effective model of movement practice to be copied by other national movements. The Irish with their mass organisations, their boycotts, their favouring of local production, and their combining of peasant and national movements, and the Russians with their disciplined party, their party-directed armed rebellions, and their rigidly ruled national development policy, became the two poles of identification in the anti-colonial movements of the twentieth century. In

[28] According to David Kotz, *Revolution from above – the demise of the Soviet system*, Routledge 1997, the regime shift around 1990 was staged by exactly the people who had earlier carried the nationalist regime, and the aim was to save the privileges that were threatened by the economic crisis and the accompanying claims for democracy.




Fig 6:1. European colonies (dark) and regions ruled by European settlers (lighter) 1920. Independent periphery states lightest grey.

the Russian case, the connection was fully conscious and publicly acknowledged by the linking up to a communist identity.

Anti-colonial movements

The polarization in center and periphery may have caused conflicts at the regional level. But as indicated in chapter 4, the conflicts were much deeper in the global peripheries. The very reason why the centers conquered colonies was that the direct producers of the center with increasing success were able to pose conditions for their participation, which was affecting capital accumulation negatively. For that reason new, unorganised direct producers were needed who would be pushed to work at less favourable conditions, and they were to be found in countries that could be organised as peripheries.

The difference in bargaining resources between local people and elites were much greater in colonial peripheries than in the center,

The rulers came from without and were not depending on consent from the ruled, which resulted in a more brutal wielding of power,

The rulers were ignorant of local conditions in the peripheries and behaved more careless than the system demanded,

The transformation from subsistence to world market was telescoped to a few generations while it had taken hundreds of years in the center.

Anthony D. Smith has expressed it as the colonial state didn't grow out of the civil society as the state did in Europe, but came from without, as something forced, something the society had to adapt to [29]. Politically, the center ruled more absolutist and

tyrannical over the global peripheries than over the regional ones. Culturally, “science” was used to declare invalid the experiences of the colonised and devalue themselves as “primitives”. Economically, a relatively greater surplus was possible to squeeze out of the global peripheries than of the regional ones, because of their political powerlessness.

The center-periphery relation was for that reason more blocking in the global periphery than in the regional one, in Rokkan’s terms [30]. Economic, cultural and political transactions were all regulated by the center to its own benefit, maximally ignorant of the local conditions. The needs of the periphery were seen as irrelevant; its role was to supply the center [31].

The world market system was first met with local peasant rebellions and warmaking of the traditional elites, see chapter 4. They were both defeated. Only in the late nineteenth century a new form of resistance was developed based in the periphery role. This were the modern anti-colonial movements, after the model of Ireland’s and East Europe’s national movements [32].

The anti-colonial movements were alliances between categories and classes with differing interests but which were able to cooperate for common aims.

The peasants wanted security, to survive the commercialization of land and food, the replacement of customs with Roman law, and the brutal taxation of the colonial regime. Primarily they wanted guarantees for their collective right to subsistence.

The workers tried to survive in relation to the center-owned monopolies. They wanted primarily support for trade union rights. Often, only a few years differed workers from peasants or pre-industrial artisans ruined by the colonial monopolies, and it was easy for them to engage in peasant aims.

The local capitalists tried to protect themselves against unfair competition and wanted primarily protection for their businesses

The educated middle class – a category produced by the the colonial power to fill subordinate positions in the colonial administration – wanted to clear away what tied them to the subordinated positions. They aimed at the offices that were monopolized by the colonialists. They also looked forward to modernization, i.e. wanted to introduce the kind of societal patterns that characterized the center. They were the only people in the periphery that had the knowledge this demanded, and they knew that they would be benefited.

[29] Anthony D. Smith, *State and nation in the Third World*, Wheatsheaf Books 1983. Joseph Schumpeter is expressing a similar thought when he refuses to acknowledge investments forced from without as “development” (*The theory of economic development*, Harvard University Press 1949).

[30] Stein Rokkan & Derek Urwin, *Economy, territory, identity*.

[31] Some people think this is possible to show physically in terms of energy content. For example N. Georgescu-Roegen, *The entropy law and the economic process*, Harvard University Press 1971, quoted by Stephen Bunker, *The exploitation of labor in the appropriation of nature*, in Charles Bergquist (ed), *Labor in the capitalist world economy*, Sage 1984.

[32] There are few comparative studies and analyses of anti-colonial movements. Anthony D. Smith, *State and nation in the Third World* is a serious one. L.S. Stavrianos’ lengthy *Global rift*, William Morrow 1981, uses almost a thousand pages to the development of the north-south conflict during five hundred years but focuses primarily at south as a victim; poplar movements appear as an abstract “defence of the nation” where actions, actors and strategies disappear and the differences between different approaches appears as ideologies.

The anti-colonial or national movement was an alliance between these parties. It was not an alliance of equal conditions.

All four categories had opportunities to contribute to the movement [33]

The peasants' contribution was their opportunity to revolt against taxes and market prices. All peasants had not equal opportunity. Migdal and Wolf have pointed to the fact that peasants living in peripheral, inaccessible regions, far from the rulers had better opportunities thanks to their greater independence and greater self-confidence. But relatively prosperous peasants had the same opportunity everywhere according to them, while the poorest didn't have much at all, at least not before their luckier neighbours had taken the initiative. Almost all peasant revolts supporting the national movements began in inaccessible mountain areas. The prosperous peasants in commercialised agricultural areas followed, to increase their influence when the earlier dominant landlords had moved to the cities to live a more glamorous life there.

The workers were able to strike against the center-controlled monopolies. As mentioned in chapter 5, their position was very strategic and gave them a striking power out of proportion to their rather small number.

The local capitalists were able to contribute with money to the movement, and also some organisatory stability. But unfortunately, they were often unreliable; theoretically, they had everything to win by challenging the foreign monopolies, but in practice there were short-term gains to make by becoming middlemen between these monopolies and the locals. The local capitalists for that reason tended to split between factions of which some supported the national movements and some supported the center, depending on trade conditions and individual inclination.

The educated middle class contributed with delight to organise the movement and fill the organisations with personnel. They were the key people of the national movement.

There were many reasons why they got this dominating role. An important one was their global view. They had been schooled in the same education system as the ruling colonialists, without having any of their privileges. They had access to a model to compare. They mastered the codes of the new society, as Ernest Gellner expresses it, when the old ones were falling apart [34]. Moreover, they had positions, if subordinated, in the absolutist colonial state.

Generally, the educated middle class got most of the yields of the movements. They were their functionaries and manned the control functions. When the movements were successful in the form of state power, the prize was closest to the functionaries.

The other participants had smaller opportunities to take a share in the gains. They were only able to claim their share in proportion to their usefulness to the movements. If the struggle against the center power had been long and arduous, the dependence of

[33] Eric Wolf, *Peasant wars of the twentieth century*, Harper & Row 1973, has like Joel Migdal, *Peasants, politics and revolution*, Princeton University Press 1974, emphasized the important role of the peasants in the national movements, and have touched at the role of the educated urban middle class. Anthony D. Smith, *State and nation in the Third World*, deals primarily with the latter. Charles Bergquist, *Labor in Latin America*, Stanford University Press 1986 includes a long passage where he analyses the strategic role of the labour movement, see also chapter 5.

[34] Quoted by Anthony D. Smith, *State and nation in the Third World*.

workers and peasants or, as in Latin America, of local capitalists, were bigger and they had for that reason more opportunities to claim their right. When the gains were easy, the functionaries were able to take all, and leave their partners in the lurch.

This phase will be considered later.

The pioneer – the Indian movement

The pioneer of the anti-colonial movements, and the movement that in the end made the colonial system unprofitable for at least the English, was the Indian national movement [35].

After the great rebellion in 1857, see chapter 4, the plunder of the Indian continent was reorganised to fit better into the peripheral role. India was specialised into wheat and cotton production, and drugs for the Chinese market, and never got admission to the free trade of the British system; protectionism ruled there unchecked to the benefit of Britain. The export of food increased as did starvation. During the last twentyfive years of the nineteenth century, on average three quarters of a million starved to death every year.

Nevertheless, the organisation that would gather the national movement, the Indian National Congress, was not anti-British when it was founded in 1885. For it emanated from milieus that were created and raised by the British administration – lawyers, journalists, teachers, officers. The ideological roots were the so-called Bengal renaissance, a movement aiming at uniting the Hindu heritage with European liberal modernism, and their ideal was “good government” and legalism. Their program comprised abolishing of provincial and caste prejudices and other obsolete Indian abuses, discussing civic matters and favouring the common good. Views on the administration, for example tax relief and other measures against starvation, were always delivered in very humble terms.

It would have continued this way if the British had not had a very contemptuous view on the Indian middle class that didn't wish more than becoming loyal Englishmen. Despite promises in connection with the rebellion in 1857, the administration refused to employ Indians to promoted positions, and it was also apparent in the social life that they regarded Indians as second-class people. As self-defence, younger Indian middle-class people began to promote Indian traditions, as they were represented in the Vedic literature, and appeal to the Indian majority. They despised the National Congress and its moderate language. They demanded action.

They saw an opportunity in 1905, when the Japanese had defeated Russia in a war and Europeans didn't appear invincible. Indians had begun to recover from the starvation of the nineteenth century, when the most arrogant of British governors decided to hit at the strongest faction of the Indian middle class, the merchants of Calcutta, by dividing Bengal into two provinces.

The effect of this alliance between Calcutta's businessmen and the nationalist youth

[35] The Indian movement is rather well told. Bipan Chandra et al, *India's struggle for independence*, Penguin 1989, gives an overview, and Ravinder Kumar, *Essays in the social history of modern India*, Oxford University Press 1983 shows the social background; both are rather Gandhian in outlook. Jan Myrdal, *India waits*, Lake View Press, 1986, gives more room for the radicals in the movement. The British repressive rule is reviewed in Mike Davis: *Late Victorian holocausts*, Verso 2001.

movement was India's first broad popular movement since 1857. The first demand was to leave Bengal in peace. The second was swadeshi, self-reliance. The movement boycotted British goods and bought Indian, which benefited the merchants who supported the movement economically. Boycott against liquor had the double aim to strengthen the energy of the Indian people and to deprive the British of the liquor tax. The movement began to use popular feasts as demonstrations against the British. Protected by the breadth, people would attack single cases of power abuse, for example when Bombay struck against a governor who had burnt down a complete town district to manage an epidemic.

As a way of increasing the self-reliance of the Indian people, the movement linked up with the Bhakti tradition. This was the only way of getting contact with the popular majority which traditionally used this way to demand social justice.

The people of the new mass movement also demanded power within the National Congress. The old guard opposed this, and the regime saw an opportunity to divide by a conscious combination of cooptation and terror, and succeeded in quieting the movement up to the first world war.

The war revived it. To get soldiers to the trenches, the British had promised reforms, but the reforms came to nothing. Instead, the laws against political agitation were tightened; for example the government gave itself the right to imprison people without trial. As a protest, the National Congress called a citizen strike in March 30 and April 6, 1919.

The success of the strike surprised all, including the National Congress. The British panicked and answered with random terror. A massacre of innocent peasants celebrating a local saint convinced the most hardened admirers of the West, and the National Congress decided that their aim was autonomy and the instrument was mass movement. But the dominant people were not the suspicious activists from 1905 but the activists trained in the campaigns organised by Mohandas Gandhi among the indigo cultivators during the war.

Gandhi developed a new political style: broad popular campaigns for aims of direct interests for peasants, workers and the traditional middle classes of the towns, like reduction of taxes and rents, directed against the British rule but carried through in a moderate way with a minimum of conflict escalation [36]. This method, used by peasants against the colonial rule during its whole history, was what made the citizens' strikes so effective. Gandhi's programmatic moderation, and his organising of the movement through traditional clientelist networks and business contacts, made him acceptable for the Congress leadership.

The new planned campaign had three feet.

The first was mass organising. In each village a congress committee was elected,

[36] Gandhi always maintained that his non-violence strategy was effective, not that it primarily was morally "right". Thanks to the low conflict level, the social costs for the participants would be kept low and permit many people to participate, thanks to the low conflict level, prestigious deadlocks could be avoided and allow the adversary to concede without losing face. See for example Arne Næss, Gandhi and group conflict, Universitetsforlaget 1974. Gandhi consciously abandoned non-violence in 1942 on the verge of the Quit India campaign, because he thought that it was under the circumstances no longer effective, see below.

which elected a new one for the country district, and so on. This organising finished the rule of the notables within the movement. Henceforth, only activists with a popular base would have any influence. Moreover, a women's organisation, a youth organisation and a trade union federation was built up.

The second was a new, more developed swadeshi-campaign. This one didn't confine itself to British goods. It completely stopped cooperation with British-ruled authorities and institutions. Young people boycotted British schools and went out to the countryside to teach the peasants to read. State officials renounced their appointments.

The third was a programmatic cooperation between Hindus and Muslims. Since the turn of the century there had been a tendency for the movement to be exclusively Hindu. The radicals had appealed to the Vedic tradition and sometimes depicted Islam as un-Indian. This had alienated many Muslims to the movement. But now, the whole Congress supported the Muslim demand of integrity for the 'Umma, the Muslim community, and opposed colonial demands of Turkish territory [37].

The movement was about to be extended to a tax boycott when it was suddenly suspended. A peasant demonstration against the police station in the Chauri-Chaura village had been attacked, a riot had ensued where people, including policemen, had been killed. The campaign leadership wouldn't jeopardize its policy of moderation and refused to lead a campaign where violence was used by the participants.

The broken campaign also broke the Indian unity.

The liberal upper middle class began to cooperate with the British and entered elections which had been permitted as a British concession. They didn't get much out of it however and most resigned after a few years.

Many campaign activists tried to continue the campaign in spite of the leadership, tried to organise a particular revolutionary faction, expressed in strikes and a particular socialist party. They were not particularly successful either and never succeeded in being more than a faction.

The most serious consequence was however a permanent distrust between Muslims and Hindus; the Muslims felt betrayed and proclaimed a jihad of their own. The antagonism would continue to grow, to reach a peak in a bloodbath with over half a million victims in connection with the independence.

Behind this distrust – an illustration to the always tricky business of finding a reasonable identity of a national movement – lurched not only short-sighted Hindu politics from 1905 and on. There were also material conflicts of interest. In Bengal, Punjab and Maharashtra a Hindu upper class dominated over Muslim peasants, in Uttar Pradesh and Hyderabad a Muslim upper class dominated over Hindu peasants. Each class conflict in these regions quickly got religious/cultural overtones. Furthermore, the political and economic decline of the Muslims during the British rule made the Muslim minority uneasy and worried about the future.

[37] This movement was called the Khilafat movement, referring to the position of the Turkish Sultan as Caliph. The emphasis on the unity of the 'umma was strong within Indian Islam, particularly in popular sufian movements, see for example Olivier Roy, *Islam and resistance in Afghanistan*, Cambridge Middle East Library 1990.

During the twenties, the radical faction continued their trade union campaigns while the Gandhians pursued a campaign for equal rights of the casteless, with the aim of clearing away an Indian disgrace and raise the moral and self-esteem of the casteless. Even more successful was a campaign within the Hindu reform movement to integrate casteless and low cast people into society to unite all Indians against the British rule; the Arya Samaj organised huge ceremonies where millions of people purified themselves according to Hindu rites to become adequate Hindus [38].

In 1929, the different strands of the movement met again for a new common campaign for autonomy, founded on non-cooperation.

The spearhead of this campaign was breaking the British monopoly of salt, on which the British made huge profits on the peasants' expense. After having proclaimed January 26, 1930 as Independence Day, the movement went on to organise a well-publicised infraction to the monopoly. Hundreds of thousands of members walked to the sea to extract salt. The example was contagious; Indian peasants began to assert old rights, and it was impossible to bring the law to bear upon all. To get peace, the British offered autonomy at the province level; the National Congress accepted, set up candidates to the elections, won and formed province governments. The radicals, who disdained compromises, went out to the countryside to unite with the peasants who had begun to expand the struggle against the British to the landlords. Together they built an organisation which would be the backbone in the campaigns for land reform in the fifties and sixties, see chapter 7.

When the second world war broke out, the Congress provincial governments resigned, in protest against not having been consulted about the war. The British on their side began contemplating an all-out illegalising Congress. It took however three full years to get the necessary unity, and meanwhile the tempers of Congress members rose against increasing war-economy and war-commandeering. A few days before the long-awaited police swoop in September 1942, Gandhi made a radio announcement that local Congress members should soon be ready to raise a new campaign on their own responsibility, to make Britain Quit India. When the whole Congress leadership got arrested, and nobody was left to give a direction, the British minister of India filled the gap – the mass arrests were done, according to him, because Congress was about to cut rail and telegraph connections and burn British government buildings. And so the members did, in most of India, and particularly in the densest populated areas, in the Ganges plain and coastal Maharashtra, but also in Bengal and Tamil Nadu, where Congress had the congress had earlier developed the best links to ordinary peasants [39].

During a few months local people took power locally, and the British soldiers who dared to interfere were killed or chased away. Industrial establishments went on strike – bosses included if they were Indians. Rails and telegraph lines were cut, and government buildings were burnt down. Innumerable people who had earlier shown no interest in the

[38] J.F.T. Jordens, Hindu religious and social reform in British India, in A.L. Bashan (ed) A cultural history of India, Oxford University Press 1975.

[39] About the Quit India campaign, see Francis G Hutchins: Gandhi and the Quit India movement, Harvard University Press 1973. About Telengana, Barry Pavier, The Telengana movement, Vikas Publishing House 1981 and John Roosa: Indian nationalism and the Telengana revolt, Journal of Peasant Studies 28:4, 2001.

nationalist cause became activists or aided activists, including high government service people. British over-reactions, mass-arrestations and indiscriminate killings did their best to infuriate even neutral or pro-British Indians (as did British callousness during the Bengal famine a year after). Regardless of the movement's subsiding in the spring 1943 it was clear that the British could not rule India in a peaceful way. It was also made clear who really represented the Indians.

The rebellion in Telengana in the south went furthest: a republic of two million inhabitants was finally organised by the peasants, who shared the land between them and admitted women and landless people into the administration. The republic lasted until the independent India sent its armies against it.

The Indian soldiers in British service who were caught by the Japanese was organised into a "National Indian Army" by a radical Congress activist, Subhas Bose, and fought against the British. After the war, it was received as heroes by the Indian public.

Finally, in 1946, the sailors of the British Indian fleet off Bombay mutinied and raised the Congress flag. The mutiny was spread as demonstrations and strikes to Bombay and out over India, all the way to Egypt.

This convinced the British that the colonial rule was obsolete. To this conclusion contributed also the fact that the labour party had won the elections in Britain and formed a government. The colonial administration decided to leave power to two successors, the National Congress and to the Muslim League.

Muslim League had been organised by Muslim politicians who were suspicious to the too Hinduising politics of the Congress, and recommended that Muslim-dominated regions should be separated as a particular state, Pakistan. Muslim League was not uncontested among the Indian Muslims, which had a solid tradition of internationalism behind them, and also ten million coreligionists outside the the borders of putative Pakistan. But the British were interested in dividing and ruling and preferred two counterparts – no doubt also because Muslim League had a more elitist character than the mass-dominated Congress.

The new Indian state backed from the beginning a national development policy, built on national investments, import substitution and, as a concession to the Gandhian peasants, village development and land reform. Successively, however, the Gandhian traits faded and from the eighties, the ruling upper middle class began to capitulate to the world market system.

But yet, there is a heritage left from the relatively popular Indian independence movement, which is almost lacking in authoritarian Pakistan. Autonomous mass movements have influenced Indian politics. The land of the landlords was distributed to the peasants. But, as Shashi Joshi has pointed out: it may have been even more influential if the activists of the movement had been more confident of the Indian peasants and less confident to foreign examples and theories, particularly those emanating from Moscow [40].

[40] Shashi Joshi, *Struggle for hegemony in India*, Sage 1992.

Derivative and rearguard movements

The independence of India made things much easier for other anti-colonial movements. For when India was detached from the colonial system, this began to appear as old-fashioned. The independence of India, like the Japanese successes in the war, inspired for this reason people in other system peripheries where national movements got a huge upsurge after 1945.

In Indonesia, for example. The Japanese occupation there had forced the thitherto small and splintered groups of urban intellectuals to cooperate and exercise a certain authority towards the Japanese as national representatives. When the Japanese withdrew, they were for a short period able to take power, before the Dutch came back, and they were naturally not pleased to leave the power to them. Instead they begun a liberation war together with a youth army trained by the Japanese to use as auxiliaries [41].

During the struggles, the inhabitants in the many islands had to choose sides, and often organise themselves. Innumerable small resistance centers appeared, some with social aims, others without. The two most well-known are the youth of Surabaya who raised the town in October 1945 and hold out for two weeks, and the Muslim movement in eastern Java that united renewal of Islam with resistance to the Dutch and to corruption. The Surabaya youth convinced the great powers that the Dutch wouldn't be able to take back control and for that reason were not worth support.

The official nationalist leadership was quite contented in taking over the position of the Dutch with not much social changes. The local resistances with higher aims were to scattered to have any significance. The impulses toward a national development were mainly aimed at enriching the urban middle class than favouring the peasant majority, and the shift to world market adaptation was quick and easy in the seventies. Peasant and union activists with wider aims were killed in a huge massacre in the sixties.

The Islamic belt in North Africa and West Asia generally escaped colonial regimes and will be treated in the next section. Only two regions were formally under colonial regimes, French North Africa and Palestine. They were scenes for two of the most bitter of all colonial contests. For they were not only directed against a few colonial administrators but also against European settlers who were few and vulnerable enough to develop a malignant racism against the original inhabitants, and numerous enough to combat them effectively.

Palestine was up to the nineteenth century a periphery of the Ottoman empire, and more or less ruled itself. But at that time the empire began to straighten up its rule to withstand the European encroachment. Among other things, the empire tried to make taxation more effective. For that reason land registers were introduced, where the peasants had to register to assert their rights. In many cases, local notabilities or merchants registered instead and were thus able to build up huge paper estates. The peasants were allowed to stay as tenants at land increasingly used by the new owners to grow citrus fruits or other export crops [42].

[41] M.C. Ricklefs, *A history of modern Indonesia*, Macmillan 1981.

[42] Baruch Kimmerling & Joel S Migdal, *Palestinians, the making of a people*, The Free Press 1993. The inception of

The same principle has been used in the whole world to deprive the peasants of their rights when customary systems are replaced by the world market system. But in Palestine it had dramatic consequences. For in Palestine, the new owners began to evict peasants to sell the estates to European Jewish immigrants who were able to offer European hard currency.

In Palestine thus appeared a conflict between notables and peasants, and the peasants were forced at an early date to define their own aims, which they found nationalist – no matter if Arab, Syrian, or Palestine, but at least against immigrants and landlords. When the British government declared that it should encourage Jewish immigration in 1919, the peasants turned militantly anti-British.

The resistance was organised about different lines.

Many evicted peasants established themselves as social bandits and attacked Jewish settlements. They had begun this in the 1880s and after 1919 this activity grew.

Others oriented in nationalist trade unions and national popular literary associations.

Most radical was the Islamist organisation that after its organiser Izz-al-Din al-Qassam was called qassamites. They turned to slum-dwellers in Haifa, mostly evicted peasants who worked in the harbour. It turned against the British occupation as well as the immigration, and it saw Islamic social justice, moral renewal and armed resistance against the repression as methods. Their members played a key part in the rebellion of 1936-39 [43].

The slump in the thirties sharpened the conflict. Many peasants were ruined by decreasing incomes and rising taxes. The immigration increased due to anti-Jewish violence in Poland and Germany; to be sure this immigration caused some upswing economically but the immigrants took the jobs. In 1933 violent demonstrations were organised against the occupation. The political parties hurried to lead the movement and the ‘ulama declared it as heresy to sell land to the immigrants. In April 13, 1936, two Jews were killed and the authorities begun a terror wave against the Palestine organisations. These answered with a general strike

The strike begun in the towns but the focus was soon shifted to the countryside. National committees were organised in the villages with peasant demands on the program. Qassamites begun to attack military posts and immigrant settlements, and blew up the oil pipeline from Mosul. Since the traditional leaders were arrested, qassamite-inspired peasants and workers took initiative, and in 1938 they dominated the countryside. A socially radical program was adopted with for example moratorium for all debts and boycotts against British authorities. Even townspeople began to dress like peasants, so great was their prestige.

The Munich agreement released British energy to repress the rebellion. The British

the Palestinian movement is also related in Ted Swedenburg, *The role of the Palestinian peasantry in the Great Revolt 1936-39*, in Edmund Burke & Ira M Lapidus (ed) *Islam, politics and social movements*, University of California Press 1988.

[43] More about the Islamists in the next section. The Qassamites are treated in Abdullah Schleifer, *Izz-al-Din al-Qassam, preacher and mujahid*, in Edmund Burke (ed) *Struggle and survival in the modern Middle East*, University of California Press 1993.

used three methods: arming the European settlers, disarming the Palestinians, and promise to stop further immigration to attract the more moderate Palestinians.

The Palestinian movement was disarmed in a more fundamental way than just being deprived of shotguns. The rift widened between the peasants and the urban middle class, the traditional organisers of all anti-colonial movement. The conflict also appeared as too expensive for the participants; surviving rebels without political coordination raved the countryside, pressing the peasants for a living. In 1939, the peasants weren't able to take more conflict. The settlers were. They had been armed by the British and had strong international organisations, and they took up the struggle against both authorities and inhabitants. They succeeded well; in 1947 the United Nations decided that they could have half the country. And the organisatorically weakened Palestinians were only able to react sporadically. Instead people reacted individually, fleeing to refugees' camps, helped to this decision by Israeli murder squads. About 150.000 stayed and applied for citizenship in the Israeli state. Their, and other Palestinians' continued struggle with the Israeli settlers will be related in chapter 8.

In Algeria the anti-colonial struggle was directed against a European settler minority [44]. After the Kabylean revolt in 1871, European immigrants raided the country and settled on land confiscated by the French state; in 1950 there were about a million of them, against nine million Arabs or Berbers who were evicted from their land or were driven out of business by European import, having to earn a living as labourers for the Europeans.

Yet, the first reflex for educated Muslims was to take the French on their word; Algeria was said to be an integral part of France where all were equal citizens. But the equality turned out not to concern Muslims; the Algerians were denied other options than opposition, which took either of two forms.

The first one was religious and aimed at strengthening the self-respect. The form was a Muslim reform movement that after its founder Abdelhamid Ben Badis was called Badisiya; it emphasised the equality of all Muslims and the indivisibility of the Muslim community, and it opposed luxury. It was supported by peasants and artisans who gathered to their schools.

The other movement was created among Muslim workers in the vineyards, in the Frenchified cities and not least in France to where half a million Algerians had moved to work. Among them the north African Star was founded in 1925, a combined trade union, insurance association and cultural society. It was partly supported by the French labour movement until the Algerians got tired of French paternalism and turned their backs to them.

These two movements created the networks used by the anti-colonial movement during the fifties.

The direct anti-colonial struggle was begun in May 1, 1945, when Algerians in Setif celebrated the allied victory over Nazism by demanding equality between Christians and Muslims. The French answered with aircraft bombing and killed thousands of people; and all Muslims realised that continued coexistence was impossible. For the issue was

[44] Eric Wolf, *Peasant wars of the twentieth century*, John Dunn, *Modern revolutions*.

defined thus: Muslims versus Christians; the term Algerians would cover both.

During the following ten years, the independence movement dealt with clandestine organising and strategic discussion. In these discussions, the supporters of armed resistance won out, and they took the initiative in November 1, 1954, with a series of attacks at French police stations and military posts.

The attacks were amateurish and the damage was slight. But the scared French response united most Algerians behind the rebels, since the prisons were filled with all Algerians who had ever expressed any political opinion, however moderate.

During ten years about 15.000 rather disunited mujahedin succeeded in engaging half a million French soldiers who successively destroyed both economy and conditions of life in Algeria and made French presence increasingly impossible. Meanwhile, French youth built up the first important anti-colonial movement in a metropolitan country, faced with the threat to be sent into battle [45].

When the French state gave up in 1960, the Algerian movement was almost beaten. It was easy for a bunch of Algerian exile politicians from the middle class to step into the vacuum and take control. Among them not much of the Badisiyan equality was visible.

In most of Africa, only weak national movements were needed to convince the colonial powers about the disadvantages of colonialism. When the first educated middle class politicians appeared after the second world war, Indians and Vietnamese had made the job for them, and the colonialists played over the power to them before any popular movements had been organised [46].

The popular national movements began as cultural self-assertions in the form of Christian revivals and domestic churches about 1900. The former often combined Christian forms with traditional African culture, and equalled “evil” with the European colonial power. Despite being pacifist and rather hoped for divine intervention than trusted themselves, they were met by brutal repression. The latter were fit into the colonial system, but were despite this important as the first super-regional organisations manned with Africans, and there is no coincidence that so many of the national movement activists were educated in missionary stations. While the revival movements had turned to peasants, the churches turned primarily to townspeople.

Meanwhile, the first organisations appeared among the educated middle class. The demands of these were narrow and concerned the right for the members to be fully integrated in the colonial society. Not until the second world war, this middle class became big enough to make some influence.

It was only then that the nationalist movements were adapted to the arbitrary colonial state borders. The early African nationalists were Africans, not Nigerians or Congolese. What made them adapt was the opportunity to take part in parliamentary elections.

Let’s use Ghana as an example, not because it is typical but because Africans for a

[45] See chapter 9.

[46] Anthony D. Smith, *State and nation in the Third World*; Robert I Rothberg & Ali A. Mazrui, *Protest and power in black Africa*, Oxford University Press 1970; and Donald Crummey (ed), *Banditry, rebellion and social protest in Africa*, Heinemann 1986. John Iliffe, *Africans – the history of a continent*, Cambridge University Press 1996, describes the de-colonization.

long time used it as a model. Ghana had the most commercialized economy in Africa, built on rubber and cacao. The war favoured production and produced money for family farmers while prices increased and trade union organisations spread [47].

The national movement appeared among students in London during the war, inspired by Caribbeans, and posed typical middle class demands like equal rights to public careers. What made it into a mass organisation was a boycott organised by traditional clan organisations against price hikes, and a demonstration by demobilized soldiers. The authorities blamed the nationalists, threw them into prison and made them popular heroes.

The campaign for independence used agitation for “democracy” and “equality” in an abstract way. The national organisations were geared to transmitting the message of the leaders out to the people, supported by youth, not to strengthening of popular self-organisation. The only popular organisations of importance were the trade unions; everywhere in Africa dockers, railway workers and municipal workers played a great part through strikes, and in North Rhodesia/Zambia the copper-mine workers were the backbone of the national movement. The peasants were in principle not involved; in Africa there was abundant land and any countryside organisation aimed at keeping bailiffs away.

This pattern – educated middle-class popular leaders with weak popular organisation, trade unions excepted – has made the social structures of the independent African states: self-sufficient tyrannical states that only the trade unions are able to stand up to. The pattern is broken only in regions where Europeans settled, in Kenya and South Africa.

In Kenya, Europeans had stolen the land in the late nineteenth century and converted the earlier customary owners into tenants. During the slump they began changing the system into commercial farming manned by land workers, and the tenants were evicted; many of them ended up in the shantytowns of Nairobi [48]

The official nationalist movement created during the twenties concerned mainly the educated middle class; it had few links to the evicted tenants. It was a cautious and moderate movement, like the Indian National Congress in its beginning.

After the war however, a radical nationalist movement was founded among demobilized soldiers of ex-tenant origins. They were not adverse to violent revolt. But to prevent them from having any influence, the moderates in cooperation with village and clan leaders started a campaign for unity, behind moderate leadership. However, the campaign was soon heavily influenced at grass-root level by the radicals, in cooperation with ex-tenants.

This frightened the British colonists to start a campaign of arrests and terror in 1953. Radical activists took to the forests and had to begin a guerrilla war to survive. In the early days it had some support from the ex-tenants, but soon survival got the upper hand over political aims, and the resistance succumbed to the British terror.

In 1963, the British left power to the moderates, whom they had let out of the prisons. These took the opportunity to take over the European farms. And the distance between

[47] Endre Sik, *The history of black Africa*, Akadémiai Kiadó 1974.

[48] Wunyabari O. Maloba, *Mau Mau and Kenya*, James Currey/Indiana University Press 1993

elites and the poor is maintained by a corruption that is huge even according to African conditions.

Only in South Africa a real peoples' movement was needed to attain independence. In the present Zimbabwe and Zambia there were many European settlers, while in Mozambique and Angola the Portuguese state knew well that it would never be able to rule in any other way than by direct colonial possession, forced labour and power monopoly [49].

Independence in the whole area was won by Frelimo in Mozambique. Frelimo was created by wage labourers in Lourenço Marques and by mission school students in the countryside. It was the latter who in the sixties began to organise "liberated zones" in the distant north where the Portuguese held a rather patchy power.

The motive for the peasants to take part in this organising was to avoid forced labour. And together with the Frelimo activists, they built up a cooperative movement that was rather successful.

What decided the outcome was however Frelimo's attack on the Zambezi valley where the Portuguese state planned a huge hydroelectric plant which was to supply power for Witwatersrand, surrounded by settler colonists. The Zambezi valley was also the lifeline between Rhodesia and the sea. It proved too expensive for the Portuguese state to defend these establishments – militarily, politically – and the burghers of Portugal refused to pay. They decided to depose the government and back European integration instead of shaky African imperial dreams and let the Africans care for Africa.

Nevertheless, the national movement had to pay dearly for independence. Even if the Portuguese didn't want to fight, the Apartheid regime did; it couldn't afford a radical nationalist government as a neighbour but continued to fight a war of attrition until it fell in 1990.

While the nationalist movement in Mozambique fought, rather chaotic conditions ruled in Angola. In reality, Angola was a loose collection of three colonies – a coffee district in the north, economically linked to Kinshasa, a cotton district around Luanda, and a wide highland around the railway to Zambia. In each of these districts a national organisation appeared that each claimed to speak for all Angola.

In the North, FNLA was created by coffee merchants. They saw an opportunity when the coffee cultivators went to strike for non-payment; they were quickly acknowledged by the other African states, but in the end they preferred to make business in Kinshasa to leading a national movement.

MPLA was created around Luanda by creoles. They were about as Portuguese as the creoles in Brazil, and they had dominated trade and administration until the Portuguese tightened up their power in the late nineteenth century. When some youth tried to liberate friends from the town prison in 1961, MPLA raised rebellion and went out to establish a "liberated zone" in the countryside.

The movement around the Benguela railway, UNITA, was created by mission school students. They used legal ways of organising associations for mutual security among

[49] David Birmingham, *Frontline nationalism in Angola & Mozambique*, James Currey 1992.

peasants and artisans, and bought increased freedom by trading MPLA activists to the authorities.

When the Portuguese renounced their African empire, MPLA hurried to take control over the north and UNITA over the south. Then followed twenty years of destructive war, while both contestants claimed the domain of the other.

All the anti-colonial movements related above united all social classes, under a never questioned leadership of the educated urban middle class. The great majority, the peasants, was seldom engaged in any autonomous function, and when this happened, as in India, Palestine and Kenya, the urban middle class was always suspicious and tried to check their independence, often with great success. For that reason, independence almost never brought any social reforms with it. The educated urban middle class simply stepped into the authoritarian colonial state and continued to run it as usual, but with themselves as beneficiaries.

Perhaps this was the reason why the colonial system was so easily dismantled once the Indian movement had liberated India.

There was however one anti-colonial struggle where the peasants were deeply involved, becoming so dominating that the colonial powers fought for thirty years not to let it succeed. This was the Vietnamese movement [50].

The peasant movement in Vietnam

Vietnam was occupied by France in the 1880s. The sparsely populated south, a settler country the Vietnamese had come to a hundred years before, was parcelled out to rubber plantations to which migrant labourers were recruited. The denser north was exploited by taxation, like native rulers had done, excepted two things: the taxes were much heavier, and the government control was much tighter. Traditionally, the Vietnamese villages had managed themselves, now there were appointed bailiffs in every village. To be able to pay, the peasants had to grow rice for export, and while their own consumption declined, Vietnam became one of the great rice exporters in the world. Those who were unable to pay lost their land which was concentrated to increasingly fewer hands.

In the first phase, the resistance was organised by the traditional upper class, but they turned out to be quite ineffective. One reason why the more traditionalist anti-colonial movement was so weak was, according to Gabriel Kolko, that most of the commercial middle class was Chinese, without links to the majority. Instead, a completely new group appeared as leaders: the “peasant students”, children to more prosperous peasants who were able to send their sons to schools according to Confucian custom to ensure them a better life. There were too many of these students however to be employed by the colonial order; without work and prospects they founded the Vietnamese communist party to combat the colonial system.

During the 30s slump, the price of rice dwindled while the taxes increased to compensate the French state. In the N gh An province, the peasants revolted and established to-

[50] Eric Wolf, *Peasant wars of the twentieth century*, and John Dunn, *Modern revolutions*, relates what happens up to 1970. Gabriel Kolko, *Vietnam, anatomy of a war*, Allen & Unwin 1986, relates what happens up to 1976.

gether with the peasant students a statelet which held on for nine months, carrying out a land reform, raising the women's status and curtailing the ceremonial costs. The peasants were in command, according to Scott, the students just contributed the communication lines [51].

The Japanese occupation in 1940 enfeebled the state control, and the communist party established a resistance stronghold in the inaccessible mountains near the Chinese border, together with the Tho people who wanted back their traditional autonomy. When the Japanese capitulated, the communist party was the only force that had any authority, and they were able to proclaim the Vietnamese republic, supported even by the puppet emperor.

The French government objected however and occupied the rice plains while the communist party had to withdraw to the forests. There it won support by reducing taxes and leases and expropriating French land and distributing it to the peasants; furthermore it was the legal government, strengthened by other anti-colonial groups into Vietminh, the Union for Vietnamese Liberation. In 1954, the French decided to clean up with a huge battle but underestimated its enemy and were themselves annihilated.

During the respite the peace accord had given the French rump army to evacuate, a general Diem took the opportunity to carve out a fief for himself in the south, with support from the French, the USA and the francophile Catholics. The Vietminh government hadn't time to act, it was itself beleaguered by a peasant revolt against bureaucratic encroachment to the villages, and Diem had time to organise a state and demand payment from the peasants for the land they had got from the Vietminh. The peasants tried to defend themselves as well as they could.

Reluctantly, the Vietminh activists had to take responsibility as representatives of the legal Vietnamese government. In 1960 they united with other groups subjected to the Diem dictatorship, primarily the Buddhists, into the FNL to organise resistance.

The backbone of the resistance was the determination of the peasants to hold on to their land and refuse to pay to the bailiffs of Diem. And the organisers were the Vietminh activists who according to Joel Migdal succeeded with an important thing: to compete with the Diem state about offering what the peasants needed to survive – trade, health care, education, law and order. A reason why the movement was able to resist the pressure from the US warfare was that FNL/Vietminh was able to offer substantial individual favours for the peasants who joined the movement [52]. And FNL had to adjust to peasant demands if they wanted to survive; the communist leadership in Hanoi tried all the time to check the redistribution demands of the peasants, but since their quest for land was the principal force in the movement these attempts were never very successful.

In the beginning, the resistance was peaceful and expressed itself in strikes, boycotts and tax refusals, but Diem's power was military and with increasing support from the USA, the conflict was increasingly violent. In the end Hanoi was forced to contribute, first with arms, later with soldiers.

[51] The Nghê An rebellion is the case study in James C. Scott, *The moral economy of the peasant*.

[52] Joel S. Migdal, *Peasants, politics and revolution*, Princeton University Press 1974.

The war strategy of Saigon and the USA – concentration camps for all peasants and conscription for all young – guaranteed that the peasants engaged in the resistance. Even the rich peasants that would have lost from the FNL land redistributions preferred FNL to concentration camps. Increasingly, the countryside identified its survival with the FNL program. Increasingly, the FNL armies were filled with people who saw no other way to survive. And the destructiveness of the US armies guaranteed that officials in the Saigon government and other basically conservative middle class people supported the movement with sabotage, intelligence and material supplies.

In 1965, the destruction policy of Saigon and the USA pushed over an overwhelming majority to the FNL side, and a power shift seemed imminent. But then the USA released a three years massive military attack, which the Vietnamese to the astonishment of the world succeeded in resisting, despite enormous costs, despite bombings that forced half the base of the movement into refugee camps. How did they do it? How did the national movement knock out the most powerful military machine in the world? How did it manage to achieve its own aim, enfeeble the power structure of the world, and empower the direct producers to release the peoples' movement resurge of 1967-75?

Probably, the most decisive fact was that while the active support for FNL diminished under the pressure, the support for the Saigon government didn't exist. Since the government consisted of corrupt officers living off American contributions, crime and plunder, nobody supported it. The worst enemy of the FNL was warweariness, but since most people tended to blame Saigon for the war, it would also favour the FNL.

The other important fact was the skilful strategy of FNL. Since USA's strategy was massive fire power without judgement, FNL saw to it that it was wasted in uninhabited forests. As early as 1967, the expenses of war had caused a budget deficit in the USA, and currency drain and receding dollar rate tended to produce opposition among the European allies since they had invested heavily in dollars.

The increasing financial troubles produced also a growing war resistance within the USA, comprising not only the black citizens' movement which revolted in the cities against social cuts, but also great parts of the upper middle class and the business community. The organised antiwar movement was created by upper middle class youth at the most prestigious universities, and was directed more against the incompetence and deceit of the government than against the war itself, see chapter 9. But this movement also catalysed a much broader movement in the system center against the consequences of the world market system. Support for the peasants of Vietnam turned into a way of resisting the system for people who had no other levers, particularly as this movement was contemporaneous with the labour movement upturn in Western Europe, see chapter 5.

Finally, the global alliance worked between the national movements of the periphery, albeit not without a hitch. Small but valuable arms deliveries from old nationalist regimes in Russia and China did a lot to close the technology gap, particularly concerning anti-aircraft defence.

The turning-point of the war was the Tet offensive in 1968, when small guerilla forces attacked almost all towns in Vietnam and in many cases succeeded in keeping them for

weeks. The aim was to force the towns to take sides. This failed – the towns preferred also henceforth to wait and see – but the consequences were decisive all the same. The Saigon machinery collapsed. And the US government was forced by a furious dollar drain and a growing home front to begin to withdraw. From Tet on, the USA was on the defensive. not only in Vietnam but globally – the failure to break the Vietnamese peasant movement made it clear that the USA was no longer the undisputed hegemon.

When the Americans left in 1975, Vietnam was laid in ruins. Not only materially, but even more so socially. Around the American bases million-cities had grown up, consisting of bombed out people who had lost their productive abilities as they had lived for years by prostitution, crime and begging. The peasant movement wasn't able to solve this problem but had to leave over responsibility to the government in Hanoi. With the peasant movement visibly exhausted, and without need for popular support when the war was won, the functionaries began a process of power concentration. But the peasant movement mobilized again; it was in the FNL core region in the Mekong delta the Vietnamese attempt at state socialism broke down and the state functionaries had to acknowledge the autonomy of the peasants [53]

The colonial system was disestablished between 1945 and 1975. The cause was partly that the hegemon of the age, USA, had participated only remotely in the system and for that reason felt locked out of it by European monopolies and supported many anti-colonial movement, particularly the more conservative ones. But principally, the cause was the efforts of the anti-colonial movements themselves. It was their strength that made them inevitable alliance partners for the rising hegemon. Thus, it was no coincidence that the self-confidence was high in the world market periphery during this time. This had several consequences [54].

First, in the collective self-assertion of the national movements turned state governments. In a meeting in Bandung in 1955 they asserted their collective political independence related to the great powers and promised to support each other against the encroachments of the center powers. This “non-aligned movement”, or “the 77 group” as it is called in a UN context, worked for some generation, albeit more hesitantly as time went on, for reasons I will come back to, but seemingly with some renaissance after 2000, see chapter 10.

Secondly, and more important, in a resurgence of the peoples' movement mobilization in the South. In the fifties and even more in the sixties, peasant and shanty-town mobilizations participated in driving back the hierarchies of the world market system to an extent that never before had been possible.

And lastly, the anti-colonial movement contributed to picking a hole in the inflated presumption of the North. The naive racism that had been nurtured by the defeats of the South between 1500 and 1900 was forever impossible. And even more. An understanding that peoples' movements in the South were a help to peoples' movements in the North was dawning in the sixties. While the labour movement of the early twentieth cen-

[53] According to Walden Bello, *Brave new third world*, Earthscan Publications 1989.

[54] According to Gérard Chaliand, *Revolution in the third world*, Harvester Press 1977.

ture was able to support “a responsible colonial policy” “in the interest of civilization” [55], much more conservative labour organisations in the seventies helped to finance the anti-colonial movements. This soul-searching had begun in a small scale by a solidarity movement in the British and American middle class for the Indian national movement as early as the 1890s [56]. The movement turned militant only in the 1950s when French young men refused to do military service in Algeria. And it was truly international thanks to the stubbornness and endurance of the Vietnamese peasants.

If the Indian national movement was the main actor that, in cooperation with the European labour movement, wore down the British hegemony, the Vietnamese movement wore down the American. So the self-assertion was legitimate. But unfortunately, these achievements were not enough for the national movements to reach their aims.

Post-colonial national movements

Liberation from the colonial system didn't create any wealth in the countries liberated by the anti-colonial movements. The world market system was guaranteed, to be sure, by colonial conquests in its inception. But subsequently, when the production chains had been laid out, not much continuous violence was needed. Countries weren't released from their peripheral role, and their inhabitants didn't grow rich, just because organised national movements became governments. There are actually some authors who contend that the anti-colonial movements were permitted to “win” because the peripheralization was so firmly set that it didn't need the protection of a colonial power [57]

Firstly, the peripheralized economies were adapted to the peripheral role. They had been conquered violently, but less violence was needed to maintain the peripheral role. The earlier colonies were specialised in labour-intensive, low-capitalized raw material extraction. They had places in the commodity chains that were controlled by others, by the center monopolies, and had to adapt to the needs of these rather than to their own national economies. To break away from the peripheral role was much more exacting than just throwing out the government representatives of a colonial power.

Secondly, the colonial states were extremely authoritarian, and offered very few levers for the majority. It turned out to be a too great temptation for the middle class in the leadership of the anti-colonial movements just to take over these states and use them to their own benefit, generally in cooperation with the governments they had just thrown out.

It is true that the new states often made more or less ambitious attempts to “develop”, i.e. advance in the system, generally by import substitution, i.e. favouring production of commodities that had earlier been imported from the center. But such development strat-

[55] From the Resolution about colonial policy, of the Second International's Congress in Stuttgart, 1907, quoted in Jan Sandegren, *Arbetarklassen och de förtryckta folken*, Oktober 1974.

[56] The solidarity expressed itself, except in material support, in an interest in Indo-European syncretic religions, popularized by the Bengal renaissance. European Theosophy of the 1890s was a direct counterpart to the European Maoism of the 1970s. For example, the organisers of the Celtic renaissance in Ireland were all Theosophists, won for anti-colonialism by Asian movements as much as by Irish.

[57] For example Michael Burawoy, *The contours of production politics*, in Charles Bergquist (ed), *Labor in the capitalist world-economy*, Sage 1984.

egies tended to be inscribed into strategies dominated by the system center. Industrialisation often consisted in production localised out from the center because of low profitability. Agricultural development often consisted in effectivizing food production to make it cheaper to buy for the north. And those who had to pay for it all were the peasants of the new nations.

So it was clear very soon that new national movements had to be built up in the independent states to protect the interests of the peripheral territories. In the global peripheries, this was expressed in different ways:

- Reforms, successful as in Japan or unsuccessful as in Turkey, engineered by the traditional ruling elites. They will be left apart in this book since it deals with social movements.
- Broad multi-class revolts against center-dependent elites, so-called populist movements. One may speak of three thrusts: the Latin American populism, the Chinese communism, and Islamism, which all tried to redefine the relations between system center and periphery.
- Attempts at breaking with the new elites by appealing to a new “nation”, i.e. separatist movements.
- Redefining of the “nation” in terms of class, in a Grundtvigian way.

Latin American populism

The failures of independence were first acknowledged in Latin America. The independence movements were led by local export capitalists, and the independent states were accordingly dominated by their export interests. Production for local needs was considered dangerous and anti-developmental, and thwarted. Instead, labour was directed to mines and plantations by means of indebtedness and expropriation. The upper class used the export profits to buy European and North American consumer goods, a pattern that would be followed by the urban middle class as soon as it got an opportunity.

Nowhere, this policy was followed more dogmatically than in Mexico, under the so-called liberal era 1854-1911, culminating in Diaz’ development despotism [58].

Labour and land were commercialized through the land law of 1861 which cancelled collective and customary ownership. The commercial holdings were thus able to subdue the peasant villages and use them for export. The resistance of the peasants had up to the mid nineteenth century been directed against forced labour and taxes. Now land theft grew more important and would be the most important of the movers of the revolution of 1910 [59].

[58] The term development despotism is from Tulio Halperin Donghi, *Historia contemporánea de América Latina*, Alianza Editorial 1969, an incredibly tight description. The term refers to the “developmentalist” ideology surrounding Diaz’ dictatorship which didn’t differ much from the authoritarian liberals of today, or for that part the Soviet Union under Stalin. It may be noted that the intellectuals that framed the ideology, the so-called científicos, were more hated by the people than the political bosses that were content with prosaic plunder.

[59] Alan Knight, *The Mexican revolution*, Cambridge University Press 1986 is a thousand pages description of the time up to 1920. Eric Wolf, *Peasant wars of the twentieth century* and John Dunn, *Modern revolutions, are summaries*. John Tutino, *From insurrection to revolution in Mexico*, Princeton University Press 1986 and Dana Markiewicz, *The Mexican revolution and the limits of agrarian reform 1915-1946*, Lynne Rienner Publishers 1993, are reasonable

Rebellions against land thefts and metropolitan power were endemic in Mexico. For the fertile parts of the land were densely populated and couldn't accommodate both peasant villages and commercial estates, and the development-despotic Diaz regime was very eager to discipline local elites. Yet, peasants and provincials were no serious threat as long as each rebelled separately. Each movement was, as peasants movements used to be, local and easily repressed.

The revolution was triggered by a democratic movement among the urban middle class. This middle class had been favoured, or even created, by the economic policy of the dictatorship, which had concentrated wealth to the towns to the expense of the countryside. But its position was precarious. The political power lay with a tiny coterie of friends of the dictator, who saw the country as a kind of personal belonging to plunder at pleasure. Faced with the customary re-election of Díaz in 1910 the politically aware middle class organised an election campaign based on a program of opposing corruption and nepotism. Of course the votes for the opposition candidate, the businessman Francisco Madero, was cancelled and himself thrown into prison, but as soon as he had escaped he called an insurrection.

Therewith, he coordinated and legitimated the divided popular movements which were now effective. For while the urban middle class preferred to wait and see, two groups responded.

Firstly, the mountain peasants of the north, serranos. They were less troubled with commercial estates than with government bailiffs. Many of them were commercial estate owners themselves. Others were peasants, donkey-drivers, miners, cattle-raisers or bandits, or all of these like the most famous of them, Pancho Villa.

The serranos responded first to the call for rebellion. They had resources – arms and horses, and they were used to a mobile life. Many of them had money too, to invest in the rebellion. They were very effective soldiers.

Secondly, village peasants in central Mexico, who for more than a generation had defended themselves against the encroachment of the commercial estates. The most militant of them were those who had current struggles going on, like the villages in Morelos against the sugar plantations or the Yaqui Indians against North American mines. They defended themselves as organised municipalities – their most legendary captain, Emiliano Zapata, was for example mayor of Anenecuilco.

While serranos' mixed society was unable to agree on anything more advanced than local autonomy, its activists displaying the most amazing careerism when they had an opportunity, the village peasants represented a social program, expressed in the Ayala plan of 1911: an egalitarian peasant society at the expense of the commercial estates. This was a goal they never budged from, neither collectively nor individually.

Their role in the rebellion was to tear down the strength of the dictatorship at the home front.

It is striking that the industrial workers didn't contribute much to the rebellion. Of

descriptions of why the peasants succeeded as much as they did. But the most fascinating and moving relation is John Womack, *Zapata and the Mexican revolution*, Vintage 1968.

course they sympathized with the opposition like most urban middle class people; politically they were a part of this middle class. The Díaz regime regarded them as such, permitting them to establish trade unions and legislating against child labour. And they also regarded themselves as such, in their contempt for the backward peasants and their identification with an Europeanized city culture.

The ruling class hurried to dispose of the dictatorship in an early phase of the rebellion, scared that it would grow to a peasant revolution, and let the dissatisfied middle class in. But the plan miscarried; the middle class was content to let the countryside down, but *serranos* and village peasants went on with their revolution and strengthened their positions. After a couple of years the military mutinied and reintroduced the dictatorship at an even narrower basis than before to get free hands to repress them.

This time, the middle class politicians had to make a serious alliance with the peasants. Madero's compromising with the Díaz high society had turned out to be suicidal. Of course the middle class politicians wouldn't think of abandoning their dominance, and were fully prepared to secure it violently if needed. But it was forced to bargain, accepting the peasants as a partner. The Ayala plan was a part of the new constitution, jointly adopted by both as a basis for the post-revolutionary Mexico, and the peasants got the titles of the land they had taken during the revolution. And *serranos* got their local autonomy. It is no coincidence that Mexican governments have to bargain with the Chiapas rebellion while their Guatemalan neighbours would have bombed it; they are forced to, because of the relative strengths established by the revolution, primarily by the peasants of Morelos, see chapter 7.

The Mexican revolution was democratic, not particularly nationalist. Knight insists that the popular revolutionaries exclusively expropriated the Mexican upper classes and left foreign investments alone. But in the geographically layered world of the world market system, a regional movement has no choice. The new government had to organise nationalistically to realize any program. In the thirties it found itself following the Russian example, nationalizing oil and build up a national industry based in national planning and import substitution.

This model was also popular in other Latin American countries, particularly when the export markets in Europe and the USA collapsed in 1929. The urban middle class took the opportunity to challenge the export bourgeoisie with a policy that has been called Latin American populism: appeals to the urban workers and paternalist support to their weak unions, nationally controlled industrialization based in import substitution, and intense nationalism. This was a policy introduced in Mexico, but which in other countries lacked the ingredient that made it viable: a strong, independent peasant movement.

For that reason, the middle class finally had to compromise with the export bourgeoisie and give up their populism, after decades of sometimes heroic attempts. The compromise looked a little differently in different countries. In Argentina the labour movement took the initiative and frightened the middle class back into the arms of the meat exporters, who after a protracted and extremely destructive struggle with the workers were able to dismantle the industry where the workers were based. In Chile and Peru the populist forces were even brittle and their promises to everybody destroyed the economy when

they were about to be met, after which the middle class gave up. In Venezuela, the populist middle class was converted into an export bourgeoisie itself, with oil as a speciality. Only in Brazil, the middle class was big enough to keep its self-confidence through all regime shifts and keep its aim, national self-assertion. Perhaps because they had never promised any integration of the direct producers and didn't have to rely on them.

The populists used the traditional ways of controlling the state – military coups, intrigues and elections. They shunned popular initiatives like the plague. In some cases, except Argentina, they were nevertheless dependent of such.

One was Bolivia. Activists from La Paz' little middle class had succeeded in using the defeat of the traditional rulers in the Chaco war in the thirties to gain access to power. When the traditional elite tried to revenge themselves, the miners saved the middle-class based government by three days of street fighting in 1953 [60].

The government tried to create a counterpoise to the miners, whom they feared a lot, by founding peasant organisations with themselves as leaders. But when the world market price of tin dropped, the towns couldn't afford to buy the peasants' crops so they consumed it themselves. At that point the urban middle class deserted populism and supported world market terror regimes instead.

The other case was Cuba [61].

Cuba is an untypical country in Latin America. The colonial rule continued to 1898 when a protracted liberation war resulted in North American occupation. US owned business took over the earlier Spanish estates, so the domestic export bourgeoisie remained weak. Middle class activists were glad to play middleman between the occupiers and the people in good times when there was plenty of money paid for sugar. In slump times they rather played the part as defenders of the fatherland and founded populist reform movements. Such a movement, dominated by students, overthrew a dictator in the thirties and launched an era of reforms that lasted until next boom. It never challenged the US supremacy however.

When the sugar prices began to decline in 1956, students took initiative again. They were hit by unemployment and were outsiders in the corruption system developed by the old populist leaders since the thirties, which tied key people from every sector to the regime. Outsiders were also the land workers and smallholders, and for the first time an alliance was developed between them and the populist middle class. For the first time, the populists were forced to take serious the land workers demand for land – the first to join Castro's guerrilla movements were the semi-illegal squatter society in the mountains. For the first time, the direct producers had a direct influence on the Cuban politics.

What gave the countryside movement hegemony within the opposition was paradoxically the traditional neglect of the government. The government didn't care about what

[60] James Dunnkerley, *Rebellions in the veins*, Verso 1962 focus on the miners. Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, *Oppressed but not defeated – Peasant struggles among the Aymara and the Qhechwa in Bolivia 1900-1980*, UNRISD 1987, focuses on the peasants.

[61] Eric Wolf, *Peasant wars of the twentieth century*, John Dunn, *Modern revolutions*, and Leslie Bethell (ed), *Cuba, a short history*, Cambridge University Press 1993. The post-revolutionary Cuba is poorly studied but Frank J. Fitzgerald, *The Cuban revolution in crisis*, Monthly Review Press 1994, seems to make the best of it.

happened there. But it thoroughly terrorized all urban opposition and forced oppositional people to escape to the countryside guerrilla. When the regime finally had to send an army against it in the summer 1958, the urban-bred soldiers didn't want to fight in the unfamiliar terrain and the government collapsed.

The new government was at first dominated by populist middle class politicians. But the participation of land workers and smallholders made a land reform necessary, and the US interests must necessarily pay for it. And the countryside people's control over the sugar plantations gave them control over Cuba. But control over Cuba was not enough to get out of the periphery role.

During the sixties the Cuban revolution was a source of inspiration for populist middle class youth over all Latin America. But the inspiration was not that a change of society is possible only through a majority alliance on the majority's condition; what was copied was the armed insurrection which the middle class youth hoped to carry through on behalf of the majority. This paternalist condescension continued to characterize the Latin American populism and made the activist easy victims when the populist middle class was called back to order [62]. Only in Central America, where the export bourgeoisie kept the middle class out of influence very long, the Cuban armed strategy had some temporary success.

Chinese communism

The most successful national movement according to populist principles during the twentieth century took place in China [63]. The Chinese central power had lost control over the country in connection with the late nineteenth century peasant rebellions, and local strongmen had established small statelets for themselves, see chapter 4. For that reason it was easy for the colonial powers to establish their own bases with extra-legal administrations and take control over raw materials and labour. In early twentieth century, American, European and Japanese businesses ruled over Chinese taxation, customs, telegraph, railways and the Great Canal.

In China, people from two circles reacted. Reformers within the Chinese administration concluded that China needed reform after European models; their attempts failed because of deficient resources and suspicions from the regime against everything new. And peasants rebelled against taxmen and European railway builders, merchants and religious colporteurs, but their rebellions were uncoordinated.

But there were nevertheless some attempts at coordination. A secret society [64], Justice and Harmony or Yihequan, got government approval for a rebellion in Shantung in 1899, but European armies put them down and took the opportunity to sack the Chinese

[62] About the Castro epigons, see Régis Debray, *A critique of arms*, Penguin 1977.

[63] I follow Jean Chesneaux, *Peasant revolts in China 1840-1949*, Thames and Hudson 1973; and Jean Chesneaux, Françoise Le Barbier & Marie-Claire Bergère, *China from the 1911 revolution to liberation*, Harvester Press 1977. Jack Gray, *Rebellions and revolutions – China from the 1800s to the 1960s*, Oxford University Press 1990, is a traditional history. Eric Wolf, *Peasant wars*, and John Dunn, *Modern revolutions*, have also a lot to say, as has Joel Migdal, *Peasant politics and revolution*.

[64] The Chinese secret societies are described in chapter 3, and in Jean Chesneaux (ed), *Popular movements and secret societies in China 1840-1950*. Stanford University Press 1972

state and claim reparations.

This broke the government completely. The peasant rebellions grew and became more frequent. In the power vacuum a small group of intellectuals with European education and support from the Shanghai merchants saw an opportunity; they took contacts with rebellious peasants and secret societies and with this alliance they proclaimed the republic in 1911. The imperial court gave up without resistance, but it was more difficult than that for the republicans to establish new order.

For the alliance with the peasants proved to be only formal. It was impossible to agree on any program – the urban middle class intellectuals who led the republic had a rather confused idea of peasant needs and were primarily interested in their own modernization project, among other things based in commercialization of food. The peasants, who weren't interested in this supported their own secret societies instead, and in this conflict, the local strongmen, the so-called warlords, got the best of it. The republicans capitulated and left over power to the strongest of these, Yuan Shikai.

Meanwhile, the colonial powers strengthened their hold, and lawlessness grew and made peasant landless and exploiters rich.

What created an opportunity for political action was the peace congress in Paris in 1919. While it recognized the right to independence for all nations, it also recognized the right for Japan to colonize China. The students of Beijing University reacted against this hypocrisy. They organised a demonstration in May 4, 1919, against the most pro-Japanese ministers, burnt the home of one and gave the other a beating. Out of it a movement grew. Merchants organised boycotts against Japanese commodities and subscriptions for Chinese production, workers in Japanese industries went out to strike, and the demonstrations spread to all China. After some failed attempts to repress the movement, the government gave in, refused to sign the Versailles agreement, but settled with the Japanese in secret.

The May 4 movement didn't reach its aims, but it changed the political climate. Youth and women had been the leaders, which shattered the Confucian order built on the authority of old men. A new spirit took hold among the students, built on independence, enterprise, practicism and science, and a host of groups were founded to live the new ideals. And despite the catchword of the movement – save the country – a cosmopolitan curiosity for new ideas also flourished [65].

From this movement, three parties originated, which would have a great influence on the continued development of the Chinese revolution.

The first was the labour movement, primarily in Shanghai. It had begun as a support movement for the boycotts of the merchants, but after a few years it didn't mind making claims on Chinese capitalists. But its most important target was still the foreign businesses. This is treated more fully in chapter 5.

The second was the students who established the Chinese communist party. They tried, in accordance with communist tradition, cooperation with the labour movement

[65] The way this movement initiated the most explosive womens' movement of the twentieth century is shown in chapter 8.

and contributed to organising trade unions. It was a tiny group, but the only one interested in contacts outside the traditional Chinese elite. It had also a valuable ally in the Russian government which had made itself popular by relinquishing old claims of concessions.

The third was the merchant society of Shanghai. They had profited from the war and developed an export of Chinese textiles and even mining and steel. They also profited on the impoverishment of Chinese peasants by exporting food. But the favours given to Japanese and European business damaged them severely. They grew increasingly impatient with the unserious regime of the warlords. Their participation in the May 4 movement had been a first step, it was followed up by a republican project to which they invited the other participants.

This project was set up in Guangzhou, far from Beijing and impossible to harass from there. After having cleaned the region from local warlords a counterregime was set up, supported by three assets: money from the Shanghai merchants, the popular appeal of the communists, and Russian organisational principles.

Primarily, it was the educated middle class that took part in organisational work. A certain antagonism could early be seen in the movement. The majority had a background in the coast cities, they gathered in the nationalist party. A minority came from the countryside; they made up the communist party. But during a few years they were able to cooperate smoothly; the communists organised trade unions and peasant associations and saw to it that they turned against foreigners, while the nationalists organised cooperation with the financial world. Together they organised the army they would use against the warlords.

The trade unions strove in 1925, against Hongkong and British interests. It went on for a year; unfortunately it also hit against Chinese merchants, and the workers tired after a while, and the alliance was close to a break. To prevent a total conflict, both parties backed military conquest instead. In 1926 they sent the northern Expedition towards the Yangtse valley, an army of 100.000 dedicated anti-imperialists. The expedition had been prepared locally by communists organising peasant associations. When the army appeared, the associations spread with lightning speed; the peasant rebelled, chased away local oppressors and took over the local power.

In the peasant associations, all were members, not only a minority as in the secret societies. They had an army of their own. They abolished unequal relations like clans and oppression of women, they introduced puritan laws to defend their small resources, they started schools with peasant oriented courses. They did not expropriate land because they didn't want to offend the conservative nationalists, but they reduced leases and interests. When they had gained impetus, they didn't need professional activists.

The labour movement had also prepared for the liberation. In Shanghai, where it was strongest, the labour movement rose and conquered the town several days before the army arrived.

The strength of the peasant and labour movements frightened the bourgeoisie that carried the nationalist party. When the army controlled the Yangtse valley there was no need to maintain the alliance. The achievement of the Shanghai trade unions convinced

them to take action. Supported by captives from the warlord armies and mobsters from the Shanghai underworld they broke first the labour movement, then the peasants' associations.

But in the inaccessible fringes of the provinces, the peasant movement was not so easy to break. Peasant activists and communist trade union organisers together with deserters from the abused Northern Expedition survived there and succeeded to keep away the nationalist party for seven years. In eleven enclaves with in all ten million people, peasant movement and communists organised the administration while the army deserters, bandits and communists looked after the defence. And this double role gave hegemony to the communists.

This practical organising was a completely new thing, compared to the traditional secret societies.

Politics in the liberated districts built on the peasant associations, but was more radical. The peasants didn't need to appease nationalists, so they didn't mind expropriating the landlords and share the land between them. The communists tried to counter the radicalism of the peasants not to make more enemies than necessary; perhaps their being sons of wealthy peasants also contributed to this. Since they had to do without much contact with the surrounding world they founded industries, which except providing the peasants with industrial products were used for building such contacts, on the terms of the liberated districts.

The success of the communists was based in the fact that they could provide a service that wasn't provided by anyone else. They provided a market and industrial goods, they provided health care, roads, defence against warlords, and not least career paths for ambitious peasant youths. They were able to provide real benefits for each peasant that took part in the movement.

However, the nationalist army succeeded after six failures to repress all these enclaves save one in 1934, and forced the participants to flee to the survivor. This escape has become legendary; under the name The Long March a 4.500 km retreat was carried through, with constant fighting, and constant opportunities of propaganda and recruitment, until it reached the last enclave far away in the northwest.

One cause of the failure, according to Chesneaux, was that the communist party never used its whole strength on these enclaves, but used the enclaves as resources for risings in the cities that failed one after another. Behind the choice lay a developmentalist belief that the cities belonged to the future; it was also nurtured by the trade union successes of the twenties. Only during the retreat, Mao Zedong and his more practical peasant organisers succeeded in wringing the party from the hands of trade union functionaries and intellectuals, and commit it entirely to the countryside.

When the Japanese attacked China in 1937 and occupied the coastal area, the nationalists chose to lie low – probably because merchants don't like to risk their property. But doing so, they threw away their capital of confidence as nationalists; the least you can expect from such people is that they should defend their country against foreign occupation. The communists didn't do that mistake. They declared war on the Japanese and won the allegiance of many conservative nationalists. From the perspective of the

peasants, resistance to the Japanese was rational also; the tactics of destruction practiced by the Japanese hurt the peasants more than any.

In 1947, the communists were politically the strongest. They had been the only organising power in the regions occupied by the Japanese. Their well-managed realms contrasted starkly with the corruption of the nationalists. The nationalists didn't see this but declared war to the communists and lost. In 1947-1949 the communist armies swept over all China.

The swift victory changed the relation of strength between peasants and party functionaries. Between the Long March and the victory they had together built up a society in the northwest. But the rest of the country was conquered with military means. While the communists in the northwest had been forced to share power with the peasants, they were now able to establish themselves as a bureaucratic hierarchy to be obeyed. This aim was achieved by establishing client networks of privilege, like the political bosses of the American cities in the late nineteenth century; some were allowed to participate in the gains while others were not; the latter had, in consequence with the formal democratic constitution, to be disgraced and blackened to provide a motivation for the exclusion.

This contrast between the democratic northwest and the autocratic center was early acknowledged as a problem; it was this contrast the many Maoist campaigns were supposed to mediate in. The Great Leap as well as the campaign of The Hundred Flowers were supposed to assert the position of the peasants against the functionaries – but the weakness of Maoism, never to allow the peasants or anybody else to organise autonomously, made failures of all these campaigns.

The Culture Revolution was released by Mao's attempt to stop police violence against critics and raise the status of the majority against the bureaucrats. Encouraged by this support, all out-groups in the Chinese society tried to assert themselves against past injustices. Poor peasants tried to assert the collective integrity of the villages against state functionaries and more prosperous peasants who had begun to use the market to part from the village solidarity, while the peasant collective as a whole tried to get control over the cooperatives and municipalities to run them after their own interest instead of the interest of the state. Contract workers without social rights tried to assert themselves against life employed workers in the national industry. And, particularly, those who had been persecuted and disgraced by the local party bosses tried to break these paternalistic networks. They contributed with most of the violence in the Culture Revolution. The contemporaneous revolt of all these categories shattered all China. But without all organisational traditions they soon lost out to the functionaries [66].

In the perspective of national economic development, however, they were effective. Without the great leap forward 1958-60, with its emphasizing of small local industrial

[66] Jack Gray, *Rebellions and revolutions*, and William A. Joseph et al (ed), *New perspectives on the cultural revolution*, Harvard Contemporary China Series 1991. It is striking that western liberals support communist party bosses as a matter of fact against their victims. But it is self-evident that a liberal científico always support "Development" against poor peasants and contractual workers. And then it doesn't matter who is the agent of "Development".

[66a]. Yi Wen: *The making of an economic superpower*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis & Tsinghua University 2015.

enterprises there had been no economic wonder in China [66a].

The peasant revolution in China is seemingly of limited value for the peasants. Fifty years after, the party functionaries is a ruling class with scant interest for the conditions of the direct producers. But it was an unqualified success from a national viewpoint. Of all peripheral countries, China has shown least sensitivity to the demands of the world market system, while it has had the greatest economic growth, i.e. the fastest advance towards the center. From 1950, China has advanced from a position near the bottom-line to the global average, and this development has also favoured the peasants [67]. This may partly be a consequence of the fact that China never was a colony and for that reason never had its economy so thoroughly subordinated to the needs of the system center. But it is also possible that it is a consequence of the huge mobilisation of majorities.

The peasant revolution in China also informed the conditions of strengths in the neighbouring countries. In Japan, the fresh labour movement was able, with not much effort, to raise its salaries to the highest levels in the world. In South Korea and Taiwan the rulers were scared into a land reform that was the most radical in the world, next to Chinas's, while they without tangible threats begun a national industrial development based in import substitution, protection against businesses of the system center, and even aggressive marketing of industrial products in the system center. A serious populism, if you like, that went further than in Latin America because the threat of popular mobilization was greater [68].

Islamist populism

Populist mobilizations are also a characteristic of the third great peripheral region that was not colonised in the early twentieth century, West Asia. There, the Ottoman empire tried to strengthen its control by building a centralised state from 1820 on, to assert itself against European assaults. This implied emergence of center-periphery relations, against which two categories in particular tried to protect themselves from [69].

One was the numerous religious minorities in the area – Armenians, Maronites, Greek Christians etc – which wouldn't have great opportunities in a Turkish Sunnite power

[66a] 66a. Yi Wen: The making of an economic superpower, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis & Tsinghua University 2015.

[67] The figures according to Angus Maddison, Monitoring the world economy 1820-1992, OECD 1993. According to Yi Wen: The making of an economic superpower, Federal reserve bank of Saint Louis & Tsinghua University, 2015, the Chinese phenomenal growth isn't a flash in the pan either. but as firmly rooted as USA's growth process in the 19th century and Britain's in the 18th.

[68] Walden Bello & Stephanie Rosenfeld, Dragons in distress – Asian miracle economies in crisis, institute for Food and Development Policy 1993. – Usually South Korea's and Taiwan's export oriented industrialization is seen as the opposite to import substitution. But it was the great theorist of import substitution, Raúl Prebisch, who as early as 1961 suggested that the new national industries should be stimulated to aggressive marketing abroad to rise the volume and reduce costs. The concept of opposites is probably an effect of the opposite results on power relations. Import substitution calls for high purchase power domestically, including high wages for the workers, which is favourable for trade unions; export oriented industry calls for low wages to make the prices competitive, and thus repression of trade unions.

[69] M.E. Yapp, The making of the modern Near East, Longman 1989, and The Near East since the First World War, Longman 1994, and Gabriel Baer, Fella and townsman in the Middle East, Frank Cass 1982.

milieu. They tried to protect themselves in two ways. The first was to appeal to the system center states, England and France, to support their local autonomy. This was the method of the Maronites in Lebanon; they tried with some success get a French support for an independent Lebanon they could control. The other was to invent an Arab identity that could be set off the Turkish state. Copts in Egypt and Christians in Syria were the inventors of Arab nationalism.

The other was the tribal societies in the peripheries of the empire, primarily the present Saudi Arabia. Their society differed too much from the urbanised Turkish bureaucracy to be assimilated.

These two groups were helpful tools when the system center powers divided the Ottoman empire after the first world war.

But it was in Egypt and Iran popular national movements first were founded. This was because the system center powers first tried to encroach upon the region in these countries.

In Egypt a local regime in the early nineteenth century had tried to create a competing center within the Ottoman empire, built on commercial cotton production. This attempt stumbled economically in the 1870s and the European creditors took control. It was the resistance to that control, or more particularly, resistance to a cut in the state budget, that provoked the first popular national movement in 1881.

It began as a military revolt against reduced salaries, but it soon spread to the peasants, attacking the taxmen and other state officials. In the towns, the educated middle class began to express their views in newspapers and lecturers' desks. Some of the were influenced by European models and demanded parliamentary reforms. Others rather expressed themselves in terms of justice and would with time develop the Islamist tradition. Together, they had no difficulty in mobilize the street and carry through the wanted parliamentary reforms.

In spite of an ever-tightening European grip over ownership and economy, the political public developed by this movement survived. In it, there were alternating appeals to the Arab or Egyptian nation or the Islamic solidarity, and a popular rising succeeded in throwing out the British occupation troops in 1919.

The tradition that would finally be called Islamism was born among people, primarily intellectuals, who had taken part in these movements and the contemporaneous ones in Iran, see below. They gave themselves the task to answer the European challenge in a way emanating from the local cultural tradition, by using an Islamic language and by link up with Islam as a utopia [70].

This discussion, called salafiya, was developed to a political practice during the continued struggles against the British rule in Egypt during the twenties and thirties.

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB), where this development took place, was according to themselves "a political, cultural and economic organisation with a social idea". It organ-

[70] Some books with basic facts about Islamism are François Burgat & William Dowell, *The Islamic movement in North Africa*, University of Texas 1993, Olivier Roy, *Islam and resistance in Afghanistan*, Cambridge Middle East Library 1990, and Olivier Roy, *The failure of political Islam*, Harvard University Press 1994. The last one is very critical. A short history is Jamil Abun-Nasr, *Militant Islam, a historical perspective*, in Ernest Gellner (ed), *Islamic dilemmas: reformers, nationalists and industrialisation*, Mouton 1985.

ised for example scouting, healthcare stations and schools where Islam education was mixed with science. The most grandiose attempt was one to rise an Egyptian economy based in self-reliance, in opposition to foreign businesses, and linked to trade unions and strikes [71].

A secret mujahedin movement was also organised for armed struggle against the British rule. Their conspiratorial methods soon became problematic for the Brotherhood.

MB organised townsmen, who had been involved in the commercialized life without having any of its benefits. Typically enough, MB was formed in the Canal Zone, the most modernized part of Egypt, while the contemporaneous Qassamite movement in Palestine was organised in the harbour of Jaffa. It resembles the Swedish non-conformist churches in the nineteenth century, which caught on in the most modernist environments at that time, the new industrial boroughs growing up at the railway junctions. Ideologically they were also similar; popular mobilizations against a hierarchical society, against growing class differentiation, against a traditional clergy that didn't answer to people's needs, and using a traditional language because it was popular and had a broad appeal. The focus was justice. Meanwhile, they used European mobilization methods like the government power strategy and the political party [72].

The first conflicts concerned resistance to European mission. But MB was soon involved in the national movement against British influence, through economic and personal support for the Palestinian revolt 1936-39.

The conflict was carried to its extremes during the second world war, with its inflation and scarcity. MB soon provided a leadership, in competition with the communist-dominated trade unions.

The peace exacerbated the economic plight because the war industry lay off hundreds of thousands. Communists and Islamists competed about organising strikes and demonstrations against economic mismanagement and against the British alliance, and it was the boycott organised by the Brotherhood that made the government break it.

When the Palestine war broke out in 1947, the MB canalised the economic and personal support for the Palestinians. But the militarisation of the conflict was disastrous. The conspirative mujahedin began a war of their own against Egypt politicians they considered untrustworthy, which was a reason for the government to put down the movement. Its inspirator Hasan al-Banna was murdered, and its moral backbone was broken. When the movement was built up anew, its activists sought respectability to any price and shunned all that could be seen as socially hot. The political initiative slipped over to the Arab nationalists in the army.

The military Arab nationalism would dominate West Asian politics during the fifties and sixties, with its paternalist land reforms and its profiting support to the Palestinian cause. What would bring forth Islamism again and lift it to a global level was the IMF revolts and the Iranian revolution [73].

[71] Richard Mitchell, *The society of the Muslim Brotherhood*, Oxford University Press 1969.

[72] Or, to use an expression from one of the most popular ideologists of the Iranian revolution, Ali Shari'ati: Muhammed founded a classless democratic society, and not any fucking religion.

[73] Nikki R. Keddie, *Roots of revolution – an interpretative history of Iran*, Yale University Press 1981; Ervand Abra-

IMF riots are modern “bread seizures”, poor people rebellions when the International Monetary Fund has ordered states to cut their social expenditure, see chapter 9. Such rebellions have been numerous since the mid-seventies, particularly in Latin America, Africa and West Asia, those regions which have suffered most from the post 1973 slump. IMF riots are usually unorganised, but in West Asia and North Africa, an organising according to Islamist models has occurred afterwards, trying to bring some order into the civil society which the heavy-handed IMF economists have worked havoc in, with their claims of interest. And in a few instances – Algeria, Palestine – such organising has got political consequences.

The Iranian regime, which was traditionally more of a loose federation of clans, was a rather easy prey of British and Russian interests in the nineteenth century. The Russians were primarily interested of territorial expansion, while the British preferred economic and bartered money for privileges – sole rights of railways, mines, telegraph and the national bank, except exemption of duty, aimed at opening Iran for British goods.

Iranian popular movements were more successful than the Chinese to defend themselves. The urban middle class was particularly active in the resistance. Within it, there were two categories. One European-educated, which aimed at modernizing and saw national independence as a precondition. And one traditional, consisting of the crafts and the bazaar, which saw itself threatened by European goods, and their traditional ally, the ‘ulamate, which was more well-organized in Iran than elsewhere [74].

During the campaigns against British concessions, these two groups found each other in a lasting religious-radical-nationalist alliance in 1891. They initiated together a very successful boycott against an intended British tobacco monopoly, and organised demonstrations that only grew when they were fired at by the army. The province towns, peasant movements and clans joined the movement in 1905 and the government fell; a constitutional republic was proclaimed and the ‘ulamate filled the constitution with Islamist content as a first attempt at practising salafiyah. But before the republic had time to undertake economic legislation, the first world war broke out and the British occupied the country; they had discovered oil. With the proceeds from the oil they financed a military government to make a very profitable agreement with; to revoke this agreement was to be the focus for all subsequent national movements.

The first opportunity was the aftermath of the second world war, when anti-colonial movements flourished all over the world. But this opportunity was thwarted by the USA and the military government in agreement; instead the government began a huge modernization program to buy off the modernist middle class and annihilate the traditional one. However, a result of this was that all industry was appropriated by the ruling family and that great parts of the peasantry were cleared off into the slum of the cities.

What brought the religious-radical-national alliance into action again was however the increasingly extremist policy of the government. As long as only active opposition is

hamian, Iran between two revolutions, Princeton University Press 1982; John Walton & David Seddon, Free markets & food riots, Blackwell 1994.

[74] See chapter 3. The ‘ulamate is organised as a corps in Iran.

persecuted, people can live in peace if they lie low. But in 1975 the regime introduced an official state ideology with the dictator as “spiritual leader” and began to assault all who didn’t hail the government servile enough. The opportunity came when in 1978 the USA introduced its campaign for human rights and would presumably not support too drastic repression in Iran, while at the same time the government had to cut the welfare budget because of the slump (without orders from the IMF in this case).

There were two phases of the Iranian revolution. In the spring 1978, the traditional alliance of modernist middle class and bazaar shook the government with its mass demonstrations and attacks on government buildings, banks, luxury hotels and other symbols of privilege and Americanized culture. They succeeded in using a language understandable by all, the Shi’ite tradition, as a sharp contrast to the regime. The government succeeded in appeasing the middle class by reforms, but these reforms entailed cuts for the poor, and in the autumn workers and slum dwellers toppled the government. The final straw was the oil worker strike and the slum-dwellers’ attack at the army.

The amplifying of the alliance beyond the traditional base was made possible by a common program, which could be supported by the shantytowns as well as the middle class. The program millions of people marched and strove for was a social-radical one – popular spokesmen like Khomeini, Taleqani, Shari’ati and the mullahs of the shantytowns scorched the waste of the court and the army, the eviction of peasants, the corruption, the high rents and the absence of social integration. They emphasized justice and the needs of the unpropertied masses. They appealed to Islamic prohibition of interest, which resonated in the aftermath of debt crisis. This was not a program that the middle class movement was happy with, but on the other side they had to get support from the majority to achieve its own ends, a better distribution of the wealth and some national control of the economy.

They turned out to calculate right. Twentyfive years after the revolution it isn’t Khomeini’s politics of compromise between middle class and the poor that dominates the Islamic republic. The incomes are somewhat more evenly distributed but are still more uneven than in other West Asian countries. The hegemony of the middle class was guaranteed by the monopoly of organisation by their political branch, the ‘ulamate.

Islamist movements of different description have made some successes in several other countries, without having the Iranian advantages of a well-organised ‘ulamate.

In Lebanon, a Shi’ite movement with a base among the poorest Beiruters, Amal, succeeded in ending the civil war in the eighties. Amal was theoretically a non-factional movement aiming at organising the civil society among the poor, for example savings-banks, vocational schools and healthcare clinics, but its attempts to amplify its base into Sunnite and Christian factions met with scant success. However, it was an Amal-led mutiny in the Christian-dominated army that initiated a de-escalating process in the war-torn country and established some other elements than factional struggles into the polity [75].

In Algeria it was also Islamist organising of the civil society that gave them influence.

[75] Juan R.I. Cole & Nikki R. Keddie (ed), Shi’ism and social protest, Yale University Press 1986.

The Algerian upper class has never cared about things like that; for them, oil export to the EU is the primary concern. But in Algeria the cultural resistance is an integral part; the Algerian upper class is francophone despite the fact that the liberation struggle in the fifties was fought under Muslim banners. For that reason, asserting Muslim values has become a matter of national and lower class solidarity, which would have given FIS government power if a military coup had not prevented it [76].

The same factors lie behind Islamist successes in Egypt and Turkey, where IMF riots initiated the movements in the 70s, and in Palestine.

Since the eighties, however, the Islamist appeal to justice has faded somewhat. Conservative governments have done their best to coopt the movements, frightened by the Iranian revolution; oil money from Saudi and the Gulf States have flooded once-Islamist movements and redirected their focus to old-fashioned, often patriarchal morals. Roy has named the result “neo-fundamentalism” instead of Islamism [77]. But the inclination towards false solidarities is always present in over-ideologized movements; when the core is “truth” the pragmatic action for real interests slip away from focus and is replaced by a discourse about moral, virtue and perfect people. So has Palestinian Hamas leaders for example refused to discuss suicide bombings in terms of practical utility for the development of a successful strategy for Palestinian liberation; for them it’s enough that if the Israelis kill children, they have right to do it too.

Peoples’ movements in the peripheries of the peripheries

Another type of second generation national movement in the global periphery is the one turning against the regional center, the capital, to assert the interests in the marginalized regional periphery.

The new states, which the national movements had to take responsibility for, were faced with the demand for adopting to the interstate system. They had, in a short time, to build a strong and homogeneous state apparatus, and also to implement what they had argued for during their phase of mobilization, “development” or advancement in the world market hierarchy.

This called for resources. And since the anti-colonial movements had mobilized people from the core regions, and were even more dominated by people from the core regions, they tended to discriminate against the peripheries. Economically, in terms of payment for the new state and for the development policy; politically, in terms of the recruitments to the state posts; and culturally, in terms of the norms and codes that were valid in the new states [78].

The peripheries of the system periphery states were for that reason posed in a situation very similar to the one of the European provinces during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and reacted in a similar way, see chapter 4. Peasants and traditional

[76] François Burgat & William Dowell, *The Islamist movement in North Africa*.

[77] Olivier Roy, *The failure of political Islam*

[78] Ralph Premdas et al (ed), *Secessionist movements in comparative perspective*, Pinter Publishers 1990. Stein Rokkan & Derek Urwin, *Economy, territory, identity*, is also topical as is Anthony D. Smith, *State and nation in the Third World*.

elites joined in tax rebellions against the new independent states. In Ghana, the clans organised such rebellions in the fifties [79]. In Kurdistan they were organised, according to old patterns, by sufi orders; the legendary Kurd leader Mustafa Barzani was a sufi sheik until he organised modern parties to appeal to the educated urban middle class [80]. Moros in Mindanao were organised by the traditional aristocracy before the urban youth took over in the seventies [81]. The ability of traditional elites to lead their societies was conditioned by the fact that such peripheries were not even peripheries for the colonial empires but were rather left alone – and if the empires had intervened it was to the benefit of the traditional elites, to have peace in their rear. They were not peripheries until the post-colonial states brought them into the world market system.

Burma, for example, had been divided by the British into a centrally administered, densely populated, rice exporting plain, and an inaccessible mountain fringe left to rule itself after old fashions. The independence movement that appeared during the twenties and thirties was recruited, quite naturally, from the plain, while the British recruited the policemen for repressing them from the mountains. Thus a reciprocal distrust was built up, which was triggered when the British left in 1948. Apart from the fact that the mountain regions were not more pleased by being ruled from Rangoon than from London, the new nationalist government lived up to the suspicions of the mountain people and refused to acknowledge any representatives for them than the ones they coopted from the center [82].

Accordingly, armed resistance broke out in the peripheries, beginning in 1948 with the Karen and the Mon in the southeast and the Kachin in the north. Some of the movements subscribed to a communist identity, but most were content with keeping the bailiffs at a distance. Some were nationalist and aimed at creating a state of their own, like the Karen; other just comprised some villages in a valley like the innumerable rebellions among the Shan in the east. They were all able to achieve a real independence, if not a formal one, and together they blocked the construction of a Burmese state. In the eighties, 40 percent of the national income went to fighting the rebellions while 40 percent of the trade was controlled by mountain people controlled smuggling, while the rest was controlled by an increasingly corrupt military caste.

Another variety is the Tamil movement in Sri Lanka. The Tamils were relatively favoured by the British because they were a minority to set off against the Singhalese majority. For that reason they were more numerous in the civil service than reasonable, though the Singhalese which began to discriminate against them in the seventies [83]. This created an anti-singhalese mobilization among the Tamil youth who were locked out from education, and the mobilization got a mass base when Singhalese peasants

[79] Endre Sik, *The history of black Africa*.

[80] Gérard Chaliand, *Le malheur kurde*, Seuil 1992; Nader Entesar, *Kurdish nationalism*, Lynne Rienner 1992.

[81] Samuel Tan, *The Moro secessionist movement in the Philippines*, in Ralph Premdas et al (ed), *Secessionist movements in comparative perspective*.

[82] Martin Smith, *Burma, Insurgency and the politics of ethnicity*, Zed 1991; David Brown, *The state and ethnical politics in southeast Asia*, Routledge 1994.

[83] S.W.R. Samarasinghe, *The dynamics of separation, the case of Sri Lanka*, in Ralph Premdas et al (ed), *Secessionist movements in comparative perspective*.

migrated into traditionally Tamil lands in connection with various “green revolution” agricultural projects.

Sometimes, regions may use political and cultural power to offset economic dominance, like when the populous states of the Ganges plain want to promote their Hindi language, to counter the economic dominance of Mahrati-speaking Bombay. Which creates a violent protest wave among the educated middle class in Tamil Nadu in the south [84].

National movements in the peripheries’ peripheries succeed very rarely. The interstate system simply can’t afford them to succeed. The first and for a long time only successful separatist movement in the South was the Bengal movement in the seventies.

At the Indian independence, the Muslim peasants in East Bengal supported the Muslim League to get rid of the Hindu landowners. But Muslim League consisted of upper class politicians from Punjab, and the Bengal peasants had no leverage on it. So the Pakistan state was organised by and for Punjabians, a state of things that got even more marked with time [85].

A result of this was that Bengal export incomes were spent in the Punjab, another that the Pakistan state declared that Urdu, a language nobody in Bengal understood, should be the only official language.

When the local upper class disappeared, a rather numerous layer of wealthy peasants had risen to prominence in the Bengal. They, and their educated children, created the Awami League which successively began to demand independence from the West. The triggering event was the military coup in 1969, which centralised the power still more. But despite the very wide support, it would according to most students have been impossible for Bengal to secede hadn’t India supported it with military means.

“Grundtvigian” national movements in the system peripheries

So far, it appears that national movements are nothing but a playground for the urban middle class, particularly the educated urban middle class. But after the failure of the populist movements in Latin America, it seems that a re-definition is under way. The Indian movements are beginning, like the Norwegian peasants in the nineteenth century, to define “the nation” as “the peasants”, and demand equality with the Creole middle class of the cities [86].

The Indian movements were born from the peasant movements that tried to manage the land reforms of the populist governments. Such reforms were acted out in almost all the Andean as an answer to the peasant mobilizations, see chapter 7 and 8. The motivation was everywhere to canalize the energy of the peasants as support for the govern-

[84] According to Anil Kohli, *Democracy and discontent – India’s growing crisis of governability*, Cambridge University Press 1990, these center-periphery conflicts are also class and group conflicts, because different classes or castes struggle for government patronage. The Tamil movement was for example also a lower class revolt against the Congress-based Brahmins.

[85] Harun or-Rashid, *Bangladesh: the first successful secessionist in the third world*, in Ralph Premdas et al (ed), *Secessionist movements in comparative perspective*.

[86] Donna Lee Van Cott (ed), *Indigenous peoples and democracy in Latin America*, Macmillan 1994; Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, *Oppressed but not defeated*; Diego Cornejo Menacho (ed), *Indios – Una reflexión sobre el levantamiento indígena de 1990*, Ildis/El Duende/Abya-Yala 1991. See also chapter 7 and 8.

ment, as a payment for legal rights to the land, in the form of paternalist organisations.

After a shorter or longer period of euphoria, the peasant terms-of-trade devalued. The urban middle class realized soon that there were more political gains to get from adaptation to the world market system, and the governments began to favour commercial agriculture at the expense of the Indian peasants. The latter then saw the need to define themselves independently from the paternalist organisations, and chose the Indian identity.

Peasants/family farmers have lead this change in three countries.

In Mexico, it took time for the state to shift from paternalist support to world market adaptation. It was a process begun during the second world war and was finished only with the NAFTA agreement with USA and Canada in 1993. Conflicts have for that reason arisen locally in many places during this time, and there was a rich world of organising for the new Indian movements of the eighties and nineties to relate to. The Indian movement in Chiapas, a state where paternalism never took root, has had much support to build on when developing the world's perhaps most eloquent critique of the development despotism of the nineties.

The Bolivian break with paternalism was swifter: in 1974, a peasant based IMF rebellion was put down by the army. The peasants and their relatives in the giant shantytown El Alto near La Paz then oriented towards a cultural movement gazing back to the peasant rebellion of the eighteenth century, see chapter 4. The government regarded this as safer than organising for material interests, but as soon as 1976 the Indianist movement was strong enough to take initiative to a resistance alliance against the government and its IMF partners. Earlier, such alliances had always originated by the miners or the La Paz middle class, but now the Katarist peasant movement both organised strike support for the miners and blockades of La Paz after eighteenth century fashion.

During the eighties culture has been emphasized more and peasant movement less. In 1993 the Katarist movement horse-traded with the government, and accepted IMF-imposed cuts for greater local autonomy and language rights. On the other hand, miners-turned-coca growers have risen as a new resistance core with an Indian identity, violently opposing the neo-liberal agenda together with the urban poor, with a lot of success.

In Ecuador, the Indian and peasant identities have fused – you are Indian if you are a peasant, even if you are black. The movement was welded around the struggles for land reform in 1964 but had roots since the thirties, and since this struggle has never been brought to a solution, the Indian identity implies that you struggle against Creole land-owners and oil companies for land, and land rights and cultural autonomy are two sides of the same coin.

But the strongest component of the Indian federation CONAIE is however the near-autonomous Shuars in the Amazonian forests. The Shuars and the peasant movement have in some way managed to solve the problems of complex identities – all Indian identities are equally valid and equally contributing to the movement. And this has given CONAIE the strength to engineer several risings against the Creole upper class, that have controlled the country temporarily. The visible results of these movements have been to depose presidents, but the aims have been to bargain about land rights with land-owners and oil

companies, and to assert national rights against IMF and WTO demands.

So far, these “the lower-class-is-the-nation” movements seems to be a Latin American phenomenon. But given the fusing of national upper-middle classes into a cosmopolitan jet set, they seem to have a future before them [87].

I will come back to the Indian movements in chapter 8, and to the peasant/small farmer movements in chapter 7.

The national movements have been alliances between different classes with very different interests. They have cooperated since they all had been able to see a foreign rule or occupier as the first and most important obstacle for attaining their interest.

The peasants have struggled against a world market system coming from without, shattering the village solidarity, creating uncertainty and dependence of money, and they have struggled against bailiffs who have been more effective than the traditional ones and who have never considered the peasants’ ability to pay.

The workers, who have usually been part-time peasants trying to get some cash to eke out their subsistence, have struggled against a usually racist labour discipline.

The local capitalists have struggled against foreign or domestic monopolies preventing a more versatile economy.

And the educated middle class has struggled against a racist colonial administration that haven’t permitted it to make careers, and struggled for a national development policy with the aim to advance in the world market system.

How well have they satisfied their interests through the national movements? Nobody seems to have made this question, and still less tried to answer it. Those who have written about national movements have usually treated the “nation” in a lump and tried to assess the outcome in a lump. But I’ll make an attempt; the history is well known.

The educated middle class is of course the big gainer. It led the national movements, and it stepped into the power positions when the national movements won. In some instances, when the movement won without much efforts and it didn’t need the help of its countrymen, it have easily been able to plunder the latter and establish itself as a corrupt bourgeoisie. But the educated middle class has been the big gainer even in countries where it really needed to mobilize majorities in protracted struggles like in for example Vietnam [88].

For the local capitalists, the results have been mixed. They have lost from long protracted struggles that have demanded concessions to the peasants as in China and Vietnam. For that reason they have opposed such developments within the national movements and preferred to make peace with the colonialists if there has been any risk.

The workers have as a rule benefited from the national movements. They have been a strategically important part if them, being able to strike against center-owned enterprises, and for that reason been able to bargain with the leaders of the national movements.

[87] See for example Gordon Laxer, Popular national sovereignty and the US empire, in *Journal of World-System Research* XI, 2005.

[88] For Africa, this phenomenon was early described by René Dumont, *False start in Africa*, Andre Deutsch 1966. Rajni Kothari, *Masses classes and the state*, in Ponna Wignaraja (ed), *New social movements in the South*, Zed 1993, is a more recent description.

They have also benefited from the development strategy chosen by most new states, the import substitution strategy which has called for increased domestic demand and increased salaries. During the fifties and sixties the workers in the periphery could consider themselves as a part of the middle class, if they had fixed employments. This applied to the semi-periphery in Russia and Latin America as well as Africa and India. On the other hand, this didn't apply to all workers. Peasants cut out by the commercialization of agriculture to become a part of the semi-proletarian layers in the cities have been the real losers of the movement. And when the states began to adopt the export oriented strategy, calling for low wages, or dropped the advancement policy altogether in the seventies or eighties, the workers lost the benefit they had had.

For the peasants, the majority of the "nation", the result has been very mixed. They have liberated themselves from distant bailiffs without interest for the well-being of the peasants. But the new states built up by the national movements have as a rule been as pitiless enforcers of high taxes as the colonialists were. They have aimed at development, advancement in the world market system. And this is expensive. Somebody have to pay. And the peasants are near at hand. The nationalist states have used different forms of transmission mechanisms which have benefited industry and towns to the expense of agriculture and countryside. Few have used as ruthless methods as the communists of Russia; most were content to go on with the commercialization of the economy the colonialists had begun with, linked to new government purchase and sales monopolies and taxes, which in the long run was more lucrative than the ungainly methods of the Russians [89].

When the national development strategies were deserted, this didn't imply any relief for the peasants. Then, the surplus has simply gone to direct consumption of the new elites.

The peasants have not been able to counter the commercialization of land and food and the dissolution of the villages, and few have been able to benefit from it. Many have been cut out and been forced to join the sub-proletarians in the shantytowns of the cities. From the thirties, the peasants were able to use the power of the national movements to push their own movements for land reform, with some success in many sites. When they gained it was because of their own efforts; they didn't get anything for free from the national movements. But the contemporaneousness, the fact that the rulers of the world were busy dealing with the national movements, helped them. This will be considered in chapter 7.

At last, the national movements have been movements for a collective aim. They can't be reduced completely to the participants' particular aims. We have to ask ourselves if the global peripheries have been helped by the national movements to escape from their peripheral situation. And this is very dubious.

The aim for the educated urban middle class people who organised the national movements was development, advancement in the world market system. All, or almost all,

[89] John P. Powelson & Richard Stock, *The peasant betrayed – agriculture and land reform in the third world*, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Gunn & Hain 1987.

from the North American independence movement on, entered a national development policy as soon as they had got their independence. The drift behind the policy, formulated by people like Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List, Josef Stalin, Raúl Prebisch and Mao Zedong – and by Henry VII, Colbert and Oxenstierna in their ages – was to protect the productive forces of the country and fortify it with the help of government planning, to make it as forceful as the productive forces in the system center. To “catch up and pass” as Khrushchev expressed it. Of course this implied that they betrayed the human needs of the civil society, and the reciprocity and spontaneous expressions of life of the people there. For the urban middle class, this was not a great sacrifice. The difference between the radical, “communist” variety and the more moderate, “nationalist” one, was mostly a matter of degree. The alternative, free trade, has only been practiced by regimes that were content with the role as periphery and the opportunity this gives for the upper classes to profit from the minimum wages of the direct producers, for example the East European regimes in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries, and the Latin American ones in the nineteenth. But the criterions of the world market system have never been called in question, except perhaps by the Maoists during a short period in the sixties.

This “developmentalism” was also something of a global dogma during the era incited by the Indian independence and the Chinese revolution. The integration mechanisms seemed to work again. As the labour movements had been able to carry through universal suffrage, higher wages and social policy within the system center countries, the national movements seemed to be able to carry through a kind of global suffrage within the UN system and an international development aid. And the national development policies based in import substitution seemed to be tolerated by the system, at least sometimes. The USA was a brilliant success in the nineteenth century, Russia seemed to be a moderate one, and for example China, Argentina and Mexico also.

But latest about 1980 it was clear that there was some serious wrong somewhere. Firstly, it was apparent that the gap between rich and poor countries weren’t affected at all, see figure. Secondly, the national development projects wrecked. Most dramatically in the Soviet Union, the pioneer and prime example of the twentieth century.

There were several causes for this.

Firstly, while the system center couldn’t oppose the aspirations of the periphery openly, because of the strength of the national movements, it could do so furtively. The development plans of the peripheral nations were as far as possible conformed to the relocations of unprofitable industry from the center and the need for cheap import. The center could use the support of supranational organisations like the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, which were able to bypass the national strategies of the new states by cooperating with their west-educated functionaries about integrating them into the global financial networks. It wasn’t always the governments of Southern countries which were eager to take the loans they later would be so strangled by, it was often lower level technocracies.

During the seventies and eighties, the Kondratiev B made it more necessary for the enterprises of the center to hit back the independence thrust from the peripheries. They were helped by the supranational institutions also this time. They were even more helped

by an increasingly presumptuous global upper middle class and their ideological guise, market liberalism. This global upper middle class had been consolidated by its control over the growing complexity of the economy and the growing centralisation of state power. Now, it provided capital with something of a mass base for an attack at both national and labour movements in North and South [90].

Secondly, to play a system center role demanded increasingly more capital. It was easier for the USA to “catch up” with Great Britain in the nineteenth century than for India to “catch up” with the USA in the twentieth, because the gap was smaller then in absolute terms. The technological equipment of the nineteenth century was easier to get than the technological equipment of the twentieth for a territory of subsistence peasants. A very large territory like China may succeed, but for a small one like Nicaragua it is a utopia. Some theorists have suggested that a very extensive regional cooperation in the South is necessary to get out of subordination [91].

Thirdly, “development” in the world market system is climbing up a hierarchy. This implies among other things that it at least in the short run may pay off for one to muck it up for the other. The national projects of the national movements have for that reason, in spite of their Non-Aligned Movement, been divided and not able to appear in common even when it has been easy. For example, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina had probably been able to dismiss the so called debt crisis if they had shown a common front to the claims of First National City Bank in 1978; yet they chose to deal separately [92]. This is partly due to the form of the national movements: forming of nations and governments.

Fourthly, the bases of the national movements were undermined from the instigation, since it gave the urban middle class such a prominent function. The urban middle class had been built up by the colonial power to its own copy, and it was always easier for it to communicate with its own counterparts in the system center than to communicate with its own rural countrymen. When the advancement in the world market hierarchy turned out to be difficult it was always handy for it to compromise with the system center, keep its own position as the representative of the system center, and sacrifice the peasants. It was strangely easy to give up national development during the seventies and eighties, also if the price was starvation.

One point with the Islamist movement and its culturally motivated abhorrence of the system center may be that capitulations like that are made somewhat more difficult.

But there are also more profound troubles about the whole development project.

[90] There is a whole literature about this attack. Walden Bello, *Dark victory*, Institution for Food and Development Policy 1994, focuses on the actors while Philip McMichael, *Development and social change, a global perspective*, Thousand Oaks 1996, focuses on the way the Keynesian development policy up to 1980 created structures which made the subsequent dismantling inevitable, not least through the debt crisis .

[91] This is Samir Amin’s prescription, for example in *Social movements in the periphery*, in Ponna Wignaraja, *New social movements in the South*.

[92] According to Walden Bello, *Brave new third world*, Earthscan Publications 1990. The same thing happened to OPEC – Saudi chose to deal separately with the center about the oil prices which almost dealt a death blow to OPEC. On the other hand, Vijay Prashad: *The darker nations*, New Press 1992, consider OPEC’s onesided price-hike in 1973 as just one example of the newly created Third World states’ constant bickering with each other to get benefits on eachother’s expense. High prices of oil was a windfall to some and the ruin of others, which made the NAM to disintegrate.




Fig 6:2. The ten richest, next richest etc decentile's part of the global riches in 1950 and 1990, per country. The first decentile thus contains the richest countries up to a tenth of the global population, etc. Apparently there has been no egalization, but at the country level no more inequality either. Incomes counted in PPP USD. Source Angus Maddison: *Monitoring the world economy 1820-1992*, OECD 1992.




Fig 6:3. East Europe's Latin America's Asia's and Africa's incomes in percent of West Europe's, counted in PPP USD. All lost heavily to West Europe in the 19th century. Latin America and East Europe recovered up to 1950 but then lost; Asia has recovered marginally since 1970; Africa lost all the time. The figure doesn't cover the difference between losing West Asia and recovering East Asia. Source. Angus Maddison: *Monitoring the world economy 1820-1992*, OECD 1992.

Fifthly, one may call in question whether it is possible for all peripheral countries to advance together within the framework of the system. For the system is a hierarchy where superior and inferior positions are dependent of, or reflexions of each other. The role as center is allotted to the one that has got a monopoly of the most strategic links in the global production system, while the role as periphery is allotted to the one that has got least of such strategic monopolies. Neither the import substitution model nor the export oriented model aimed at destroying or conquering monopolies. At most, as in Russia or China, it implied to delink from the world market system and build “independent” alternative societies at a small scale or, as in South Korea and other “tiger economies”, to specialize in accidental niches with the consent of the monopolies. Also in this way the disunity of the national projects of the peripheries appeared; they never made any concerted and serious attempt at challenging the possibility to monopolize resources, contacts and faculties [93].

Sixthly, finally, perhaps the development model they chose was impossible. For the model was the one practiced by the system center – capital and energy intensive investments adapted to a global techno-structure rather than effectivation of the popular economy of the country. Some people have argued that this technostructure is impossible without cheap raw materials from the periphery, guaranteed by cheap labour. The model would, if that is correct, be impossible to copy because the peripheries don’t have any periphery, except their own peasants. Perhaps development is so extremely expensive if you don’t have any peripheries that the sacrificing of several generations is necessary to make it – the Soviet example, and the miserable European seventeenth century are cases in point. So the failure of the Soviet example wasn’t only due to its narrow social base; it was also due to its narrow geographical base – without peripheries it had to plunder its own people to the skin to get resources to advance towards the center [94].

To invalidate the center-periphery dicotomy would thus call for destroying of the overcapitalized technostructure of the center.

But perhaps the whole section above conveys a too negative picture of what happened. The center-periphery dichotomy of the world market system is five hundred years, and it may be unfair to demand from the national movements that they should be able to annul them in just a generation. What they really did achieve was to hold up the increase of the gap between North and South that had been going on from 1500 up to about 1900. During the last decades of middle class desertion from the movement, the gap has increased again, see figure. But in a long term movement perhaps momentary backlashes are inevitable.

Many debaters have pointed at the fact that the razor-sharp differences between North and South are blurred; distances grow increasingly unimportant and it isn’t more difficult today for a North-based enterprise to exploit workers in the South than in the

[93] There has been much debate about the capacity of the peripheral countries to at least “reformulate” the relation between center and periphery. See for example Cristóbal Kay, *Latin American theories of development and underdevelopment*.

[94] One author arguing for this perspective is Stephen G. Bunker, *The exploitation of labor in the appropriation of nature: Toward an energy theory of value*, in Charles Bergquist (ed), *Labor in the capitalist world-economy*, Sage 1984.

North. While a wealthy middle class and an industrial working class grow in the South, an unintegrated subproletariat arises in the North. If this is lasting, perhaps it is a sign that the national movements in the south have been successful after all: they have broken the twentieth century protectionist blocks of the center and to some extent homogenized the world. Even if the polarity between center and periphery doesn't disappear – the system presumes that the center exploits the periphery – perhaps the division between one center and one periphery is being substituted by many centers and many peripheries. Whatever this implies, it implies that the traditional anti-colonial alliance is history. The national movements of the future will have a different composition.

The twentieth century national movements in the system center

In the center, national movements have primarily been active during the Kondratiev B phases 1914-39 and after 1973. When the economic problems have begun to spread, the system have primarily tried to foist them on the poorly organised, peripheral provinces. For that reason, attempts grew in the provinces to assert their increasingly pressed economic, political and cultural interests during such periods.

The movements have developed rather differently depending on if the peripheries have been “under-developed” or “over-developed” according to Rokkan's terminology [95].

Movements in “under-developed” peripheries have seldom aimed at organising a state of their own. This calls for too much resources. Their aims have been to keep the central power at a distance and assert their own culture. They have also tried to get control over economic investments to attain the same service level as the center – or demand the same level of integration as people in the center. This has been the aim in Sápmi, in Occitania, in Corsica and in Wales.

Up to the second world war these culture asserting movements were usually led by traditional local strongmen, for example landlords or the church, and the bite was against “the city”. The first organisation to defend the interests of Bretagne was founded by landlords who were as much interested in propping under their own faltering power as asserting the interest of their province. During the interwar years, the national movement in Bretagne was, as the movement in the Flanders, hostile to the labour movement because it was seen as “modernist” and threatened traditional local culture. This, a result of the political blocks formed in the French revolution, induced them to support the most ruthless anti-labour policies from the state [96].

During the post-war Kondratiev A, this local, traditional upper class disappeared or was coopted into the center, and the peripheral movements had to rely on its popular base. For that reason, they often developed radical democratic features. For example, Alain Touraine has noted how the Occitan movement, despite its notorious inability to unite in any organisation or on any strategy, yet is united around one thing: its aversion against all hierarchies and all authoritarian rules. Such things are identified as “Parisian

[95] Stein Rokkan & Derek Urwin, *Economy, territory, identity*.

[96] Jack E. Reece, *The Bretons against France*, The University of North Carolina Press 1977.

methods” and won’t be accepted [97].

Who takes part in such movements? Rokkan points at local culture workers like teachers as important organisers. But Touraine points at trade unions for workers and peasants, whose economy is threatened by peripheralization, as at least as important. Wine growers in Occitania, miners in Norrbotten and fishermen along the Norwegian coast are typical examples of core groups in regional peripheral movements.

It is very difficult to organise a movement in an under-developed periphery. Despite the great needs, the divisions are even greater. The identity as peripheral is so disgraced that most people see assimilation, or submission, as a less painful way out than self-assertion. The resources are small and the hope is scant. The Breton movement may be an example of the failures a national movement in an under-developed periphery is likely to get into [98].

The interwar movement consisted of youth, awakened to the Breton cause by the repression of their language at school. For that reason they emphasized, after Irish pattern, the Celt culture and demanded independence from France. Action consisted much of blasting French monuments. But the interest from Bretons was poor; a majority spoke French and didn’t want to hear about any cultural oppression. Desperately, the movement began cultivating racist mythologies and turned to like-minded people in Germany for help. Hoping that the Germans would give them independence they turned tools for the German occupation according to the principle of my enemy’s enemy. I suppose it’s obvious that they were disappointed.

The interwar movement had ignored the economic misery of Bretagne. This was the theme of a new organising after the war, consisting of different interests in the province – trade unions, municipal politicians, farmers’ organisation and trade associations. They used primarily parliamentary alliance; like the Irish seventy years earlier Breton politicians formed a block in Paris and succeeded in canalizing money for integration in Bretagne. This organising was however disrupted in 1957 on the issue of supporting de Gaulle or not, and it definitely lost its drive in the centralist bureaucracy of the fifth republic.

But then the force had appeared that finally would create a popular national movement in Bretagne. In 1955, the Breton farmers had invented a new struggle method – dumping of underpaid agricultural commodities in the city streets. In the early sixties, they begun to interpret their distress in terms of geographic discrimination and internal colonisation, and they were soon followed by the trade unions. But it was the contemporaneous rebellion of youths and workers in 1968 that opened for the Breton movement; it was only then that it was possible to see that the Breton problems were the same that hit the South, as a matter of center-periphery relations that was possible to tackle economically, politically and culturally.

[97] Alain Touraine, *Sociological intervention and the internal dynamic of the Occitan movement*, in Edward A. Tiryakian & Ronald Rogovski, *New nationalism of the developed west*, Allen & Unwin 1985.

[98] Jack E. Reece, *The Bretons against France*; Suzanne Berger, *Bretons and Jacobins, reflections on French regional ethnicity*, in Milton J. Esman, *Ethnic conflicts in the Western world*, Cornell University Press 1979; Michael O’Callaghan, *Separatism in Brittany*, Redruth 1983.

Thus, workers strove against Parisian-owned businesses and demanded Parisian wages and got support from municipalities, youth organisations and musicians. Bombing of French projects of exploitation were met by sympathy if not by support by municipal politicians. And the Breton language the interwar activists had in vain tried to promote was casually converted to a symbol of resistance to be sung and learnt in study circles.

The Breton movement seems to have stagnated in the recent Kondratiev B, possibly because of the pressed situation for peoples' movements in the North after 1975. The result is poor so far – some mitigated centralism in the administration, Breton acknowledged as a school language, and a stop for the unpopular nuclear project in Plogoff. But Bretagne is still the second poorest region of France.

One of the most effective short-run peripheral movements was the Norwegian anti-EU movement, emerging from the same milieu that carried the national movement of the nineteenth century – farmers and fishermen in the valleys and fiords of western Norway [99].

The initiative to the resistance was taken by the family farmer organisations in the early sixties. About the same time, marginalized milieus within the Labour Party, which earlier organised the resistance against NATO, took initiative to a party-internal resistance. The anti-EU movement in the sixties was geared towards debate; since the membership was closed in 1963 it was never tested. But it created the personal contact that would be used later.

In the early seventies the membership was considered anew. At that time another participant had appeared, the youth movement which was formed about 1970 for defence of the environment, resistance to nuclear weapons, defence of the interests of women, and for reconciliation with the South. This diversified movement, which was facilitated by the difficulties of the world market system to deal with national movements in the periphery and a militant labour movement in Europe, was strong enough to swing all political youth organisations except one to the anti-EU line.

During the campaign in 1972, the family farmers were the organisatory back-bone – for example they laid a struggle tax on milk. In the valleys and fiords the whole civil society worked as an incredibly strong campaign organisation which knocked out the united pressure from media and authorities. In the cities, the youth movement fought under a disadvantage against the upper middle class, the state and business establishment. In addition a few of Oslo's strongest trade unions lined up with the resistance, as a result of resistance to NATO in the forties and fifties.

The victory in the referendum in 1972 was a short-run victory for the aim of the family farmers, status quo. But the alliance between them and the other resisters was broken as soon as the short-term aim was won, so the upper middle class politicians were able to work for their aim: increased class differences and undermining of the peripheral Norway's grip on investments, political cooption and cultural codes. In 1994 the same

[99] The Norwegian resistance to the EU is poorly related. Tor Bjørklund, *Mot strømmen*, Universitetsforlaget 1982 is an, according to the author, "a little too near-sighted" account of the way it was organised. The classic account of the power of peripheral Norway over economy, politics and culture is S. Rokkan & H. Valen, *The mobilization of the periphery*, in Stein Rokkan, *Citizens, elections, parties*, Universitetsforlaget 1970.

anti-EU coalition had to take the struggle once more, and won with equal result. This time they posed Scandinavian the welfare state against the market fundamentalism of the Maastricht Agreement.

Only the “over-developed”, that is, the industrially strong, peripheries that have been able to develop separatist movements and sometimes wring some autonomy or even independence for protection of their economy. To these belong Scotland, Flanders, the Basque country, Catalonia and Croatia.

The Basque national movement began as a rebellion of the lower middle class in Bilbao against the five families who owned the prosperous Basque steel industry. The core of their critique, apart from power concentration, was the way the city had been destroyed by industrial slum inhabited by immigrants without feeling for the local culture [100].

The movement had for a long time some difficulty to formulate a uniting identity. Since the eighteenth century, the Basque country had tried to retain some autonomy against a centralizing state, and this tradition was important to the Basque movement. But the autonomy had been defined locally, as local so called *fueros* or agreements with the central power about local autonomy. During the eighteenth century, the church played an ideologically leading part in this struggle, and the Christian identity was for that reason natural to assert against both capitalist and socialist non-Basques. The language was no leading factor though, because half of the native Basques spoke Spanish. The uniting identity was “we natives”. To have a Basque name proving the identity turned out to be the crucial test.

It was not easy for the Bilbao middle class movement to spread over the Basque country on this meagre program. But the activists took on to develop it, they investigated the needs of the Basque peasants, they combined an enthusiasm for Basque popular culture with organising of saving banks and friendly societies, and got a base this way. During the Republic, some third of the inhabitants sympathised with Basque nationalism.

According to the Basque nationalists, the Spanish civil war was a foreign affair that didn't concern the Basque country. This didn't help them; Franco considered Basque separatism as treason and established the most centralising regime ever in Spain. To say “hello” in Basque was a crime, as was using Basque traditional costumes.

This petty repression made Basque nationalism a mass movement. Basque nationalism was the most natural way of opposing the dictatorship.

The first resistance was raised within the church, where younger priests held service in Basque, organised Basque schools and protested in public against the repression. When they were thrown out of the church they continued as laymen. ETA begun as a movement in seminaries.

For laymen, sending children to Basque schools and collect money to these was a natural way of resisting the dictatorship. The political resistance which appeared during the sixties was associated to this base activity.

[100] Marianne Heiberg, *The making of the Basque nation*, Cambridge University Press 1989.

Another way was to organise producers' cooperatives. Cooperatives were seen as a democratic alternative to the hierarchic Franquism, and also a way of breaking out of the control of the dominating big business. Cooperatives were thus associated to Basque nationalism, and a valuable economic base for the movement.

In the late Franco era, Basque cultural festivals were also a way of demonstrating the strength of Basque culture. It was at that time that young people began to attack police, banks and other symbols for the central power, while the revenge of the state gave opportunities to mass demonstrations and strikes.

Since Basque nationalism had spearheaded the democratic struggle it had hegemony in the Basque country when Franco died. All political parties were Basque nationalists. The most nationalist were the immigrants, who saw nationalism as a way of being accepted. According to Heiberg, ETA of today is dominated by immigrants.

Basque nationalism is unique so far that it is was antagonistic to the locally dominating upper class. Usually, this has a strong position in national movements of over-developed peripheries. Its endeavour may be said to achieve equality with other center bourgeoisies, preferably with peripheries to exploit in their turn.

One example may be the national movement in Croatia, which appeared in the nineteenth century within the Zagreb middle class, as an effort to keep the Hungarian state at a distance, and developed in the twentieth with the same aim with regard to the Yugoslavian state. When the Yugoslavian developmentalist policy went bankrupt in the eighties, leading circles in Zagreb simply seized on the opportunity to grasp as much of Yugoslavian territory as they could, to create their own center [101].

An almost over-explicit instance of over-developed nationalism is found in Germany in the inter-war years. An attempt to global hegemony had collapsed in the first world war and the ruling class had got limitations to its power imposed on it by the victorious coalition. The German ruling class' endeavour to regain its liberty, linked to middle class attempts of revenging itself on a successful labour movement, caused a process that is rather badly investigated, as if research were prevented by the bad conscience of the middle class [102].

Despite a lack of reasonable accounts I will try to sum up as follows.

According to Peter Fritzsche, a key factor was that the labour movement had a formal strength that was not matched by a moral one. On the one hand, the German labour movement leadership had repressed its own members in blood, helped by rightist para-militaries, see chapter 5. On the other, the labour movement was culturally a sect – it

[101] Reliable accounts of the Yugoslav breakdown will probably appear soon. But it is likely that it wasn't a matter of national movements at all, but simply local strongmen or local bureaucrats aiming at creating empires out of the crumbling Yugoslav edifice.

[102] The research on Nazism is not nearly as developed as the research on, let's say, the Russian revolution. Pierre Aycoberry, *The Nazi question*, Pantheon Books 1981, makes an overview of the literature and judged by Norwegian and Swedish university libraries it hasn't developed much since. Still, historians tend to see Nazism either as a conspiracy between some leading figures while the mobilization that supported the Nazis is forgotten, or as a psychological disease. There are some statistical surveys of who supported it, by for example Peter Manstein, *Die mitglieder und Wähler der NSDAP 1919-1933*, Peter Lang 1990, but the only account of the social dynamics that led to it seems to be Peter Fritzsche, *Rehearsal for Fascism*, Oxford University Press 1989.

didn't consider outsiders as important enough even to have diplomatic relations to. The labour movement thus confined itself to unionist struggles, protected by its dense subculture, and was rather successful.

The middle class people, who had greeted the labour movement as an ally in 1919 were however disappointed when the state and business interests decided to inflate away all their debts, at the expense of the middle class, since the labour movement was able to at least partially compensate with higher wages. Exasperatedly, middle class people, divided by trade, terms of employment and historical affiliations tried to emancipate themselves from earlier guardianships, in sharp rivalry with the labour movement. The only unifying factor they found to counter their divisions was the nation, so from the twenties all middle class movements appeared as romantically nationalist. This, however, didn't make them any more effective.

What finally made the need for effectivity acute was the slump of 1929. While unemployment and misery increased, the politicians of all shades had no remedy other than cuts and wait-and-see. The middle class mobilizations, which were as frustrated by their own incapacity as the one of the politicians, gave their confidence to an organisation that had three clear advantages: a stand for Keynesian politics, independently of the vagaries of the world market, a lower middle-class origin of the leaders which appealed to the self-esteem of other lower middle-class people, and ample funding.

We all know the insistence of the Nazi leadership that professional people must rule; we don't think so much over that this is only the habitual outlook of NGOs. For the Nazi party was like the Bolsheviks an NGO, an association of professional managers for national self-assertion and development, who in a moment of crisis manages a social movement to their own ends. Like the Bolsheviks, the Nazis chose their constituency, by appealing to its needs when nobody else did. The difference between them was of course that the Bolsheviks worked for the equality of a semi-periphery, while the Nazis worked for the hegemony of a momentarily enfeebled center.

The background of the Nazis was the Bavarian high society with links to the para-militaries that had repressed the workers in 1919. Their program was mainly stolen from the organisation of the commercial large farms, Bund der Landwirte – government responsibility for the economy, expansion eastwards, the superiority of the Germans and worthlessness of Poles and Jews, and the need for professionals to rule, see chapter 7 [103]. This was supplemented with some planks for middle-class and farmers' needs, like attacks on big business and commercialization in general; these items were not taken seriously in government position, though, but the items taken from Bund der Landwirte were faithfully carried out [104].

[103] For a German, or French, or Russian, nationalist this constant carping on Jews was not as arbitrary as it may seem a hundred years later. The reasonable enemy, about 1900, should be the hegemon, the British empire. But the most important finance center of the empire was Rothschild's bank. And to the Germans, Polish Jews played about the same part in the economy as Muslims do today, as easily dispensable casual workers who had to organise in mafias to survive (see for example Abraham Léon, Jewish question – a Marxist interpretation, Pathfinder 1970).

[104] Some authors, for example Alan Bullock, Hitler, a study in tyranny, Pelican 1962, seem to think that the Nazis were completely pragmatic and only interested in power for its own sake, and with no program at all. This is obviously exaggerated.

The Nazi party was a fringe until 1928. At that date it was singled out by some industrial interests who needed personnel for a campaign against an American plan for paying German reparations. And well-funded with money it proved effective; better than the industrial interests it was able to tie together the campaign with attacks on the industrial and labour establishments in a way that appealed to the middle class democratic self-esteem.

In power, the Nazis relied on the thrust for hegemony to keep the active support of capital, and Keynesian economics to keep the passive support of the direct producers.

But the Nazis are also the most outstanding example of a movement that except directing upwards, against the privileged, directs downwards, against people who have even less privileges than the movement's middle class participants. The aim is, of course, defending privileges that are for some reason threatened, and the instrument of doing this is usually appealing to the privileged for protection, applying to something the movement participants share with these. For example, the nation.

Future national movements

National movements aim, to quote Rokkan again, at defending a territory that is at a disadvantage in a center-periphery relation. The disadvantage may be economic (the center directs the investments), political (the center decides whom should be coopted), and/or cultural (the center decides the codes). The ultimate aim is to cancel the disadvantage, that (more of) the control over investments, cooptation and codes should be decided by people within the territory.

The growth of a national movement is as a rule a successive process. For the direct producers, it is generally more reasonable to interpret the encroachment and bullying of outsider elites as crimes against justice and aim at old laws or popular power in one for or another. Only when it proves impossible to communicate with the outsiders it appears self-evident to see them as outsiders, and only when a common identity for the inhabitants of the peripheral territory has been formulated, the movement takes a national form. The easier it is to form such a common identity, the faster the movement turns national.

Several authors have poked fun at non-European movements copying a European "national" language in their endeavour to assert themselves against European power [105]. But of course, the language isn't European. It is a global peoples' movement language, made necessary by the global spread and geographical stratification of the world market system

The first step, to create a national identity and secure that the inhabitants of the peripheral territory identify with it, is usually not easy. Many national movements have stumbled on it. There are so many other things to identify with – classes, religions, other territories. The successful national movement has usually been the ones that have been able to free-ride on other identities, like Catholicism in Ireland and peasants in China.

The identity and language creation, the mobilizing and action in the peripheries have

[105] For example E.J. Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson, et al.

been complicated by the fact that the national movements have consisted of so many different classes and groups. They have been effective when they have linked up with the needs and confrontation opportunities of the majorities.

The classic confrontation methods of the national movements have been boycotts of the goods and services of the center power, with strikes against center-owned businesses second. Sometimes this has been enough, particularly when other successful peoples' movements have contemporaneously enfeebled the center powers and forced them to compromises. This was the case during the 1945-1975 era, when the accumulated strength of many national movements made it possible for many of them to reach their immediate aim without much effort. But for the total resistance of the system peripheries, violence has also been necessary to force the system center to retreat. For example, peasant rebellions in India and war in Vietnam was necessary to make center powers, enfeebled by other wars, give up.

Strategically, the first aim has generally been, since the Creole revolutions, to get a state of their own. This has been natural, since the state is the only actor that has "the right" to defend local interests in the world market system. And this aim has been reached by many national movements during the twentieth century. But the overarching aim for the national movements – that the power over investments, cooptation and codes should be with people living in the territory – seems to be as far away as it has always been.

In the sections about the national movements of the system periphery, I suggest three things. Firstly, that the movements had a political success because the colonial empires really were abolished to the benefit of states built on citizens. Secondly, that they had a marginal economic success because the growing economic gap tended to be stagnate and even close, at least in times of mobilization. Thirdly, that they had some cultural success because the naive racism and Eurocentric worldview that had ruled for some hundred years at least were challenged.

Against this it is possible to contend that it is no improvement that the regional elites take over the regional government power in a world where governments, at least in the system peripheries, lose out to global powers, that it still is in the system center the most important economic decisions are made, and that the western upper middle class culture and its codes seem more expansive than ever, irrespective of being challenged or not.

In the light of the present corporate globalization, the national movements seem to have failed grossly.

Yet such a claim should probably be qualified. First, the failures are not equal everywhere. They tend to be greatest in Africa, where movement mobilisation was least. Successes tend to be greatest in areas where mobilisation was greatest, in East Asia where the Chinese and Vietnamese peasant revolutions dominated developments. This may be a coincidence, but it may also reflect the fact that societies where the majority of people are co-creators of development are more economically viable than societies where the majority of people are merely victims of it. There, governments have implemented successful development policies of much the same kind as the established industrialised countries achieved during their industrialisation phase [105a].

Secondly, the national movements may not be outright failures but only to the extent they have applied a mistaken strategy.

Like it was to the labour movements, the government power strategy was double-edged, despite its convenience. It placed power with the social layer whose interest in the ultimate goal of the national movements was the least, according to Rokkan, the publicly employed upper middle class. It discouraged cooperation between peripheral territories about breaking center-based monopolies and encouraged each country to look for short run benefits by offering services to system centers and system center based businesses. It encouraged demobilization of the popular movement that had been the base of the victories of the movements: strikes and tax resistance had to be prevented in the name of national development, despite the fact that the peripheral status depends of low wages more than anything else. In most countries, the strength of the national movements decreased after government power (except in East Asia).

These facts have induced some authors to contend that the national movements have strengthened the world market system instead of challenging it – they have spread both the state system and the world market adapted western culture to the whole world and to the best of their abilities legitimated it to the global majority [106].

The state fixation of the national movements has caused conflicts within the movements themselves. I have touched above upon the conflicts between the centers and peripheries within. But the conflicts have also been strong within the movements, between the state-constructing elites and the rank-and-file which are interested in safeguarding the civil society and peoples' spontaneous expressions of life. The systemic necessities are strict for a peripheral state, and to assert itself it has to place heavy burdens on its own citizens. As a rule though, the citizens in the new state is primarily organised in the national movement, and when its leadership suddenly deserts them to perform state duties, people are disillusioned and paralysed and have no tools to defend themselves with. Thence the authoritarian, hierarchic politics that has often afflicted peripheral countries after liberation.

There was at least one country where this conflict got a distinct expression, which in the long run resulted in a fairly democratic society, despite demoralization in the short run – Ireland.

The Irish national movement was, as always, led by the urban middle class, but had close ties to the countryside through the successful tenant movement against British landlords in the 1880s. Irish nationalism was primarily spread by a Celtic sports movement turning to youth, and these youth was later mobilized to the liberation war through an anti-conscription movement. Youths had for hundreds of years had the task to defend the Irish villages against bailiffs and policemen, and the increasing level of conflict didn't change anything except that "the Public Band" was renamed IRA. When the

[105a] Alice Amsden has described the strategy in *The rise of the rest*, Oxford University Press 2001: consistently favouring, politically and institutionally, those firms that are prepared to invest in more advanced technologies, and consistently disadvantaging those that are not.

[106] Georgi M. Derlugian, *The social cohesion of states*, in Terence K. Hopkins, Immanuel Wallerstein et al, *The age of transition – trajectory of the world-system 1945-2025*, Zed Books & Pluto Press 1997.

movement leadership organised a state based in a peace agreement with Britain, these youths saw no reason to subordinate themselves under this state and its world market career. They continued the war, against the Irish state [107].

Tom Garvin has examined the goal conflict between youths and the movement leadership, in a way that isn't damaged by his sympathies being on the side of the leadership. The youths wanted a republic of cooperating villages; their aim was to protect the civil society of the villages and its spontaneous expressions of life. The leadership wanted to build a modern society where the villages were subordinated under the world market. Garvin expressed this in opposites like subsistence against commercialization, equality against meritocracy, community against individualism. When the movement that the youths had belonged to wasn't a peoples' movement any longer but an official institution with an alien goal, their understanding and language were confused: Garvin describes them as undemocratic and elitist, and when you express yourself in an official language when you are cornered it may sound so.

It is another matter that their high level of conflict jeopardized the civil society they tried to protect.

While the national movements were ambiguously successful in defending the system peripheries, they were exceptionally successful at an unintentional level, where the success caused a lot of trouble for them.

Since the national movements have been so desperately dependent of bringing home the territorial identities and solidarities in their struggle against the system centers, they have easily come into conflict with popular movements stressing other identities. Labour movements, peasant movements, and women's movements have tended to be repressed in the name of unity, at best been treated paternalistically as a subordinated ally, at worst been terrorized to silence. Few national movements have escaped this conflict; some have even let themselves out as henchmen to ruling classes within the territory. The "national" has for this reason, despite its roots in the democratic revolt, become the principal ideological weapon against the self-assertiveness repressed classes and categories. This is also true for national state projects with roots in peoples' movement traditions and peoples' movement mobilizations, not least those who refer to communist identities but also for example the USA [108].

Meanwhile, these repressed classes and categories have to a great extent been caught in the concept formation of the national movements. The labour movement defined itself nationally as early as in the nineteenth century – the name is the International, not the Global for example – and to form a government in a nation was declared the main strategy at the same time. The intellectual and professional advocates of the repressed classes and categories were even more caught – while "the left" in the nineteenth century was a movement for equality between human beings and between classes, it is today principally a movement for equality between nations [109]. And I suppose it has been so since the

[107] Tom Garvin, 1922 – The birth of Irish democracy, Gil & Macmillan 1996.

[108] Of course states have used nationalist themes to discipline their citizens. I haven't dealt with this since I write about national movements, not nationalist ideologies.

[109] I can't interpret otherwise the near exclusive focus on North-South issues among the intellectual left. See for

Third International decided to focus on anti-colonial struggle in 1921.

This has weakened the national movements themselves. For it has weakened other social movements against the destructive consequences of the world market system, movements that would have been able to curb the adversaries of the national movements by struggling for other themes. And it has hid the ultimate aim of national struggle, democratic autonomy, behind group identities whose value is never more than occasional and pragmatic.

It is perhaps possible to argue that a national movement that is exclusively national, i.e. sees only the center-periphery stratification of the world and disregards that there are also classes and genders, has to be statified as soon it has any success, and that it then has to play ball with the world market system not to be shattered.

There may be reasons for future national movements to reconsider some things they have taken for granted. And in the tracks of the neo-liberal thrust of the ruling classes, and the so-called globalisation of capital some new trends seem really to be under way among periphery defending movements.

One possible choice is what we have seen in the tracks of bankrupted national state projects in Eastern Europe or World Bank shattered economies in Africa: a war all against all about shrinking resources, formulated as a hate against all “others”. As a long-run peoples’ movement strategy it is perhaps not very wise, but it may arguably work as a tactics for casual survival in a world where market war all against all is the conformist behaviour.

Another more positive possibility is the one recommended by Alain Touraine: broad, radical democratic, “Grundtvigian” regional movements against all hierarchies and technocracies, under the cover of regional culture. The advantage of this is that labour movements, women’s movements, environmental movements and other are easily subsumed, and that it doesn’t obstruct mobilization it may benefit from due to contemporaneousness, and that it avoids cooptation into state building projects it can’t take a responsibility for [110]. This is not an impossible way, which is shown by the Norwegian national movement in the nineteenth century, the Indian movements and much of the anti-WTO movements of today, see chapter 10.

And a third possibility is to simply disregard the center-periphery stratification in the tactics of the everyday struggle and exclusively deal with what creates it – the low incomes of the direct producers. A global trade unionist solidarity to strengthen the self-assertiveness of trade unions in the South may be the most effective weapon against the center-based monopolies, and by that way also the center-periphery relation as such [111].

It is far from certain which of the possibilities that will prevail. For the time being,

example their behaviour at the Social Summit in Copenhagen in 1995, when it proved impossible to make them focus on class, unemployment and precarization of the labour market. The sad story is told in a pamphlet by Friends of the Earth Sweden: *En miljard nya jobb till år 2000*, in Tord Björk et al (ed), *Arbetslös?, Miljöförbundet Jordens Vänner* 1997.

[110] Alain Touraine, *Sociological intervention and the internal dynamics of the Occitanist movement*.

[111] This seems to be the strategy of the Indian peasant movement, according to Gail Omvedt, *Reinventing the revolution*, M.E. Sharpe 1993.

some years into the 21th century, it seems that the typical form of peripheral defense is the governments of the 77 group, defending their own commons against encroachments from the center, exhorted by agrarian movements, see Chapter 10 -- but this may be conjunctural [112]. The only thing that is certain is that the inbuilt center-periphery relations will create new national movements as long as the world market system remains.

[112] Vijay Prasad: *The poorer nations – a possible history of the Global South*, Verso 2012, seems rather optimistic that recent thrusts of China, India and others may be a turning point. Patrick Bond & Ana García (eds): *BRICS – an anti-capitalist critique*, Haymarket Books 2015 is however more doubtful; what we see is only the development of new centers of the system, they believe, and the model they pose is the same highly extractive one as the old north-Atlantic center has pursued for hundreds of years.

Chapter 7.
**Agriculturalists' defence against
the food markets**

FOOD PRODUCTION DIFFERS FROM OTHER PRODUCTION in a crucial way: it depends of natural processes [1]. It is more difficult for capital to range into the industrial discipline than, for example production of shoes or books. And it is also less profitable, since there are no economies of scale in agriculture. For that reason, the direct producers of food have been able to maintain a certain autonomy right up to our days. But not always – food is a key commodity if any, and it has often been so urgent for states and capitals to control it that they have been forced to use violence to keep it. Farmers’ defence against the market has for that reason more than other direct producers’ been characterized by autonomy and violence.

The villages that had defended themselves by peasant rebellions against an encroaching state began to dissolve as soon as the world market system had them in its grip. For the subsistence villages’ peasants and land were needed to produce food for the towns and raw materials for the industry. And in world market system terms this meant that food had to be commercialized, became a commodity, and that the subsistence peasants were mobilized as slaves, wage labourers or petty entrepreneurs. All alternatives implied that the village solidarity was dissolved [2].

This happened at different times in different sites in the world. As early as during the medieval commercial system there was some commercializing of food, according to Slicher van Bath [3], and in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries it was commercialized grand-scale in North Italy, the Netherlands, England and around the big cities and coasts of Western Europe generally, and in the plantation regions in East Germany, Poland and South America. Commercialization spread to the rest of the world during the eighteenth century. Today, about 2000, the last agriculture in Africa and central China is commercialized.

This also happened in different ways, with different outcome for the peasants. In the system center, the peasants often took the initiative to commercialization and were actively promoting it, to get cash for their villages. Conflicts around the process concerned methods, to make most of the proceeds benefiting the peasants instead of merchants and landlords [4]. In the system periphery, where peasants were at a greater disadvantage concerning resources and the system had less to offer, the main actor behind commercialization were states, system center based businesses and/or the richest peasants, and the resistance from the village was greater. But since the peasants are always at a disadvantage, because they are small producers furthest down the commodity chain in a monopolized market, in an activity with no economies of scale [4a], they have been

[1] David Goodman & Michael Redclift, *Refashioning nature*, Routledge 1991.

[2] Commercialization of food is described shortly and concisely by Eric Wolf, *Europe and the peoples without history*, University of California Press 1982.

[3] B.H. Slicher van Bath, *The agrarian history of Western Europe*, St. Martin’s 1963.

[4] Victor Magagna, *Communities of grain*, Cornell University Press 1991.

[4a] The main reason of the poor remuneration of agriculture, according to Erik Reinert: *How rich countries got rich, and why poor countries stay poor*, Carroll & Graf 2007.

forced in the system center as well to organise in peoples' movements to protect their civil society against state, capital, world market system and the destruction that is inflicted by the callous routines of these.

It was not easy for the peasants to deal with the commercialization collectively. For they were afflicted in very different ways. The richest peasants had most to gain; Joel Migdal has even shown the way these rich peasants consciously used the opportunities of commercialization to shatter the village community and escape their responsibility for common needs [5]. The poor peasants generally lost by commercialization and would even be forced to leave their land to become wage labourers at big estates and plantations, emigrate to the shantytowns of the cities, or starve to death – if they couldn't use the opportunities of industrialization. Between them were vast groups whose experience of commercialization differed. The balance between these categories decided how the peasants acted as a collective, or if they acted at all.

Barrington Moore has contended that such balances determined the development of the whole society and whether the majority in a country would have any saying or not [6]. I think his contention is somewhat one-sided: all popular movements carry some weight to establish a democratic tradition. But since the peasants were a majority in all societies until fairly recently, it is reasonable to suppose that peasants' movements determines most for the democratic development in a region. In global and regional peripheries it may determine the difference between popular self-assertion and a fast capitulation before the system center and domestic elites, see chapter 4. And in the system center it may determine the difference between parliamentary democracies or aristocratic or fascist dictatorships (according to Moore) or at least the difference between popular and elitist cultural dominance.

In the system center, farmers' or agrarian movements have taken as a starting-point to control commercialization. The principal instrument has been cooperation. To this is added trade union and political pressures on the states, but they have as a rule not been dominated by government power strategy as much as have labour movements and national movements. Self-education has been used as an auxiliary.

In the system peripheries, there have been more labour regimes than in the center and thus more different protection strategies. When commercialization has taken the form of plantations and large estates, demands for land reform have been pressed in different ways – through litigation, land occupations and revolutions. When commercialization allowed the peasants to stay as small independent producers, the methods have resembled the one in the center. But the fact that the surplus is smaller in the peripheries, and that commercialization brings in less, has forced many methods of struggle apart from cooperation.

[5] Joel Migdal, *Peasants, politics and revolution*, Princeton University Press 1974.

[6] Barrington Moore, *Social origins of dictatorship and democracy*, Beacon Press 1971. Moore presumes the bourgeoisie as the real actor in the drama – when they ally with peasants, the result is democracy, when they ally with the aristocracy, the result is dictatorships. But an alliance with the peasants presumes that the peasants have reasonably much to offer, which makes my reformulation plausible.

Agrarian movements have been less effective than labour movements and national movements to achieve hegemony over the peoples' movement scene. (This is the reason why there is such a dearth of literature on agrarian movements; intellectuals have simply thought that agrarian movements are dull). They have often had to be foot-soldiers to others – both to other social movements like the national movements, and to elites in struggle against other movements or each others. Most students of the field blame this on country people's limited horizon; if they have only been able to provide for their immediate local needs they have been happy, they have thought. More sophisticated theorists point at the fact that market dependent farmers compete with each other and for that reason find cooperation difficult [7]. But the fact that for example the Danish agrarian movement, with its People's High Schools and its Grundtvigian awakening, and the Mexican peasants with their demands for *tierra y libertad* effectively were able to challenge at the hegemonic level shows that it has been, or is, principally possible.

System center: cooperation and world market resistance

The European agrarian movements are a creation of two dramatic events during the nineteenth century. During the Kondratiev A phase 1848-1873, see chapter 5, the railways opened opportunities for the farmers to sell surplus food to the towns and thus increase the incomes of the villages. Expectations on further incomes enticed the farmers to concentrate in the most profitable crops, while the growing urban industry drove the home industries of the countryside out of the market. But during the Kondratiev B phase of 1873-1894 the expectations were crushed by the slump and by cheap mass imports from American wheat and meat, cheaply produced because of abundant land. It was the British model and the free market that had cracked down on the farmers. Survival had been subordinated to the demand of keeping the wages of the industrial workers as low as possible. While farmers earlier had been able to rely on the subsistence of the village during lean times, this was now impossible; in a generation the economy had been commodified and nationalized beyond return, and the farmers were stuck in production for a market that promised less and less [8].

The reaction from the farmers to this disaster varied in different parts of Europe. The most important denominators were, according to Urwin, the power relations that existed already in the countryside and between countryside and city.

Parts of western Europe's countryside was since old dominated by family farmers – Norway, Sweden, the Rhine valley, Bavaria, Switzerland, Catalonia, north Italy and much of the Balkans. Other parts was dominated by commercial manors while family farmers as a strong opposition – Denmark, France, Ireland. Britain was the great excep-

[7] Jeffery Paige, *Agrarian revolution*, The Free Press 1975.

[8] Eric Wolf, *Europe and the peoples without history*. The most systematic account of the social conditions of the farmers and their organisational endeavours in Europe is Derek W. Urwin, *From ploughshare to ballot box*, Universitetsforlaget 1980. A more near-sighted book is Flemming Just (ed), *Co-operation and farmers' unions in Western Europe*, South Jutland University Press 1990. The importance of the railways is stressed by Eugen Weber's classic *Peasants into Frenchmen*, Stanford University Press 1976, and by Roger Price, *The modernization of rural France*, Hutchinson 1983.

tion in the West, completely dominated by manors, as was most of East Europe and the Mediterranean.

The other deciding dimension was the closeness to the surplus of the system center. It was easier for the farmers close to the center to sell their produce directly to the towns and thus gain a certain independence. In the periphery in the east and south, trade implied more capital and was for that reason controlled by the rulers. Another factor which isn't mentioned by Urwin is that all landowners in the center had better access to capital and more opportunities to invest than in the eastern and southern peripheries; dependence on cheap labour was a reason for the eastern landlords' unwillingness to relax its repressive power the least.

A third dimension was the traditions of the village. According to Urwin, the villages in the west were older and had stronger identities than the villages of the east. John Powelson contends that this strong village identity, and the collective action and bargaining ability this had conveyed since the middle ages, is the main reason why the west European peasants were able to assert themselves and liberate themselves from serfdom [9]. On the other hand, Eastern Europe's peasants had a stronger class identity than Western Europe's, because they were equals in their poverty – but this poverty also implied less resources for struggle. In the west, the participation of farmers in food trade had begun to result in class stratification as early as the eighteenth century, with unpredictable political and social conflict as a result.

This difference between west, east and south indicates of course the difference between center and periphery/semi-periphery. Eastern Europe was organised as a periphery with grain export as the main task in the infancy of the system in the sixteenth century, and succeeded in advancing to semi-periphery in the nineteenth.

Up to the market explosion in the nineteenth century, the peasants' defence against the routines of the world market system had been tax rebellions against the state, refusal to pay local dues to local authorities, bread seizures, and attacks on foreigners (who were seen as agents for state and market). All these forms had been local or in some cases limited to a province, and often been expressed as individual violence, backed up by the local community [10]. The crisis of the 1870s demanded new forms of actions and organisations. But they were not easy to find.

Firstly, it wasn't easy for farmers to act supra-locally. They were dependent full-time of their farms, dispersed over vast areas; they weren't like workers concentrated to communication nodes, and coordination was tricky for that reason.

Secondly, they were dependent to maintain their economic activity continuously. This left out strike as a struggle form (except in extreme cases like in Germany in 1923 and Russia in 1929), because it would imperil the farm.

Thirdly, commercial farmers lived under very different conditions and found it difficult to act in common. There were differences between freeholders and tenants, rich and

[9] John P. Powelson, *The story of the land – a world history of land tenure and agrarian reform*, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 1988.

[10] Nathan J. Brown, *Peasant politics in modern Egypt*, Yale University Press, is an account of such traditional forms of struggle.

poor, and cultivators of different crops. For that reason it was easy for the adversaries of the farmers to play off farmers against each other.

So it was difficult to prevent bigger landowners or professional politicians to establish themselves as shadow movements and take over the agrarian movements as for example populist party politics.

In the system center, the farmers decided on two main forms of defence: cooperative organising of purchase and sales, and political struggle against free trade and anti-inflation policies.

The struggle against free trade aimed at getting at the consequences of the constantly deteriorating terms of trade for the farmers. It also aimed at creating guards against the violent price fluctuations on the world market. But in a more generalized level, it also aimed at putting up a limit to the commodification of the means of subsistence. Strategically, the struggle against free trade constituted an opportunity for political alliances, desperately needed for the peasants, but sometimes such alliances were problematic.

The struggle against the anti-inflationist, monetarist policy aimed at creating better access to credits and getting out of the economic stagnation and debts.

Cooperation aimed at wringing the control over the commercialization of food from the hands of capital and get out of the thankless role as the furthest, unmonopolized link of the commodity chain. Locally, and for subsistence needs, cooperatives had been organised by peasants in Holland in the middle ages, for reclaiming marshlands, and cooperative irrigation plants are represented over the whole world. If you want, you may see a village as a cooperative with subsistence as an aim.

The first supra-local co-operatives among agriculturalists, with the market as an aim, were organised in the Rhine valley in the 1840s. They were savings banks, aiming at breaking the dependence on moneylenders who could take up to 100 percent interest. The idea spread to Scandinavia in the 1850s, and after twenty years farmers in Denmark began to organise co-operatives for sales and purchases. In France, farmers' cooperatives were started in the 1880s with fertilizers as a pioneering activity. In Ireland, farmers' cooperatives were one of Sinn Féin's methods for self-reliance against the British rule.

The aim of co-operation was thus to get out of the subordination under monopolist capitals, by organising a monopoly of their own in the market. But the organisational difficulties inherent in the farmer predicament were an obstacle. Firstly, most cooperatives were strictly sectorial: potatoes had its cooperatives, wine had another. But the great obstacle was paternalist organising. In many cases, cooperation was a business of elites, while the farmers for that reason regarded the whole thing with suspicion and kept aloof.

The Danish farmers' co-operation would be the most successful in the world, a never surpassed model for all agrarian movements in Europe. The reason was not least that it was not only an economic and/or political movement, but also a spiritual one, that put human dignity at the center and for that reason broke definitively with paternalist organising [11].

[11] Peter Gundelach, *Sociale bevægelser of samfundsendringer*, Politica 1988; Flemming Just (ed), *Co-oper-*

The agrarian movement in Denmark had strong links to Christian revival. It was Christian agitators that aroused peasant politically in the 1820s, and it was the regions where Christian revival had strong roots that began to act politically in connection with the struggles for suffrage in the 1840s. The core issue of the revival was that the church consisted of the congregation, not of officials or scriptures – as the leading proponent of the revival, N.S.F. Grundtvig expressed it – and for that reason in principle of the peasants themselves, of the people. According to Gundelach, Grundtvig is the first theorist that have used the concept “the people” in opposite to the upper class, with positive connotations. Grundtvig even saw the peasants and the lower class in general as the people equalling the nation, while he saw the upper class as a worthless froth at the surface.

This understanding gave a democratic self-reliance. It was first expressed when the Danish king promised, after external pressure, to call a kind of consultative parliament. The Christian agitation methods were activated to give a voice to the peasant demands: land reform, universal conscription (instead of conscription only of peasants), and universal elementary school. The poor peasants, those who had to work at the manors, went to strike, and in 1845 a mass meeting was hold in Holbæk for the demands. The government panicked and prohibited meetings of peasants, but this discriminating law only heightened the conflict. A petition collected 100.000 names, and in 1846 a national political organisation was established that succeeded in electing oppositional peasants to a third of the seats in the new parliament. The organisation would disintegrate and be supplanted by others, but in two things a fantastic continuity would prevail in more than fifty years: popular politics would be powerfully represented in the public, among other things in an increasingly growing majority in the parliament, and it would be represented by farmers.

The farmers also worked out a system for competence development and ideological articulation: the peoples’ high school movement. This had also its foundation in the religious revival; if the congregation made the church, and the congregation was the people, the people had to learn to rule the church – and the state. An since the foundation of truth was not scriptures but “the living word” ans Grundtvig expressed it, the peoples’ high school wasn’t based on textbooks but on discussion. The education was directed towards practical agronomy and municipal matters, but was imbued with the Grundtvigian democracy. The first peoples’ high schools were founded in the 1840s, the same time as the battles about suffrage and freedom of assembly.

The economical crisis of the 1870s forced the farmers to act to survive. The prices of their traditional produce fell, and the speculation economy forced up the interests. The landlords were more able to manage the crisis through their economy of scale, but such economy of scale was also within reach for the farmers if they cooperated. The key business was butter, a profitable product thanks to export to British industrial towns, but the

ation and farmers’ unions in Western Europe has a short description. The most ambitious attempt at explaining the spirit of Grundtvigianism to foreigners is Erika Simon: *Réveil national et culture populaire en Scandinavie*, Presses universitaires de France 1960.

big estates had an advantage thanks to the fact that they could guarantee high quality. In 1882 the farmers founded their first cooperative dairy in Hjedding in Jutland to take up the fight with the estates. They broke consciously with the joint-stock company form and organised it as an association of one man, one vote, and they used the most modern technology available. They formed a model; cooperative dairies, cooperative slaughterhouses and cooperative trading companies had soon forced the estates from the market. The cooperatives also took care of purchases for farms and households; they took care of veterinary service and agricultural research.

There were no organisatory links between the economic, political and ideological thrusts of the farmers. The links were cultural. The activists tended to be educated in peoples' high schools. Cooperators tended to take political responsibility. There was a common Grundtvigian conduct in the different expressions of the agrarian movement, which kept the movement together but also repelled outsiders.

And this was the decisive weakness of the agrarian movement. The movement was an expression of the self-defence and political self-assertion of the freeholders, *gaardmændene*. The crofters, *husmændene*, were to great extent outsiders, as were even more the land workers, and the relation to the labour movement was cold. Crofters were sometimes coopted into the cooperation, as hostages or as proofs of the democratic disposition of the movement. But they had no admission to the core of the movement, for example they were for economic reasons in practice excluded from the peoples' high schools, and from the early twentieth century they formed their own associations in cooperation with the labour movement rather than the farmers.

About that time, the state bureaucracy accepted parliamentarism in Denmark, i.e. allowed the agrarian majority in the parliament form a government. The farmers, thanks to their commercial success, soon proved themselves to be good capitalist businessmen; politically, the division was increasingly between farmers and bourgeoisie on one side, and workers and crofters on the other. Seventy years later, the farmers' organisations were the strongest political force for corporate liberalism and EU membership in Denmark.

Yet, the Danish example was the great model for farmers in Europe the decades around 1900, a model that almost never was possible to emulate. There was always something in the way.

In France, the traditional political divisions prevented them from common action and becoming a power. In some regions, primarily in the east and south, the peasants had liberated themselves from the landlords during the revolution, so the farmers were republicans. In others, primarily in the west and north, the peasants had struggled against the revolutionary government's claims for taxes, conscripts and Roman ownership, so the farmers were anti-republicans. Different notables were able to play on this false conflict up to 1945, and put themselves at the leadership of agrarian organising, which for these reasons was slow. In the anti-republican movements, landlords led the way, appealing to the rural solidarity against government and towns. The republican movements were led by veterinaries, agronomists and not least lawyers who run after offices, needed voters,

and appealed to the republican solidarity against church and traditional landlords. These organising was for natural reasons paternalist, they were small, sectorial and the combat-ed each other as much as they could [12].

The French agrarian movement – in a genuine meaning – was for that reason an occasional and divided thing, which not only had to fight against banks, wholesale dealers and government discrimination, but also against very strong shadow movements.

The strongest mobilizations were businesses of winegrowers. They were republicans all of them, and they were not prevented by anti-republican colleagues to mobilize against the republic if necessary.

What forced them to action was the ravages of the vine-pest in the 1870s. The wine-growers had organised themselves in an interest organisation quite early, and these took initiative to cooperatives. They got new vitality when the Algerian wine forced down prices in the early 1900s. In 1907 the winegrowers in Languedoc in the south revolted against the government, demanding legislation against fake wine – industry had discovered a way at that time to add wine essences to sugar water and sell it as wine. The viticulturalists borrowed their terminology from the labour unions, and went to strike. The strike was even more efficient because taxes at that time were collected by the municipality and delivered to the state, and most municipalities in Languedoc were controlled by viticulturalists. The state had to give up and legislate, and after the war the wine-growers made law even more efficient by inventing the principle of Appellation d'Origine Contrôlée – a kind of copyright of wines, controlled not as private property but as the property of the collectivity of local wine-growers [12a].

Possibly, this is the first time food quality is at the center of the agitation in an agrarian struggle.

Professional politicians tried to make a shadow movement within but were never quite successful; instead, the cooperatives with their stately buildings had the hegemony and symbolized popular power. Wine-growers are still a core of egalitarian republicanism in southern France.

If the political activities of farmers tended to cancel out in France, because of shadow movement influence, it spelled disaster in Germany for the same reason.

The German countryside was a patchwork socially; freehold farmers dominated regions like the Rhine valley and Bavaria while landlords dominated others like lands between the Elbe and Russia. These north-eastern landlords, the so-called junkers, also dominated the state and the civil society in the dominating state of the German empire, Prussia. They were a hardy lot, pioneers of world market agriculture with slave labour since the sixteenth century and used to work within small margins [13].

[12] M.C. Cleary, *Peasants, politicians and producers*, Cambridge University Press 1989; Annie Moulin, *Peasantry and society in France since 1789*, Cambridge University Press 1991; and André Gueslin, *Agricultural co-operatives versus farmers' unions in France*, and Yves Rinaudi & Geneviève Gavignaud, *The emergence of wine co-operatives in the Midi*, both in Flemming Just (ed), *Co-operatives and farmers' unions in Western Europe*. Georges Ferré: 1907, *La guerre du vin*, Loubatières 1997, relates the "wine war".

[13] Robert Moeller (ed), *Peasants and lords in modern Germany*, Allen & Unwin 1986; Hans Jürgen Puhle, *Politische Agrarbewegungen in kapitalistischen Industriegesellschaft*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1975.

The agricultural crisis in the 1870s hit the junkers as hard as the farmers. But unlike the peasants, the junkers were well organised through their monopoly of higher employments in the Prussian state. Without waiting for a political reaction from the farmers, they organised their own movement, first through the state and from 1893 also through a mass organisation open for all agriculturalists but under control of the junkers, Bund der Landwirte.

The immediate aim of Bund der Landwirte was protection for the German agriculture against the ravages of the world market. This satisfied the needs of the peasants as well as the junkers. Thanks to the state control of the junkers, this part of the program was carried out immediately: in 1894 protection duties were introduced for agricultural goods, which created prosperity for many farmers, even if the junkers took most of the money. The Kondratiev A wave from 1894 also contributed to the prosperity.

But Bund der Landwirte had also other items on their program, intended to put up a front against democratic tendencies threatening the junkers' power in the state: hate against Jews and Poles, demand for "strong men" instead of parliamentarism, demands for war and expansion eastwards, summed up in a defence for property against the unpropertied and a jingoist assertion of the superiority of the German people. And with "people", they didn't mean the lower classes as Grundtvig had done, but the "race".

This program was later something the farmers would associate with the good times between 1894 and 1914.

Bund der Landwirte didn't have a monopoly among the German farmers though. The Catholic and democratically egalitarian family farmers in Bavaria had strongest capability of organising. They had a tradition to build on, of Catholic suspicion against the superiority of Protestant Prussia, and against irreligious power-worshipping upper classes. So when they launched their Bauernbund or Farmer's Alliance in the 1890s to protect the price of food, the ideology was Catholic.

Bauernbund was egalitarian; against aristocrats and landlord privileges, anti-militarist but for government protection for agriculture and for branch lines of the railways, and for universal suffrage and freedom of speech. What made them a power was their anti-aristocratic touch: their first mobilization concerned a particular tax on all commoners in Bavaria.

Bauernbund remained organisatorically divided; it remained a political organisation while the cooperative movement that might have given them stability was organised by others with strong links to the big Center Party. For that reason Bauernbund swung considerably up and down depending on immediate struggle matters. It had a high tide just before the war, and another at the breakdown of the empire in 1918 when it founded the Bavarian Republic together with the labour movement.

The defeat in the war shattered the reputation of the junkers and forced the farmers to stand on their own feet in north Germany also. The circumstances were odious. The economy of the cooperatives was wrecked by the super-inflation of 1923 while the terms of trade of farmers deteriorated fast in the world market. The attempts from the government to protect agriculture with customs benefited only the junkers this time.

The farmers responded with delivery strikes. Their organisations were defined as

anti-socialist, since socialism was identified with urban interests and the kind of forced deliveries the war economy had begun and Social Democrat governments had continued. They also arranged mass demonstrations – in January 28, 1928 some 140.000 farmers demonstrated in Holstein against taxes, interests and food import. But all these actions were local.

Under these circumstances, three initiatives were taken to unite the agrarian movements nationally.

The first was one from the Bavarian Bauernbund, which tried to create a national farmers' party. The attempts fell because most leading activists in other German states supported other parties whose interest they put before the interests of the farmers.

The second was one from regional leaders of Bund der Landwirte, who tried to break away from the junker interests. This attempt fell because many of them saw the defence of traditional values as more important than defence of the interests of farmers, and for that reason supported conservative parties without exacting anything in return.

The third initiative came from the Nazis. They succeeded where the others had failed; they took by force of their well-oiled organisation over the leadership of Bund der Landwirte whose program they had already copied. Their Keynesian economic policy promised liberation from the tyranny of the world market. And their take-over of the agrarian movement was facilitated by the fact that so many non-Nazi farmer leaders were jailed for unionist activities.

Control over the agrarian organisations gave the Nazis a popular legitimacy which mobsters or skilful NGO managers would never have. And they inherited this role from the junkers, thanks to a paternalist organisation culture within the Bund der Landwirte. It is striking that the Bavarian base of Bauernbund remained anti-Nazi to the end. Their egalitarian organisation culture was impossible for operators to penetrate.

In the USA, the people's movement democracy tradition was stronger than in Germany. But nevertheless, the rank and file's inability to cope with strong shadow movements would have destructive consequences for the American domestic history and owing to that also for the global history [14].

We can read with Tocqueville about the USA in the early nineteenth century and its popular-dominated culture [15]. This society was cut to pieces by the civil war in the 1860s, which was a struggle between the northern industrialists' attempts to advance in the world market system and the southern cotton planters' ambitions to remain an aristocratic periphery in dependence of Britain, see chapter 6.

The civil war produced a speculative war industry, which after peace went on to conquer the rest of the economy, supported by the huge gains of war contracts. In due time, this attack resulted in system hegemony, see chapter 2. But the civil war also resulted in a hierarchic society, where the farmers and artisans of the north were filed up behind

[14] Hans Jürgen Puhle, *Politische Agrarbewegungen in kapitalistischen Industriegesellschaft*, Patrick H. Mooney & Theo J. Majka, *Farmers' and farm workers' movements*, Maxwell Macmillan 1995, and Lawrence Goodwyn, *The populist moment*, Oxford University Press 1978. The last one is so far I know also the book that coins the concept shadow movement.

[15] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, several editions, for example Vintage Books 1945.

the war industry while the farmers and artisans of the south were organised as support for the planters. After the peace this order remained, materialized in the republican and democrat parties.

The breakdown of the democratic peoples' movement society in the USA coincided with the crisis of the 1870s. The category that was hardest hit was the family farmers of the south.

These family farmers had always had a hard time. Most cultivated some cash crop, for example cotton or tobacco, but most were indebted to the merchant buyers who often were political bosses as well, and were able to pay only after the harvest. And then they had to borrow again. The 1870s crisis and the monetarist policy made things even worse.

The first family farmer association, Farmer's Alliance, was organised in 1877 in Lampasas, Texas. Not until 1885, the Alliance, at that time spread all over Texas, begun to deal with purchase and sale cooperatives. But the movement wouldn't be a success by economic means; it was not enough to get out of the debt trap. The decisive impulse was instead the idea of the popular movement genius S.O. Daws to keep one week mass meetings with travelling agitators for the cooperative idea. And it seems that mass meetings was the right thing to do during the nineteenth century; in this case they created a kind of radical popular movement culture that according to Goodwyn threatened to recreate the lost democracy of the US.

In 1886, the great railway strike broke out in Texas and Farmers' Alliance took its stand at the side of the workers. Farmers and workers were both declared as working people, and the railway companies were the main enemies of the farmers; the political aims formulated the same year were control over the railway unions' unfair freight rates, stop for land speculation and monetarist economic policy, and trade union rights for working people [16].

To be sure, the majority for these aim was slender. But this was no obstacle for expansion. Agitators were sent out over the cotton belt and the cooperative sales organisation was extended. In 1890 the Alliance had a million members, but the cooperative business didn't go well, lack of capital was always a great handicap. Increasingly, the focus of the movement was pushed over to politics, and to struggle against monetarism, anti-inflation and the gold standard.

The movements had also other problems that would never be overcome.

There was the deadlock of the civil war. The USA was divided in North and South, each with its political hierarchy, and none could be attacked for fear that the other faction would exploit the split.

There was also the inability to communicate with the urban industrial workers. Not for lack of good will – the identification of farmers as workers was firmly rooted in the agrarian movement. But because the worker majority consisted of fresh immigrants, ex-farmers ruined by American food import, who couldn't even speak the language of

[16] The role of railway companies in the robber capitalism of the late nineteenth century, and the main enemy to one of the mightiest popular movement mobilizations in the USA is probably the most important backdrop to the role of the auto in the popular American mythology. Through the private car, the Americans defeated the railway companies. I suppose Henry Ford saw this symbolism as he had farmer background.

the American farmers, and even less were able to take a stand for them. Not the least obstacle was the inability for Italian or Irish workers to understand American farmers' teetotalism.

The third problem was the geographical vastness of the USA. The indebted cotton farmers of the South had few interests in common with the so far prosperous grain farmers in the Midwest.

The fourth was the division of the southern farmers themselves, between whites and blacks. The Alliance did its best to include black farmers in the movements, but they proved hard to approach. Their dependency, precarious position and lack of self-confidence made them weak fighters; more than once they acted as strike-breakers and support for local bosses. And after the defeat of the movement, this guided white farmers' opinion of blacks for two generations.

The Alliance pinned its faith to politics. But how do this without challenging the paternalist system that also the members of the Alliance were a part of? First they simply supported candidates who promised to support them, but these promises were never fulfilled. Then they began to launch their own candidates, with spectacular success in Kansas in 1888. Three years after it was formalized in a political party, the Populist Party, with an aim to struggle for union power to put an end to the anti-inflation policy. At the 1892 election the party won successes in states where the Alliance had a strong cooperative organisation – Texas, Kansas, Georgia and Alabama.

The Populists were successful in some other states. But these were of another kind. Since no strong popular movement culture had been built up, the electoral successes could not be translated to effective politics. The elected politicians proved completely impotent against railway corporations, banks and wholesale dealers, and many of them changed sides rather than fighting.

In the election of 1896 these took over the Populist Party. They dominated 30 state organisations, the popular movements only four. And since the need for professional politicians is to be elected and get offices, they forced through an amalgamation with the Democrat party and the Democrat program.

With that, Populism was dead as a political movement, and the aspiration of the farmers for popular hegemony was at an end. The victory for the Republican candidate, the business lawyer McKinley, only confirmed the weakness and demoralization of popular politics. And the defeat, and shame over having lost the movements to political opportunists and middle class urban intellectuals, gave rise to two typical American phenomena that superficially look like opposites: an intense gulf between popular politics and intellectual reform without popular base [17], and an extreme subalternity, i.e. incapacity for popular movements to take responsibility beyond their own niches. Not even the successful labour movement of the thirties was able to take this hegemonic grasp, with the effect that the political superiority of professional middle class politicians

[17] Richard Hofstadter, *The age of reform*, Random House 1955, has related how upper middle class politicians stole the reform demands of the agrarian movement, realizing them in such a way that their democratic potential was lost.

remained unmoved. Subsequently, all agrarian movements were sectorial, aiming at economic relief for farmers, but nothing beyond that.

Despite all failures, the European and North American farmers, in contemporaneousness with labour and national movements, succeeded in breaking down the food regime of the 1870s. Against free trade with grain and meat, they successively forced through national food security as the superior principle for food supply. This principle was a part of the different varieties of emergency policies in the USA, Scandinavia and Germany in the thirties, finally confirmed in Bretton Woods in 1944. The tyrannical power of the world market was harnessed, and the states gave themselves power, right and duty to protect the living standards of their citizens.

The market where the break was most distinct was the food market, for it had been most attacked by popular movements. When the food markets were reorganised from the thirties, and particularly from 1944, the agrarian producers' cooperatives were partners of the state [18].

This was an ambiguous success for the spontaneous expressions of life of the civil society, which the cooperatives originally were intended to protect. This for two reasons.

The first, most elementary reason was that also cooperatively organised farmers act on a market. And the world market favours always the most well-adjusted. There was for this reason always a tendency that the farmers most well-adapted to the world market exclude the others and establish themselves as agri-business, and moreover, that the cooperatives help in the process to promote their own competitiveness. Sometimes the cooperatives even abolished themselves, converting themselves to joint-stock companies [19].

The second was that new forms were developed to exploit the farmers.

In the food regime established from the mid-nineteenth century, agriculture was for technical reasons not very well integrated in the capitalist system. The production of food was ruled by biological processes that capitalists couldn't understand, and it was for this reason impossible to organise it in the same way as production of shoes and bottles was organised, with wage-labourers working under the supervision of capitalists. The production had to be organised artisan-like by autonomous households. Instead, capitalists were reduced to exploit the farmers through their control of marketing.

But with the emergency politics of the thirties a new opportunity opened. Almost everywhere this policy built on production subsidies. The consequence was that it was profitable to increase production, which created a market for agricultural machinery, fertilizers, and seed. Commercial relations began to spread within the food chains.

According to Friedmann and McMichael, the new food regime after 1944 implied that three industrial complexes were built up around food production. They were the

[18] Harriet Friedmann, *The family farm and the international food regimes*, in Theodor Shanin (ed), *Peasants and peasant societies*, Penguin 1988; Harriet Friedmann & Philip McMichael, *Agriculture and the state system*, in *Sociologia Ruralis* 29-2; William Friedland et al (ed), *Towards a new political economy of agriculture*, Westview Press 1991; and David Goodman & Michael Redclift, *Refashioning nature*.

[19] According to André Gueslin, in Flemming Just (ed), *Co-operatives and farmers' unions in Western Europe*.

wheat complex, dominating the trade with American wheat, which used this to dump the prices in the south; the canned goods complex, which replaced southern ingredients in northern produce with high-processed north-products; and the meat complex, which used crops from the whole world to raise cattle sold as food for wealthy people in the north. Within the domains of these complexes, food production was industrialized, i.e. farmers and their artisan-like work was subsumed under industrial discipline and replaced as much as possible with machinery, according to the American model that demanded cheap energy and abundant land.

These factors put together implied that the central political power over food production was moved from farmers to capitalists and industrial workers. These operated increasingly, according with the principles established during the USA hegemony, within globally organised large-scale enterprises. The system of perfectly competing farmers locked into a vice of monopolies was thus confirmed.

The farmers of the system center thus lost much of their political power after 1944. They were able, thanks to their cooperative organising, to see to it that state and market bought them off individually to a good price. But they were unable to assert their principles and preserve themselves as political actors.

Primarily, there were three countries left where they had some scope of action: USA, France and Norway.

The USA was the home country of agri-business. This was a consequence of the fact that USA was the leading country of the new food regime, but also that the independent agrarian movement was so divided and subaltern. Farmers' Alliance survived the breakdown to be sure, and even succeeded in growing as a cooperative movement, but it never got hegemony within the agrarian movement. The wheat and corn farmers of the Midwest had their own organisations, like the dairy farmers of the northeast. These organisations were often locally and sectorially limited.

In the confused muddle of non-cooperating organisations the government took the initiative and formed its own paternalist organisation, American Farm Bureau Federation, with the aim to help the ignorant farmers to develop into effective food producers at the bottom of the commodity chain. The farmers would for a long time regard this organisation with utmost suspicion, but during the crisis of the thirties they had no choice. If they would have any of the loans and subsidies of the New Deal they had to support the AFBF and accept its aim, market efficiency, as their own. Local resistance could easily be isolated and broken.

The permanent conditions of war after 1940 created a boom for food and some prosperity for the farmers. This led to a temporary thinning out of the populist inheritance – radical politics was seen as a threat to war and prosperity. But dependence on the world market is insecure. Towards the late fifties, violent price swings caused new mobilisations among farmers. But they were also patchy, so for that reason it took time for a new attitude to AFBF and agri-business to grow.

An early instance of independent organising was National Farmers' Organization in Iowa, a strike organisation against the cooperatives, which according to the farmers run the same politics as capitalist enterprises. They invented the telephone chain as a strug-

gle method when they organised strike pickets. Their drastic methods against scabs made them newsy, which spread their influence west of the Mississippi. They also developed as cooperative marketers, but they were crushed by the state and the banks after some decade, with economic means.

During the peoples' movement wave of the seventies other even more divided movements appeared instead. Some of these, like for example American Agriculture Movement, grew fast and organised for some periods about half the farmers in some states. But they relied in lobbying with media support and failed to mobilize locally, which doomed them. Others have been even more local and short-termed. But common to them was that they linked up with old populist anti-capitalism, countryside fundamentalism – and ecological consciousness, an effect of their struggle with the chemical corporations [20].

It is because of this retained ability to mobilize, that the US agrarian movement have been able to take the initiative, together with the Indian, the French and the Central American agrarian movements, to a global resistance to the new corporate food regime of the twenty-first century.

It was also during this period the agrarian movement in France finally was able to organise independently. The old paternalist organisations asserted themselves poorly during the slump of the thirties, and many of them discredited themselves through collaboration with the Germans during the occupation. After liberation, the soil was open. The initiative was taken by a group of French “Grundtvigians” – members of the Catholic youth organisation Jeunes Catholiques; Christians who despised the hierarchies and took a stand for self-organised adult education, not least for women [21].

They saw to it that the farmers joined one organisation in 1945 that unlike earlier organisations were ruled by the farmers themselves. They formed the Gaullist food policy, implying development of the countryside for government money. They also broke with it when it was evident that this development only favoured the most prosperous farmers. It was also they who developed the radical struggle methods of the French farmers – dumping of poorly paid food at the town halls and blocking the motorways with tractors.

If the farmers of the system center were present in a weak way during the post-war era, farmers in the system periphery so much stronger. Here, it is possible to talk about a long peoples' movement cycle that is begun in the early twentieth century and doesn't grow ripe until the early seventies.

The system periphery: land reform and national movements

The peasants of the world market periphery have since the instigation of the system in the sixteenth century remained its bottom-rock underclass. They have had least bargaining power towards the rulers of the system. The farmers of the system center have at least had an opportunity to disturb the public order and the peace and quiet of the

[20] According to Mooney & Majka.

[21] M.C. Cleary, Peasants, politicians and producers.; Annie Moulin, Peasantry and society in France since 1789; and André Gueslin, Agricultural co-operatives versus farmers' unions in France

rulers. And the wage workers of the system periphery were at least able to strike. The peasants haven't had much of these opportunities. They have been far from the levers of the system, and it has been easy to play some of them out against others, over the whole world. When the twentieth century began, they were alone of having got no integration whatsoever in the form of democratic and social reforms. For them – a majority about the year 1900 – the world market system thus was plunder and nothing but that.

The forms of this plunder varied however in different parts of the world. Not only parts of the world for that matter; since the world market system took over adjusted and adjusted itself to, local regimes and systems of exploitation, the forms might vary from village to village, or even individually.

Roughly however, it has been possible during the twentieth century to distinguish between three agricultural regimes, shown on the map [22].

- The bimodal regime, or the latifundia system. It is characterised by the fact that almost all land is owned by very few, who let the direct producers, the “peasants” cultivate it for wages, part of the harvest, or/and a right to cultivate a small part of the land for themselves. The latifundias were always established by a European state, at the expense of the forms below. The original reasons for establishing it may have varied, but about 1900 they were all engaged in some form of commercial agriculture for sale or even export.

- Family farming, or the clientelist system. This is characterised by the fact that the whole scale exists, from landlords over more or less prosperous farmers, both owners and leaseholders, to crofters and landless workers. This is the “traditional” system in all densely populated agricultural societies, including Europe. In this system, a great variety of exploitation forms appear – taxes, price manipulation, corruption, low wages and high leases, and they hit unevenly. As the name suggests, there are often local strongmen, whose interests are not necessarily the same as other farmers', crofters' or land workers' interests.

- Customary land tenure systems. Here, the land is owned by the clan or the family, and the cultivator has only a user right. This is the typical “traditional” regime where there is abundant land. The traditional form of exploitation, which was inherited by the Europeans, were taxes and forced labour. The world market system also implied another pain – introduction of Roman law, and individual ownership made compulsory, not always in the name of the cultivator but rather some powerful strongman or tax-collector.

Agrarian movement during these three regimes are different and worth considering separately.

Cultivators in a bimodal system usually struggle for their own land. Cultivators in a customary land tenure system struggle for keeping the state at a distance, or for better prices if they sell their produce. And cultivators in a family farming system are stuck in a cobweb of conflicts.

[22] According to Solon Barraclough, *An end to hunger*, Zed 1991.



Figur 7:1. Agricultural regimes in late 19th century, Hatched indicates latifundias with belonging minifundias for landworkers, in Latin America, East Europe, Great Britain, western Mediterranean, northern India etc. Dark grey indicates a mixture of family farms and manors. Light grey indicates collectively owned villages according to customary law. China is changing to hatched, Ireland is changing to grey after the successful struggle of the Irish Land League.

Agrarian movements in a bimodal system

I will begin with agrarian movements in a bimodal system, since this is simplest and since they have marked the twentieth century at least up to 1974 and for that reason left most literature [23].

One or another form of bimodal regime seems to have been the most obvious way for the European upper classes to introduce their world market system during the first centuries. It was established in Andalusia when it was conquered from the Arabs; the military chiefs parted the land between them and let workers run it for them. In the same way South America was parted between Spanish conquerors, and what it could not digest was delegated to the domestic upper class to own on the same conditions; the aim was primarily not land but control over silver. In eastern Europe and Ireland, grain exporters made peasants into serfs in latifundias on conditions reminding of the South American. At the Caribbean, from Bahia to Potomac, European merchants established

[23] Case studies apart, there are Rehman Sobhan, *Agrarian reform and social transformation*, Zed 1993; John P. Powelson & Richard Stock, *The peasant betrayed – agriculture and land reform in the Third World*, Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain 1987; Howard Handelman (ed), *The politics of agrarian change in Asia and Latin America*, Indiana University Press 1981; and Demetrios Christodoulou, *The unpromised land*, Zed 1990. They all focus on the cultivators as victims. One book that is almost unique for focusing on the cultivators as actors is Jeffrey Paige, *Agrarian revolution*.

plantations for tropical export crops and put African slaves to work there. In northern India, the British East India Company decided that the domestic bailiffs or tax-collectors should consider themselves owners of the peasants' land. In Algeria, South Africa and Kenya, European settlers established latifundias while they chased away the earlier cultivators by means of government-supported violence, after which they were allowed to come back as tenants or land workers. In this way, the system periphery was mobilized to produce cheap crops for the center.

In the whole system periphery, regardless if agriculture was organised as latifundias or not, the legal and ideological guise for the violence was Roman law, and to force putative owners to write their names in a land register. The consequence was often that urban interests or the colonisers themselves beat the peasants to it and took over as formal owners.

The immediate reaction of the peasants is described in chapter 4. These immediate reactions were rather fruitless, except of course that all resistance makes the rulers be more careful. There were only three bimodal zones where the cultivators reached any decisive result before the late nineteenth century. In the Caribbean plantations, the Haitian revolution and numerous small rebellions resulted in that slavery was replaced with wage-labour or share-cropping during the nineteenth century. In the East European grain estates, the peasants got the right to buy off parts of their previous farms and their personal freedom, if they had any money. In both cases, a contributing reason for liberation was that forced labour is ineffective and extremely sensitive to everyday resistance. The only reason why it was used at all was rather imperfections in the market system. As soon as the state was able to guarantee the unequal distribution of property effectively enough, wage labour was more profitable, alternatively family farming exploited through the marketing system.

But from the early twentieth century, the pressure began to grow on the bimodal system. This is to some extent related to the increasingly effective resistance to the European rule over the world, see chapter 6, and an increasingly peoples' movement system in general. The bimodal system was a part of the colonial system, and was attacked as such. With a lot of success, for a while.

But it is also related to the fact that the latifundias found it difficult to adapt to the decline of the food regime of the 1870s and the emergence of the Bretton Woods system. The land owners had, to survive the increasing competition, to relinquish their roles as protective patrons and convert themselves into lean managers. And this provoked the direct producers to militant defence of their subsistence.

The pioneer, as in so many cases in social movement history, was the Irish, the third zone of the above mentioned.

The land of Ireland was owned by English landlords, mostly absentees, and was rented by Irish peasants. When food prices fell in the 1870s due to competition from American import, the leases were kept at the earlier high levels. The rural discontent was organised into a national movement, and the organizers were the Irish nationalists in the Irish Republican Brotherhood. It had up to then been an urban phenomenon, but it saw the opportunity to win a mass base in its struggle with the British rule. Together with

local rural mobilisations and a few parliamentarians they founded the Irish Land League with the aim to decrease the lease or if possibly take over the land themselves [24].

The method was primarily resistance to evictions of peasants in arrears.

This was a popular and often successful method that involved the whole district. Peasants who took over evicted peasants' place were banned – nobody would speak or deal with them, and when this method was extended to the estate managers the language was endowed with a new word, coined after the estate manager John Boycott in Co. Mayo. And the peasants used every possible trick – roadblocks, summons, reoccupation of emptied farmsteads – to make collection cumbersome for the landlords. The latter increasingly became the main strategy. The movement was integrated by the urban middle class nationalists and became so strong that it could elect the majority of parliamentary seats in Ireland; it also dominated local politics and local courts in countryside Ireland, and after a few years the British state was compelled to a tenancy legislation and began to buy off the estate owners and sell their land cheap to the peasants.

The Irish agrarian movement was significant in Ireland, but on the global level only the Mexican agrarian movement made a hegemonic impact. It was the Mexican movement, together with the Indian and the Chinese, that put land reform at the global agenda [25].

This despite that the agrarian movement in Mexico was a local affair that hardly went beyond the borders of the state of Morelos.

Morelos belongs to the densely populated central tableland of Mexico. Sugar plantations had begun to establish themselves there in the late 19th century, protected by Diaz's development despotism (see chapter 6, the section Post-colonial movements). The villages tried to protect themselves with lawsuits and weren't completely unsuccessful despite the corrupt judicature. But in 1909 the planters changed tactics. So far, they had relied on bribed judges. But now this was not enough; the planters had invested heavily in equipment that required increased sales to pay off. So they took, with the help of Diaz, complete control over the state legislature and made it a law that the planters could take over all land in the state if they wanted.

The villages tried to defend themselves with petitions to the central government but with no avail. What emboldened them to go further was an instance of contemporaneity: when the middle class constitutionalist movement took to arms in the north in November 1910, the peasants of the village of Anenecuilco invaded a newly stolen field and planted maize.

[24] Paul Bew: Land and the national question in Ireland 1858-1882, Gill and Macmillan 1978; Samuel Clark & James S Donnelly (ed): Irish peasants – violence and political unrest 1780-1914, The university of Wisconsin Press 1983, and F.S.L: Lyons: Ireland since the famine, Fontana 1971. There seems to be a real dearth for books on the Irish Land war, despite the importance of the subject.

[25] John Womack: Zapata and the Mexican Revolution, Alfred A. Knopf 1969, is still the book most quoted by people writing on the Mexican agrarian movement. It ends in 1920; for later times there are Dana Markiewicz: The Mexican Revolution and the limits of agrarian reform, Lynne Rienner 1993; Gerardo Otero: Agrarian reform in Mexico, in William Thiesenhausen (ed): Searching for agrarian reform in Latin America, Unwin Hyman 1989 and The new agrarian movement in Mexico 1979-1990, University of London 1990. John P Powelson & Richard Stock: The peasant betrayed contains a chapter about Mexico. And Ann L Craig: The first agraristas, University of California Press 1983 describes villages passed by of the Zapatist movement.

The authorities kept a low profile because they were busy controlling the northern insurrection. And two other villages, Ayala and Noyotepec, joined Anenecuilco and established a joint fund. As chairman they elected the mayor of Anenecuilco municipality, Emiliano Zapata.

It is fitting here to define the concept “peasants”. The peasants called themselves *campesinos*, i.e. country people. What acted were the villages, collectively, like during the early world market system, see chapter 4. The bimodal system had not given space for stratification among the peasants; all identified with the village regardless of profession [26].

Small successes, for both the little agrarian movement and the democracy movement in the north, called for bolder projects. At the Shrove Sunday Market next year in the small town of Cuautla, Zapata together with the local teacher proclaimed revolution and association with the democracy movement. The aim was land reform in Morelos.

Now, the Mexican establishment hurried to co-opt the democracy movement, appointed its leader Francisco Madero as president and sent an army to Morelos to deal with the peasants. This proved more difficult than expected.

For with their pillages, village-burnings, massacres and mass deportations, the occupying armies gave the villagers no choice. To survive they had to take to the woods. And in the woods, they had to organise to fight. In this way, the Zapatist peasant army was born, and they turned out to be as skilful soldiers as the professional ones.

But the villagers also organised politically. They formulated their program, The Ayala Plan [27], and spread it over the country. They had good help from the press, which depicted them as a center for all subversive activities, enticing revolutionary youth from all the country to the peasant base. These urban youths – the secretaries, as they were called – would be useful to manage the correspondence, communications and administration of the peasant movement.

In April 1913 a new rebellion broke out in the north, because meanwhile Madero had been killed and the army had taken power. The military pressure on Morelos was lifted

[26] For example, Zapata himself was a horse breeder, his brother Eufemio was a fruit dealer, other of the future leaders of the movement were teachers, limeworkers or farm-hands. The picture is supported by an investigation about the agrarian movement in Peru in the 60s; the labour migrants were leading, they had experience of city life and/or labour organising (Gavin Smith: *Livelihood and resistance – peasants and the politics of land in Peru*, University of California Press 1989).

[27] The Ayala Plan, named after the district where the three villages were situated, had 15 items. They may be summarized thus: 1. Madero has deserted his own program. 2. Madero is thus dismissed. 3. Instead, the certain Orozco is named as successor. 4. Morelos has a right to its own program. 5. The revolution should be done methodically, not to leave any Díaz people in power. 6. All land stolen from the villages must be left back. 7. The peasants have right to more if they can't get a living from the old land. 8. All the lands owned by the Díaz upper class should be nationalised and given to the peasants. 9. The model from the nationalisation of church lands in the 1860s can be used. 10. Those who don't support this are traitors. 11. The cost for the revolution is taken account for in Madero's original plan. 12. A future interim president should be appointed by the revolutionaries in common, and he should call an election immediately. 13. Each state should do the same. 14. The present rulers will be pardoned if they retire immediately. 15. A rhetoric summing up. New items were added step by step and the old items were changed after the political situation. It may be added that “plan” is Mexican for political manifesto. The Plan can be read in full at <http://www.ilstu.edu/class/hist263/docs/ayala.html>

somewhat and the peasant army could mount an offensive. While the so-called constitutionalists approached Mexico D.F. from the north, it was flooded from the south by the peasant army. In August 1914, the government fled and left power to the constitutionalists. The peasant army went home to carry out their own land reform, according to the Ayala plan.

While Mexico during 1915 was ruled by military adventurers or not at all, Morelos was ruled by the villages and their elected councils. They took back the stolen land, and shared the plantations between them; some of the plantations with belonging refineries were maintained though, for cash. The “secretaries” saw to it that the new title-deeds were written into the land registers and maps. It looked as if everything was all right, according to the traditional countryside way of life.

But in October, the grip of the constitutionalists hardened. They were uninterested in land reforms, they wanted business as usual, and demanded submission from the peasants. After some weeks of bargaining they sent in the army.

This occupation was worse than the previous one: it burnt villages and deported people even more energetic than the military dictatorship had managed to do. The peasant army had to fight again; after two years they had succeeded to chase the army out of Morelos but at that time a fourth of the inhabitants were dead.

The Zapatist army had shown that it was able to carry out a land reform, and it had shown that it was able to beat armies. But it couldn't do both at the same time. To keep plundering soldiers away it had to be militarily mobilized. But then it couldn't organise the civil society or even tend the land.

It surely tried. In 1917 it organised something of a political party in the villages to defend the villages against militarist tendencies with the peasant army, and nurture democratic autonomy, for example to run schools. But the pressure was too hard, from poverty and the uncertain future.

During 1918 the understanding grew that alliances from outside Morelos was needed to get permanent results, or even survive. At first they were difficult to get. But during 1919, the conflicts grew among the ruling constitutionalists; a reformist faction with a base in the commercial middle class in Sonora was increasingly marginalized by traditional landowners, and the alliance-making of the Zapatists were beginning to ripen.

In April 1920 the leading reformist Obregón – a general with good ties to the Yaqui Indians – was threatened by prosecution and fled to the Zapatists. And while local reformists rebelled in self-defence, Obregón and the Zapatist army conquered the capitol together.

During Obregón's presidency 1920-1924, the Zapatists were a part of the ruling coalition. They gained from it. The Ayala Plan was made into law, and since they controlled the ministry of agriculture and were mobilized locally they could use the law to wipe out all remnants of the sugar plantations. And their battle-cry *Tierra y Libertad* was made the national motto and symbol. But they had to pay for it also. Unlike when they carried out the land reform themselves, bureaucrats had to approve every step they took. And they grew increasingly parsimonious with time.

The reason for this was the local limitations of the agrarian movement. In the rest of

Mexico the peasants weren't mobilized to undertake any land reform, so it was a sluggish thing to do. When it was done, in the thirties, after a new peasant rebellion in the state of Michoacán, it was as a paternalist concession from the state. For that reason, the state could lay claims to political and economic support. For a very effective method was invented in Mexico to get the peasants to pay for the country's advancement in the world market system, by buying dear and selling cheap to state monopolies [28]. This method would later be used in the whole world.

For that reason, the gains of the agrarian movement would be undermined with time. From the second world war, the rulers of Mexico concentrated on agriculture for export, which was more profitable for them and for the state, even if they now and then proclaimed new land reforms to reassure the agrarian movement which never demobilized completely, despite cooptation in paternalistic organisations [29].

The success of the Mexican agrarian movement is perhaps appreciated better when compared to its contemporaneous counterparts in Russia. There, the peasants were even more brilliantly successful in seizing the land from the landlords in 1917. But the easiness of the task, the fact that they never had to organise more than at village level, made them easy victims for the new Russian state bourgeoisie when these needed resources for the Russian world market career. When the latifundia system was resurrected in 1929, to the misfortune of the food supply, the peasants had few opportunities to defend themselves. Scattered strikes and even violent resistance against regime henchmen could only force through small concessions [30].

The link between resistance to the bimodal agricultural regime and anti-colonial movements was – of course – forged in India. The anti-colonial movement pioneered (if one doesn't count Ireland) a mass movement in India, and this implied engaging peasants to struggle for their interests against the colonial power – see chapter 6.

A movement for land reform against the colonial system was an effective combination. For it made it necessary for the global anti-colonial coalition to attack the bimodal system everywhere [31].

The Indian peasants had managed a defence struggle against the land thefts of the British state from the beginning: what the peasants had regarded from time immemorial as village and county commons was treated as belonging to the state, and the peasants were deprived of their usufructs. Since the peasants needed the commons for wood and

[28] Gerardo Otero, *Agrarian reforms in Mexico – Capitalism and the state*, in William Thiesenhusen, *Searching for agrarian reform in Latin America*, Unwin Hyman 1989; Neil Harvey, *The new agrarian movement in Mexico 1979-1990*, University of London 1990; and *Democracy Backgrounder 1.1: Land and liberty in rural Mexico*, <http://daisy.uwaterloo.ca/~alopez-o/politics/landliberty.html>

[29] The Mexican peasant organisation CNC was founded at an initiative by Zapata's chief of staff and successor Gildardo Magaña. But at that time, Magaña had little to do with the peasants of Morelos; he was a general in the army and would soon take up a post as governor of the neighbour state of Michoacán.

[30] Described in chapter 6. For sources see Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's peasants*, Oxford University Press 1994, and Victor Magagna, *Communities of grain*, Cornell University Press 1991.

[31] Some authors, for example Eric Wolf, have seen peasant movements as the core and driving force of the national movements, and called the great revolutions of the twentieth century as "peasant wars" (Wolf, *Peasant wars of the twentieth century*, Harper & Row 1973). I think this is an exaggeration, if you think of the result of the revolutions. But certainly there was an alliance.

other things they had to break the bans and sometimes defy the military power of the occupiers. This was a locally based and uncoordinated mass movement as early as in the nineteenth century, decades before Gandhi had begun to formulate it as a strategy, as disobedience, and coordinate it nationally [32].

These movements were however limited to the mountainous peripheries of India. In the densely populated plains it was according to Dhanagare only in the twenties that the peasants began to assert their interests collectively and in an organised form. For better or for worse, it was the national movement that taught the tactics. Not because the nationalists were interested in the conditions of the peasants in the first place, but because they realized that they couldn't win against the British if they didn't engage the whole people [33].

But the Indian National Congress consisted of people from the urban middle class. For that reason it was natural that they turned to the cultivators that most resembled themselves, to the commercialised farmers halfway up in the hierarchy, who mostly had poor land workers to do most of the work for them. The movements of poor peasants and land workers against high prices of food during the war left them cold; only the sinking prices for the products of commercial farmers after the crash of 1929 triggered them to systematically thematizing the problems of the farmers.

The class structure in the Indian countryside was not two-tiered – landowners and peasants – but three-tiered. There were the owners who sometimes were zamindars, taxmen who had been granted ownership by the British, sometimes merchants or money-lenders who had taken land for forfeited loans. Then there was a middle layer of farmers who managed the farming with right of usufruct. And finally there were the landless labourers who mostly did the labour for the farmers. In some regions there were even more layers, for example in the Bengal where there were big and small landowners and tenants without rights.

According to Indian parlance these layers were described as high-caste, low-caste and untouchables, see chapter 3. Each caste may be described as a guild with a more or less well-formed internal organisation. This organisation would, in the case of the low-caste, be used by the farmers when they built their agrarian movement.

The initiator of the farmer strategy within the National Congress was Mohandas Gandhi. An important reason why he mobilised the richer farmers was that he didn't want any conflict between Indians, even if some of them were landowners by grace of the British. He wanted to attack the British directly. And the most well-placed for this were the tax-payers, who had something to withdraw. Such fairly prosperous farmers were the indigo cultivators in Champaran in Bihar and the farmers in Kheda in Gujarat whose movements Gandhi took part in in the tens.

[32] Vandana Shiva, *Ecology and the politics of survival*, Sage 1991.

[33] D.N. Dhanagare, *Peasant movements in India*, Oxford University Press 1983, Sunil Sen, *Peasant movements in India*, K.P. Bagchi 1982, and A.R. Desai, *Peasant struggles in India*, Oxford University Press 1979. Gail Omvedt, *Caste, agrarian relations and agrarian conflicts*, in A.R. Desai, *Agrarian struggles in India after independence*, Oxford University Press 1986, and T.K. Oommen, *Protest and change*, *Studies in social movements*, Sage 1990, describe the class structure in the countryside.

But with the mobilizing of farmers, the National Congress had set in motion a process they couldn't control.

The disobedience campaign in 1930-32 built on the ability of the more prosperous to withhold taxes. In parts of the Ganges plain the campaign was extended to refusal of paying the rent. But the campaign was directed against the government; in 1932 the Congress achieved an agreement about autonomy of the provinces, and the campaign was suspended.

But some of the farmers who had taken part in the campaign were not at all in the mood being demobilized. For the small family farmers, the government was not the only problem. For them, the rent was more important. So they went on with their campaign, with demonstrations, mass meetings and violent resistance against the landlords' men when they came to evict them.

This was to a great extent done with only local organisation. The peasants of villages or counties utilized the contemporaneousness created by the nationalist movement to assert their trade-unionist claims. But there were also attempts made to coordinate the movement. The prime movers were the Kamma and Reddi castes of Andhra and the Yadav and Kurmi castes of Bihar, together with middle class intellectuals in the communist party. In 1936 they went together in Kisan Sabha or Farmers' Alliance, which aimed at asserting the economic claims of the farmers and in the long run abolish the landlord system and give full ownership to the farmers.

Kisan Sabha never got the organising capacity the activists dreamt about. The agrarian movement was even afterwards a local or at most a regional affair. They also had trouble with their relations to sharecroppers and landless workers further down the social ladder, and their enemies were sometimes skilful exploiting this fact. And the movement was unevenly spread over India. But at the local and provincial level, the Kisan Sabha alliance was yet effective enough to change the social balance towards the small farmers over all India during the next generation.

When the Congress was allowed to form provincial governments in 1937, this awoke expectations among the farmers, and their strike movements grew. The movement seems to have been particularly active in the Ganges plain and above all in the Bengal. There was no coordinated planning, the farmers acted locally protected by the contemporaneousness of the movement. In the Bengal, sharecroppers – tenants paying with part of the harvest – managed their own versatile movement against both farmers with right of possession and landlords and moneylenders.

In August 8, 1942, the Congress launched its Quit India campaign, and the farmers rallied to it. Despite the fact that most of the Congress leaders were rounded up and jailed, the farmers rose locally in the United Provinces, Bihar, Bengal, Maharashtra and Tamilnadu, chased away the British police, blocked the railways and organised their own authorities at village and county level. Ranga contends that the British in some regions didn't dare to return for years. The government succeeded to restore order to be sure, but it didn't last long [34].

[34] N.G. Ranga, Indian peasants' struggles and achievements, in A.R. Desai, Peasant struggles in India. Ranga

For when the war ended, the farmers mobilized again. It was still a matter of local refusals to pay rents and taxes, but in three regions the movements achieved some coordination. In the Bengal, the rice sharecroppers demanded decreased rents and refused to deliver the harvest before the demand was approved. In Malabar in the present Kerala and surroundings tenants and land workers strove separately but with growing cooperation. In the part of present Andhra that is called Telengana, the agrarian movement grew to revolution; the princely state that controlled the region collapsed and the agrarian movement administered the countryside half a year before the new Indian state sent the army to repress it. Meanwhile, the movement grew to something more than a movement of Reddi and Kamma farmers with right of possession; landless workers got parts of the land, and women took part in the administrative power. To make the farmers competent to assert their citizenship, the movement managed an ambitious education program. Some students contend however that this focus on the least privileged made the Reddi-Kamma alliance less eager to support the movement, thus contributing to its downfall [35].

After independence, the weight of the farmers have however continued to grow. The national movement's dependence of mass mobilizations gave the farmers an influence on the politics of the independent state. Urban interests, struggling with each other, have been forced to appeal to the farmers' caste organisations for support, and have been forced to promise continued land reform to get it. The process has sometimes halted, and the farmers have been forced to resort to land occupations and tax refusal to get it afoot again, and the process has not gone equally fast everywhere. But since the eighties, the farmers is a force that struggle in earnest for hegemony in India [36].

So the Indian agrarian movement was successful. So was also the agrarian movement in the other giant state China. It succeeded in carrying through the most ambitious land reform in the world, thanks to its alliance with the national movement. The subordinated or subaltern role of the agrarian movement would however guarantee that the land reform wasn't realized to the primary benefit of the farmers but more to the benefit of the Chinese state – in a way analogous to the Mexican case, the state was able to utilize the land reform to create mechanisms which let the farmers pay not only the industrialization of the country but also the consumption of the urban population.

The achievements of the alliance are described in chapter 6. But the history can also be told focused on the agrarian movement [37].

The traditional Chinese order had been rather favourable for the rice cultivators; they

was chairman in the All-Indian Kisan Sabha and he may have an interest in making the movement look more effective than it was – but Francis G. Hutchins: *Gandhi and the Quit india Movement*, Harvard University Press 1973 confirms it.

[35] Barry Pavier, *The Telengana movement*, Vikas 1981.

[36] The literature on this is fixed on the role of the state. I have relied on oral information from Staffan Lindberg, University of Lund.

[37] Jean Chesneau, *Peasant revolts in China 1840-1949*, Thames and hudson 1973. The period after 1949 is described, unfortunately focused on the state, by Edwin E Moise, *Land reform in China and North Vietnam*, The University of north Carolina Press 1983.

had bargaining power thanks to their technical skill [38]. But the nineteenth century, with its dissolution of the traditional order had been a time of social sinking for most people in the countryside, according to Moise. And the twentieth century was even worse. Instead of a taxing regime, they got mutually warring armies to provide for, the so-called warlords who misruled China between 1912 and 1927 had to plunder their provinces to get resources to maintain themselves against their rivals.

Incapable of paying all duties, the peasants had to convey their land to strongmen – landowners, moneylenders etc – with good relations to one warlord or another, against the right to stay and work for a part of the harvest.

The traditional conflict organising of the Chinese peasants were the so-called secret societies, see chapter 3. The societies organised mutual help, smuggled salt and were during tumultuous times recruiting bases for peasant rebellions. In the early twentieth century, the most important secret societies in south China were the Society of the Elder Brothers or Gelaohui, and the so-called Triads or the Society of the Three Harmonies or Sanhehui. In the north the most important were heaven and Earth Society or Tiandihui which went back to the White Lotus of the fourteenth century, see chapter 4. The societies were more networks than hierarchies; they were for that reason hard to wipe out but they were also usually incapable to concentrate on greater projects [39].

The fall of the empire in 1911 had been impossible hadn't the republicans had useful contacts to secret societies; Sun Yatsen and his closest collaborators were members of several, and risings arranged of them accompanied the formal republican takeover in the cities. Pressured by the economic exploitation and the military harassment in the China of the warlords, these societies were used for revolts according to the old catchword "attack the rich, protect the poor".

The advantage of the societies was legitimacy. The disadvantage was the lack of mobilizable resources. Rebellions of secret societies might make the Chinese provinces ungovernable and hard to tax. But they were not able to establish an order of their own against the armies of the warlords. To succeed, the Chinese farmers had to make use of modern weapons, in the form of effective organisation and language – to mobilize enough support they had to set the aim of a Chinese renaissance. They were able to borrow these weapons from the national movement assembled in the communist party – but only on conditions.

The Chinese communist party had a background in a student movement for national renaissance around 1920. They had been invited by merchants in Shanghai to take part in a nationalist counter-regime able to unite China and assert Chinese interests in the world market. Faithful to communist ideals, most of its members were more interested in what happened in the cities and the industry. But most of the members had also an origin in the countryside, and with some of them solidarity with their native ground won over

[38] Ravi Arvind Palat, Historical transformations in agrarian systems based on wet-rice cultivation, in Philip McMichael, Food and agrarian orders in the world-economy, Praeger 1995.

[39] Jean Chesneaux (ed), Popular movements and secret societies in China 1840-1950, Stanford University Press 1972.

ideology; they used the government party position to organise peasant unions in the base of the counter-regime, Guangdong-Guangxi in the south, and create a school for peasant organisers. Meanwhile, communists got a position in the army that was set up to conquer all China.

The conquest was launched in 1926. Since it represented an end to the warlord regime, it was received enthusiastically by the peasants, who created organisations after the Guangdong pattern. These organisations took over power in the countryside, they decreased leases and interests, they organised cooperatives, they abolished patriarchal laws and founded schools. It is estimated that in early 1927 about 10 millions were members. Meanwhile the secret societies organised self-defense against plundering soldiers in the periphery where such things was possible.

But this movement, and the increasingly active labour movement in the cities, frightened the merchants and their allies in the nationalist party. In April 1927, they used their military positions to repress both and establish a military dictatorship.

They weren't strong enough though to control all the countryside. The peasant movement was able to survive for a while in eight peripheries. They happened to be regions where the secret societies were strong, and the new cooperation between peasant movement and national movement was made a good deal easier by a common background in secret societies. For example, the communist generals Zhu De and He Long were prominent members of the Gelaohui, and it was said about He Long that he was able to order for whole armies through them [40].

The history about peasant movement and national movement together survived and carried through land reforms in these peripheries, and later in the regions they controlled behind the Japanese lines during the war is told in chapter 6. I will only touch upon here the way the process and the character of the reforms was informed by the fact that the hegemony was kept by the national movement, and not the peasants.

During the early phases, up to the defeat and abandonment of the southern base in 1933, and again in the remaining base in the northwest up to the war against Japan, the peasant movement had a strong position. The national movement was a refugee in need of protection. So the peasants were able to dictate the forms for the land reform, and the communist party just had to adapt. This implied that landlords and rich farmers who were considered oppressors simply were expropriated and that their land was divided among the other peasants [41].

During the war against Japan, the bargaining power of the nationalist movement was strengthened. Also landlords had to be involved in the struggle, so land reforms were out of question. The peasants were only too happy for help to protect their land against Japanese terror attacks, so they were not able to question this policy.

On the other hand, the cultural hegemony of the peasants was strengthened. Peasants were the core of resistance. The intellectual urban people who dominated the communist

[40] According to Edgar Snow, *Red star over China*, Penguin Books 1972.

[41] The land reform is treated, except by Chesneaux, by Mark Selden, *The political economy of Chinese socialism*, M.E. Sharpe 1988.

party had to live in a peasant way, not least because Mao and other veterans from the twenties sided with the peasants.

When the Japanese were defeated, the peasant movement was able to take initiative again. Now, landlords and rich farmers were attacked, sometimes corporally, and their land and other belongings was shared. The communists tried to put a brake on the movement but had to put a good face on it not to lose confidence.

After 1948, when the communists were able to form a government, the peasants were weakened again. The communists now needed the support of rich farmers to industrialize the country, and in the regions the peasant movement hadn't got a hold of – the heaviest populated areas – the land reform was a rather slow affair.

But yet, the peasants made some headway during the early fifties. Much land was shared out to the poorer peasants, and they formed cooperatives to utilize the resources more efficiently. But this was not enough for the state, which needed the resource of the peasants for its own project – advancement in the world market system. In 1955, the state cracked down on the peasants. Instead of the locally formed cooperatives under peasant rule, it introduced collective farming organised in a national hierarchy. This was easy, since there was no organising beyond the village to put the interest of the peasants foremost. For that reason, the peasants had to trust the communist party and its national considerations. The model was not unlike the one that the Mexican state had invented: selling dear and buying cheap, the state was able to seize the surplus of the countryside and invest it into industries.

This doesn't imply that the peasant movement was powerless and its successes worthless. Not at all. The collectivization wasn't carried through violently as in Russia, but with consent on the whole. The Chinese communist party was not only an instrument for the state bourgeoisie, but the peasants had a stake in it. And after 1970, the state control decreased as a result of the culture revolution, let be a new that local upper class with ties to party and state were posed to make the greatest advantage from it. The deep involvement of a broad popular mobilization in the national project guaranteed that the project would continue to develop, to some degree, to the benefit of a majority and not only for the new upper class [42].

The Mexican, Indian and Chinese agrarian movements were during the age 1945-1975 an example for agrarian movement over the whole world. Over the whole world market system periphery, agrarian movements attacked landlords under the banners of "land to the tillers" and constituted the popular base for the southern national movements of the twentieth century. But as Jeffrey Paige has pointed at, differences in the exploitation patterns have resulted in differences in the strategies and aims of the agrarian movements [43].

[42] The discreet and almost unorganised way of circumventing government control and step by step breaking it is described by K.X. Chou, *How farmers changed China*, Westview Press 1996. According to Chou, the peasants' liberation from bureaucratic control and exploitation is the secret behind the fast economic growth of China.

[43] Jeffrey M. Paige, *Agrarian revolution*, The Free Press 1975.

When the relations between landlord and peasant has been weakly monetarized and rested upon forced labour, and when the landlords haven't had any other assets than land, agrarian movements have primarily fought for land reform. Such conditions have for example ruled most of Latin America.

The Latin American latifundia system found it difficult to produce enough food for the growing urban population which forced these to use their scarce foreign exchange to buy food in the world market. And during the thirties slump, the market for the export agriculture disappeared. The landlords were for that reason enfeebled politically and economically, and an opportunity for an alliance between urban middle classes and peasants appeared, as it had done in Mexico [44].

In South America, the agrarian movements were not as politically strong as they were in Mexico – perhaps except in Bolivia where the control of the state was weak. The urban middle class politicians were always able to use local agrarian mobilizations, co-opt these, and utilize them as pressure on traditional landlords to force them to modernize and create strong export units, or divide their lands to create commercialized family farms. In Peru, the peasants were for example sandwiched between government ruled cooperatives and the local middle class organised in Sendero Luminoso, and had few opportunities to act on their own [45].

For in South America, the agrarian mobilizations didn't take place until the Bretton Woods policy was firmly established in the fifties and offered capital-intensive food-exporters and effective family farms a room in the global food regime. For that reason, it was not long before the urban bourgeoisie deserted the agrarian alliance and concentrated on food export. Only with the Indian movements in the late eighties, the peasants of South America has got a new instrument to assert themselves with, see chapters 6 and 8.

The agrarian mobilizations did however also get an impulse from this political situation, according to Paige and Handelman. Monetarization, market and the reforms of the urban middle class gave an opportunity. In Bolivia, the agrarian movement was begun by commercial farmers in Cochabamba when the local landowners ignored a new law against forced labour. In Peru, it was begun by peasants near the Cerro de Pasco mine which was a market to them although it had stolen land from them, and by the commercial coffee-growers in the Convención valley. From them, the movement spread unevenly; peasants made local invasions into haciendas which had stolen land from them. The leaders of the movement were often people with unionist experiences from the towns.

[44] Alain de Janvry, *The agrarian question and reformism in Latin America*, Johns Hopkins University Press 1981, is a standard work about the preconditions. Agrarian movements are described in Jeffrey Paige, *Agrarian revolution: Howard Handelman, The politics of agrarian change in Asia and Latin America*, and Gavin Smith, *Livelihood and resistance – peasants and the politics of land in Peru*, University of California Press 1991, are case studies.

[45] As contended by Linda Seligman, *Between reform and revolution – political struggles in the Andes 1969-1991*. Sendero Luminoso was formed by the “new” university educated middle class in the province, which began with offering the peasants a political leadership contrary to the interests of the state and the market. But the peasants had their own interests sometimes contrary to the local middle class, and this was of course not accepted by these, and it didn't last long until Sendero Luminoso directed most of its aggression against the peasants.

The methods were always the same as in Morelos. Peasants in a village gathered at dawn, preferably with a music band, banners and weapons. They marched away to the land they considered theirs, but which a big estate had stolen sometime during the centuries. They built a fence on the ground and sometimes a small house, let loose some animals or planted maize. Then they waited for a reaction [46]. If the reaction was violent they usually retired. But during the period up to 1972 many local agrarian movements were usually able together to get the landowners to the defensive.

Sharecropper movements

When the relations between landowners and agriculturalists have built on sharecropping, i.e. the peasants have leased land for a part of the harvest, the peasants have usually taken part in movements aiming at government power. Paige's explanation is that economic and social terms of agreement have been more important to them than the formal ownership, because they haven't been tied to a certain village but worked where a contract has been available. Such conditions have ruled in Vietnam, West Bengal, Philippines and China.

In reality, they have acted according to workers' trade union principles. The rice cultivators in the Mekong delta is a typical case. The unionist movement against absentee landlords was the core of Vietminh as well as the FNL, see chapter 6. While Vietminh had fixed a maximum for the leasehold rent, the South Vietnamese dictator Diem fixed a minimum while the South Vietnamese state established itself as the biggest landlord at land it confiscated from the French plantations [47].

But what about the rice cultivators north of Manila? When the paternalist ties between landlord and cultivators began to be substituted by purely commercial ones after the first world war, the peasants formed trade unions to pose elementary economic demands like that the landlord should pay for the tools or that the peasants' share of the produce should be increased. When the Japanese occupied the Philippines the peasants used their trade unions to protect themselves against excesses, and this soon grew to a guerrilla army of several thousand people, fighting the Japanese [48].

After the war, the peasants didn't ask for more than going back to their business, but the authorities and the landlords persecuted the ex-guerrilleros and forced them to take to arms again. From 1945 through 1951, the state and the peasant army waged war against each other, primarily because the landlords were afraid of a too strong trade union. After a few years, the leftist parties joined the battle, but at that time the peasants had begun to withdraw because a new government tried the carrot instead of the stick, yielding to the unionist demands. Kerkvlied shows that the peasants were completely alien to the urban leftist demands – but he also shows that they found it easy to talk to each other as long as the conversation dealt with the trade union matters of the peasants.

[46] Eric Hobsbawm, Peasant land occupation, in Past and Present 62, 1974.

[47] Vietnam is Paige's example of sharecropper's movements. See also Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a war, Allen & Unwin 1986.

[48] Benedict Kerkvlied, The huk rebellion, University of California Press 1977.

When landowners have had plenty of money, it has been easy to take over their land – they have then found it easy to invest in other activities like banking or wholesale grain business, and the agricultural movements have swiftly turned to cooperation and pressure on the state for pro-agrarian policies. This is the case in parts of India for example.

Regardless of varying strategies, the peasants succeeded very rarely to repeat the achievement of the Zapatists and make inroads to the global hegemony. Almost always, they subordinated themselves to nationalist agendas or urban reform movements. Paige, Barraclough and other theorists come to the conclusion that it is impossible for southern cultivators to organise a movement of their own with any strength.

And all examples may indicate that it is not easy.

But regardless of varying strategies, and regardless if the movements succeeded in organising themselves regionally or nationally or only took the form of local land occupations and marginal strikes, the movements were nevertheless partly successful. The movement alliance between agrarian movements and national movements worked; it hit hard against the landlords who had had close ties to the colonial powers, and much of their land was shared among the cultivators.

Up to some 15-40 percent of the peasants have thus benefitted from land reforms in the countries where they have taken place – in Mexico, China, Vietnam and South Korea the figure was about 70 percent [49]. But still many agriculturalists were left landless. Many were forced to urban slums as a sub-proletariat – and even those who have benefitted had to pay for it.

For after an early period of concessions, the global rulers began to formulate a counterstrategy, which was launched globally at the UN Land Reform Conference in Ottawa in 1966. It built on three principles, which were later copied to hit against other peoples' movements, for example the environmental movement, see chapter 9.

The first principle was to declare the land reform to be primarily of a technical character. The core matter was not social justice or food security for the peasants, but with a repetition of the crisis policy of the thirties maximum food production for the world market. This was declared to call for a new agricultural technology based on ample access to water, fertilizers, pesticides and new seed varieties; of course few peasants could afford that, so only prosperous farmers could be selected for support by national and international aid.

The technification of the land reform question was an invention by the Mexican agrarian bourgeoisie – when the peasants had taken most of the land area, they had to find more capital intensive ways to utilize the land they had left. It was in Mexico the “green revolution” was launched as one of the ways to curb the agrarian movement in the early forties [50].

The other principle, used over the whole world, was also a Mexican invention – gov-

[49] Rehman Sobhan, *Agrarian reform and social transformation*, Zed 1993. Other authors say about the same, for example John P Powelson & Richard Stock, *The peasant betrayed*, Demetrios Christodoulou, *The unpromised land*, and Howard Handelman (ed), *The politics of agrarian change in Asia and Latin America*, Stephen Bunker: *Peasants against the state*, University of Chicago Press 1987

[50] Vandana Shiva, *The violence of the green revolution*, Zed 1991.

ernment monopolies of sales to and purchase from the cultivators, to utilize their surplus for industrialization and urban privileges. Sometimes, when the world market career was particularly ambitious, this was combined with government supervised cooperatives to strengthen control. The purchase prices were kept down, by means of a massive supply of subsidized agricultural products from the North.

The third principle was to coopt selected parts of the agrarian movements into a talkshow without end.

And when the postwar Kondratiev A fell in the mid 70s, and with it the Bretton Woods model of agriculture, agriculturalists were forced to new mobilization models. For they were still placed in the periferies of the peripheries, in the links most exposed to competition, and squeezed between monopolies in an increasingly commercialized market [51].

Future agrarian movements

There were several weaknesses with the Bretton Woods food system, seen from the agriculturalists' point of view. And they were rather aggravated by the substitute: an increasingly (but unevenly so) free market.

In the system center, subsidies remained, which made possible an aggressive dumping of cheap food over periphery countries where subsidies were repealed in the wake of the debt crisis. Most of the benefit of the subsidies in the center, however, went to land value appreciation and thus to financial institutions [52].

In both center and peripheries the most dynamic element, the transnational businesses, integrated increasingly more of the commodity chains of food. It was not possible to keep food outside the market when most of the value in it was managed by transnational businesses in the form of inputs and refined food products, bought and sold over the whole world. And as always in the world market system, profits are realized in the most monopolized link.

Capital is also learning to integrate more of the food into its industrial production. Some organic substances like fat and sugar is completely removed from the control of farmers and included in the industrial discipline. With development of bio-technology, this will apply to an increasing number of products. Other products grow so dependent on industrially produced seed, fertilizers and pesticides that the farmers will be considered as subcontractors rather than independent producers.

The process of subordination thus seems to be the main theme of resistance of agriculturalists in the post-Bretton Woods age. It seems to have begun in India, as a response to the green revolution in Punjab [53].

[51] Philip McMichael, Rethinking globalization: The agrarian question revisited, in *Review of International Political Economy* 4:4, 1997; David Goodman, Some recent tendencies in the industrial reorganization of the agri-food system; Harriet Friedmann, Changes in the international division of labor; agri-food complexes and export agriculture, in William Friedland et al (ed), *Towards a new political economy of agriculture*, Westview Press 1991; and David Goodman & Michael Redclift, *Refashioning nature*.

[52] Göran Djurberg, *Gods och gårdar*, Arkiv 1994.

[53] Modern Indian agrarian movements have been described by A.R. Desai, *Agrarian struggles in India* after

Like in Europe a hundred years earlier, the Indian farmers who had at last got their ownership secured went into the market – just to discover that it wasn't easy to withdraw when it wasn't profitable any longer. For the methods introduced by the green revolution might have been profitable at the onset, but they called for high expenses and indebtedness that had to be paid back. And when the loads of food increased on the world market, the prices went down according to the law of supply and demand.

Since the green revolution had been introduced most forcefully in Punjab, the first agrarian movement for market-related demands in the peripheries began there also.

When food prices fell while chemicals and fertilizers grew more expensive, farmers became insolvent; a third were ruined between 1970 and 1980 according to Shiva. Meanwhile, the commons of the villages had been enclosed during the commercialized euphoria; the consequence of this was an ethical vacuum where violence and liquor was spread. As a reaction, the farmers organized themselves in a Sikh revival with trade-unionist streaks. The forms of struggle were blockades against authorities and bankers, and the Sikh agrarian movement began to cooperate with the young agrarian movements of north India. Among other things, they tried to get control over the increasingly important water supplies which were used by the government as a way of divide and rule.

These movements joined into an interstate agrarian committee in 1982. As a first step, it planned an embargo of grain in Punjab in 1984; Punjab is the grain basket of India and such a strike would hit hard at the urban middle class. The action began well, the boycotts were supplemented by mass meetings and an occupation of the city of Chandigarh.

But the mobilization ended in disaster. In 1984, the Indian government bombed the most important Sikh temple and killed the most important Sikh clergymen. The movement in Punjab was thus canalised into religious fundamentalism. And the religious card proved itself effective; henceforth, Hindu fundamentalism and massacres of religious minorities would be the government's and the urban middle class' best counter against agrarian mobilizations.

But increasingly market related mobilizations went into gear in other parts of the world as well. For as the global rulers met to decide about the successor rules of the Bretton Woods system, farmers who were about to be squeezed by these rules also had to decide of a common program.

There were several strands of mobilizations that lead up to such a program.

In the system center, family farmers of Canada and France had most liberty of action. The French continued since the early 70s to dump surplus harvests in front of government buildings to protest against low world market prices and subsidies favouring agri-businesses. Primarily, it was a fraction of the postwar, "Grundtvigian" farmer or-

independence, Oxford University Press 1986; and Tom Brass, *The new farmers' movement in India*, Frank Cass 1995. The most interesting contribution is, I think, Gail Omvedt, *Caste, agrarian relations and agrarian conflicts*, and *New peasant movements in India and the formation of a national agricultural policy*. And finally, the book about the way farmers were hit by the "green revolution" is Vandana Shiva, *The violence of the green revolution*, Zed 1991.

ganization Jeunesse Agricole Chrétienne that united ecological farming with solidary principles.

This fraction, Confédération Paysanne, “Conf”, was based on the French term *terroir* as a local tradition of culture, work and biological conditions, which it wanted to assert against the Fordist mass production for the world market, often with drastic food cultural happenings as a means. For example, early cultivation of genetically modified crops began to be sabotaged, and world fame was gained when a Macdonalds was dismantled in 1999 in protest of the United States’ ban on the sale of Roquefort cheese. This did not hinder ordinary peasant union work [54].

The Canadian family farmers began to doubt, without taking to dramatic actions, the world market competition orientation of the Canadian government and the reliance on chemical additives in about the same time, and also began to cultivate international relations. It was the Canadian family farmers of Canadian National Farmers Union who called the first international Farm Crisis Summit in 1983, meeting farmers from France, India, the Philippines and more than forty other countries, since they understood that the crisis couldn’t be dealt with on the national level [55]. The cooperation continued for a decade to organize common events like the demonstration of 10.000 peasants in Brussels against the GATT meeting there in 1990.

In the peripheral countries there have been particularly four driving forces.

First there were the Central Americans. In Nicaragua, the peasant organization UNAG began to decouple from the Sandinista party when this got out of power in 1990. It had already got good funding from international, particularly Dutch, development programs and NGOs, and went out to form links with other Central American peasant organizations trying to overcome the setbacks of international competition, abolished subsidies and increased indebtedness, funding education of peasant leaders. The Central American organizations began soon to act as a network or bloc on the global level. It was the cooperation of UNAG and its Dutch counterpart that were the cause of the forming of an anti-systemic peasant International, the Via Campesina in 1993, see below.

Another mobilization was the Karnataka Rajya Ryota Sangha, KRRS, which hit the world news when it raided the grain giant Cargill’s offices and destroyed its records in 1992, as a protest against theft and copyrighting of the farmers’ seeds. It continued with equally dramatic actions, for example burning of Monsanto’s fields of genetically modified crops under the battle-cry “knowledge should be free”. KRRS had come into being as an organizing of peasants displaced by hydroelectric dams but grew to engage in ordinary agricultural bread and butter issues, mobilizing millions without employed staff, relying on the farmers’ children for that kind of work. KRRS managed to get so-called intellectual property rights on the global agenda, and the issue of peasant having to pay the transnational to use seeds they had always used.

[54] Chaia Heller: *Food, Farms & Solidarity*, Duke University Press 2013.

[55] Jeremy Brecher & Tim Costello, *Global Village or global pillage*, South End Press 1996. The rise of the family farmer movement globally is primarily told in Marc Edelman, *Transnational peasant and farmer movements and networks*, in *Global Society*, Yearbook 2003.

The third is "the world's biggest mass movement", as they claim themselves, Movimento Sem Terra in Brazil with about 1,5 million members [56].

In Brazil there was no land reform; latifundias even grew into the 50s, evicting peasants from stolen land. In the poor Nordeste peasants came together in peasant leagues which had some success in convincing the developmentalist government about the necessity of land reform in the early 60s. However, the military coup in 1964 prevented this for a generation and even contributed to growing land concentration in the hand of both traditional latifundistas and modern high-capitalized agri-business.

A new peasant mobilization begun in 1981 among some 6.000 families evicted from a hydroelectric dam site in Rio Grande do Sul, organized by Catholic liberation theologians. The core of Latin American liberation theology is that Christianity has to be formulated from the perspective of the oppressed, and of course the perspective of landless peasants is land [57]. Other evicted families followed suite and MST was formed in 1984 as a coordinating body of different camps that left most decisions to the encampments themselves. The post-dictatorship constitution of 1988 promoted land reform, but since the reform stayed on paper, MST began to sponsor occupation of untilled land belonging to latifundistas in the 90s. And since following governments promoted agri-business to get in foreign currency instead of land reform, MST began to shift its focus to invading and occupying agri-business land. The ideological ground was still the Catholic position that property should fulfill social needs instead of just profit.

Beside this, MST run primary schools and agricultural high schools, and as the frontiers between land workers and slum-dwellers are fuzzy, it has also formed an urban offshoot, Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Teto. Increasingly, MST is positioning itself as the center of Brazilian popular movements.

The fourth was the rising in Chiapas, Mexico [58].

Chiapas was a backwater where the Mexican land reform never applied, neither as a result of an authentic agrarian movement nor as a paternalist state-building. Commercial ranch or plantation owners ruled arbitrarily as representatives of the ruling party until liberation theology begun to spread in the church in the sixties. This was partly a result of the poverty of Chiapas; careerist priests shunned it, the poor country priests that remained had to invite the lay people to make the business go round. In Chiapas as well as Brazil the concern of the oppressed was that they were peasants without land. The Mexican constitution gave them in principle right to it, and when they had begun to formulate their predicament in the terms of liberation theology, in their own Indian languages, they got courage to assert their right. They were favoured by the fact that farmers over all Mexico, as in the whole world, were unusually active in the early seventies and threatened to break the paternalist subordination under the ruling party, so the state had to

[56] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landless_Workers%27_Movement. It can be suspected, though, that the text is written by MST people and that it should be taken with a grain of salt.

[57] A standard work is Ulrich Duchrow, *Alternatives to global capitalism*, International Books 1995.

[58] Neil Harvey, *The Chiapas rebellion*, Duke University Press 1998. Neil Harvey, *The new agrarian movement in Mexico 1979-1990*, University of London 1990.

offer them something. New national agrarian organisations were established, breaking the dominance of the parastatal CNC, both to carry on the land reform and to strengthen the farmers as commercial actors in the market. The family farmers in Chiapas were soon among the most active in both these fields.

But the concessions of the government in Chiapas were small, and the concessions of the local ruling class were even smaller. Particularly after the Mexican national bankruptcy in the early eighties, the government found it more pressing to earn currency in the world market than to favour family farmers, so they began more actively to cooperate with the local ruling class to repress agrarian movements in a violent way. It also used a method that proved extremely destructive – to concede favours to small groups for their help to use violence against their neighbours.

From 1983 on, the Chiapas villages considered it necessary to set up an armed police force against these “coras” as they were called, with an old Indian term for henchmen of the colonial power. This police force would be the origin of the Zapatist army EZLN. The settlers in the great Lacandón forest were the pioneers; they had enough initiative and space to take offensive steps. They also began to link up more creatively to the themes of liberation theology; earlier, land reform was always at the center of Mexican agrarian parlance. Now, the Lacandón agriculturalists began to look for support in all Mexico for their rights as citizens to express their meaning without being met by violence.

The response for this appeal was so strong that the government had to change tactics. Instead of naked violence, they turned to “development” in the form of roads, logging and credits. But while the farmers got credits, the world market prices for their products fell. The core of the government tactics, however, was market liberalization, as it was everywhere in the eighties, among other things liberalization of the land market. As a part of this liberalization, the paragraph in the constitution that gave peasants right to appeal for land reform was abolished in 1991. Three years after, the cooperative ownership of villages was abolished too, as a part of the Mexican free trade agreement with USA and Canada. The same day as this agreement was signed, the EZLN occupied four towns in Chiapas, in January 1, 1994.

The occupation, the “Zapatist rebellion”, was a demonstration of strength in order to force a negotiation, to force the Mexican government to acknowledge the Indian family farmers as citizens with equal rights. This was also the aim behind other diplomatic demonstrations of strength, used by the Chiapas farmers, like websites and global mass conferences in the Lacandón forest with participation from the most prominent intellectuals of the era. But the content of these demonstrations have been a new political language. The farmers don’t speak of government power in order to introduce democratically supported integrating reforms; they don’t speak of new utopian routines at all as an alternative to the present, repressing ones. They speak of the right of the civil society to reject all utopian routines and find futures, in pluralis, for all. In this way they have found a peoples’ movement language that has been rather invisible during the twentieth century – the language of the spontaneous expressions of life and the social responsibility, in contrast to the language of the political projects. The focus of the mobilization has not only been the Mexican state however, and its marginalizing and repressive policy; the

Zapatists have consciously linked it to the “Washington consensus”, the market fundamentalism favoured by the ruling class of the world market system around 2000.

There are also other family farmer mobilization with other focuses. The main organization in Maharashtra, India, Shetkari Sanghatana, is not against going to the market; its principal foe is the state that keeps the farmers in subjugation, and thus it struggles against the state and the city establishment, for the countryside’s right to decide for itself [59]. Shetkari Sanghatana works in the same way as KRRS, with mass meetings, for bread and butter issues, and by the way also with organizing Maharashtra’s main women’s movement.

Another focus is that of Sahel, where family farmers have tended to get away completely from the market. Agriculture in Africa was never monopolized by latifundias when the world market system expanded there; instead, merchants bought products directly from the peasants, for example coffee, cacao and cotton [60].

Farmers have however lost out in terms of trade during the whole post-war era; while a tractor in 1960 cost three tons of bananas, it cost twenty in the mid eighties. For that reason, they had to sell more and more to pay for the commercialized part of their living, and when drought hit them in the early seventies, the subsistence plots weren’t enough. An estimated 300.000 people starved to death in Sahel in the seventies.

For many farmers, commercial agriculture for that reason appeared as exploitation, something to avoid. In Senegal they speak of “the peanut trap”. And when they began to organize from about 1970, the aim was to make subsistence agriculture more effective to avoid the need for sale.

The cooperative institutions established over Sahel aim at coordinating resources for investments in the villages. They build on traditional African forms of collective work, but this work is also used for modern purposes, i.e. to change things. Cooperatives develop storages, schools; they experiment with biological pesticides, and change the power balance between the sexes to the benefit of the women. The organisation is transnational but governed from the villages. According to Pradervand, the migration has shifted in the most effective villages; young people return from the cities because they have a better future in the countryside.

The family farmers’ international Via Campesina was originally thought of as a base for research, but the peasant organizations revolted against the preconception of the founding NGO, and used the loose network as a means of articulating the aims of small family farmers around the world and to demonstrate for it to various world summits where their fate would be decided [61]. Via Campesina has branches in primarily Ameri-

[59] Gail Omvedt: *Reinventing revolution*, Sharpe 1993.

[60] Land was cheap in Africa because there was so much of it; labour was much more valued. About African agriculture and African agrarian movements, see for example Jonathan Barker, *The politics of agriculture in tropical Africa*, Sage 1984, Gudrun Lachenmann, *Social movements and civil society in West Africa*, German Development Institute 1992; Pierre Pradervand, *Une Afrique en marche, la révolution silencieuse des paysans africains*, Plon 1989, is a completely unacademic book, for better and for worse.

[61] The emergence of a global small farmer movement is related by Marc Edelman: *Towards an anthropology of some new internationalisms: small farmers in global resistance movements*, i Focaal 40/2002, and by An-

ca, Europe and South Asia with African movements keeping independent but increasingly cooperating. The size of the member organizations differ enormously.

Catch phrase in the beginning was "food security", against the vagaries of the world market, but it soon changed into "food sovereignty", i.e. the producers' power over their own product. Via Campesina was to be the mass-base for the movement wave around 1992-2001, linking up to slumdwellers in the South as well as environmentalists in the North, see chapter 10.

According to McMichael, one thing differs the agrarian movements of today from those a hundred years ago. The latter would to a great extent be co-opted by national upper classes as a part of the attempts of those to create effective and aggressive states; the farmers were granted their food security in a way that in the short run favoured capital accumulation and stability. Today, there are no "national projects" to co-opt the farmers into, perhaps except China and the USA, and the agrarian movements are forced to rely on themselves and to other peoples' movement mobilizations to challenge the world market system in its entirety [63].

There is another difference, that is not mentioned explicitly by McMichael but is implied in his relation. The agrarian movements a hundred years ago acted in a phase of the world market development when the production was firmly in the farmers' hands. The agrarian movements of today are in the same position as the artisans two hundred years ago, when they organised the classic labour movement: they were about to lose their autonomy as producers to become wage labourers under industrial discipline. There is a strange likeness of Via Campesina's catch-phrase "food sovereignty" and the catch-phrase of the early labour movement "struggle against wage slavery". Biotechnology is one of the two most important components of the next Kondratiev A, and the most important aim of biotechnology is to industrialize food production, or to subjugate food production under the rule of capital. For that reason, agrarian movements are more central actors in the conflict between system and human beings than they were a hundred years ago.

The point is if they are prepared to manage their leading part in a competent way.

We don't know anything about this. But if we may compare our experiences of labour movement traditions (and have a glance at Bader's peoples' movement cycle), three thresholds seems to be decisive. One has to establish an identity that is attractive enough to be worth following. One has to formulate a language that sum up the experiences of the category and offer a credible program. And one has to offer a model of action that

nette Aurélie Desmarais: *La Via Campesina*, Pluto Press 2007. There is more about the 90s' social movement wave in Chapter 10 The social movement system. Via Campesina's environmentalist stance is treated in Joan Martinez-Alier, *The EROI of agriculture and its use by the Via Campesina*, *The Journal of Peasant Studies* Vol. 38, No. 1, January 2011.

[62] The concept food sovereignty is explained at Via Campesina's website, <https://viacampesina.org/en/food-sovereignty/>

[63] Philip McMichael, *Rethinking globalization, the agrarian question revisited*. *Review of International Political Economy* 4:4, 1997. McMichael has also described the shift between the two models in *Globalization, myths and realities*, *Rural sociology* 61/1996.

may be spread over the world. This was what the First International succeeded in, helped by successful worker experiences of the Chartist movement and the French revolutions of 1789 and 1848.

Two factors indicate that the present agrarian movement will be successful.

Several agrarian movements have been extremely sensitive for the demand of linking their local to global mobilizations, and linking their mobilizations for bread and butter issues to attacks on the prevalent ideology of the world market system. Several agrarian movements have been very skilful in leading mobilizations going far beyond the farmers as a category. Agrarian movements in for example Maharashtra, Karnataka, Chiapas and Ecuador express not only their own trade-unionist demands but the demands of all oppressed people, like the labour movement did in nineteenth century Europe.

And this policy is carried by the without comparison most dynamic global small farmers' organization, Via Campesina. These two factors indicate that at least some strong agrarian movements see a need for struggling about the global hegemony, and this is at least a first step.

On the other hand, one factor indicates the opposite. The labour movement was spread from a center of industrialization, and followed the wave of industrialization out over the world, and established a pattern for new worker groups to emulate. But for agrarian movements, there is no such center. Strong hegemonistic identities have to struggle with other more narrow-minded traditions, and it is not certain that they will win out. And the ones aiming at hegemony are in a minority so far.

The agrarian movements have however strength that is the same everywhere: they have not, as the labour movements and (particularly) the national movements have, got stuck in the government power strategy of the twentieth century. For that reason, they have qualifications to take part in the creation of the new peoples' movement strategy we need.

Chapter 8.
Marginalized peoples' aspiration for equality

WAGE LABOURERS, FARMERS AND PERIPHERIES are in a subordinate position within the world market system, by being peripheral links, exposed to competition in commodity chains dominated by monopolists whose power is maintained economically and politically. The point with these commodity chains is that they make it possible to divide labour in components, making it possible to transfer the surplus extracted in each link through purchases and sales to the most monopolized link. The subdivision of labour wouldn't serve any purpose if some links weren't rewarded less than others.

The different roles in the game, both the attractive ones and the unattractive ones, have to be distributed to a cast. They have to be distributed in such a way that those who have to play the unattractive roles accept them, and that those who play the attractive ones don't solidarize with the others.

In a system that is so complicated and so labour-divided as the world market system, there is a countless number of roles to distribute. Some of them are evidently much less attractive than others.

The most obvious division is the geographical one. The attractive roles are disproportionately hoarded in the system center, where most of the political, economic and cultural power is situated. This can partly be explained with the fact that it is important for the rulers of the system to be surrounded by relatively contented direct producers. But it can also be explained the other way around: it is the parts of the world where there are favoured direct producers that become centers, since their high remunerative level push for "modernization" of production, thus creating a basis for new center-creating monopolies, see chapter 2.

Resistance to this geographical labour division is the origin of national movements.

But there are also within each geographical zone large quantities of activities which have to be distributed, and it is quite obvious that this dimension is growing more important today [1]. Gordon, Edwards and Reich describe the way the activities of an industrial country is divided in three kinds of work – independent core workers (higher employees in capital-strong enterprises and people with access to scarce and desirable knowledge), subordinated core workers (lower officials and skilled workers in capital-strong enterprises) and peripheral workers (unskilled workers in service and subcontractor enterprises. The technological and social foundation for this subdivision is that some kind of work, to be performed effectively, calls for knowledge about the whole working process, while others do not. The more knowledge of this kind that is needed, the greater are the concessions the enterprise has to give to get the work carried out. For that reason, it is favourable for the enterprises that this kind of work is isolated and given to only a few – and that the gaps between the different kinds of workers are big enough not to create any solidarity between them [2].

[1] See for example Global Inequality Report 2018. <http://wir2018.wid.world>, or Göran Therborn: The killing fields of inequality, Polity Press 2013.

[2] David M. Gordon, Theories of poverty and underemployment, Lexington Books 1972; David M. Gordon,

Gordon et al describe the way the US enterprises in the late nineteenth century learnt to distribute work according to sex, race and age. The unattractive works went to immigrants, blacks, youth and increasingly to women, while the attractive works went to native white men. This had nothing to do with different rates of qualification; black artisans in the Northern states of USA were as skilled as the white ones. Instead, it was a matter of dividing the budding labour movement. When the immigrant category was growing scarce in the thirties, the strategy worked less well and the workers were able to organise and work forceful peoples' movement mobilizations, but when the agricultural mechanization in the South freed millions of black land-workers in the fifties it recovered its strength again.

The hierarchy displayed in the North American worksites characterises the whole world market system. Basically, generalized inequality creating processes, observed by for example Charles Tilly, are at work [3].

- opportunity hoarding, i.e. when a connected group of actors, or a category, collectively claims an asset which they try to exclude others from; if they succeed one can speak of a monopoly;
- exploitation, i.e. when this group utilize other people's work to cultivate the asset without paying the full value of the work; and
- adaptation, i.e. when the two categories – the in-group and the out-group – develop social or cultural patterns to facilitate continued existence under these unequal conditions, and these patterns are spread to new social relations.

When the elite groups of the world market system, its most important opportunity hoarders, monopolizers and exploiters – capitalists and state bureaucrats, among others – are about to organise in-groups and out-groups to their own profit, it is easier to use existent categories and adapt these after the unequal relations following from the opportunity hoarding and exploitation. It is easier than to create new categories.

During the world market system, several categorisations are used.

Firstly, people are categorised according to descent: those who originate from the center zones are valued higher than those who originate from the peripheries – even when they work in the center and have qualifications identical to native people. Secondly, people are categorised according to sex: men are valued higher than women. Thirdly, people are categorised according to age: this dimension is more unclear and depend to a certain extent on the class position of the valued person, but generally middle aged people is valued higher than young or old.

When an activity is moved between levels of qualification and remuneration, its direct producers are changed. For example, men took over sock knitting when the knitting machine gave a higher status to it in the seventeenth century, as well as type-writing when the computer did the same thing in our time [4].

The stratification would be less effective, and hard to maintain, if it applied only to

Richard Edwards & Michael Reich, *Segmented work, divided workers*, Cambridge University Press 1982.

[3] Charles Tilly, *Durable inequality*, University of California Press 1999

[4] Merry Wiesner, *Spinning out capital*, in Renate Bridenthal et al, *Becoming visible – Women in European history*, Houghton Mifflin 1998.

the productive sphere. Through the history of the system, the state system has stratified people in to citizens (of different status) and non-citizens. In the early age of the system, citizens with right to make demands on the states were very few, and when the share grew as a consequence of successful peoples' movement mobilizations, people didn't get admission at the same time. To this day, a big part of the labour force, the so-called migrants, is kept without citizenship and has no rights at the site where they work (or are kept as un-employed reserve army) [5].

From the rulers' point of view, there were several advantages of such a caste-like system, quite apart from obstructing unionist aspirations, and apart from keeping aspirations of the most disadvantaged at a low level. It was also a way of buying support from people from the middle of the ladder, or even fairly low down; they could be persuaded to toe the line and be grateful for not being even further down. It was a way to get the direct producers to put up with parsimonious citizens' rights instead of demanding the whole world; they at least had some admission to the high society, and even rather meagre privileges have some value when they are not shared with all. The rulers have for this reason tried to keep the caste-system into place and often got support from middle-layer people. We use to call this kind of help fascist or liberal movements, depending of their appearing niggardly and mean or jovial and superficially kindly; if they suggest that the lower castes should be kept down violently or be appeased with partial concessions on the condition that they acknowledge the cultural superiority of the middle class.

Such repressive alliances between rulers and factions of the direct producers aren't just based in misunderstood ideology on the part of the latter, but also that the caste-system is of some short-run advantage for some direct producers. Men may benefit at least something from repression of women; natives may benefit at least something from repression of immigrants; and the middle-aged may benefit at least something from repression of the young and old. And even if they don't buy these arguments, direct producers often defend the few successes they have got, by preventing others from getting into their markets. Not only elites group together in resource-defending confraternities, so do also Turkish pizza bakers and male motor mechanics. The caste-system has for that reason tended to be defended within the civil society of the direct producers, which had made successes of the challengers hard-earned. As Tilly contends, both resource monopolizers and their subordinates contribute to forming habituses to make inequality enduring, and thereby they also contribute to perpetuating the hierarchies.

Since the caste system is not only layered in above and below, but in qualitative biological or cultural differences which are attributed superior or inferior qualities, they cause many different resistances from the discriminated – women's movements, youth movements, pariah movements of different kinds. These may sometimes cooperate, but more frequently they try to assert themselves separately or sometimes against each other. It is thus reasonable to describe them separately, to tie them together in a final section.

[5] Immanuel Wallerstein, *Integration to What? Marginalization from What?*, Scandinavian Political Studies XX, 4, 1997

Women's self-assertion against patriarchy

Subordination of women is of course much older than the world market system. The labour division between men and women, with women in the disadvantaged position, is arguably the oldest of all systematic inequalities.

In the hunter and gatherer society, there is a labour division based in women's care of small children; with this follow compatible tasks like gardening and artisanry. But we know no hunter and gatherer society where this labour division imply any difference of status and power [6].

The difference originated with agriculture and the state. In the oldest literate societies, the old Mesopotamia, Egypt and China, women were already subordinated to men, economically, legally and politically. Sometime close to the emergence of agriculture and states emerged in other words patriarchy, as this subordination is usually called. Several hypotheses have been put forth to explain how it happened structurally, and it is possible to see them as different steps in a development.

Groups of families and local communities created alliances by changing children, who were married into the families and local communities they came to. It soon appeared more profitable to accept girls since their children belonged to the receiving local community. For the girls, this implied a peripheral position in the new societies, and also an objectification; they were not asked for themselves, but their future children who were to belong to a patrilineal clan [7].

With the origin of agriculture, the property rules were strengthened, as were the household members' dependence on each other, and the children became useful as labour. The power of the clan, which implies the clan leaders, grew at the members' expense, particularly the younger members'. Much of the power was related to power over women, who were needed for the sake of their children [8].

Agriculture made possible a permanent surplus, which became a basis for the emergence of upper classes. In the beginning, these upper classes based their legitimacy in redistribution services. In very rich regions it was possible for these groups to seize great parts of the surplus for private use with the help of magic and letters [9].

Thereby, war and conquest turned profitable for unscrupulous groups. Traditionally, men made war because it is impractical to bring small children with war parties, and for that reason men seized the property of the conquered peoples. To the booty belonged women, who became slaves, while men were killed as potentially dangerous rivals.

Conquerors were able from about 3000 BOE to establish states where they constituted a ruling class, and impose an order on the conquered communities where their praxis was seen as legitimate and honourable, among other things the praxis to enslave women. Lerner considers this enslavement as the "prototype" of subordination of some people under others.

[6] Gerda Lerner, *The creation of patriarchy*, Oxford University Press 1986.

[7] Marshall Sahlins, *Tribesmen*, Prentice-Hall 1968. According to Lerner however, it was Claude Lévi-Strauss who came up with the idea.

[8] This explanation has been forwarded by Claude Meillassoux, *Maiden, meal and money*, Cambridge University Press 1981.

[9] According to Robert Adams, *The evolution of urban society*, Aldine 1966.

During the third and second millennia BOE, the patriarchal order is successively established, with absolute paternal power, female sexual slaves and concubinage, authorized by war and ruler gods and the sinfulness of Eve, and supported by disgracing of men who were not able to control the women of their family [10]. While the status of men is due to their property or government rank and is announced by the number of their subordinated women, the status of women is due to the rank of their men. The women retain however in many cultures a power over their home and domestic production, based in their own activity, while the activity of the men is related to society as a whole; the activity of the men is public and gives opportunity of cooperation, organising and a public culture, which is not the case with the activity of women.

The patriarchal model is strongest established in the high culture of the Old World, from the Mediterranean over West Asia and India to China. This is where agriculture and states has existed for the longest time. In the old peripheries, in Africa and North Europe, women has a stronger position and are able to bargain for independent dispose of their time, property and work [11].

Before the world market system, women's resistance to patriarchy took predominantly intellectual forms, according to Lerner. Faced with the massive pressure of the patriarchal worldview, women had to define themselves in a way that permitted them to maintain their self-respect. Since only men had the position to create a public opinion, this was incredibly difficult, and was usually pursued in an individual way. It was difficult to accumulate and build a collective cultural tradition, so the development was slow up to the nineteenth century [12].

There is however a peoples' movement tradition, where resistance of women makes an undercurrent since more than a thousand years: the Christian tradition.

The early Christian congregations were a refuge for women who felt suffocated by the Roman patriarchal order, and women got a strong position in the Christian movement. Particularly rich women who had become Christians, sometimes to evade their husbands' demands for abortions not to split the inheritance, liberated their slaves and converted their property into Christian communes, were able to take a leading role until the patriarchal culture hit back by establishing a male bishop hierarchy in the third century. The female influence made itself known by traditions and theories emphasizing the importance of women. Such traditions were forbidden when the bishop hierarchy had monopolized power [13].

When the Roman empire had broken down, opportunities were opened again for women to assert themselves politically, economically and culturally in the emerging Eu-

[10] Men's and women's different power is also reflected in different legal rights. According to §6 of the mid-Assyrian law, for example, a man has the right to kill his children while a woman who makes an abortion is impaled. Killing as such is not punishable, just the woman's appropriation of it.

[11] Deniz Kandiyori, *Islam and patriarchy*, in Nikki R. Keddie & Beth Baron, *Women in Middle Eastern History*, Yale University Press 1991.

[12] Gerda Lerner, *The creation of feminist consciousness*, Oxford University Press 1993.

[13] Jo-Ann McNamara, *Mater patriae, matres ecclesiae*, in Renate Bridenthal et al, *Becoming visible*, Houghton Mifflin 1998. The literature about this is plentiful; women in early Christianity is a favourite field for feminist research according to McNamara.

ropean society, based in their role as household managers. The particular kind of household constituted by monasteries was a base for powerful abbesses through the whole middle ages, but it was also eminently permitted for women to manage farms, estates, trading houses and countries when the men who strictly speaking should have done it were dead or absent. It was within a monasterial framework the earliest counter-identity and counter-ideology for a women's movement were formulated during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when this relative female autonomy was threatened again. Principally, "female intuition" was used as an excuse for interference. This was for example the excuse Hildegard of Bingen used.

With the upswing for international trade in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the scope for women was curtailed, beginning among the Italian merchants who had the pivotal role in this upswing. Supported by Roman law and Aristotelian philosophy, both formalizations of the Mediterranean patriarchy, exhumed again after half a millennium, the headmen of the trading houses began to assert their unrestricted power over their and their family's property. Their position would be attractive; as late as during the struggle for suffrage in the early twentieth century, Aristotle and his cocksure opinions about women was the main arsenal for the adversaries of the women's movement. It took time before these novelties reached people in general; as late as in the sixteenth century relations were traditional between the sexes in a farm or a workshop. But Roman law and Aristotelian philosophy were the foundation of the university system and the established wisdom, and for that reason difficult to sidestep [14].

The defence for a more egalitarian order was pursued primarily by the radical Christian movements. A more democratic form of Hildegard's argumentation was developed by the Beguine movement in Northwest Europe. The Beguines were a Christian lay women movement building on small artisan communes in the towns, which flourished in the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The movement was broad; in Cologne lived for example more than three thousand beguines in 169 communes in the mid fourteenth century, or about three percent of the total population [15]. Due to the freedom they gave women to organise their own lives, and due to the agitatoric power developed by some Beguines, they were persecuted from the late thirteenth century as heretics, but despite this they succeeded in surviving for almost 200 years. But it is evident that not even they had the force to reject the patriarchal pretensions of superiority; what they demanded was right to have a saying, by virtue of intuition and the mystic divine inspiration.

In the gnostic Cathar movement in Southern France, women had also a strong position as long as the movement was strong, and many female leaders are documented. But when the persecution was set in from the thirteenth century, the movement turned nervously and conventionally patriarchal for self-defensive purposes.

The relative strong position of women in the radical Christian movements paid off

[14] Susan M. Stuard, *The dominion of gender – How women fared in the high middle ages*, in Renate Bridenthal et al, *Becoming visible*.

[15] Malcolm Lambert, *Medieval heresy*, Blackwell 1977.

when these movements achieved state power with the Reformation. For then, women got a principal right of education for the first time. In Protestant and Calvinist countries, women made the fastest progress during the world market system era, because their access to agitatory instrument is the greatest in these countries [16].

During the early modern era, there were two milieus where women were able to develop an anti-patriarchal habitus, ideology and tradition – the Protestant sects, particularly the Pietist, the Unitarian and the Quaker movements; and the literary salon. The former was a popular movement with a base among the urban artisans; the latter was an aristocratic and bourgeois tradition. Both traditions played a role for the emergence of the organised women’s movement in the nineteenth century. But since the literary salons also played an important part for the emergence of the profane language of the French revolution and the literary Romanticism, these traditions have survived better in the present women’s movement while the pious popular tradition has been obscured afterwards.

What these milieus emphasized as the foundation for female self-assurance and a motive for women’s legitimacy in public society was motherhood. This was reasonably safe from the viewpoint of patriarchal culture, while it also was what most women had in common. And it could be seen as reasonable that those who educated future generations had access to some education and public experience themselves. Paradoxically however, says Lerner, those who maintained these demands had no time for motherhood themselves; the patriarchal female role permitted nothing but daily work for the survival of the family.

These forms of resistance are fairly uniform over the entire patriarchal zone. In the Islamic countries it was the Sufi movements which gave women an opportunity to play a public role, provided that they referred to intuition and mysticism. In India, Bhakti movements did the same service. And in China, women used the Buddhist monasteries and Taoist movements – but in China, the egalitarian and Taoist-inspired secret societies offered an opportunity to take part in interest politics and outright rebellion as well [17].

During the eighteenth century, the European women’s autonomous identity creating was to pass a threshold. They had to.

With the development of the world market system, the women lost the position they had had in domestic production. A position restricted to managing the home may be endurable as long as domestic production has a value. But with the development of the world market, this value was undermined. Household-organised artisans and merchants were out-competed by industrial enterprises. Household-organised education was out-competed by the state. In both these fields, activities that had taken place in the

[16] Lerner leaves out of consideration that patriarchy had had less time to root in North Europe than in the old agrarian empires. Sweden for example didn’t even had a state until the mid thirteenth century. For that reason, women probably were more self-reliant in this region than further south.

[17] Leila Ahmed, *Early Islam and the position of women*, in Keddie & Baron, *Women in Middle Eastern history*; Barbara N. Ramusack & Sharon Sievers, *Women in Asia*, Indiana University Press 1999. About China’s secret societies see Jean Chesneau (ed), *Popular movements and secret societies in China 1840-1950*, Stanford University Press 1972.

home, and for this reason were open to women, were transferred out to the public sphere where men held monopoly – a monopoly asserted with increasing fervour into the twentieth century. If women were to be received it was at a disadvantage [18].

If women lost one role, they got another.

The characterizing pattern of the world market system is that production takes place in long chains of sale and purchase, where some links are more monopolized and profitable than others, and where those who control the links try to pass their costs over to others, see chapter 2. The direct producers within each link are organised into households, whose members contribute to their common survival by pooling resources from different sources. It has proved cheapest for the exploiters of the links if the direct producers are members in households where other members supply themselves outside the wage market. In such semi-proletarian households, the households in common take upon itself to provide for the education, adolescence, sickness care and old age care, among other things. This reduced the cost for the capitalist, see also chapter 5 [19].

“Other members” implies, with the traditionally given pattern men/public – women/private, women, who got the thankless role to work unpaid to make the wage labourers profitable [20].

For this reason, it turned necessary for women to defend themselves also for economic reasons. Many women sought renewed protection by confirming the submission under patriarchal structures like the church. But others defended themselves more actively. Under the period between 1700 and 1850 they did so not in their capacity of representatives of an oppressed sex, but as representatives of their households, as responsible for family and purchases.

The most important peoples’ movement repertoire during this time was the bread seizure. The form of the bread seizure was that the bread consumers in a town seized the bread of the baker or the meal of the miller as a protest against increased market prices. The bread or the meal was sold in the market place for the “reasonable” price, after which the money was left to the legal owner. Sometimes the people would give particularly incorrigible price-hikers a beating; sometimes the people would also have a fight with the military [21].

This form of action got popular at the time the traditional “reasonable” price was re-

[18] Dorothy Thompson, *Women, work and politics in the nineteenth-century England; the problem of authority*, in Jane Rendall (ed), *Equal or different*, Basil Blackwell 1987; and Merry Wiesner, *Spinning out capital*, in Renate Bridenthal et al, *Becoming visible*.

[19] The system has been described by Immanuel Wallerstein, *Historical capitalism*, Verso 1983, and more extensively by Joan Smith & Immanuel Wallerstein (ed), *Creating and transforming households*, Cambridge University Press 1992, and Claude Meillassoux, *Maidens, meal and money*.

[20] The principal proponent of gender specifiers of the commodity chain argument is Claudia von Werlhof, in for example *The proletariat is dead, long live the housewife*, in Joan Smith et al (ed), *Households and the world-system*, Sage 1984, and Wilma Dunaway, *The double register of history*, in *Journal of World System Research* VII:1. The “double register” is private/public, or household/market, or the small and the great.

[21] E.P. Thompson, *The moral economy of the English crowd in the eighteenth century*, Past and Present, 1971; Malcolm I Thomis & Jennifer Grimmett, *Women in protest 1800-1850*, Croom Helm 1982. The bread seizures as a driving force in the development of peoples’ movements are described by Charles Tilly, *The contentious French*, Harvard University Press 1986.

placed by a variable market price, and it was a defence of the “moral economy” against the market economy. And the leading activists were often women, because they were responsible for the purchase of food.

Another kind of activity where women took part was collective, organised resistance to evictions. This was also a homely thing where female participation was permitted culturally.

During the most concentrated political event of the bread seizure era, the French revolution, women had a received a peoples’ movement political repertoire to respond with. Not that they had a common political aim. But women took part in the political game and took initiatives which were decisive in several instances [22].

The final crisis for the royal prestige was for example when a women-dominated bread seizure of about 3000 participants decided to claim food provisions to a decent price before both National Assembly and king in October 5, 1789, and went off to Versailles. When the answers were evasive they forced both institutions to go back with them to Paris to be under popular surveillance and keep a better contact with realities.

Women were also the principal actors in the constant demonstrations which eroded the prestige of the Girondist government and made it possible for the Jacobins to take power. The demonstrations were also this time about food prices.

Women took also part in the public life of the clubs in the bigger cities, although they were never allowed the same political rights as men. Since they had no admission to the male clubs, they formed their own, officially derided but in reality necessary to ally with for anyone who wanted power. But the bread seizure technique was the base for their actions to the end – street demonstrations, seizure of food, sale of these in the market square, and public stigmatizing of speculators and politicians who didn’t intervene. Some political leaders raised demands for female suffrage in some form, but this was never a main issue. Economic demands were always in the foreground.

And since no revolutionary government ever succeeded in solving the food issue, female agitation remained a threat until Bonaparte’s dictatorship.

The Jacobin governments tried without success to get an end to the bread seizures by introducing a maximum price and a ban on female activities; then it fell. The following government tried to achieve the same thing by letting the price free, with equal lack of success. In spring 1795 Parisian women rallied for their last and greatest attack on state and speculators and occupied the National Assembly for two days. They seemed successful when several military detachments went over to them, but in the end they were repressed.

Although food matters remained the most important issue, the women learned gradually that food and power hung together. For that reason they voiced increasingly political demands, for example universal suffrage. The catchwords of the French revolution – liberty, equality, fraternity, and the republic of citizens – got an increasingly concrete social content.

[22] Shirley Elson Roessler, *Out of the shadows – women and politics in the French revolution 1789-95*, Peter Lang Publishers 1996.

The same thing happened in England in the 1810s when the demand for bread was politicized into a broad female participation in the movements for among other things parliamentary reform, see chapter 5.

Popular movement activity involving women during the first half of the nineteenth century almost never defended particular female interests, but popular interests in general. Bread seizure was a way of defending the household. Attacks on the English workhouses, where women took a leading part, intended to defend the poor against a new law demanding dissolution of families to get poor relief. And women's participation in the Chartist movement aimed at supporting their men's movement for male suffrage. But yet, local Chartist activities were dominated by women, organizing demonstrations and mass meetings to defend agitators against prosecution, apart from more typically "female" activities like sewing streamers or cooking public dinners. But few Chartist organisations demanded female suffrage [23]

Women organised also female trade unions, particularly during the two intense periods of unionist organizing in England in 1833-34 and in France in 1848. To be sure, women had a long tradition of unionist participation, if they were skilled artisans. But this tradition was threatened by new technologies and by ambitions of the capitalists to employ women in the least remunerated positions. And these unskilled workers were hard to organise, and often opposed by the skilled workers who feared that they would undercut them. The feverish unionizing in 1833-34 and 1848 were parts of a wave of organizing of unskilled workers generally, and they collapsed when the political circumstance that created them did, when the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union broke down and the French revolution ended in a massacre of workers.

With these efforts, the lively early nineteenth century female unionism disappeared. And more important than the conjunctural politics was in this case the long-run changes in the labour market. The women were crowded out from the core economic activities and were relegated to unorganizable and peripheral service work. Industrial labour was declared qualified and for this reason, according to old patriarchal tradition, male.

Nineteenth century feminism: charity and unionism

Instead, female politics became for a long time a privilege for the middle class, where the contrast between citizen men and non-citizen women was sharp.

The protestant sects who had produced so much female self-assurance during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries continued to take initiatives where women were active and often leaders: the movements for temperance and abolition of slavery. And middle class women were permitted to take part in charity, an activity which got a huge boost in connection with the Evangelical awakening in Britain, USA and other protestant countries after 1800 (see chapter 10). Such movements often behaved in a toffish way towards the people they pretended to support, but they at least gave women a public space and a practice of public work, which in the long run challenged the male monop-

[23] Malcolm I Thomis & Jennifer Grimmett, *Women in protest 1800-1850*; Dorothy Thompson, *The Chartists*, Pantheon 1984.

oly and legitimated citizen's rights for women. They would work for schools for poor children, for support of women against their alcoholic men, for vocational education of prostitutes, for economic support to the starving, or for religious salvation – and, through suggestion, claim that if they could do that they could work with anything men could do. In England there were links to the labour movement through co-operation and utopian socialist associations where artisans took part, and in the 1830s a kind of middle class response to bread seizures took the form of a movement against food tariffs, with women active in financing and agitation [24].

But the most important of these movements, in this context, was the anti-slavery movement in Britain and the US. More about this in chapter 10.

The seed for an organized movement of women's rights was sown when the anti-slavery world congress in London refused to acknowledge the right of speech for women, and half the American delegation left in protest. Eight years later some hundred anti-slavery women met in Seneca Falls in New York and adopted a declaration modelled on the American declaration of independence, and called for six demands: right to divorce, right to education and employment, equal rights in the church, abolishment of different moral standards for men and women, and female suffrage – the last demand with a slight majority. In addition they accused men for substituting themselves for God when they tried to define what was fitting for women. During the following years several congresses were summoned. The violent opposition they met stimulated a women's movement locally; for organisation however they relied in the structures of anti-slavery until the end of the civil war and the slavery institution [25].

Women's movement and anti-slavery movement, up to then being a unitary citizens' rights movement, split however shortly after. When the government proposed suffrage for black men, parts of the movement accepted this, not to be offensive, while others hold on to the demand for suffrage for all [26].

The demand for suffrage would remain the focus for the American women's movement up to 1920, with right to be admitted into professions as a second part.

In Europe, suffrage was not granted even for men; for that reason other issues were the prominent ones for the women's movement – right to education, right to employment, right to property, right to divorce. Married women's right to property and women's right to university studies were the first mobilization demands in both England and Sweden.

The first campaign to get some mass participation was a campaign against the contagious diseases act in England from 1869. The law decreed that anyone that could be suspected for being a prostitute would be detained for disinfection for an undefined time,

[24] Jane Rendall, *The origin of modern feminism*, Macmillan 1985; Karen Offen, *European feminisms*, Stanford University Press 2000, Richard Evans: *The Feminists*, Croom Helm 1977.

[25] Barbara Ryan, *Feminism and the women's movement*, Routledge 1992.

[26] With a certain reservation. The American women's organisations often maintained that they deserved suffrage better than immigrants from Italy and Poland, and in the south women's organisations often used racist arguments. This is obviously an example of marginalized people easily trying to climb in the system at the expense of other marginalized people.

and a group of feminists succeeded in allying Christian enemies of prostitution with poor people who risked arbitrary arrest, and demands for moral renewal and legal rights were linked to refusal of different moral standards for men and women. Such alliances were also built for campaigns for the right to divorce, but female interests had difficulty to attain hegemony within them. The campaign against the contagious diseases act was broadened to a movement against legalised prostitution but degenerated into hostility towards sex and demands for censorship and disciplinary power for authorities, and a movement just after 1900 for the right to contraception and, if necessary, abortion, was easily hijacked by doctors who wanted control over fertility. Methods were primarily petitions; through these one could constantly search for allies and show a growing constituency [27].

The women's movement was strong in England and the USA, with their big middle class, their tradition of evangelical revival, and their relative unaffectedness by Mediterranean patriarchy. In the European continent this tradition didn't exist, and the urban middle class where women were assumed to be passive and domesticated was rather small. So women's movements were proportionally weaker.

In France, the citizen tradition from the literary salons and the revolution inspired the liberal Saint Simon sect to establish female lodges, and these organised female trade unions and cooperatives in 1848. After the coup d'état of Napoleon III however, this tradition expired and the late nineteenth century middle class women's movement remained a debating society – since it was per definition was “republican” it refused to demand anything from the “republic”. In Germany, women's associations demanded right to property, education and employment, and even for a short period suffrage, but after 1907 they was caught by the imperial vision, defined themselves as “national” and began to see its role as producing soldiers for the German empire. In South Europe women's movement found it even more difficult to cut through Roman patriarchy and Catholic patriarchal hierarchies; practically no women's movement existed there before 1965 – but young people's revolts against patriarchal power was a favourite literary theme during the whole nineteenth century.

To some extent, the political weakness of these middle class women is compensated by a women's movement flourishing in patches within the labour movements of the continent. In patches, because in other places nothing was permitted which diverted focus from the exploitation of the workplace. In France, for example, female socialist activists considered “bourgeois feminists” as their main enemies and even refused to defend women who were thrown out from trade unions because they were women, referring to the unity of the labour movement. Accordingly, they remained few and had no successes at all before 1944. And in Russia, social democrat women devoted themselves to organised disruptions of the meetings of the “bourgeois feminists”. The conflict was real; the biggest profession among the women was domestic servant, but when the labour movement tried to organise them they met angry resistance from the middle class

[27] Olive Banks, *Faces of feminism*, Martin Robertson 1981; Barbara Caine, *English feminism 1780-1980*, Oxford University Press 1997; Karen Offen, *European feminism*, Stanford University Press 2000, Richard Evans: *The feminists*, Croom Helm 1977.

feminists who wanted to retain their absolute power as employers [28].

The strongest worker women's movements were the German and Italian ones. The Italian labour movement had, due to the lack of skilled artisans, a need for radical educated people which produced an openness for different citizen's rights issues, for example women's rights. There was also a militant tradition among north Italian rice-pickers dominating the land worker union and even sent women to the leadership of trade unions and socialist parties.

But the biggest and strongest was the worker women's movement in within the well-organised German labour movement. The women there had their own organisations, the so-called female workers' associations, since women were legally prohibited from entering political parties. The women turned this forced restriction into a source of strength; since men were excluded they were able to develop their own politics and meeting culture, in most cases according to orthodox social democrat norms but sometimes containing parts which were hard to put up with for social democrat men, for example campaigns for right to contraception and resistance to the "family wages" urged by the trade unions.

Due to the fact that the middle class feminist movement was weak in Germany, the campaign for female suffrage there was organised by social democrats. From 1908 they arranged mass meetings and demonstrations in March 8, much to the chagrin of male leaders who saw a competition with the First of May. These campaigns were formalized as the International Day of Women (which began as an American initiative), but about the same time the prohibition against female participation in politics was abolished, so the male dominated social democrat party decided to abolish the unpredictable women's organisations to get their activities under control.

But the women's organisation was not only split between "feminists" and "socialists" as the terms were. From of old there was a conflict crosswise, between what Karen Offen calls relational feminists who pragmatically assumed that the sexes had different spheres but wished to develop the female sphere to make it less repressive, and individualist feminists who demanded equal citizen's rights for all [29]. The latter were a minority in the beginning but their share grew as increasingly more women got higher education and an interest in competing with men about the well-paid jobs. The conflict between the currents was sharpened with time, and concerned the worker protection legislation that was introduced in the late nineteenth century and considered women and men separately; women were excluded from some kinds of jobs but got particular rights in connection

[28] Charles Sowerwine, *Socialists, feminism and the socialist women's movement from the French revolution to world war II*, and Richard Stites, *Women and the revolutionary process in Russia*, respectively, in Renate Bridenthal et al, *Becoming visible*; Charles Sowerwine, *Sisters or citizens?*, Cambridge University Press 1982 deals with the (lack of) women's movement in France; Richard Evans, *Comrades and sisters*, Wheatsheaf Books 1987, deals with the strong social democrat women's movement in Germany; and Bianca Beccalli, *The modern women's movement in Italy*, in Monica Threlfall (ed), *Mapping the women's movement*, Verso 1996, touches also upon the Italian worker women's movement before 1914.

[29] Karen Offen, *Contextualizing for theory and practice of feminism in nineteenth-century Europe*, in Renate Bridenthal et al, *Becoming visible*.

with childbirth. This was a red rag to the individual feminists but not unwelcome for the relational.

Partly to patch over the conflict and find a common aim, the women's movements focused increasingly on suffrage in the early twentieth century. The campaigns were most well-organised, not surprisingly, in England and the USA [30].

Suffrage had always been a focus in the USA; the women's organisations had organised suffrage campaigns since the 1860s, and the big mass organisation among women, Women's Temperance Union, pushed for suffrage as much as for temperance. They had successes insofar as they got it in the new states admitted to the union. It contributed to the success that so many women had begun to take part in the public as academics and social workers, the latter through the voluntary settlement house movement, that it appeared ridiculous to maintain the principle of different spheres.

But the breakthrough was late, and about 1900 organizations were established in England and USA, that tried a new strategy which was to be copied fifty years afterwards by the peace movements, the black citizen's movement, and the environment movements: maximum public provocation. They deranged election meetings, chained themselves to parliament buildings, hunger-stroke, smashed windows and committed arson, all for the purpose of being observed, arrested and sentenced. But the aim was not only to be noticed but also a way for women to raise respect and liberate themselves from the superficial paternalist benevolence that reformist liberals had used as an excuse for incapacitating women. The official women's organisations dissociated themselves cautiously without deprecating, and dared according to Raeburn to act more provocatively than earlier, multiplying their membership. The strategy was effective. When the rulers tried to reconstruct the world after the debacle of the first world war, the women in Northern Europe and Northern America got their suffrage, as a part of the concessions to the global peoples' movement system. Rights for women had, thanks to women's movements and other citizen's rights movements become a part of "modernity", something to adhere to for all regimes that wanted to appear modern, even if the rights in reality were meagre.

In the system peripheries and semi-peripheries, women's organisations had been established with the aim to promote the position of women, but primarily to contribute to the national independence – in about the same way as women's organisations had been established in labour movement milieus. Women's organisations took on themselves to educate new generations in the national culture and language. They were also involved in confrontations with the empires, for example they had to take the responsibility for the whole national movement in Ireland when most of the regular leadership was in jail after the land war in the 1880s. The Finnish women were rewarded for their struggle for independence with being the first to be legally equal with men in 1907, and the new East European states including the Soviet Union introduced female suffrage as a matter of course. In the global peripheries in Asia, Africa and South America, on the other hand,

[30] Barbara Caine, *English feminism 1780-1980*; Antonia Raeburn, *The militant suffragettes*, The New English Library 1974; and Barbara Ryan, *Feminism and the women's movement*.

the women's movement were as a role restricted to the north-inspired urban upper middle class, and were incapable of achieving much.

There was one exception to this pattern. The Chinese women's movement in the twenties was perhaps the most effective women's movement ever, in the short run [31].

It grew out of the radical Fourth of May movement, for which all hierarchic patterns were a part of the despised Confucian structure that kept China down in poverty and dependence of the system center powers, see chapter 6. But there was also since centuries a feminist current within the tradition of the secret societies, where women had reached high positions in violation of the Confucian principles, see chapters 3 and 7. The movement began as a student movement manifesting itself by organising schools and evening courses for women to make them more independent of their families, but it was a mass movement only in connection with the so-called thirtieth of May incident in 1924 when the British police fired and killed striking workers in Shanghai. Schools and course organisations were then able to use their pupil contacts for mobilizing women to the national movement. When the national movement took control over the Guangzhou province, members of the women's movement flocked there to organise a mass movement. The first aim was to stop enforced marriages, and an instrument was organising escapes and a secure future for women who tried to get rid of their men.

With the "northern expedition", the conquest by revolutionary movements of the Yangtse valley, the women's movement expanded its scope and radicalized its aim. The equality of sexes was considered by many as an inseparable aspect of the national revolution, and young women gathered in organisations who made themselves a part of the new regime with power to prohibit forced marriages, foot-binding and concubinage, and administer divorces if the women wished it. Gilmartin suggests that this threat to the patriarchal order was a main cause of the split in the national movement in 1928; it choked farmers as much as conservative officials and merchants. The subsequent violence hit the women's movement as hard as labour and agrarian movements. And although many of the aims of the women's movement were incorporated in the national and agrarian movements, the women's movement was not allowed independence henceforth.

With the end of the first world war what has been called the "first wave feminism" ended in Europe and North America. According to Johanna Brenner, this was due to the fact that the leaders of the movement – wealthy, university educated women from the upper middle class – had got their aims satisfied [32]. According to Richard Evans, the reason was that the middle class leaders of the movement saw their privileges as bourgeoisies threatened by a rising working class, and hurried to support their own national hierarchies. Others have emphasized how wars and authoritarian movements were able as patriarchal demonstrations of strength to relegate women into a subordi-

[31] Christina Kelley Gilmartin, *Engendering the Chinese revolution*, University of California Press 1995.

[32] Johanna Brenner, *The best of times, the worst of times: Feminism in the United States*, in Monica Threlfall (ed), *Mapping the women's movement*.

nated position [33], while yet others put the blame with the irresolution of the women's movements themselves. For when the suffrage issue was settled, the movements had to agree if they asked for the same rights as men or other rights than men. And they couldn't. For example, the American Women's Party met their angriest opponents against their campaign for equal labour market rights in the twenties with NAWSA, the biggest American women's organisation, which was afraid to lose the small paid maternity leave they had achieved. Also the worker women tended to support different rights since their opportunities to compete for other than the lowest paid jobs was small; for them even a housewife role was a step forward. So accordingly, the separate rights were included in the welfare legislation from the thirties in Scandinavia and the USA and from the fifties in Western Europe, within the framework of a Fordist production culture – men as unionized wage labourers, women as unsalaried, uncontracted household workers for life. This perhaps most rigid separation ever between wage labour and non-wage labour was supported by many relational feminists, not to speak of male labour movement activists. Child allowance was tied to the mothers, protective legislation and rights for child bearers made enterprises reluctant to employ women, and attempts at social childcare were never more than attempts before the sixties. Many women's movement activists engaged themselves in the welfare project and succeeded in Scandinavia and Britain to abolish the legal discrimination of women, albeit not the real one nourished by the inequality patterns of opportunity hoarding [34], while others tried to counter the militant interwar patriarchal thrusts by engaging in peace movements.

Post-Fordist women's movements

The long Kondratiev A wave and the integration mechanisms of the Bretton Woods program after 1945 changed the preconditions of the compromise. Industrial growth and national welfare policies cried out for salaried labour power, and the women of the system center began to fill the least attractive positions of the labour market. The themes of the women's movements became topical again.

The women's movement mobilizations from the sixties, which have been called the "second wave feminism", were however more a result of the growth of the education system, the resistance to the social consequences of the dogmatic labour division, and the global peoples' movement upswing about 1970, than of subordination in the labour

[33] The conservatively authoritarian regimes in Central and Southern Europe, with their unequivocal hostility to the aims of the women's movements were less destructive for the self-assertion of women than the equally authoritarian development despotisms in Eastern Europe after 1945, with their official support for women's rights combined with an extremely selective implementation through paternalist reforms and prohibition of independent movements. In Central and Southern Europe, women's movement aims became a natural part of the democratic resistance. In Eastern Europe, women's movements are still, two decades after the fall of the communist parties, almost non-existent.

[34] An example is the Swedish social democrat women who succeeded in reformulating the old aim "how married women should be able to work for a salary" to the more acceptable "how working women should be able to rear children" – which muted resistance substantially although it is exactly the same.

market. The principal source of inspiration was the black civil rights movement in the USA [35].

The direct initiative to this wave came from traditional feminists working within the welfare system, older women with experiences from the interwar movements. They used the opportunity when a law against discriminating of blacks was discussed in the US congress in 1965, and succeeded in adding sex as an unlawful reason for discrimination, and thus legitimated complaints for sexist treatment. A flood of complaints ensued under high publicity, and women began to organise. Organisation took two forms.

Mass organising of interest was expressed by the National Organization for Women (NOW), with time an organisation of hundreds of thousands of members, and by other smaller organisations. Their focus was concrete cases of discrimination, and they organised political pressure, legal cases and other public protests. Their members were generally professional career women and the organisations had a traditional structure, but members were expected to take an active part.

The feminist networks aimed more at strengthening women's identity and language as a struggling repressed group, through discussions, therapeutic talks and confrontations. It was these networks that popularized the catchword "the personal is politic". The members were primarily women who had taken part in the civil rights and anti-war movements and discovered that they were considered as second-class members due to their sex. The networks were radical-democratic, without formal leaders according to a model initiated by the black movement but later fallen in disregard there.

This division of labour occurred also in other system center countries. In France the career women gathered in Choisir and Ligue du Droit des Femmes while young women fed up by the patriarchal patterns that were recreated in the youth groups and radical leftist movements created the radical-democratic Mouvement de libération des femmes. In Denmark there was the same division between Dansk Kvindesamfund and Rødstrømpebevægelsen.

After some years, the differences between these two currents subsided while others grew in importance – between blacks and whites, between separatists and interest politicians, between professionals and lay women, and not least the old false conflict between equality feminists and relational feminists [36]. Some observers have complained that the women's movement identities have split in a host of identities while many of the standpoints of the movement have been adopted by official society, without influencing the material conditions of life for women the slightest.

Meanwhile, the movement grew increasingly professionalized. Instead of mass mem-

[35] Flora Davis, *Moving the mountain*, University of Illinois Press 1999, is a comparably non-academic and detailed history of the American women's movement since the sixties. Her point of departure is however not the black citizen's movement but really an issue of labour market subordination – the strike of the airplane cabin attendants in 1963 against the low retirement age and the sexist motivation for this. For Denmark, *Drude Dahlerup, Rødstrømperne*, Gyldendal 1998, is even more detailed but confines itself to the period 1971-1986.

[36] Expressed as focus on equal legal rights – without considering that law doesn't decide the way opportunities are hoarded – versus focus on particular privileges for women – without considering that this would place women in a kind of clientship with those who guarantee the privileges.

bership organisations and activist groups, NGOs came to the forefront – foundations or enterprises with employees managing campaigns on strictly limited issues, engaging lay people for yet more limited tasks without giving them any influence over the political frameworks. This development was most manifest in the USA, where lobbying and legal cases came to be the principal method to assert the interests of women, while mass mobilizing was left to the opponents.

At the outset, women's admission to employment was the most important issue for the movement – including public childcare and equal rights within work. Less important issues were protests against sexist stereotypes underpinning the segregation – often these protests defined the women's movement publicly, like for example the action against the Miss World contest in Atlantic City in 1969 or Rødstrømpernes much-published action in Copenhagen in 1971 against the necessity of being cute.

But increasingly, the right to abortion grew to the great focus issue in almost the whole system center. This was the main issue in France where thousands of well-known women reported themselves to the police, protesting against an imprisonment sentence against a poor woman, and achieved an amendment of the law. This was the main issue for the small and weak Irish movement which lost heavily against the Catholic church. This was the issue for an Italian referendum – where however the political parties took the main scene, increasingly as the campaign went on. And it was the women's movement issue that took the main public interest in the USA [37].

Afterwards, this priority can arguably be seen as a strategic miscalculation or perhaps due to the lack of any strategy at all. For this was the only issue where it was possible for patriarchy to mobilize a mass support against the demands of the women's movement, a support which in the USA grew so strong that it could be used against the labour movement, the blacks and other non-privileged. The mass support didn't only consist of men, seeing their privileges threatened, but even more of women, heiresses of the women's movements of the nineteenth century who saw motherhood as the greatest asset of women. Meanwhile, it appeared difficult to mobilize any strong support for the abortion issue; the partial successes turned out to be highly formal in many cases, calling for resourceful people to use. And the issue was also primarily a symbolical one, and concerned rather few people directly.

But it is true that the abortion issue made the women's movement very visible.

After the failure of the abortion issue as unifying for the movement, different interests have in principle catered for themselves. Closest to the role as symbolic focus has perhaps been defence against violence. Rape and wife-beating show patriarchy at its worst, and it has been possible to produce a wide support also from conservative people against them, and protection centers have functioned as centers of organisation and culture for the movement. Sometimes, groups have demonstrated for right to the night, against legal machineries that often condone violence against women.

[37] Monica Threlfall (ed) Mapping the women's movement, Verso 1996, deals with the "second wave" feminism in the system center. An older and more nearsighted book is Drude Dahlerup (ed), The new women's movement, Sage 1986.

Defence for women's economic interests have however been out of focus most of the time and been maintained only by trade unions of female majority, without being officially parts of any women's movement. To be sure, the nurse strike in France in the early seventies, and the female auto-workers' strike for equal pay at Ford in England in 1968 were memorable feminist events, and Swedish nurse trade unions have also used feminist language sometimes. But apart from this, it's only in Italy that lay people based in women's movements have considered it important to work in trade unions for their aims. Which is notable, since women are a growing part of the workers, particularly of the poorly paid workers, and since the trade unions are increasingly dominated by women. The strong unionist connection in Italy is of course an effect of the very strong labour mobilization there between 1967 and 1975.

Defence against the phasing out of the welfare reforms after 1973 have been more a part of women's movement focus. In the USA and Britain, where the liquidation has been most brutal, resistance has often been constructed around women's interest – but as often around other interests.

And finally, defence against forced double work and against the demand of taking responsibility for non-waged work has almost never been an issue for struggle anywhere, despite being the reason for repression of women if the commodity chain argument is true. This issue was thematized only in the radical feminist networks around 1970 and to some extent in Scandinavia thereafter.

According to Threlfall, the women's movements of the system center have for this reason primarily favoured middle class women. It has become much easier for women to make a career in well-paid professions – but this hasn't favoured women in less well-paid professions. Women have filled academic professions and influenced these according to women's interests – but they have also filled the global proletariat. Women's work has been commercialized, been made official, regardless of what class it has belonged to. The dogmatic segregation between women/non-wage work and men/wage work has been broken, but this has often only implied that women have got double work. It isn't only the women's movements' fault that the favours haven't been more evenly distributed; this is a result of the poor successes generally of peoples' movements to assert the interests of the majority after 1973.

In the system peripheries, the priorities have been different. This is a result of the fact that women's movements there have a different base. Primarily, they emanate from work and the needs of the households.

In the system center, the non-waged work women have to take responsibility for consists primarily of household work, i.e. subsistence work. In the system periphery, it also consists of small businesses, production of commodities and services for the market [38]. This is a consequence of the fact that wages under peripheral conditions are so

[38] Joan Smith & Immanuel Wallerstein (ed), *Creating and transforming households*, Cambridge University Press 1992. – Ingrid Palmer has coined the expression “reproductive tax” to cover the burden laid on women in connection with government cuts of transfers and business cuts of wages. See Haleh Afshar & Carolyne Dennis (ed), *Women and adjustment policies in the Third World*, Macmillan 1992.

small that they have to be supplemented by cash, and under peripheral conditions there are few public transfer payments with this purpose. The need for supplementary production has risen fast and radically during the Kondratiev B phase and the business-liberal government programs of the late twentieth century, when wages and transfers have been curtailed, and it has even began to appear in the system center.

A main current in the women's movements of the system peripheries has for this reason been defence of non-wage work [39].

But like in the system centers, women in the peripheries have been increasingly involved in wage labour since 1973. Earlier, they worked primarily in agriculture and home industry, like the West European women until early nineteenth century. When industry began to be localized out from the system center in the seventies, women were recruited to unqualified assembly line production, since they were purchasable for lower wages. While the female part of the global industrial working force has risen to about a third, they amount to about 90 percent in the transnational enterprises' subcontractors in the free zones of the "new industrial countries". Meanwhile, the female part of the public servants increases over the whole world, concurrently with the diminishing public salaries.

A consequence of this is that women engage more and more in trade unions.

Women being contented with low salaries turned out to be a temporary occurrence. The unionist movement developed by women's employments in the sweatshops of economic free zones has been best documented for the pioneering South Korea. The unionist movement of the female textile workers may put its birth date to the day the women of Dongil Textiles elected a female leadership of their union in 1972. They began the tradition of militancy and alliances with students and churches against the enterprises and the military dictatorship characteristic of the South Korean labour movement. With this unionist power base they have engaged in more traditional women's movement issues like the power in the family and legal protection for the victims of American soldiers [40]. During the nineties, organization has begun in the Mexican maquiladoras, and Moghadan reports about organization among female assembly line workers in Southeast Asia.

Defence of non-wage labour may be expressed as defence of natural resources or organisation of informal businesses. The Indian Chipko movement defended the forest as a source of food and firewood, and the Bangladeshi savings association has been an example for savings associations over the world. But mostly such projects are too small to figure in Western media. Odoul and Kabira have registered 27.000 women's groups

[39] Torry Dickinson, Preparing to understand Feminism in the twenty-first century, in *Journal of World-System Research* IV, 2/1998; Valentine M. Moghadam, Female labor and women's mobilization, *Journal of World-System Research* V, 2/1999, Amrita Basu (ed), *The challenge of local feminisms*, Westview Press 1995, and Bonnie Smith (ed), *Global feminisms since 1945*, Routledge 2000, are somewhat impressionistic overviews over the global women's movements.

[40] Miriam Ching Yoon Louie, *Minjung feminism; Korean women's movement for gender and class liberation*, in Bonnie Smith, *Global feminism since 1945*, Routledge 2000; and Hagen Koo, *Korean workers, the culture and politics of class formation*, Cornell University Press 2002.

just in Kenya working with savings, land purchase, house-building and redistribution not managed by the state, meanwhile struggling for women's right to own land [41]. The aim is, except the economic one, to create a space outside the traditional patriarchal structures. Due to a weak organising at the overarching level, these groups are however sometimes a gateway for new patriarchal power groups in the forms of national politics and international aid, and they are generally not related to feminist politics.

Since the limits between wage and non-wage labour are not razor-sharp, movements tend to mix with each other, according to Dickinson. Renana Jhabvala tells in Rowbotham's and Mitter's book about the way street-vendors in Ahmadabad in Gujarat have been acknowledged as a trade union by the ICFTU, despite their being formally business women – employers don't treat them as employees but as subcontractors. But they seem so far as an exception.

Defence for non-wage labour, household and civil society mechanisms have sometimes been a base for "politics" in its traditional meaning. The street-vendors of Ahmadabad have for example intervened in the turf squabbles between Hindus and Muslims, referring to women's solidarity. Women in Mexican shantytowns have organised defence for commons like water and electricity from the eighties, utilizing their status as mothers like European women in the nineteenth century, casually organising a movement that challenged the political monopoly of the PRI. The most famous examples are women's resistance to South American military dictatorships in the seventies and eighties. Their traditional invisibility made them never appear as a competitor to the regimes and gave them a space to lead the emerging democracy movements. For example, women in the shantytowns around São Paulo, organised in Christian congregations, began struggling for water and electricity, went further to publishing the falsifications of the consumer's price index regulating wages in Brazil, and initiated the labour movement which destroyed the dictatorship [42].

Gradually, the role as defender of the family against violence and economic misgovernment, which was genial in the struggle against repressive dictatorships, has appeared somewhat problematic particularly to urban middle class feminists; isn't this the role women want to escape, asks Jaquette. So these economically based resistances have had difficulties to come to terms with north-influenced feminism. For example, they refused to break with traditional female roles and they have refused to see any conflict with men. But beginning with the UN year of women in 1975, they have had to discuss common platforms and at least in one issue they have had to find a common base of action and

[41] Wilhelmina Odoul & Wanjiku Mukabi Kabira, *The mother of warriors and her daughters*; in Amrita Basu (ed), *The challenge of local feminisms*. You can get a picture of the manifoldness in Sheila Rowbotham & Swasti Mitter (ed), *Dignity and daily breads*, Routledge 1994; Ann Leonard, *Seeds*, The Feminist Press at The City University of New York 1989, and *Seeds 2*, ditto 1995. Regrettably, the two latter have a perspective of "we", the clever people in the north, helping "them" to "development".

[42] Jane S. Jaquette (ed), *The women's movement in Latin America*, Westview Press 1994; Kathleen Logan, *Women's participation in urban protest*, in Joe Foweraker & Ann Craig (ed), *Popular movements and political change in Mexico*, Lynne Rienner 1990; Yvonne Corcoran Nantes, *Female consciousness or feminist consciousness*; women's consciousness rising in community based struggles in Brazil, in Bonnie Smith, *Global feminisms since 1945*.

discussion – the issue of patriarchal violence which hit at women of all classes.

In Brazil, such issues were raised by the shantytown networks about 19980 because the men tried to prevent women’s organisation [43]. But the most published movement is the Indian one, perhaps because they work within the most patriarchal culture of all. Middle class women have taken up struggle against so-called bride murders while under-class women have mobilized against the sexualized violence of employers, and the gap between different traditions have slowly begun to close [44].

Because of the “feminization of global wage labour”, linked to remaining division of work, where women are responsible for a non-waged labour that continues to be necessary, some researchers see women’s movements as the most important peoples’ movements of the twenty-first century [45]. But what are their opportunities?

First a certain reservation. With reference to women’s presence in wage labour, we may remember that wage labour in the system center in the early nineteenth century was also to a great extent dominated by women, but that they were squeezed out gradually from the key businesses and made defenceless. The structural need for someone to be responsible for non-wage labour was stronger than the need for women in wage labour. It is possible that the “feminization of wage labour” is a passing phenomenon this time also.

On the other hand, wage labour is spread to increasingly more links of the commodity chain. And during a hundred and fifty year of women’s movements, some successes have accumulated and made it politically sensitive to squeeze out women this time. But it is certainly not impossible.

Historically, women’s movements have, since the time of Beguines, Sufis and secret societies, used a lot of energy to build identities and to struggle for publicity. One may call it a struggle against the cultural capital; a struggle seemingly the fate of all marginalized categories. I will return to this in the end of this chapter.

The cooperation that was a central feature in the early phases disappeared strangely, only to return in the present southern movements. Obstruction has all the time been difficult to use in the issue I have supposed to be the core issue, because the forced non-wage labour doesn’t imply any clear adversary. But the Icelandic women’s strike in October 24, 1975 also covered household work, and in 2000 the idea was taken up again for the Eighth of March manifestations, supported by among others COSATU in South Africa. It is possible that the increasing female participation in trade unions may make such unionist actions easier, even for non-wage labour.

Through its weak focus on economic matters, women’s movements have missed

[43] Sonia E. Alvarez, The transformation of feminisms and gender politics in democratizing Brazil, in Jane S. Jaquette (ed), The women’s movement in Latin America.

[44] Gail Omvedt, Reinventing revolution, M.E. Sharpe 1993; Radha Kumar, From Chipko to Sati, in Amrita Basu (ed), The challenge of local feminisms. Bride murders refer to the growing habit within the urban middle class to let sons marry girls to get the dowry and then kill the girls. – It’s strange that Islamist fundamentalism has got such a bad reputation while few seem to have noticed that one of the program points of the Hinduist fundamentalists is the right to burn widows alive.

[45] For example Peter Waterman, Globalisation, solidarity and new social movements, Mansell/Cassell 1998.

many opportunities to create hegemony among the women struggling for such issues, which are the majority. Women forced to non-wage labour, and women forced to badly paid industrial labour, have been neglected while upper middle class women in or without professional NGOs have appropriated the right to define their issues as the most important ones for the women's movements, as "Feminism". Probably, though, it is a matter of time until trade unionists and cooperatives of non-wage labourers gain hegemony within the women's movement universe. Perhaps they do already – Nancy Saporta and Yvonne Corcoran describe the way north-influenced middle class feminists lose power within South American women's movement networks to the benefit of shantytown women and their more universal experiences [46].

On the other hand, women's movements have a clear advantage. Because of its peripheral position during the twentieth century, they are rather unspoilt by the breakdown of the government power strategy, and should for that reason be rather privileged in participating in the construction of the new popular movement strategy of the twenty-first century.

Pariah movements

Wage labour and non-wage labour are however not the only kind of labour divided according to pseudo-biological criterions.

According to Tilly, the easiest way of distributing attractive and unattractive tasks is to link the different kinds of work to different pre-constructed kinds of people, no matter which. Different kinds of waged work are also distributed according to pseudo-biologic criteria. We remember Gordon's et al dividing of work into independent core work, subordinated core work, and peripheral work. Tilly uses the terms loyalty systems, contract systems and control systems – loyalty systems being work you are entrusted to draw up as you like, contract systems being work ruled by a strict unit prices, and control systems being work supervised strictly by a foreman. Of course, the two latter are those reserved for people from categories with a low attributed value, where sex is one dimension of division while "ethnicity" is another and age is a third [47].

This section focuses on "ethnicity" while age and other criteria are conceived later.

What is "ethnicity"? Apparently, it has nothing to do with geographical origin per se. Like national movements arise only in regions which are somehow treated negatively by a center, ethnicity arises only if categories are treated negatively by other categories. For with the special treatment, the treated category responds by adapting itself to the discriminating situation to do it endurable, and thus develops a habitus and an identity as a category. Not least, new generations are imparted a self-image and ambitions which

[46] Nancy Saporta Sternbach et al, *Feminisms in Latin America: From Bogotá to San Bernardo*, in Arturo Escobar & Sonia Alvarez, *The making of social movements in Latin America*, Westview Press 1992; Yvonne Corcoran Nantes, *Female consciousness or feminist consciousness; women's consciousness rising in community based struggles in Brazil*, in Bonnie Smith, *Global feminisms since 1945*.

[47] David M. Gordon, Richard Edwards & Michael Reich, *Segmented work, divided workers*, Cambridge University Press 1982; Charles Tilly, *Durable inequality*.

may seem “realistic” but are an adaptation to the unequal conditions they for that reason contribute to maintaining [48].

Such “ethnic” divisions of work exist and have existed in many kinds of systems – we may think of the Jewish merchant networks in medieval Europe, which maintained themselves through cooption, or the clans in the peripheries of society in medieval India to whom was relegated the most unrewarding tasks. Tilly contends that it is almost universal to do so, because it is so simple and convenient for people with power to distribute tasks. But since the world market system builds on such an overwhelming amount of labour distribution, and whose distribution extends to such vast areas, the ethnic principle becomes generalized in a quite different way than in systems building on subsistence and/or local markets.

The overriding ethnic layering is of course the global one, the one implied from the center-periphery or North-South division. But an interesting factor is that this ethnic layering remains in local labour divisions; people from the center – the North – are assigned core work in loyalty systems, while people with an origin the periphery – the South – are assigned peripheral work in control or contract system, irrespective where they happen to live.

While the ethnic layering tied to territories generally has been combated by national movements demanding independence, see chapter 6, ethnic layering within countries or regions have often (but not always) been combated by civil rights movements.

The citizen concept has its origin in the medieval European peace movement and its creation of the commune as a community to defend the city against ravaging barons, see chapter 9. But only the artisans of the French revolution raised citizenship as an antithesis to the subject concept of the royal dictatorship, and its ramifications of unequal privilege, and they succeeded in getting it acknowledged at least in theory in the compromise presided over by British liberals after the end of the Napoleonic wars. According to their version, not all were citizens, only those with enough property to be, as it was called, economically independent. But the extension of the egalitarian citizenship without any privileges to an increasing part of the population was a common theme for all popular movements of the nineteenth century, and the labour movement which was to be hegemonic within the peoples’ movement family claimed that it should be extended to all. Suffrage was understood as the symbolic seal of citizenship, and the more the government power strategy was to dominate after 1900, the more important appeared suffrage. Resistance to privileges played a less predominant role, since also comparatively unprivileged people may have some privileges to defend, but at least one kind of “pseudo-ethnic” privilege system served in the peoples’ movement discourse as an example of radical evil: aristocratic privilege.

For the pariah movements [49] of the twentieth century, this was a tradition to draw from.

[48] Joan Smith & Immanuel Wallerstein (ed), *Creating and transforming households*.

[49] I have used a concept that was popular a hundred years ago at least in Sweden, and called pseudo-ethnically downgraded people “pariahs”. This word derives etymologically from the name of a South Indian low status group, *pariya*, assigned to scavenging.

The pariah movements of the plantation complex

The pariah group within the world market system that was most visible at the earliest time was the group created by slavery in the plantations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see chapter 4. The formal slavery was abolished during the nineteenth century along the American Atlantic and replaced with wage labour or sharecropping, through a cooperation between the Haitian revolution, the Barbados rebellion in 1816, several small rebellions in the USA and Brazil, organised escape from the plantations, religiously motivated anti-slavery movement among the middle class, see chapter 10, economically motivated resistance to slavery among the artisans and farmers, and – in the USA – enthusiastic participations of black slaves at the Union side of the civil war, in the form of strikes and volunteering. But this didn't imply that the slaves and their descendants became equal citizens. Even henceforth, people of African descent were relegated to the most unrewarding tasks. In the part of the earlier plantation territory where there was most to exclude them from, in USA, Tilly's usual inequality mechanisms was reinforced by a formalised rule system forbidding a lot of activities to the blacks, for example education and voting. The aim was to supply the comparatively poor southern states with cheap labour and prevent its comparatively peripheral economy to be knocked out by the stronger enterprises from the North. To do away with this rule system was the primary aim for the movement emerging among the blacks in the early twentieth century [50].

Political organising began among educated and wealthy blacks in the north. The first big organisation, NAACP, was originally uninterested in mass organising, but acted as a lobby among politicians and courts, to declare the southern discriminating rules unconstitutional. They had some lesser successes but these didn't affect the lives of people in general.

The black majority, the southern sharecroppers, shied away from political organising, being burnt by the post-war backlashes. They gathered in separatist Christian revivals, which would get importance in the fifties. Otherwise, mass movements would grow only in the twenties. There were several reasons for their growth then.

One was the excesses of the white establishments. According to Raymond Gavins, NAACP grew to a mass movement in the south as a self-defence against white lynch gangs, who waged an erratic terror regime to keep the blacks in their place [51].

Another was urbanization among the blacks. Only at the time of the first world war, blacks began to work in the industry and in urban services, sometimes after having

[50] The classic among black historians of the USA is John Hope Franklin, *From slavery to freedom*, Alfred A Knopf 1967 (first edition 1947); this is however rather white-washed. Supplementing histories are Cedric Robinson, *Black movements in America*, Routledge 1997, and Michael L. Coniff & Thomas J. Davis, *Africans in the Americas*, St. Martin's Press 1994. The civil rights movements are documented in Jack E. Davis (ed), *The civil rights movement*, Blackwell 2001, Charles Eagles (ed), *The civil rights movement in America*, University Press of Mississippi 1984, and Harvard Sitkoff, *The struggle for black equality*, Hill & Wang 1981.

[51] Raymond Gavins, *The NAACP in North Carolina during the age of segregation*, in Jack E. Davis (ed), *The civil rights movement*.

served at the front. The new experiences brought a new pride, among other things manifesting itself in the so-called Harlem renaissance, a cultural movement among blacks in the north, and one may remind of the strong position blacks had in popular music at the time. But it also manifested itself in organisation for interests.

Both Franklin and Davis emphasize the importance of the labour movement upswing in the thirties for black mobilization. Traditionally, trade unions within the AFL had refused to admit blacks, except the Miners' Federation. But in 1935, the Miners and some other federations founded CIO to organize the assembly line workers, where blacks were abundant. The radical popular culture inspired by the labour mobilization moved also the blacks. And black workers organised themselves in businesses where they were in majority, for example the sleeping-car staff, whose trade union become a backbone in the black civil rights movement. For example, they organised a threat of a demonstration in 1942 that was enough to make the government legislate against segregation in industries producing for the army.

The post-war boom strengthened the blacks even more. The proportion of blacks with education increased, and the educated accepted no more than black soldiers to be discriminated against. In 1942, the Congress for Racial Equality, CORE, had been organised in Chicago by students to challenge discrimination with sit-ins. Other black students copied their methods in the south as early as 1947, but with little success.

The catalyst for a broad black movement was the bus boycott in Montgomery in 1955. It was well prepared, organised through the black churches, and got mass support. What made it a success was, except the economic loss for the bus company, the appeal to white sympathisers in the north about improving the city by eradicating a bad practice, and never to degenerate into hate of whites.

The dissemination over the country was also initiated by the black churches, organised in Southern Christian Leadership Conference, SCLC. But the foot-soldiers of the movement were students who copied the CORE sit-in actions with increasing success: they acted as if segregation was abolished and demanded to be served at cafés and boarding-houses. When they were arrested they helped to fill the prisons. Business after business desegregated rather than risking fuss and lost revenues. The youth movement was the third of the great civil rights movements of the fifties, Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, SNCC.

But the successes were isolated to the economically forward states in the southeast. An attempt of CORE to test desegregation in the poorer Alabama and Mississippi in 1961 was met by murders. A grand campaign to register black voters provoked a state of terror with dozens of murders and constant maltreatment from the police. It was evident that the tactics from Montgomery didn't work.

Instead, the movement chose another: to provoke the racists to overreact and cause massive disorder. This was the reason why King and SCLC chose Birmingham for a demonstration for a law against discrimination in 1962 and Selma for a demonstration for black suffrage in 1964. Both were known to have brutal racist chiefs of police, and when these acted according to character before the TV teams it caused a wave of indignation over the world – not least in the new independent African states. The president

was forced to back legislation according to the wish of the movement not to lose the reputation as leader of “the free world”.

The tactics worked bad for the voter registration in Mississippi, despite the fact that the movement recruited white high-status students as shields, for the murders took place out of sight for the TV public. Instead, the escalation of violence caused bitterness in the movement, over treachery from the liberal establishment and from trade unions. This bitterness would later be one of the causes for split in the movement and relative defeat.

There were also other causes.

One was the Vietnam war, breaking unity between trade unions and civil rights movement. The trade unions supported the war since it increased demand of skilled labour – while the blacks were not qualified but were hit by cuts in the social budgets. Parts of the black movement belonged to the pioneers of war resistance; King belonged to the earliest opponents, and the provocative action models and the radical democratic, flat structure of the Mississippi movement was also the model for the war resistance.

An attempt to save the cooperation with a joint campaign for full employment came to nothing; the unionists lost interest when the big city slum people took revenge for a life of humiliation in a wave of unplanned revolts in 1966-67, usually provoked by police outrages, and when King left the scene in 1968 there was nobody with enough stature to make them interested again.

Another was that cooperation within the movement ceased. During the phase of mobilization up to 1964, different organisations and groups were able to practice a far-reaching creative disunity concerning the means because they agreed on the goals [52]. They wanted to do away with segregating laws and have equal rights of all Americans, and militant street activists and conservative businessmen were able to cooperate for this aim. But those who were victims of white violence in 1963-64 lost interest in integration. For them, the American dream turned into a nightmare, and the goal for them was separatist black power instead. This was an attractive goal for the underclass of the slums; their living standard didn't increase at all just because legal restraints disappeared since it depended on Tilly's inequality functions [53]. King's and SCLC's policy of integration had been carried by the growing black middle class, whose position was strengthened.

But perhaps the most likely explanation for the relative failure is that it is easier to mobilize against a discriminating law than to mobilize against a discriminating routine in economy and culture. When the laws disappeared, new alliances would have been needed to struggle against this discrimination.

The blacks didn't find any other focus when the laws were abolished. They fuzzied out in hosts of campaigns against rack-renting, for equal rights to jobs, for fair food price

[52] Nancy Weiss, Creative tensions in the leadership of the civil rights movement, in Charles Eagles (ed), The civil rights movement in America, University Press of Mississippi 1986.

[53] The overwhelming majority of the two million convicts in USA are blacks, sentenced for possession of marijuana, according to Punishment and prejudice: Racial disparities in the war on drugs, Human Rights Watch 2000. Whites also use marijuana but are not convicted for it. And ex-convicts lose the suffrage in all states except four.

es, against discrimination in school, and against expressways – in 1970 there were 400 campaigns against expressways designed to destroy the homes of poor people. Many of these campaigns were successful but they couldn't change the picture nationally and they couldn't prevent the poor from being yet poorer [54].

In the rest of the old plantation territory from the Caribbean to Brazil, movements for self-assertion of black people have been missing, probably because no laws have forbidden them anything. Their subordination has depended on routines, copied between businesses and supported by inaccessible cultural routines and world order principles. And these are much more difficult to mobilize against. In some Caribbean islands, there have been political movements, but only in for example Trinidad and Jamaica where blacks are “the nation”. These have later pioneered African self-assertion in other areas – Marcus Garvey from Jamaica organised the first, short-lived black mass organisation in USA in the early twenties, George Padmore from Trinidad organised the African Bureau in London during the second world war as a gathering space for putative African liberation leaders, Aimé Césaire from Martinique introduced the literary current in Africa called *négritude*, and Frantz Fanon from the same island became an ideologist for the liberation movements in the French colonies [55].

In other places, for example Brazil, black organising has exclusively been cultural and generally taken the form of religious cults and carnival organising [56]. It has become a politics of interest only after 1973, generally beginning within congregations of liberation theology [57]. Both have had scant success so far.

Pariah movements of the settler colonies

The other great complex of local category building is what was created in European settler colonies. As described in chapter 4, settler colonies began to appear with the plantation economies in America, but their great age of multiplication was the nineteenth century when Europeans emigrated and established themselves as new upper classes in America, Australia, South Africa, Kenya, Algeria and, somewhat later, Palestine. By force of their global organising, the Europeans deprived the original inhabitants of their land and forced them to manual, low-waged labour for the Europeans, and this pattern has survived. Because of the often numerical superiority of the original inhabitants, the Europeans have been forced to underpin the caste system with rigid laws, giving the original inhabitants strong goals for their mobilizing against subordination and exploitation.

In several of the enumerated cases, the resistance has taken the form of national movements. The Europeans have been few enough to make it realistic to force them to “go home” or stay as ordinary citizens. These were the cases in Algeria and Kenya. In

[54] Thomas F. Jackson, *The state, the movements and the urban poor*, in Michael B. Katz, *The underclass debate*, Princeton University Press 1993.

[55] C.L.R. James, *The black Jacobins*, Allison & Busby 1994.

[56] Olivia Maria Gomes da Cunha, *Black movements and the “Politics of identity” in Brazil*, in Sonia Alvarez et al (ed), *Culture of politics, politics of cultures*, Westview Press 1998.

[57] Michael L. Conniff & Thomas J. Davis, *Africans in the Americas*.

other areas, resistance has perhaps begun this way but with time been forced to see forward to a future co-existence, and taken the form of civil rights movements. These were the cases in South Africa and America. Palestine may be in the transition just now.

The people displaced by settler colonies in America survived in two kinds of environments [58].

- Those who were relatively numerous and whose labour was profitable to exploit as peasants/land workers; they lived primarily in the Andine highlands, from Mexico southwards.

- Those who lived so far away that they were left more or less in peace up to our time; they lived primarily in Amazonas, and in the mountainous parts of western North America.

- The rest were chased away by land-hungry Europeans

It took five hundred years for all these people began to identify themselves in common and discover common interests. During all this time, they had tried to defend themselves locally – or in some cases nationally as peasants. The peasant movements struggling for land reform in Mexico in the tens, in Peru in the fifties and sixties, and in Guatemala in the seventies were mostly Indians but defined themselves politically as peasants or country people, *campesinos*.

But during the post-war boom, their societies were drawn into changes resulting in a common popular movement mobilizing. Indians were engaged increasingly as workers in the towns and came into contact with each other and with the global peoples' movement culture. It was during the popular movement upswing about 1970 the modern so-called Indian movement was born.

It may for the sake of pedagogics be divided in two segments: the Andean peasant movement and the Amazonian/North American movements against exploitation of their resource base.

The American peasant movements of the twentieth century had a strangely subaltern position. They were sometimes strong locally, but in national context they played the part of the poor cousin from the country to the urban middle class; while the urban middle class challenged the export bourgeoisie for power they needed a popular image as representatives of the people, so they emphasized the peasants in a paternalist way, stating the importance of Indian culture for the identity of the nation, see chapter 6. Land reforms in Mexico (except in Morelos), Bolivia, Peru and Chile were carried through by city people who kept land distribution, credits and food markets in their own hands. So

[58] The literature on Indian movements have a strong bias to "identities" and tend to pass by politics. Alison Brysk, *From tribal village to global village*, Indian rights and international relations in Latin America, Stanford university Press 2000, has the most encompassing coverage for Latin America; it may be supplemented by Stephen Cornell, *The return of the native*, Oxford University Press 1988 for North America. Greg Urban & Joel Sherzer (ed), *Nation-state and Indians in Latin America*, University of Texas Press 1991; Kay Warren, *Indigenous movements and their critics*; Pan-Maya activism in Guatemala, Princeton University Press 1998; Silvia Rivera Cusicanque, *oppressed but not defeated*, Peasant struggles among the Aymara and the Quechwa in Bolivia 1900-1980, UNRISD 1987; Diego Cornejo Menacho (ed), *Indios – Una reflexión sobre el levantamiento indígena de 1990*, Ildis/El Duende/Abya-Yala 1991, and Marc Becker, *Indians and leftists in the making of Ecuador's modern indigenous movements*, Duke University Press 2008.

while the deputy role acknowledged the importance of the Indian peasants, and flattered their self-esteem, it refused them all power and autonomy.

It was the failure of populist politics that gave rise to the Indian movements in the Andine world; the campesino movements in Bolivia and Ecuador became Indian as the land reform had left the peasants as poor as they were before, in Mexico the Chiapas rising broke out when the land reform had got stuck, in Guatemala peasants in the north began to identify themselves as Maya when the land reform movement had been repressed by a five year long massacre.

The wilderness peoples were subjected to an increasing pressure during the post-war boom, from mineral exploiters and from states aiming at demarcating territory with different development projects.

Not surprisingly, the North American Indians were first drawn into resistance; this happened already in the late nineteenth century when Indians organised into “tribes” to defend their territories. A common identity began to appear in the late forties when the government experimented with abolishing the reservation to where the Indians had been pushed, for so-called developmental reasons. It was also North American Indians who first got a had an impact in the public as Indian resistance, when American Indian Movement occupied Alcatraz Island in 1968.

Except this, the first Indian organisations were founded locally in the fifties and sixties, supported by liberation theology missionaries. The Shuar Federation in Ecuador is considered as the first successful organisation, educating children on the radio since 1964, owning cattle farms, having negotiated themselves into the position as Ecuadorian border authority, and having got a key position in the peoples’ movement federation CONAIE.

But also during later mobilizations, forest people have had much support from allies, according to Brysk who mentions Christian networks, environmental movements and researchers. While the highland Indians have mobilised in local and national contexts, the forest Indians have needed global support because of their small numbers.

The first common Indian movement mobilization was catalyzed by the somewhat pompous attempt of the Creoles to celebrate the quincentenary of the Spanish conquest in 1992. They weren’t able to do it anywhere. Because of the visibility the Indian movement had gained it was able, the years after, to appear as the “representative of the nation” in several countries – Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia and Guatemala – when new constitutions were drawn after military dictatorships and other breakdowns, and been granted ownership to their lands or regional autonomy.

The Indian mobilizations differ according to region.

The strongest movement, in Ecuador, defines itself very broadly: if you are a peasant you are an Indian, and the borders to other underclass people is permeable. The Indian confederation CONAIE has led national rebellions against corrupt governments on behalf of all Ecuador. The movement and the strategy has a long tradition from the campesino movement between the wars, claims Mark Becker, and points at close cooperation between the campesino movements and townspeople. In Bolivia, the movement has been rather separatist and accepted rough neo-liberal cuts for non-Indians for factional gains

– until it rebelled in the early twenty-first century when the cuts went to far. Factionalism wasn't anything the movement chose; the perhaps most culturally separatist Indian movement, the Guatemaltecan one, was forced by a genocidal politics to abandon all other ways of action than cultural separatism, and the zapatists of Chiapas have to pay dearly for appealing to a Mexican identity when claiming civil rights for all.

South Africa was established as a half-way station on the way to India, and settlers were encouraged to produce food for the crews of the East Indiamen. From the beginning, competition grew between them and the primarily cattle-breeding African peoples, and during the nineteenth century the Europeans took over most of the present country; successive colonial administrations moved forward the line between “white” and “black” land, usually after armed conflicts. At each redrawing, Africans were faced with the choice to move or take an employment as land worker to the Europeans. At the end of the nineteenth century the former opportunity began to dry up; at the same time gold was discovered at the present Johannesburg and the need for cheap labour increased. The Africans established themselves increasingly as a working class [59].

The class differences were legislated from the outset. Blacks were forbidden to own land in “white areas” by the Natives Land Act in 1913, and shortly after also to lease land. Black miners were forbidden to leave the mining area and their families were forbidden to enter it. In Natal, the governor was entitled to transport black people forcibly at any time and expose them to forced labour in the 1890s; this was extended to all South Africa in 1927. Compulsory passports had already been introduced. Blacks were barred from all qualified jobs in 1900; an attempt to reclassify led to a strike among the white miners in February 1922 under the battle-cry “Workers of the world, unite for a white South Africa”. And the right of employers to physically punish black workers was confirmed legally in 1927 after having been praxis all the time.

The resistance took a long time to be organised, though.

Trade unions had been organised among the dockers in Durban in the nineteenth century. But the impulses to organising didn't get any speed until the global labour movement upswing after the first world war. They met, as stated above, with violent resistance among white workers who saw their privileges threatened, and the black miners who were to become the core of black workers in South Africa had a slow start. Instead, the refuse collectors, dockers and primarily land workers made the first unionist thrusts. The land workers were ex-tenants who had been prohibited from leasing and had to adapt to the repressive servant regulations. They made up the core of the Industrial and Commercial Union, the union center of the twenties. In addition, the textile workers succeeded for a long time to defy the racial legislation and recruit both blacks and whites, thereby protecting themselves against the repression.

The political organisation of the blacks, ANC – originally South African Native National Congress – was founded with Indian inspiration in 1909, during the debates on

[59] Rodney Davenport & Christopher Saunders, *South Africa – a modern history*, Macmillan 2000 has details for 800 pages; Robert Ross *A concise history of South Africa*, Cambridge University Press 1999, says as much in a fraction of the space but is almost too laconic to be intelligible.

suffrage in the new South African Union, and for a long time it was like its Indian model a lobbyist organisation. Except an early movement in East Cape (where M.K. Gandhi made his first experience), there was almost no mass mobilizing before the second world war.

The changed power balance in the mid-forties – the difficulties for the colonial empires, the successes for the Indian national movement, the fall of the nazis – bred new hopes in South Africa. During the war, price hikes and shortage of commodities had stimulated bus boycotts and squatter movements which police repression hadn't been able to quell. These had been organised locally, without involvement by national organisations. But meanwhile ANC, where a new and more activist generation had come to power, had contributed to a new miner's trade union for blacks in 1941, and this together with an equally new national trade union center challenged the rulers with a general strike in 1946. The mining companies were inclined to compromise as was also the government, but this came to nothing. In 1948, the most rigid white supremacists won the election and began to build in a most fundamentalist way a society of separation, of legal ranking of all inhabitants, supported by an increasingly repressive security police.

It has been discussed, not least within the South African resistance organisations, why a majority of whites supported a system which in the end turned out to be counter-productive for their own living standard and against the interest of business. It is true that the apartheid system for a while supplied cheap labour to the mines – but it prevented also the companies to recruit skilled people by reserving the qualified jobs for too few whites, who probably were the only ones to profit from the system. Probably the system was initiated to guarantee both cheap labour and middle class privileges, but in the end the necessary coercion authorities run the system in absurdum by their own.

The apartheid system called for complete separation between what their architects considered as “peoples”. This called for dissolved marriages, forced removals, doubling of public spaces and authorities, and ban on organisations. These things had happened before, but apartheid called for mass measures; four millions are estimated to have been forcibly removed, from cities to external townships, from township to township, from township to the so-called homelands, land which was distant or bad enough to be possessable by blacks.

The resistance was concentrated from 1950 in a disobedience campaign with strikes and organised offences against the apartheid laws. The campaign was directed on one hand against laws harassing individuals – evictions, passport rules, and forced slaughter of cattle – and on the other against the general coercion in the form of ban on organisations and the restricted suffrage. The protests were best organised around Port Elizabeth where the trade unions were strong, and East London where the activist ANC youth had its base. And in the countryside, in the areas which were still owned by blacks, people resisted government encroachment; in Pondoland they refused to acknowledge the local authority imposed by Pretoria and elected an independent one which operated from the forest. It took three years for the government to defeat it by air bombing.

During the disobedience campaign ANC grew to a mass movement of a hundred thousand people. As common program all participating organisations adopted the Free-

dom Charter in 1955, written in a simple language combining political and social rights violated by Apartheid.

In 1960 a mass demonstration in Sharpeville against the passport laws was repressed, killing 69 people to the horror of the world. A state of emergency continuing to 1990 succeeded in defeating ANC whose activists were imprisoned or escaped abroad where they began to argue for armed resistance. Instead, the initiative went over to the traditional aristocracies in the “homelands”. Some of these succeeded for many years to keep the government agents at a distance and keep a degree of autonomy. Most notable was the KwaZulu leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi who gathered the Inkatha mass organisation against the apartheid regime on a federalist program, until a new movement didn’t content itself with entrenchment in homelands but demanded civil rights in all South Africa.

The beginning was the Black Consciousness movement, BC, from the late sixties. Its background was an original form of Christian liberation theology, and most of the leaders were priests and students. They maintained that the best tool of the oppressor is the self-contempt of the oppressed. Since it didn’t incite to rebellion it was tolerated by the government, but since it appealed to the self-respect of the blacks it met with an enormous response among the youth. The movement went on for a while without formal organisation, but established itself in the early seventies as a student organisation, organisations for social welfare in the shantytowns, and a political front for the BC ideas. It didn’t succeed much before being repressed in 1974-75 [60].

BC failed as an organisation, but this didn’t matter because it had been a movement of ideas, and the ideas were taken up by the youth in the enormous shantytown Soweto. In June 16, 1976 they demonstrated against a decree that mathematics should be taught in Afrikaans, a language they didn’t understand, and police violence was met with new demonstrations. What had been a youth revolt grew during the autumn to strikes and rent strikes which made the appointed government of Soweto to resign. During the autumn similar revolts broke out in townships all over the country with youth influenced by BC as leaders. There was not much leadership involved however, so when the young BC activists were thrown into prison people organised themselves and begun local struggles for welfare aims. This movement was given a structure by people who were interned after the Soweto revolt and were released after 1978.

During a few years around 1980 a broad movement grew of local committees for electricity, water and sewer, cheaper bus fares and lower rents in all South Africa, not only in the big townships. The movement had short-term economic aims and was tolerated by the government as an alternative to the violent ANC and BC. After a few years in 1983, the movement was organised into the United Democratic Front, UDF, with a common aim to encompass all anti-apartheid forces.

The pretext for UDF was to oppose a government scheme of giving small advantages to Indians. But UDF also coordinated economic struggle; in 1984 its base in the

[60] Anthony W. Marx, *Lessons of struggle – South African internal opposition 1960-1990*, Oxford University Press 1992; Tom Lodge (ed), *All, here, and now: black politics in South Africa in the 1980s*, Hurst 1992; and William Cobbet & Robin Cohen, *Popular struggles in South Africa*, Review of African Political Economy 1987.

so-called Vaal triangle organised a rebellion against rent rises and it spread over the country. Around rent strikes, consumer boycotts and labour strikes, organised in neighbourhood committees where “each family was a part of the movement”, an alternative power structure grew up with courts of their own which even the police was forced to take into consideration to be able to keep some order. UDF activists talked euphorically about “double power”. But after 1986 UDF began to crack by the joint effects of police violence, crime and police-supported revenges from organisations passed by the development, like Inkatha and the BC offshoot AZAPO.

So the lead passed over to the trade unions. They had begun to organise in mass scale in the early seventies in industries localised out from Europe, see chapter 5. They had a narrow economic focus in the beginning and was tolerated as the lesser evil, like UDF had been. But when UDF went to pieces the trade unions took anti-apartheid programs, launched political strikes and took responsibility for the remaining UDF neighbourhood committees.

In 1990 the government gave up. The cost for violence, for control authorities, for flight of capital and for irrational sorting mechanisms in the labour market had become too high for the voters. The legal apartheid system was abandoned surprisingly easy, and the black leadership was coopted into the state. Blacks are still almost only workers (or unemployed) but the labour center COSATU belongs to the leading labour organisations at a global level.

The pariah people in Palestine has so far been less able to find a successful strategy for its struggle. According to Edward Said, elitist romantics of violence has blocked the way for an effective mass movement [61], and one may also argue that a separatist nationalism has blocked for an appeal to a general global peoples’ movement identity in the same effective way as the South African and the Indian movements were so good at.

Of course there are causes to these failures. One is of course the interest of great powers to support their adversary economically and maintain a strategy of suspense. But there are also internal causes.

The early phases of the Palestinian conflicts are described in chapter 6. When the Israeli state was founded in 1948 and the Palestinian land and people were divided in three, their resistance was so also [62].

The Palestinians who stayed in Israel were gradually converted into wage labourers in Israeli industry. The authorities were skilful to prevent organising with measured terror and cooption until the war in 1967, when the need to take sides was acute. The leaders then were municipal politicians, who from 1974 built a civil rights movement claiming that Arab citizens should have the same rights as Jewish citizens. In March 30, 1976 a general strike was called, the Land Day, which remained a tradition. From the

[61] Conveyed in several articles, for example in Media Monitors Network 23.4.2001 and in the article The only alternative, published in several places, among others at Zmag.

[62] Baruch Kammerling & Joel S. Migdal, Palestinians, the making of a people, The Free Press 1993; Christopher Parker, Resignation or revolt? Sociopolitical development and the challenge of peace in Palestine, I.B. Tauris 1999.

eighties Islamists also began to organise a kind of reciprocal welfare system since the Arabs were excluded from much of the national welfare system.

For the refugees, the prospects were even darker. Some were absorbed in the growing oil economy in the seventies and many of these supported the Palestine movement economically. The majority, living in refugee camps, were free to organise but had nothing to act for as they lived on charity. In desperation, youths began to organise symbolic armed “returns” into Israel, and this soon became organised through Fatah, an organisation created by exiles in Kuwait. Armed attacks were no end in itself, only an action for want of something better.

However, Fatah and other refugee camp organisations grew to the organising force within the camps, supported by enthusiastic youth and petrodollars. But their militant exile politics was embarrassing for the host states, and they were chased away, in 1970 from Jordan and in 1982 from Lebanon, and had to take up quarters in Tunisia, far from their constituency, where they were increasingly dependent on petrodollars and increasingly corrupt and bureaucratized.

The core area, the West Bank, had no popular movement at all before 1967 since it was incorporated into Jordan. After the Israeli occupation, much the same course was followed as for the Israeli Palestinians: political initiative against the Israeli discrimination and military high-handedness was canalized through local administrations, sometimes against the wish of PLO. They organised youth organisations, trade unions, women’s organisations, and organisations for mutual aid.

Increasingly, the focus in the conflict with the occupation power was the Israeli settlements which not only stole land from Palestinian farmers but also made the most of their privileged position as herrenvolk. This, together with the shrinking economic opportunities during the eighties, ended the wait-and-see mentality that had been prevalent since the forties. The Intifada rebellion broke out in 1987.

The Intifada – Arab for shake off – took the initiative from the professionals and put it in the civil society organisations. The strategy was boycotts and strikes against Israeli activities and enterprises, and the success was striking. The Palestinian power over their own economy increased along with the Palestinian self-confidence while the Israeli economy was wrecked. In 1990, the Israeli had to bargain for the first time and recognize the Palestinians as a part.

However the bargaining body on the Palestinian side was not the peoples’ movements taking part in the Intifada – they were at that time hard pressed by Israeli military terror – but the PLO which was content in being a recognized part and able to slip away from the exile in Tunis. They accepted a settlement which made themselves a “home-land” government according to South African precedence but conceded preciously little to the Palestinians in common. Accepting this solution also gave the PLO an interest in helping Israeli authorities in curbing continuing struggles which were now likely to direct itself against the increasingly corrupt PLO administration as well as against the Israeli occupation.

For a long time since 1990, the only resistance to survive this onslaught were the elitist and militarist hit-squads and desperate individual revengers, while popular organ-

ising took the form of mutual aid and organising of everyday life again, mostly done by Islamist organisers.

However, battle over land – settler colonies’ *raison d’être* – might be a feature of the past. Ethnified access to capital might be more important in the future, since it is an recurrent theme particularly in poor countries. Chinese capitalist power in Southeast Asia, or Lebanese capitalist power in West Africa and Indian capitalist power in East Africa might result in popular movements. It has rarely done so up to now, however, but rather used as fuel in elections or other struggles between ethnified elite groupings [63].

The movement against the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines may be an example. Marcos based his power on Chinese capital, and was resented by others for that reasons. When elites from other ethnicities built up the huge manifestations against Marcos in 1986, lower-class organizations tried to give them a multi-class character and a multi-class leadership – but failed. The elites had no difficulties in presenting themselves as representatives of the nation, and keep the protest firmly within the established order [64].

Movements of traditional pariahs in a new era

A third complex of pariah categories are those who have appeared within earlier systems and still remain because they also satisfy the world market system’s demands for low wage labourers. In Europe there are for example Romas and Travellers, in Japan there are Eta or Burakumin, but the most systematized example is of course the Indian Dalits. Their movements are also the most developed ones [65].

Dalits is an omnibus concept for those Indian clans and guilds who are attributed a particularly low status. They have traditionally worked in despised professions like cleaners or land workers but work today as low wage or casual labourers in general. The low status is in local jargon termed “impurity” but this implies only that the Dalits, to retain their self-respect, refuse to accept the ritual purification norms of the traditional elites.

Traditionally, Dalits have either engaged in Hindu reform movements, so-called Bhakti movements, see chapter 3, or been converted to Buddhism or Islam to evade their repressive conditions. This has generally not been effective, since these efforts have been led and dominated by others than Dalits.

Modern Dalit movements began contemporaneously with the national movement in the twenties. The center of such movements was Bombay, where some Dalits had

[63] Amy Chua: *World on fire; how exporting free market democracy breeds ethnic hatred and global instability*, Doubleday 2003.

[64] Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow & Charles Tilly: *Dynamics of contention*, Cambridge University Press 2001.

[65] Dalit movements before the twentieth century is described by T.K. Oommen, *Protest and change*, Sage 1990; modern Dalit movement by Sion Charsley & G.K. Karanth: *Challenging untouchability – Dalit initiative and experience from Karnataka*, Sage 1998 and Gail Omvedt, *Reinventing revolution*, M.E. Sharpe 1993. Dalit peasant movements are described in Ronki Ram, *Untouchability, Dalit consciousness and the Ad Dharm movement in Punjab*, Punjab University without year, and Arvind N. Das, *Bihar’s lawless ways*, Unesco Courier 2/1999.

made a career within the textile industry or the British administration, and demanded a corresponding status. Large parts of the textile workers' union in Bombay was Dalit dominated. They succeeded in getting a share in independence, particularly by playing on the National Congress's fear of splits. In the new constitution, written by the Dalit B.R. Ambedkar, Dalits were granted citizenship and some guarantees.

The formal citizenship changed little for most, and around 1970 a new generation Maharashtra Dalits were inspired by the global peoples' movement wave and proclaimed the Dalit Panthers in 1972. This was a movement of a first generation of university students, and their thrust was almost exclusively against the cultural capital; they challenged concepts and customs they thought humiliating for Dalits, often in a provocative manner, but their immediate range was short. Other movements spread later however: the Dalit party Bahujan Samaj was successful for a while in the eighties in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, and in Karnataka a youth movement resisted humiliating practices.

But the most successful Dalit movements have not expressed themselves as Dalit but as peasant, labour or environmental movements. Dalits have mobilized for land reform, from the Ad Dharm movement in Punjab in the twenties to the violent clashes of Bihar today, they have mobilized against dams and forest clearances.

The peoples' movements upswing in the sixties inspired to mobilizing among other out-groups who had never tried things like that before, for example youths, homosexuals and disabled.

Youth movements are generally not peoples' movements in the meaning of this book – aspirations of categories to change social conditions. A youth generation is too short to develop from a category to a movement. Youth movements are rather habituses or identities created with an aim to escape the final subordination under a soul-destroying capitalist work discipline as long as possible; this is at least the core of the identity of middle class youth movements. For underclass youth another feature is added – to defend the local territory and the local “we” against outsiders; this was the signification of the Irish “public gang”, see chapter 6, as well as suburban ethnic gangs of today. Furthermore, there is a bite against authorities and not least school [66].

But all the same youth identities are resources for peoples' movements. Brake emphasizes that worker youth identities often supply strike movements with their most dedicated and militant activists, and the peace movement of the fifties and the environmental movement of the seventies were a kind of anti-commercial middle-class youth-culture identities in themselves.

Although youth have been a low status category in earlier eras and earlier systems, the prolongation of education, incomelessness and exclusion in the system center in the post-war era has widened the base for youth movements, and probably also the reason for them. The emerging youth identities and the upswing of peoples' movement after the mid-sixties created a kind of occasional contemporaneousness alliance. In Europe, the labour movement was the core but the revolt of the youth against the work routines supplied a great deal of the utopian appeal to the movement resurgence. In USA the revolt

[66] Mike Brake, *The sociology of youth culture and youth subcultures*, Routledge 1981.

of the middle class youth was itself the core of the resistance against the Vietnam war. The base was the beat culture and its resistance against subjugation to a puritan middle class career; in France the situationists formulated the same opposition against the post-war Fordist consumer society as “there is a life after birth” [67]. Tarrow describes the manner in which several mobilizations during the movement resurgence around 1970 were tied together by youths who moved from one to another and created communication, solidarities and common languages, which sometimes would be liberating but as often were strait-jackets for the popular movements [68].

For youths have, because of their lacking experience, as a rule found it difficult to create languages. They tend to catch ready-made ones, created for and by others, and create their identities from the languages instead of the other way about. As Maoism of the seventies, as Anarchism of the nineties, as all the identities of rock cultures.

The focus on hedonism and “free time” of youth cultures has opened them to exploitation of show business, which has to some extent disarmed them as critical resources – but as late as in the late nineties the English rave culture was one of the main forces behind the resistance to motorways, and youths have always created new identities when the old ones have become too exploited.

A category whose mobilization has been conspicuous after 1970 is the homosexuals. Bisexuality seems to have been a norm in parts of the Mediterranean culture some thousand years ago as it is in some other cultures. Not until the end of the 12th century did homosexuals begin to be subjected to active persecution, i.e. at the same time that religious nonconformists and Jews also began to be persecuted [69]. But despite the dislike, the homosexual milieus were left more or less in peace until the late nineteenth century when an angry campaign began, with a base in the perfectionist evangelical circles which created the women’s movement, and forced them underground [70].

Adams and Cruikshank don’t explain why this happened at just that time. It is probable however that the Fordist household regime forced through then, with a male breadwinner in a compulsory partnership with a female housekeeper, made all who didn’t fit in the pattern controversial. For this reason it seems logical that their self-asserting power regained as soon as the Fordist model broke down between 1965 and 1975.

The modern gay movement appeared in the USA in the mid seventies as a defence movement when the evangelicals tried to exclude homosexuals from the labour market once more. But the fall of Fordism, together with inspiration from blacks and women caused a joint movement instead of fear and complaisance. From the beginning, solidarity with other marginalized was a dominating strategy. Lesbian women’s engagement with women’s movements was an obvious example; they supplied them with their most

[67] Simon Ford, *The Situationist International : a user’s guide*, Black Dog Publishing 2005. The most widespread situationist inspired youth movement was however probably the Dutch Provo’s, see Teun Voeten: *Dutch Provos*, High Times, jan 1990.

[68] Sidney Tarrow, *Democracy and disorder, protest and politics in Italy 1965-1975*, Clarendon Press 1989.

[69] R.I. Moore: *The formation of a persecuting society*, Blackwell 1987.

[70] Barry Adam, *The rise of gay and lesbian movement*, Twayne 1987, Margaret Cruikshank, *Gay and lesbian liberation movement*, Routledge 1992.

indefatigable activists but this also tended to make women's movements strange to many women. Homosexuals also began to advertise their disposition; this also spread over to Europe despite the fact that there was no mobilization for a strict gender-organising of society there. All in all, the successes of homosexuals have been quick a far-going in the system center – perhaps because there is no economic reason to discriminate them. Perhaps they don't fit into Tilly's pattern. In the peripheries however society is more sex-divided which makes homosexuality more non-conforming to societal needs.

The economy-based discrimination is however very topical for disabled people. They have historically been reduced to a few professions or to the role as labour reserve, and sometimes also been attached to the role as an object for charity, so that the non-disabled would feel good. Local organising for mutual aid has been ubiquitous, and it has grown in the twentieth century. In the system center it have grown in a dialogue with growing social states and in the system peripheries it has been a part of the peoples' movement wave that followed on independence [71].

Inspired by the peoples' movement contemporaneousness of the sixties, and particularly by the black movement in USA, disabled people began around 1970 to go beyond their traditional program – mutual aid, consumer control of social services – and make demands for adjustment of the whole society to the conditions of the disabled. Some disabled students at the Berkeley University in USA during the Vietnam war era were pioneers, when they occupied social service offices to get their civil rights. Ten years after, in 1980, it got an international breakthrough; when the disabled's organisation organised globally it was as a protest against the paternalist approach of the welfare institutions. Mutual aid is still the principal aim for the disabled movements in the system periphery while consumer control is the principal aim in the system center, but even these aims are interpreted in civil rights terms.

The absence of migrant workers' movements

Descendants of plantation slaves, traditionally impure castes and people subdued by European settler colonists are few and hardly enough for manning the lower layers of the labour hierarchy of the world market system. Migrant workers – people who move temporary or permanently from a poor and peripheral place to a richer and more central one – are however potentially countless. Globally mobile people, “cosmopolitans”, are of course of many descriptions and may be both privileged and unprivileged. The privileged ones don't need to defend themselves, but which are the opportunities for non-privileged migrant workers to defend themselves through peoples' movement mechanisms?

Migrant labour is from the viewpoint of the capitalists a kind of supplement to relocation of production sites. In both cases, the aim is to wring production out of the grip of strong unionist movements and rely more on unorganised and unpretentious workers.

[71] Diane Driedger, *The last civil rights movement – Disabled People's International*, Hurst & Company 1989; Joseph P. Shapiro, *No pity – People with disabilities forging a new civil rights movement*, Times Books 1993 is about USA.

As a matter of course, migrant workers are unorganised and comparably defenceless; that is what makes them exist. And the difference between migrant workers from North Thailand to Bangkok (or Sicily to Torino) and migrant workers from Anatolia to Germany is primarily that the latter cross a state boundary on their way and are not citizens in their new site of work. For that reason they are deprived of some formal privileges or protection other workers have; they are deprived of integration.

Experiences from the massive immigration to North America between 1880 and 1914 suggests that migrant workers don't organise to defend themselves through popular movements but through other mechanisms of civil society like religious congregations, friendly societies, cultural associations and paternalist client networks organised by their countrymen for political and economic profit. The latter kind of organisation is often developed into mafias, i.e. business which defies the legality of the majority society and keeps a coercive apparatus to defend itself. The absence of popular movement confrontation with the discrimination they are subject to – except some turf-defence of the youth – is a consequence of that most migrant workers see forward to returning to their country and don't care about getting a position in the country of work. Migrant workers who aspire to a position try to assimilate as quick as possible and don't solidarize with their countrymen, except perhaps for profit reasons [72].

After a generation however there appeared in the USA an organised resistance against the results of discrimination. The children of the immigrants became the leaders of the regular labour movement and to a great extent the leaders of the uniquely successful labour mobilizing in the thirties. There were also examples of ethnic metropolitan enclaves defending themselves collectively against discriminating city halls. A particularly famous one was the Chicagoan colony of East European slaughter-house workers in Back-of-the-Yards who organised a durable campaign during the forties and fifties where trade unions, churches and small businesses cooperated about confronting the authorities for small improvements of all kinds. Their successes inspired countless local community movements over the USA but their sheer successes probably precluded an overarching strategy for the minority movements during the seventies and thereafter [73].

Such movements don't however change the picture of migrant workers as relatively defenceless; it is symptomatic that the initiative to the struggle in Back-of-the-Yards was taken by the trade union organiser Saul Alinsky in cooperation with Chicago's Catholic bishop, and not by the workers themselves. It is rather a task for the peoples' movement society to rely to the migrant workers. And this has been done by the peoples' movement society in different ways.

It is usual that direct producers turn against migrant workers because they see them as (potential) blacklegs. The organised trade union movement in USA was for example against immigration about 1900 and refused, to their own ruin, to defend immigrants, see

[72] Humbert S. Nelli, *From immigrants to ethnics, The Italian Americans*, Oxford University Press 1984; Timothy Walch (ed), *Immigrant America*, Garland 1994.

[73] The methods are described by the leader Saul Alinsky in *Rules for radicals*, Vintage 1971, and the movement history by Donald Reitzes & Dietrich Reitzes, *The Alinsky legacy, alive and kicking*, Research in social movements, conflicts and change, JAI Press 1987.

chapter 5. To some extent this is rational – the aim of migrant labour is to increase the supply of labour, and it contributes to rendering organisation more difficult because of confused habitus and language. On the other hand, conscious efforts to break with such pettiness has led to great victories. The breakthrough of the American assembly-line workers in the thirties was a consequence of the anti-racism of CIO and their insistence of organising all. And Stockholm’s artisans contributed to an active and successful thrust of union organising in Sweden in the 1880s through their conscious repudiation of anti-immigration policies [74].

The odds are that only unionized workers can organise immigrants to defend themselves and to prevent a rise of subproletariats and layered labour markets. Probably, a labour movement on the offensive can do this, as a part of a global mobilization, and doing so they will also reach out to the labour markets of the South. A defensive labour movement focusing on defending their privileges locally are likely however to miss the opportunity.

A summary – identities or social movements?

I have earlier in this book described the action methods of peoples’ movements as obstruction against repressive structures, infiltration or invasion of power organs, cooperative and non-repressive production of the necessities of the civil society, and tying together this with a popular culture. But the movements of discriminated categories have often had a weaker repertoire.

While women’s movements almost never and pariah movements very seldom have attacked state and capital through obstruction of their functions, they have attached great importance to assaults of the prevailing cultural capital, by asserting the value and entitlement of their own habitus. This has been considered necessary to break the self-contempt in the discriminated category. Women have pursued feminist research or feminist theologies, blacks have maintained that “black is beautiful”, dalits have ridiculed high-caste purification rules, and youths have grouped together in countercultures.

Cultural capital may be defined as power over the cultural codes, power to decide which habitus is the correct one – which habitus that has a high status as the saying goes [75].

The power over the cultural codes is partly detached from the power that arises from positions within state and capital. Power over the cultural codes is not as rooted in distinct institutions as are power over production and violence; the institutions that come closest like schools and media have not the extent of monopoly as have state and capital. Power over the cultural codes is also exercised within the civil society.

Generally, the cultural power is disproportionately exercised by upper classes, and there are certain upper class segments that have specialized in it, so-called intellectual

[74] Tage Lindbom, *Den svenska fackföreningsrörelsens uppkomst*, Tiden 1938. Mass movement organisation was seen as the only way of countering the decreasing wages of due to increased supply of immigrant workers with no expectations of a decent life.

[75] Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction*, Routledge 1979.

elites. But since this power is less institutionalized and protected than economic or political power it is also more vulnerable, and both women's movements and pariah movements have been rather successful in making inroads.

Three factors have made these movements to consider struggle over cultural capital as particularly important.

Firstly, discriminated categories have a need to assert their own habitus and refuse to accept the opportunity hoarders' habitus as superior – because it is by disgracing the habitus of the discriminated categories they make their own monopoly legitimate. For that reason it seems reasonable to attack discrimination by primarily attacking the legitimation, and this is done most easily by trying to raise the status of their own habitus.

Secondly, the decreasing integrative ability of the society – see the end of chapter 2 – makes it less attractive to struggle for the equal citizenship in a welfare state in a nineteenth century manner. Instead there is a kind of renaissance of group identities or “group citizenships”. Since the state seems unable to guarantee security, categories try to strengthen the borders to other categories, thereby creating protection for their members. What they might have strived to be integrated in appears increasingly irrelevant [76].

Thirdly, the present strategy of the world market system – commodification of language and life – is arguably a cause of making identities terrains of contention. The more capital tries to integrate symbols and language into its metabolism, the more important it is for categories to keep control over symbols and languages for what they see as priceless.

If such a cultural strategy has appeared as attractive, it has also has a price.

Firstly, the concentration on cultural struggles has resulted in elitism within the movements. Those who have a middle class education are more able to struggle for cultural capital than people without education, so women, blacks, indians, dalits etc from the middle classes have had greater opportunities than others to take part in this kind of practice and assert themselves within the movements.

Thereby, they have arguably strengthened middle class interests within the whole peoples' movement system. And it is possible that this has contributed to the marked disability of the peoples' movement system to defend the interests of the popular majority after 1973; the ability of the direct producers to use it to their defence has been weakened to the same extent that the ability of the middle class has been strengthened.

Secondly, it has resulted in a strong tendency to essentialism – to the closing of the frontiers of each category separately and their asserting that only their own category has a particular quality that the others don't have. And this has resulted in competition, treachery and in appealing to rulers and elites to consider the own category more than others; the rulers have of course used this as an opportunity to play different discriminated categories against each other [77].

[76] Immanuel Wallerstein, Integrating to what?, Marginalization from what? Scandinavian Political Studies XX, 4, 1997.

[77] Slavoj Zizek suggests that essentialist “ethnic” movements may even contribute to a strengthening of categorization and casteness; they are forced in their aspiration to mark their own exclusivity to appeal to rulers for guaranteeing this exclusivity and make thereby themselves into clients. Zizek's alternative is to assert the equal rights of all, for example expressed as citizenship (Slavoj Zizek, Class struggle or postmodernism – Yes

Some would formulate it even more grimly. Because representatives of the discriminated have tended to demand culturally motivated particular rights for themselves instead of equal access to the rights of all, it has been easy for those who profit from discrimination to mobilize the majority against them. It has been easy to convince the majority that particular rights have been a threat to the interests of the majority [78]. And because representatives of the discriminated have emphasized what sets them apart from others it has been easier for upper classes with a need for discrimination between privileged and unprivileged to go on with that.

Thirdly, one may put in question that the cultural achievements women, blacks, dalits etc have made are substantial enough to justify practices with so dubious side-effects. As Tilly maintains, it is not the cultural status, the “prejudices”, that decide the position of discriminated categories in society; it is the aspiration of discriminating in-groups to retain their profitable monopolies. The “prejudices” are a consequence, a way for the people included in the system to maintain the hierarchies and make them endurable. Only to try to change the cultural status would according to this approach not have any more lasting effect than a plaster – even if it may facilitate a breaking down of discrimination that is going on for other reasons. Perhaps a one-sided cultural struggle has no other effect than facilitating the cooptation of the leading representatives of a discriminated category into a mental apartheid, euphemistically called “multicultural society” [79].

But yet, one should not depreciate the need for a discriminated category to make its own habitus legitimate. The trick may be to do this as a less emphasized part in a many-sided strategy primarily aiming at political and economic self-assertion? When direct producers – discriminated or not – have asserted themselves economically and politically, they have also tended to assert themselves culturally, irrespective of their attaching any importance to it or not. Their habitus has simply been worth more when they have been economically and politically successful, at least in their own eyes, and they have then dared to behave more self-assuredly than before. The uniquely successful Nordic labour movement was able to dominate also culturally during the twenties and thirties, not by striving at it, but by asserting themselves through strikes, cooperation and electoral gains. Respect for the ability of the labour movement bred a respect for their habitus as well.

please, in Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau & Slavoj Zizek, *Contingency, hegemony, universality, Contemporary dialogues on the left*, Verso 2000. Boris Kagarlitsky raises the same critique in *The return of Radicalism; reshaping the Left institutions*, Pluto Press 2000, as does Charles Tilly in *Social movements 1769-2004*, Paradigm Publishers 2004. To appeal to category differences is to strengthen them, says Tilly, and this enfeebles the democratic impulses which always feed from weakened category differences.

[78] Brian Barry, *Culture and equality*, Polity 2001. Barry points particularly to the USA with its weak tradition of equality demands and strong tradition of culturally motivated particularisms which has been an easy prey for elitists mobilizing on fear for the culturally aberrants to get a mandate to pursue benefits for the rich.

[79] Charles Tilly, *Durable inequality*, University of California Press 1999. And Nancy Fraser: *The end of progressive neo-liberalism*, *Dissent*, January 2017, claims that focusing group representatives' equal access to power and wealth has strengthened the competition all against all in society, thus undermining equality on the individual level. It is of no use that a woman can be a CEO or an African-American can be a president, she thinks, if all those who aren't are left out in the cold.

But for the moment, group assertion dominates, which is a source of weakness for the peoples' movement society as a whole, and suggestions for cooperation has never reached farther than a wishing list. There is a common need for all discriminated to turn against the ability the privileged minorities to classify and sort out. But this hasn't so far got any expression in the form of programs, organisations or actions.

Chapter 9.
The self-defence of civil society

SO FAR, THIS BOOK HAS DEALT WITH the defence of exploited, repressed or discriminated categories – workers’ defence against capitalists, peasants’/farmers’ defence against food markets, women’s defence against the patriarchy, pariah groups’ defence against aristocratic elites. The world market system seems to breed such groups, while the local communities which in earlier system constituted the civil society seem to melt away under the pressure of the continuous globalizing of the world market system.

But there are yet some kinds of peoples’ movements which are an expression for the whole or great parts of the civil society and its resistance to the repressive routines of states or capitals. As expected, such peoples’ movements are rather weak and diffuse. They are often unable to create a “we” strong enough to tie them together at the range that is needed to defend the whole civil society. Often, but not always, minorities have taken on the role to defend “the commons” while the majorities have been indifferent for various reasons – not least because they are busy defending itself as categories.

But in some situations, such movements may be rather effective all the same and reach out broadly. Such movements have often defended civil society against violence and against destruction of the resource base, and defended social wages and gift economies.

Defence of peace

A category of popular movements that expresses the interest of the civil society as a whole is the defenders against the violence of states or other coercive groups, or peace movements in everyday speech.

As long as there has been a storable surplus in human production, there has also been what William McNeill calls “macro-parasites” i.e. people who “by specializing in violence are able to secure a living without themselves producing the food and other commodities they consume” [1]. Such macro-parasites may be small groups – what we usually call mafias – or states. Experience tells us that the difference between them is not one of kind but rather one of scale.

Certainly, macro-parasites direct their violence not only against those they are parasites on; through the history of macro-parasites the most massive violence has arisen in the competition between different parasiting groups. Generally, periods of massive violence has been followed by unstable compromises when the groups have shared the base of support between them according to the position of strength of each, and created territories, “realms” or “states”, within which most of the violence is directed against the direct producers and against groups who threatens the collection of protection money or “tax”.

We don’t know much about organised war resistance during the first few thousand years of state conquer, from about 3000 BOE and on. The first organised peace movement we know of was probably the one organised by followers of Mòzǐ during the

[1] William McNeill, *The pursuit of power*, University of Chicago Press 1982.

Warring states of China, in the fourth and third century BOE. They agitated against war generally, and if a war threatened they offered their own considerable war making skill to the weakest and/or attacked part. About the same time we hear about an organised repudiation of war in India, from the Jainist and Buddhist sects, but we don't know that they actively opposed any particular war. Yet vaguer is the peacefulness of the Christians around the Mediterranean somewhat later [2].

The first known peace movements in Europe arose at the same time as our present state system. This has its origin in the mafias that struggled with each others about the right to parasite in Western Europe in the tenth century, the so-called aristocracy [3]. Earlier power structures had been exhausted because of attacks from without and because they tried to live up to Roman ideals they didn't have resources for, and unscrupulous people with a local power base used the opportunity to expand it, by using massive violence.

This violence affected, except the direct producers, primarily the religious institutions. The representatives of these took initiative to the early medieval peace movement that has been called the Truce or the Peace of God [4].

The first peace movement event we have documents from is the meeting in Charroux in Western France in June 1, 989, but it seems to have built on a thirty years tradition. It was summoned by the bishop of the see, and what the sources call "the people" took part; the meeting condemned killing and plunder of "peaceful people" and called down God's condemnation of those who did such things. The bishop, who was like most bishop an aristocrat, was principally interested in protecting the estates of the church, but since he needed the political support from the congregation he included peasants and artisans and their property in the protection.

The Charroux meeting established a pattern for the peace movement wave which passed through Western Europe in the decades around the year 1000. Bishops summoned meetings where lay people took part and formed a public opinion, and it took no long time until the lay people took initiatives of their own which they invited the clerical hierarchies to answer to. The initiatives had the form of a religious revival. Peasants and artisans referred to the peace message of the gospel, asked local saints for support, and exhorted the clerics to lead the movement.

In many places, particularly in the cities, the initiatives went further. The townspeople didn't wait for bishops to care for the peace, particularly since the bishops and their chapters many times belonged to the violent people. The first cities whose common declarations of peace we know are Le Mans and Cambrai from 1077, and they were issued against bishops and chapters who tried to forcefully introduce new "evil customs"

[2] Mòzǐ is mentioned in Jacques Gernet, *A history of Chinese civilization*, Cambridge University Press 1982. Peter Brock, *Pacifism in Europe to 1914*, Princeton University Press 1972, tells about early Christians refusing to do military service – but nothing about their possible resistance to violence from others. I miss sources about other traditions and would like to hear about them!

[3] Charles Tilly, *Coercion, capital, and European states 990-1992*, Blackwell 1990.

[4] Thomas Head & Richard Landes (ed), *The peace of God – Social violence and religious response in France around the year 1000*, Cornell University Press 1992.

against the wish of the townspeople. The peace concepts of the townspeople was more extensive than the one of the church hierarchy, and comprised protection against illegal taxes, fees and forced labour. They also differed from the declarations of the clerics by that they were egalitarian treaties, and not only popular legitimation of episcopal power. The word used by the townspeople for this kind of treaty was “commune”, a concept also used off and on for the community of bishops and congregations, but it was increasingly used only for equal treaties [5].

Anyhow, the popular initiatives were embarrassing. From about 1030 a conservative counterreaction began to assert itself within the peace movement, and it was strengthened by degrees. The church hierarchy began, for fear of the popular initiatives, to appeal to the perpetrators that they should protect society against their equals or at least turn the violence outwards, against the unbelieving. As a kind of euphemism of violence, or legitimation of power founded in violence, this faction created the ideal of chivalry – the myth of the “good warrior” [6]. As the ultimate guarantor of peace wasn’t as before mentioned God and the congregation of Christians, but the king, who was usually appointed by the violent barons as one from their own circles. In the short run, this reformist and compromising clergy succeeded in creating a kind of order where the peasants got peace on the condition that they paid protection money; in the long run the reform led to strengthened royal power and the escalating warmaking of the early modern era.

Against this development, much of the lay movement was radicalized in the form of radical Christian movements, see chapter 3. These turned primarily against the clergy who had in such a frivolous way changed sides in the conflict. There was never a total breach though, the tradition to appeal to the congregation as the ultimate judge of disturbers of peace survived for hundreds of years and got a new lease of life during tax revolts against the plundering soldatesque of the early modern age, when priests often led the way.

The medieval compromise was broken by the great crisis in the mid fourteenth century, when a growing food deficit, black death and Chinese revolution toppled the existing economic system and sharpened the competition among remaining upper classes, against each other and against increasingly autonomous popular movements, see chapter 3. The competition manifested itself as an intensification of the level of violence; it increasingly promoted more powerful and expensive arms and favoured the greatest users of violence; these were able to establish increasingly bigger and more centralised states. The political power structures of this era have fittingly been called cannon monarchies. As the profits in the conflicts grew, so did also the campaigns of violence; a normal war in the middle ages comprised a few thousand people during a season, in the late fifteenth century the French king had a standing army of 25.000 men and was able to mobilize three times as many when he needed them; the thirty years war in the early seventeenth

[5] From the Latin *communis*, common, and in France and many other countries used as the term for municipality. Albert Vermeesch, *Essai sur les origines et la signification de la commune dans le nord de la France*, Heule 1966.

[6] According to R.I. Moore, *Postscript; the Peace of God and the social revolution*, in Thomas Head & Richard Landes, *The Peace of God*.

century was fought year after year by armies of more than 100.000 men.

Correspondingly, the devastation increased. Bureaucratization of the war-making, to be sure, reduced the need for plunder to keep the soldiers alive [7], but the dramatically increased costs to keep the machine going on the other hand increased the need for the kings to collect protection money; resistance to this kind of plunder was the predominant form of popular politics during the early modern era, see chapter 4. But yet, the resistance was not focused on the wars but on the taxes; so effective had the priestly compromise formula war = peace been that it appeared impossible to challenge the chivalry ideal of the kings.

But yet, at some instances tax rebellions would effectively end wars. A common revolt against plundering soldiers in the Netherlands in 1576 forced a truce which successively was stabilized as a formal peace. The Catalan revolt in 1640 forced Spain to withdraw from the thirty years war and in practice give up its great power status; it began as a peasant protest against billeting of soldiers and culminated with the peasants' occupation of Barcelona. Other corresponding movements were less successful, for example the peasant rebellion in Sweden in 1743 against taxes and forced recruitments which culminated only when the war was already lost.

In other cases peasants would be content with refusing to take parts in the massacres – at least if they were far enough from the regimentation machinery of the states. For example, peasants on each side of the Swedish-Danish border made separate peace in several instances during the seventeenth century [8].

These movements forced, as emphasized in chapter 2, a new compromise in the mid seventeenth century. The kings acknowledged each other reciprocally and refrained from questioning each other's legitimacy, private persons were spared responsibility for the politics of the kings, and rules for war-making was introduced. This so-called Peace of Westphalia, implied a considerable reduction of violence.

The notion that wars were inevitable was first challenged in the milieus that had carried the opposition against the compromising clergy in the middle ages, i.e. the radical Christian movements. There were particularly two milieus where an active anti-war opinion appeared: with the heirs of the Husite movement in Bohemia – Bohemian brothers and Mennonites – and with the heirs of the English revolution – Quakers, Baptists and Unitarians. The notion of inevitability dominated even among these people; they remained sects, dispersed in Europe and North America but more engaged in living peacefully and just themselves than in preventing disasters in their countries.

But such forms of actions had yet a revolutionary potential. For example, peace-political legitimations developed for traditional tax revolts and refusal to enlistment as early as in the seventeenth century. And in England a more peoples' movement-based

[7] The direct producers continued to be affected directly by wars however. Myron Gutman, *War and rurality in the early modern Low Countries*, Princeton University Press shows how plunder and war-conveyed epidemics would spell disasters given the narrow margins of the early modern era. Geoffrey Parker, *The Dutch revolt*, Allen Lane 1977, shows that such disasters affected the entire outcome of wars.

[8] Alf Åberg, *Nils Dacke och landsfadern*, LTs Förlag 1960.

political tradition was developed influenced by the intense political agitation during the second half of the eighteenth century, particularly in connection with the unpopular war against the American colonists [9].

This war resistance was carried particularly by those who had to pay for the war, and was in this way a typical tax revolt. But it was also a democratic movement against a royal dictatorship; the “enemy” the war was waged against was the fellow citizens across the sea who maintained the same principles as the English had made a revolution for in the 1640s, see chapter 6.

There was a continuity in the popular political discourse, and there was a milieu that was eager to use and develop it – the increasingly wealthy non-conformist sects, and soon enough also a broader movement of Christian revival which far into the established church. The same milieu created the resistance to slavery, see chapter 10, and the women’s movement, see chapter 8, and the engagement for peace was rather a lesser issue at the outset.

Churches, labour movements and women’s movements

What brought matters to a head what the Napoleonic wars, the struggle for hegemony that raged between primarily Britain and France between 1792 and 1814.

As I mentioned in chapter 5 it was a war that provoked resistance in Britain, more resistance than the American war since it exhibited people to more strain. Workers began to organise for the first time, to protect their standard of living. Merchants protested against obstacles to trade and against the fact that a few monopolists got access to the war contracts while the civilian consumption decreased. Sailors and soldiers mutinied. The resistance was so great that the government in practice converted into a military dictatorship that kept more troops at home to keep people in place than it sent abroad to fight against Napoleon [10].

During the entire war, the pacifist religious groups discussed a way of conduct towards the war, with each other, and in public with pamphlets about the evil of war. But this was all. It appears as they, prosperous burghers as they were, with connections deep into the state, were scared to be associated with the democratic demands that war resisters from other traditions put forth, and for that reason lay low. Only when the war was over in 1815, the first peace organisations were established.

And this pattern continued. Peace organisations spread over the system center; in France the “philanthropic” Saint-Simonist milieus were interested, and in the USA it was the same kind of evangelicals as in England. International peace conferences were held, the first in 1843 and later also international confederations (two, to be on the safe side). These groups succeeded in two generations to put in question war as a legitimate and natural instrument of politics in rather wide circles. But no initiatives for action were taken, not against the Crimean war in 1854 – except the Quakers -, not against the North American civil war in 1861, not against the German-Austrian war in 1866, not

[9] Martin Ceadel, *The origins of war prevention*, Clarendon Press 1996.

[10] E.P. Thompson, *The making of the English working class*, Victor Gollancz 1963, Penguin 1975.

against the German-French war in 1871, and not against the rapacious colonial wars that European states increasingly indulged themselves in towards the end of the nineteenth century [11].

At least a few reasons for this can be suspected. The social base of the wealthy middle class made a militant opposition unlikely, particularly as the middle class at this time was integrated in to the political base of the West European states, became “citizens” and beneficiaries of the aggression of the states. And the base of ideological conviction for the peace organisations rather than practical needs shaped up for endless discussions about moral subtleties while the question never was raised of what one should really do at an acute threat of war. The poles in the movement were for a long time demands for supranational authorities, i.e. new hierarchies added to the already existing ones, and individual radical pacifism, i.e. confining the resistance to an ideologically convinced avant-garde.

Not until about 1900 an extension of the movement base to others than the “citizens”, to workers and women, created for a while a strong peace movement based in interest. The background was that the British hegemony began to crumble at the late nineteenth century, and the threat of military confrontations between the contenders began to appear as likely. Meanwhile, increasingly articulate labour and women’s movements began to supply a real, sometimes anti-systemic, counter-power [12].

Workers had good reasons to maintain peace. In the new compulsory military services they had the role as cannon-fodder, and in the war economy choice of cannons or butter they were the losers. Perhaps the social antagonism between workers and military officers was even more important; soldiers were not infrequently used to break strikes and the body of officers was in most countries a reservation for conservative aristocrats. For that reason it was natural for the organised labour movement to be programmatically anti-militarist. It is not surprising that the most militant anti-militarists were found among the young conscripts, and social democrat and anarchist organisations competed for their support. The anti-militarism manifested itself in social hostility in the streets and in the movement publications, in labour votes in parliaments when military supplies were discussed, and in armaments as a professed cause for general political opposition particularly from 1905 on. And labour movement representatives tried repeatedly to argue for peaceful settlements of conflicts and sometimes they even mobilised against wars, as for example in Italy in 1912. Of course, they were ignored by the governments. But there was one instance where a peace initiative had a real effect – when Swedish military circles wanted to use force against Norway when it broke the union in 1905, and the Swedish trade unions threatened a general strike. The good result was no doubt due to the fact that a war was genuinely unpopular with a wide majority.

[11] W.H. van der Linden, *The international peace movement 1815-1874*, Tilleul 1986; Rainer Santi, *100 years of peace making*, International Peace Bureau 1991.

[12] Jill Liddington, *The long way to Greenham Common*, Virago 1989, is an outline of feminist war resistance, with focus on Britain. Anti-militarism within the labour movement is a neglected theme, the only place I have seen it worked out is in B.N. Ponomarjov et al (ed), *Den internationale arbejderbevægelse*, del 3, Progress 1987.

The other peoples' movement culture where there was a resistance against the increasing militarization of society was the women's movements. This was, as mentioned in chapter 8, strongest in Britain and the USA, and it was in England that the first mobilization since a hundred was carried out against a real war. This was when British mining interests in South Africa run into conflict with the settler colonists and got armed support from the state, in 1899-1902. Activists from the women's movements then mobilized to mass meetings and demonstrations against the war, by publishing news about the army's brutal treatment of civilians.

The result of this was not peace, but it contributed to more courage and self-assurance among the "liberal" or "humanist" peace movement after 1900, in the form of peace organisations, peace meetings and programs for peace and international arbitration. It also led to more support and kind reception in wide circles of radical christian groups practicing war resistance all the time like Quakers in Western Europe and Old Believers and Duchobortsy in Russia who had earlier been treated as isolated avant-gardes [13]. An odd alliance between labour movements, women's movements, radical christians and liberals appeared in the shadow of armaments, an alliance that also spilled over to general politics like common demands for universal suffrage. As a broker acted the consumer cooperative movement, who convinced the labour movement organisations that making common cause was constructive.

As we all know, this alliance was completely ineffective when the war broke out in 1914. The "liberal" peace movements didn't say a word. The labour movements gathered to a peace conference in Brussels but agreed that war resistance would lead to illegality and loss of jobs of movement functionaries so it also kept quiet, if not supported the infrastructure of war by obstructing strikes in the armament industry. And the women's movement milieus were too unstructured to supply a leadership.

Initiative to organising a resistance to the war was taken by oppositional groups within the labour and women's movements, who began to network over Europe in 1915, with international meetings in Zimmerwald in Switzerland and The Haag respectively. They remained ineffective though in at least two years, and it is open to discussion if they participated to the protests that broke out in the warring countries about new year 1917.

In France, the trade unions turned against the war in 1915, and this may have contributed to the strong protest. In early 1917 the soldiers at the front mutinied, mostly as a protest against a series of meaningless and sanguinary offensives. The mutiny and all attempts to politicize it was however brutally repressed while the offensives were discontinued to calm the sentiments.

In England it was the women's movements again that took initiative to mass meetings and demonstrations against the war; these actions were most massive in the industrial towns in the north where trade unions were involved.

In Germany, strikes against the shortages from 1916 on successively was supple-

[13] Peter Brock, *Pacifism in Europe to 1914*, Princeton University Press 1972.

mented with demands for peace and demonstrations among the queues. Cooperation between trade union activists and social democrat war resisters was explicit. The unpopularity of the war grew and when the generals from the front let know that the war was lost in September 1918 it was received with relief. Great parts of the labour movement began to organise an armed defence against military cliques that might think of reviving the war again.

Russia was the country where the war resistance developed most. A political culture had begun to develop within the army during 1915 in opposition against the incompetent war command. During 1916-1917 when shortages became increasingly severe it developed into opposition against the war as such. During 1917 soldiers mutinied and joined the demonstrations against the shortages, attacked the government and went home to share the land. Peace was one of the demands the Bolsheviks won government power on.

With these peace movements it became increasingly difficult for the governments to demand privations for war ends that most people had lost interest in. And the USA government got a broad appeal in all warring countries by taking up old peace movement demands into their war ends. In late 1918 the war ended in a spirit of weariness. The old peace movement demand of a permanent supranational authority was written into the peace accord in the form of the League of Nations. And in Russia, the peace party formed government. These two successes killed the peace movements.

Most of the peace movements rallied around the government diplomats in the League of Nations as a subaltern supporter club, and pursued numerous campaigns during the twenties and thirties that governments should agree within this framework. Such campaigns always rallied many members to the peace organisations, and international conferences began at this time to allow a certain peoples' movement presence, according to a pattern that wouldn't return until the seventies. These peace movement milieus fell into confusion when the Nazis took power in Germany and began to argue openly for violence and plunder. The majority rallied to anti-fascist fronts for the purpose to struggle against Nazism, violently if necessary. The minority took refuge to radical pacifist moralism and condemned among other things support to the republicans in the Spanish civil war [14]. On the eve of the second world war, the peace movements seemed almost extinct in Europe. In the USA, where peace movement organisations had reached about 30 million members during the thirties, according to Wittner, Pearl Harbour caused within a few hours a complete collapse, and moralist anti-Japanese racism became as predominant as moralist pacifism had been [15].

Instead, what was at the time less noticed initiatives would be of importance for the future. Immediately after the first world war, Christian peace movement activists established organisations like Service International and Fellowship of Reconciliation intended

[14] This was for example the position of the British WILPF, according to Jill Liddington, *The long road to Greenham Common*.

[15] Lawrence Wittner, *Rebels against war – the American peace movement 1941-1960*, Columbia University Press 1969. The two nuclear attacks against the defeated Japan was according to Wittner supported by 95 percent of the Americans, while as many as 24 percent recommended extinction of the whole Japanese people.

to stimulate inter-people solidarity by, in the manner of Quakers, rebuilding after the war, while Christians together with Anarchists created the War Resisters International as a central of draft resisters [16].

These groups were numerically few during the inter-war years, except in the USA. It was also there that the essential reformulation of the peace theme was carried out. In the American FoR, social-evangelical activists added justice to the peace theme and got involved in worker mobilizations and organised sit-ins for desegregation as early as in the early forties, following Gandhian example. By not focusing on the state but on what each could do as a person for a peaceful society, they created the milieu which the post-war peace movement initiative would grow out of.

Outside Europe and North America, in the system periphery, defence of the local community against violence implied defence against colonial conquerors. It is no coincidence that the great icon of the peace movement, Mohandas Gandhi, primarily was a leader of the anti-colonial movement in India, the movement which in a programmatic way made colonialism obsolete in the whole world, and achieved this with a minimum disturbance for the civil society.

For the colonial conquests exposed, as pointed out in chapter 4, the civil society for extreme strain. While a measure of dialogue, consent and compromises always had to be maintained in the system center, this was not as necessary in the system periphery, and it is possible that it wasn't even attainable because of the cultural and technological gap. The plunder was for that reason so much more violent than in the system center, and legitimated by Social-Darwinist notions of the per definition non-human value of the deprived people.

Under these conditions it was difficult for the representatives of the civil society to assert its interests. Everywhere, they successively drew the conclusion that it could be asserted only if the colonial state was overthrown by a national movement which in case of success established a state of its own for protection of the civil society and "development", i.e. imitation of the patterns of the favoured system center. Sometimes the national movements drew the conclusion that this called for armed revolt, even if that almost would threaten the survival of the civil society. Sometimes they were forced to such revolts by violent repression of more peaceful action forms. These anti-colonial movements are described in chapter 6.

Middle class radicalism in the system center

The focus for peace movement during the US period of hegemony after 1945 have been four, and they have mostly been kept rather separate and not been mixed in common mobilizations: nuclear weapons, real wars, local warlords, and violent group conflicts. On the other hand, peace issues have often been thematized by movements which at the same time have thematized other issues. There has not been a Peace Movement, there have been reformist or anti-systemic milieu which have raised the peace issue as one of

[16] Peter Brock, Twentieth century pacifism, Van Nostrand Reinhold 1970.

many issues, one that has dominated at some periods when it has been considered topical, only to be substituted by others.

The second world war discredited to a large extent the ideologic pacifism; violence had been needed to overthrow the Nazi dictatorship and few in Europe regretted that it had been overthrown. On the other side, the legitimacy and respectability of the organised state power had suffered a setback because of occupations and other failures. Anxiety over threatening devastation of nuclear weapons was organised partly by other actors than the old peace movements [17].

The mobilization against nuclear weapons was primarily a European business; it was Europeans that had felt the war, Europeans were for the first time for centuries exposed to decisive strategic decisions without their control, and when the rivalry between the USA and the Soviet Union gathered momentum Europeans had a vision of their native district intended as a zone of confrontation.

Only in Japan, which had actually been nuked, there was a comparable movement. It had however a broader focus and directed itself against all armaments, as it had a broader base than other peace movements and comprised trade unions. And it remained mobilized during the whole post-war era, until the seventies and contributed to the fact that the Japanese state kept down armament expenditure to the benefit of the whole society.

The first to engage against nuclear weapons were scientists who regretted their scientific contributions to the development of nuclear weapons. They were for natural reasons not able to form a mass movement but they contributed with legitimacy and arguments. The mass movements were two.

One was the World Federalist Movement. It had appeared among idealist American middle class people and had some trade union connections. Its aim was that a world-comprising state would make all wars impossible, and it contributed to much of the popular backing of the United Nations, and to the fact that many peoples' movement organisations was linked to the UN in an advising role. Also in Europe it had its original support with people half-way into the establishment, until an American ex-pilot, Garry Davis, publicly renounced his American citizenship and inspired an enthusiastic wave among youth; they contributed jointly to municipalities primarily in France, Germany and Italy declaring themselves internationalized and condemning nuclear weapons, and the milieu around it would survive long after the end of the peace movement of the forties.

The other was the odd alliance between the Soviet state and Western European, particularly French and Italian, labour organisations. Even if they had few things to agree on, resistance to nuclear weapons was a genuine common interest, and in 1949 they created the World Peace Movement at a meeting in Paris. It was also in France the

[17] Two overviews exist about the anti-nuclear movement: April Carter, *Peace movements*, Longman 1992, which is very short, and Lawrence Wittner, *The struggle against the bomb*, Stanford University Press 1993, which consists of two heavy volumes. The British mobilizations around 1960 are described particularly by Richard Taylor, *Against the bomb – The British peace movement 1958-1965*, Clarendon Press 1988.

movement initially appeared most creativity and best ability to convince; subsequently however Soviet interest of state took over and when the Russians had developed their own nuclear bomb their interest waned remarkably. The dishonesty, state opportunism and jealousy against other mobilizations that was shown by this movement contributed to discredit the whole nuclear resistance, and contributed for that reason also the legitimation of the cold war; not only the gigantic petition campaign against nuclear weapons in 1950, the so-called Stockholm appeal, raised any respect without the campaign itself because of the too apparent state interest in it.

It was particularly in a completely different field this mobilization would be important. During some years in the fifties, their World Youth Festivals supplied a scene for activists to meet, and not least to create contacts between North and South, and between southern activists. It was to a great extent at these festivals the anti-colonial movements met and became a global actor [18].

From 1951 for a few years, all mobilization counter to the interest of state was impossible in the system center, because of the internal disunion among the peace movements. Not until the USA and the Soviet Union had become relatively equal in nuclear capacity, it was politically possible again to put them in question. The mobilization that brought the cold war attitude into disrepute was initiated independently by two different kinds of milieus, partly supplementing each other but partly obstructed each other because of mutual suspicion and misdirected loyalties.

One was what one may call peoples' movements serving as the popular base of government parties. In the USA, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, SANE, originally created by a small group of pacifists, was coopted by trade union people and liberal members of the Democrat party during 1957-58. Their demand was not that nuclear weapons should be abolished but that tests should be discontinued because of the radioactive fallout. About the same time the Cooperative Women's Guild in the London suburb Bowling Green took initiative to a series of meetings for the same demand for the same reason. This initiative was quickly absorbed by people in the left fly of the Labour party in the form of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, CND. Its demand was more far-reaching – that Britain should refrain from nuclear weapons and be a good example for the rest of the world – and it was also more mobilizing.

The other milieu was people who had been inspired by the non-violent action methods of the Indian independence movement and wanted to test similar methods against evils in the system center. Some of them came from the World Federalist surroundings in Europe, others came from the Service International or Fellowship of Reconciliation circles. In Britain, this milieu was first visible as a movement against a movement against nuclear weapons, under the name of The Direct Action Committee, DAC.

While CND aimed at discreet influence on the Labour leadership to write in nuclear disarmament in the party program, and for that aim shunned all fuss, DAC aimed at

[18] Some of the atmosphere at these festivals is recreated in a novel by Jan Myrdal, *Maj, en kärlek*, Norstedts 1998.

mass mobilization through conspicuous actions. The result was that CND was forced to take responsibility afterwards for the successful DAC actions, for example the increasingly enormous easter demonstrations, and because of that had to receive huge amounts of members. The original plans of CND as a committee of notabilities had to be abandoned to the benefit of a traditional peoples' movement organisation. But CND had also to take responsibility for the DAC actions that were not accepted by the British cultural climate, for example blockades of armament industries, the relations between the two organisations was sometimes tense, and the political energy was to a great extent wasted on dissociating themselves from each other.

Despite this, the creative British peoples' movement culture stimulated the rest of Europe to imitation. Easter demonstrations against nuclear weapons were arranged in many countries. In Sweden a CND-ish group, Aktionsgruppen mot svenska atomvapen, AMSA, succeeded in getting the government to discontinue a nuclear program, while the broader Svenska Freds- och Skiljedomsföreningen suggested that the whole defence budget should go to aid the poor of the world [19]. In Germany, the putative front between the East and the West, the churches and for once also the trade unions mobilized against nuclear weapons on German land, and carried through several strikes against them during 1958 and 1959. A global mobilization against government violence against their citizens was also started at this time in the form of Amnesty in 1961.

The methods introduced by DAC and its successor Committee of 100, where the Gandhians increasingly shrank to a minority on a broad anti-systemic spectrum, would be typical for the new peoples' movement culture from the sixties on in the whole system center. As would also the lobbying methods of CND. And the interplay between them.

What set the limits for the effectiveness of the anti-nuclear movement was, according to Taylor, its middle-class radical character. Thereby he means that its foundation of mobilizing was the individual and its interest in having a good conscience, not the collective and its interests in having reasonable conditions of life. This made the limits to the repertoire – since collective refusal of cooperation in the form of for example a strike was left out, the only opportunities left were expressions of opinion like demonstrations, petitions and small scale obstruction by casually organised, high-motivated individuals whose legitimacy was questionable. This limitation was not self-chosen, it was a consequence of the support for the government power strategy of the class-based organisations, and the subordination under government functionaries which followed from that. DAC tried heroically to engage trade unions for civilian production but the trade unions had already renounced the right to have a saying about the content of production and the organisation of society, and declined the invitation. Unlike the peace movement wave of 1900-1914, the movement mobilization of the fifties-sixties was rather thin.

The influence of government politics was for that reason small, compared to the visibility of the movement. The realised goal was SANE's, not END's and even less DAC's. When USA and the Soviet Union agreed on limitation of bomb tests in 1962, people

[19] Per Anders Fogelström, Kampen för fred, SFS 1971.

felt relieved and the mobilization subsided. CND and its counterparts in other countries engaged in building the welfare state, while DAC and comparable currents engaged in environment, democratic rights or solidarity with the system peripheries.

For neither of these currents was specifically interested in peace; they were general peoples' movement milieus with democratic aims in general; the nuclear weapon issue happened to be the most topical in the late fifties [20].

A focus which would grow in importance after 1965 was resistance to colonial wars by people in the system center.

Little resistance had been shown in the system center against its wars against and occupation of the rest of the world – probably because people in general didn't come in contact with it. A solidarity with the Indian independence movement had been organised by Theosophists in the early twentieth century, but it was not very practical. Only in the late colonial era, the state demanded resources from their citizens in the form of taxes and lives of young men, and only then there appeared a mobilization for peace.

The first fumbling efforts to such a mobilization appeared in France, when the government tried to repress the struggle for independence in Algeria. The first resistance was raised by conscripts on the way to the front; they mutinied on a grand scale during 1955-56 but were defeated one after another without being able to coordinate or being met by solidarity from others [21].

Instead, a support for the Algerians network organised, of course by Algerians in France but also by Catholic so-called worker-priests, the French Fellowship of Reconciliation and non-Communist radicals from the Resistance tradition. They worked in deep underground to collect money and to help deserters, without trying much to convince the public opinion. Only when such a network was exposed by the police in 1960 and put to trial, others began to organise mass meetings and write books and articles about the ravages of the French army. But this war resistance never got any scope; what convinced the French opinion about giving up the war was the costs and the disgust for the French settlers in Algeria when these began to kill Frenchmen to protest against the hesitant warfare. The importance of this movement was rather ideological; only now the right of the South to independence was formulated in unambiguous terms in the North for the first time.

The resistance to the US warfare in Vietnam reached a much grander scope.

Despite the fact that the first critique against the increasingly escalated American involvement in 1962-63 was voiced by established politicians, the first mass base of the critique was the organisations that had carried the resistance to nuclear weapons. SANE organised the first petitions and demonstrations in the USA. But within a few years a

[20] You can get a picture of the amplitude of the discussion in *Ikkevoldsaksjon*, PAX 1972, edited by the Nordic WRI organisations VCO, AMK and FMK. There is a general discussion about democracy and "non-violent revolution", but also a systematic exposition of peaceful methods of struggle and a description of thirteen mobilization covering all between a boycott of examinations over defence of a popular outdoor café and tenants' struggle against eviction to occupation of a draft board's premises.

[21] Martin Evans, *The memory of resistance*, Berg 1997, Alistair Horne, *A savage war of peace*, Macmillan 1977, *Cahiers de la réconciliation* 2/1993.

motley resistance had been formed, whose participants had deeply varied motive, aim and perspective [22].

One category was what DeBenedetti calls antiwar liberals. To this category belonged the critical politicians but also many lay people. Their main concern was that USA as a state risked to take bigger morsels than it could swallow; their aim was negotiations and neutralizing of Vietnam so that USA could deal with more important businesses. They saw the war as a stupid mistake by an otherwise respectable government. They were however increasingly critical the more the war went on.

Another category was the reform movement called up by the black civil rights movement, whose aim went far beyond black equality. The main concern of this category was to stop the war because it took energy from necessary reforms, but the nature of these reforms was as shifting as the category.

A third category, during some years the biggest mass base of the movement, was middle class youth. For them, it was rather the bureaucraticized and hierarchized society that was the target, peronified by the military-industrial establishment, or perhaps it was the Fordist compromise and its work-and-consume culture; their main concern tended to be worded in cultural terms – the “counter-culture” – rather than political, and identity-shaping actions tended to be more important than the politically goal-oriented ones. This was of course a typical middle class youth movement, see chapter 8, perhaps the most pure one that has existed so far.

A fourth category was the core of the “old” peace movement, the Gandhian tradition in and around FoR. It would with the time be a small minority, despite the fact that it would come up with most of the initiatives, not least as attempts to bridge over the distrust and conflicts between the other categories.

This task was not easy, and on the whole it never succeeded particularly well, according to DeBenedetti. The participants tended to stick to their main concerns and to see stopping the war as a side-kick. And for the counter-culture of youth the anti-war liberals were a part of the establishment, and for the anti-war liberals, the counter-culture youth was a drag that discredited their own standpoints.

No organisations or mobilizations were for that reason possible to build on the entire war resistance or even major parts of it; initiatives was always taken by casual alliances, small groups or persons.

For that reason, the war resistance during the first years tended to be rather ineffective. Neither the sophisticated strategic discussions of the liberals nor the scandalous behaviour of the ocounter-culture appealed to any big public. Demonstrations in Washington were able to get together tens of thousands as early as 1964 but the walls between the engaged and the majority were thick.

Three initiatives would try to create a leadership for the countless local pockets of resistance that appeared during the years 1964-67.

One was the National Mobilization to End the War, or the Mobe, an attempt to

[22] Charles DeBenedetti, *An American ordeal, The antiwar movement of the Vietnam era*, Syracuse University Press 1990.

make a huge demonstration in October 1967. It was started by a broad alliance from SANE people to counter-culture activists, but as the initiative developed into a chaotic counter-culture happening it created the impression that anti-war activists were chaotic people, marginal to the American society.

The other was an initiative from the anti-war liberals to launch an anti-war candidate for president in 1968. But as the successful FNL new year offensive discredited the optimistic government assurances, most candidates appeared pro-peace including the final president. And although the war dragged on for years, the fact that peace negotiations had started demobilized most of the organized anti-war movement while the remaining counter-culture was even further marginalised and tended to lose interest in the war.

The most successful attempt was decentralized organizationally but focused regarding content: refusal to do military service. Peace activists had begun to burn calling-up papers as early as 1964, but after 1967 it grew to a mass movement, organized through local support committees and stimulated by TV news about the hell of war. The resistance began to spread within the army as soon as the negotiations started, as soldiers demonstrated, deserted, refused to fight, sabotaged the equipment or killed the officers out of frustration over that they were presumed to risk their lives for a cause nobody believed in. By 1972, the American army was unfit for service [23].

After 1968 it was apparent that the war was meaningless and had to be finished; this was also the government view. Since it went on all the same it was paradoxical that the popular mobilization was rather diminished while even more people went against it. The initiatives that were really taken were local and small, for example a referendum in San Diego decided in 1972 to bar the harbour to warships, and the support for draft resisters and deserters continued. At the national scene, elite politicians took the initiative and kept it to the end.

The weak war resistance, and the fact that a growing repudiation led to passivity rather than protests, was a consequence of the class content of the movement according to DeBenedetti. Like the British anti-nuclear movement the war resistance was characterized by middle class radicalism – the base of mobilization was the individual and the clean conscience, not the collective and the interest, and most people remained indifferent to the movement. It is telling that the part of the movement that was based in survival issues – draft resistance – was the most successful one.

In the rest of the world, the resistance to the Vietnam war had other motives. In both system center and system peripheries, the resistance was a part of the defence against the dominance of the hegemonic power. At some occasions it even got a character of an attack against the world order the hegemonic power was a guarantor of. The years around 1970 the Vietnamese peasants pursued the most high-tense resistance against the order of the world market system, and they became to a great extent symbolic for other resistances. Together with the resurgence of labour movements in Europe and the many peoples' movement mobilizations in the South that were inspired by the anti-colonial successes, they were the driving force of the most far-reaching common attack so far against

[23] Gabriel Kolko, *Anatomy of a war*, The New Press 1994.

the world market system. For that reason, they inspired huge amounts of people to venture their lives in asserting the mutual relations of peoples' movements and civil society against the capital accumulation of business and hierarchic subordination of states.

In Japan, the broad post-war peace movement culminated. Farmers, environmental movements and war resisters occupied the airport site of Narita, intended for transports to Vietnam, and kept it for months – until an activist killed a policeman and the whole movement considered itself to have lost face and discomposed. In France the support for arrested Vietnam activists triggered the revolt of May 1968. In Denmark and Australia dockers refused to unload American ships. In Canada a mass movement was built to help deserters from the USA. In Sweden the Vietnam movement became a highly respected popular movement although it was organised by eccentric Maoists, and was spread far from its original youth culture [24]. The resistance against the Vietnam war stimulated peoples' movements in the north increasingly began to support peoples' movements in the South – but it also tended to put up criterions for serious movements that they should struggle against colonizers from the North, preferably by arms. The latter was a consequence of the programmatic split between “non-violents” and “anti-imperialists”, created by the impression of the war and exposed at the Russell Tribunal in 1967, an event organized by END people to exhibit the brutality of the US warfare.

The long slump after 1973 decreased the space for state and capital groups, and the competition increased. The so-called detente between the USA and the Soviet Union broke down in the late seventies and both began to invest in new arms systems and even consider the possibility to annihilate the counterpart in one strike. A consequence of this was an unequalled peoples' movement mobilization, primarily in Europe [25].

The initiative came in 1978 from the Dutch churches, which had discussed the peace issue in an organised way since the sixties. They got a quick response from Norwegian churches and youth organisations. But it was in West Germany that the peoples' movement mobilization was the greatest. In a short time, local groups in each city were mobilized, coordinated into five networks according to political profile, in their turn coordinated by congresses and a national action committee. The aim was that no new missiles would be deployed at German soil. For this aim millions demonstrated while more militant groups blocked and occupied, this time without discord within the movement. Instead, the different actions were seen as different ways of achieving a common aim.

In other countries, like in Britain, France, Italy, the Nordic countries and USA, the

[24] The Swedish movement is described in Mats Örbrink & Christer Lundgren, *FNL-rörelsen i Sverige*, en historik, DFFG 1973. It appears that the Christian WRI circles initiated the movement in Sweden even if the Maoists took over later.

[25] The overarching literature about this is thin. What exist are the broad books about “new social movements”, peace movements among this. Most extensive is Roland Roth & Dieter Rucht (hg), *Neue soziale Bewegungen in Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Campus 1987, and Karl-Werner Brand (hg), *Neue soziale Bewegungen in Westeuropa und den USA: en internationaler Vergleich*, Campus 1985. Thomas Rochon, *Mobilizing for peace – The antinuclear movement in Western Europe*, Adamantine Press 1988 is primarily a sociological exposition of who took part. April Carter, *Peace movements*, use a third of the book for the movements of the eighties.

mobilization was not as broad as that. But it was strong enough to be the greatest mass mobilization in the system center for twenty years, and the forms were the same as in Germany. For the contemporaries, it appeared as the “new social movement”, a fusion of the peace movements of the sixties and the environmental movements of the seventies, a movement of a new kind that focused on existential needs rather than material ones, and which would render traditional kinds of peoples’ movements obsolete. But despite the expectations, the mobilization subsided soon after it had failed to reach its immediate aims.

There are several explanations to that. Thomas Leif suggests that the one-sided focus left the movement completely at a loss, at least in Germany, when the decision of deployment had been taken. Others have pointed to the fact that the debate at an early stage had become so fixated at arms technology that it had become a concern for arms experts, which blocked all debate about political issues and priorities. An initiative from the Danish Women for Peace about thematizing the military expenses and alternative use of the money was for example completely marginalized, unlike what happened during the fifties and sixties. An equally credible explanation focuses on the fact that the movement was really not so new after all. Diarmuid Maguire shows that at least in England and Italy the whole leadership of the movement were tightly tied to strategic alliances to parliamentary opposition parties and as incapable as these to see beyond the world of government combinations. When these parties dropped the issue, the mobilization also collapsed. There had been no movement based in an identity, only a loose coalition [26].

On the other hand, the peace mobilization of the eighties was important in other respects.

Through the dense contacts between West and East European peace movements, the movement contributed to challenging the power monopoly of the Communist parties in the Warsaw Pact countries. Since the movement insisted that both official, party-dominated organisations and unofficial, often Christian, groups were relevant it was impossible to marginalize the latter – even when they, as in Poland, took up draft refusal as a strategy. The peace movements became the organisational focus for the demands for democratization of the whole society, and symptomatically the peace movement was the immediate organisational focus for destroying the dictatorship in DDR and in Czechoslovakia.

Peace movement groups had begun to appear in the early eighties, initiated by scientific circles and by people from the youth cultures. In Poland and in DDR they could count at passive support from the Church which made them somewhat out of reach from authorities. In the Soviet Union, they were extremely marginalized but because of their close relation to the youth culture and because of the unpopular Afghan war they got quickly a strong position as soon as the rulers began to find censorship inconveniently narrow. Peace and environmental movement organisations and were the first to be

[26] Thomas Leif, *Die Friedensbewegung der achtziger Jahre*; Tord Björk m.fl, *Barnen behöver generalernas klöver*, *Dagens Nyheter* 29.9.1984; Diarmuid Maguire, *Opposition movements and opposition parties, Equal partners or dependent relations in the struggle for power?*, in Craig Jenkins & Bert Klandermans, *The politics of social protest*, University College of London Press 1995.

allowed freedom of expression in the Soviet Union. And for many Russians, the mass meetings which were organised around the marches of the peace movement were the first autonomous political contexts they had experienced [27].

And by mobilizing against a rearmament governed by the USA and the Soviet Union by referring to a European identity, the movement contributed to creating a popular legitimacy for the EU as a dream of the European bourgeoisie, and it got very properly a new lease of life shortly thereafter. Unlike the peace movement wave of the fifties and sixties, the wave of the eighties screened off the world; the model of explanation was entirely the East-West conflict while the North-South was forgotten. This was also a consequence of the self-inflicted subordination under parliamentary opposition parties.

But there was at least one European peace movement mobilization as early as in the seventies that broke the pattern, one that was based in interests, one that was successful, and one that is still a center for inspiration and mobilizing of the whole peoples' movement family.

In 1972, the sheep farmers of the Larzac plateau in southern France got to know that their native district was to be expropriated by the army. Instead of selling out, 103 farmers declared that they would keep on and invited to resistance. They got an immediate support. Their campaign was imaginative; they demonstrated with their herds in Paris, they supported other socially motivated protests like factory occupations with food, they invited to music festivals, they left their military papers to the authorities, they occupied military installations and destroyed expropriation papers – and after nine years the government gave up. Today, the farmers of Larzac belong to the leaders in Via Campesina and the global justice movement, and Larzac is the place where national protest actions are usually planned in France [28].

Politics of interest in the system periphery

As can be seen from the maps, all wars during the half-century after the great war for hegemony 1914-45 have taken place in the semi-periphery and periphery of the system. This is of course due to the missing structural power of the semi-periphery and periphery. There are the least resources to smooth over conflicts with, and great powers use them to fight out their conflicts. A reasonable question may be which peace movements with a base within the area have tried to reduce the violence during these conflicts. Another reasonable question may be to what extent they have been an expression of the aspiration of the civil society to maintain orderly conditions of production rather than privileged middle class people's aspiration for keeping a good conscience.

The wars marked at the map have very different background and reasons. There is a great contribution of great power control-keeping – the Vietnam war, the Algeria war, the wars in Angola and Mozambique, the war in Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war. There are local warlords striving at widening their power base when old states crumble for lack

[27] From below, independent peace and environment movements in Eastern Europe and the USSR, Helsinki Watch Report 1987.

[28] Toni Liversage, Fra Gandhi till Greenham Common – om civil ulydighet og ikke-vold, Gyldendal 1987.

of resources – the Bosnian war, the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Chechenia war. There are genuine local center-periphery conflicts – the Sudan war, the Bangladesh war. And there are class conflicts that run amok – the Chinese civil war, the Lebanon civil war, the massacres in Central America, Rwanda and Burundi. Mixed reasons abound and many of the enumerated are not simple.

For local peace movements, great power wars are difficult to manage – but other kinds of conflicts should in principle be possible to deescalate by the actors in a local civil society.

Has this been done in the southern countries where there have been wars 1945-2000?

Perhaps not unexpectedly, the kind of conflict which provokes the most successful response from the civil society seems to be the one the fewest people have an interest in – the violence that is pursued by warlords who aim at building a powerbase, like when the Peace of God was most active in Europe. And like with the Peace of God, the most active actor seems to be churches, with interest groups in avant-gardist and supporting roles.

In Lebanon, the civil war was begun as a majority rebellion against the power monopoly of the Maronites, but degenerated into an increasingly militarized free-for-all, with neighbouring states adding fuel to the flames. The initiative to de-escalation came from the Shi'ite self-help organisation Amal, which except building a militia of their own at a crucial moment convinced the soldiers in other militias that war was against their interest and got them to desert [29].

In Liberia and Sierra Leone, violence began as fighting among factions within the ruling elite about the shrinking resources in the economy of recession and structural adjustments ordered by the IMF. The aim of the war making factions became to get people to pay protection money and sell off the country's assets to the transnational capital, rather than to get power over an increasingly powerless state. For that end, they used destitute youth gangs who had no other way of making a living than as mercenaries; some of these had begun their war practice as oppositional groups against the egotist practice of the elites.

The peace initiatives came from two quarters – neighbouring states whose governments were worried that the war would spread, and broad peace movements within the countries [30].

The peace movements have had three components. In both countries the religious leaders – Christian and Muslim – have played the principal part. They have, except their religious position also had a prestige as leaders for education and social welfare. The religious leaders took the first initiative for peace talks in Liberia in 1990 and they kept the initiative through the whole peace process. In Sierra Leone women – small traders, unionists and academics – took the first initiatives in 1994 but after having mass base for the elections organised by the neighbouring states they seem to have got tired and

[29] Augustus Norton, Shi'ism and social power in Lebanon, in Juan Cole & Nikki Keddie (ed), Shi'ism and social protest, Yale University Press 1986.

[30] Monique Mekenkamp et al (ed), Searching for peace in Africa, European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation 1999, Accord 1-1996 and 9-2000.



Fig 9:1. Killed by war; each dot indicates 50.000 people.

Above, 1945-75. The Chinese civil war, the Korean war, the Indochina war, the Suharto coup in Indonesia, the Bangladesh war, and the Biafra war have killed more than half a million. Civil wars in Central America, Colombia, Sudan etc more than 100.000

Below, 1975-2000. The Afghanistan war, the war Iran-Iraq, and the civil war in Cambodia, Rwanda, Sudan, Angola and mozambique have killed more than half a million. Civil wars in Liberia, Lebanon, Somalia, ExYugoslavia and Guatemala and the invasion of East Timor have killed more than 100.000. Source: Correlates of war, www.correlatesofwar.org. The numbers are very approximate.



left over to the religious leaders. In both countries there have also been ad hoc groups of mixed origins who have taken initiatives. In Liberia for example they took initiatives to demonstrations when the peace talks came to a standstill in 1994 and 1995. And in both countries neighbouring countries have exerted pressure on the warring parties to make them agree.

In both Liberia and Sierra Leone the weakness of the peace initiatives appear clearly. What they have aimed at has been an end of the war, i.e. an end of the rivalry within the elite. When the elite has agreed, at the instigation of the peace movement, of the way of sharing the booty, the role as peacemaker has been more difficult. In Liberia, where the religious leaders have increasingly insisted on some kind of justice, the elites have easily, when they have come to terms with each other, also agreed on how to extinguish the peace movement violently.

Direct conflicts of interest seem to be more difficult to manage. It seems to be less space for a peace movement if there is a violent conflict between classes or between center and periphery. Such conflicts are real, and affect many, and when they have gone so far as to violence there is so much invested in the conflict that those who have greatest interest in de-escalation are too weak and few to make a difference.

To be sure, it is generally not rational for direct producers that a conflict is managed at a level where the method is killing and destruction of the resource base. But if the part which represents change in a power balance is strong, massive violence may be the only way to win for a part that represents status quo, particularly if the only resource it has is violence. For a government, violence may be the only way of preventing an unfavourably treated province to break away, thus discouraging other provinces to break away, and for a landowner class with no other capital, massive violence may be the only way of preventing a land reform which would end all its privileges. A peace movement would then have the difficult task to block the most violent action opportunities of this actor and make the conflict solvable in a less destructive way.

And the requirement for this is there is another category, a third party whose opportunities for survival is not tied up with the success of the most violent party. Such third parties have generally been weak or missing – for example during the Chinese civil war or the Vietnam war. In Vietnam groups of Buddhists tried to play a mediating part in the early sixties but they were soon forced to choose sides or disappeared as irrelevant [31].

Sometimes they have however emerged after a while. The civil wars in Guatemala and El Salvador began when the reformist urban middle class challenged the power monopoly of the landowning elite, was defeated and had to take to the woods to survive. For years there was an unmediated war between status quo and armed guerrillas, and third parties found it difficult to make themselves heard.

After some decades, the constant warfare met resistance from an unexpected quarter. In Guatemala parts of the business class began to find the power of the military and its violence too expensive, not least in terms of reduced international credit. When the guerrilla organisation URNG realized in the early eighties that the conflict was militar-

[31] Gabriel Kolko, *Anatomy of a war*.

ily unwinnable and appealed of a peaceful continuation, it was primarily the business organisation CACIF that forced the government to take the offer seriously. When the negotiations had begun appeared more and more organisations of war victims, many under church covers, who together with UN representatives and North American peace organisations guarding their own government saw to it that the negotiations continued even when CACIF at times regretted what it had done [32].

In Colombia the initiative lay with the church. The background of the conflict was a struggle for land reform which took armed shape as early as in the sixties. By degrees the conflict has become self-generating; the armed groups originally formed by peasants as well as those formed by landowners have increasingly focused on getting resources to keep the conflict going, and often degenerated into mafia activities with drug trafficking as life-blood. Two initiatives from the mid-nineties, a student demonstration through the most violent region and a public letter from an eight year girl from the shantytown of Medellín to her brother, released a wave of demonstrations – a referendum among three million children, contemporaneous demonstrations with thirteen million participants, proclaiming of peace municipalities whose inhabitants refuse to support any of the warring parties, and a movement among children to stop violence at home. All these have been led by the church [33].

Even in Angola the peace initiatives have come from churches, but it seems that there has been less popular participation there [34].

There are many similarities between civil wars and terrorist regimes; in both cases there are macro-parasites whose consensus with their base of provisions is negligible. It shouldn't surprise any that there are many similarities also between the defences against them.

For example, the Chilean resistance against the dictatorship consisted first from communal kitchens in the shantytowns, and was first coordinated within the church, which in the late seventies formed the organisation *Vicaría de la solidaridad*, to support opposition people and gave them meeting space in the churches. When the Copper Workers' Federation invited to the first national day of protest in May 1983 there was a wide network to answer [35]. In a corresponding way, the revolutions against presidents Somoza in Nicaragua and Marcos in the Philippines was coordinated by very broad groups of churches, business organisations, trade unions and guerrilla organisations who were successful when they appealed to officer groups in the army. But this could only happen when the parasitic terrorism of the regimes began to hit at the upper and middle classes [36].

[32] Susanne Jonas, *Centaur and doves*, Westview Press 2000.

[33] Sara Cameron & Marina Curtis-Evans, *Reclaimed territory, Civil society against the Colombian war*, from *Development* 2000 vol 43:3.

[34] Steve Kibble, *Angola: Hearing the people's voice*, from *Development* 2000 vol 43:3.

[35] Patricia Hipsher, *Democratic transitions as protest cycles; social movement dynamics in democratizing Latin America*, in David Meyer & Sidney Tarrow (ed), *The social movement society*, Rowman & Littlefield 1998.

[36] Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow & Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of contention*, Cambridge University Press 2001.

The absence of peace movements with an identity of their own in the system peripheries is most strikingly demonstrated in India, the country which has contributed so much to the identity of the peace movements in the system center.

The Gandhian tradition has contributed to much peoples' movement activity in India after 1945. But it has concerned defence of the resource base, struggle for land reform and not least defence of Dalit interests. The greatest Gandhian peoples' movement mobilization after independence happened in 1974-77; it began as a protest movement against price hikes for necessities, continued as a movement against corruption within the administration and ended – when the government tried to protect itself with a state of emergency – as defence against this [37]. But issues like defence against the constant political violence in India or for example the war against Pakistan seems to have led an obscure life if they have existed at all. The term “peace movement” in Indian parlance is only a peoples' movement working with peaceful means.

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When the USA attacked Iraq in 2003 the biggest peace movement mobilization ever was released; about 15 million people over the world demonstrated in the streets against the attack [38]. The mobilization then subsided immediately into almost nothing.

The failing in almost all peace movement mobilizations are similar. Since they generally not are carried by particular categories, their networks are weak and loose. If the violence has been released by a local macro-parasite, it is generally as a part of a process where the violence is not the focus per se; the violence has appeared in a conflict about resources and possible peace movements are small and weak compared with the parties involved in the conflict, at least in the beginning. If the violence has been released in a global scale, as in the case of the Iraq war, the only way for the stricken people to protect themselves is anti-colonial resistance, violently or peacefully, while people near the macro-parasite who could afford a peace movement are not stricken themselves and their interest of carrying a durable peace movement is weak. And if they try to compensate for the weak interest with strong ideologies they have vacillated between isolation in a sub-culture and reliance on paternalist solutions – relying on the king in the middle ages, relying on the UN or NATO today.

But yet one should take care not to write off peace movements as futile.

In local conflicts, forces that may carry a peace movement may be weak in the beginning but be strengthened gradually when the destructiveness of the conflict is evident – this is what happened in Guatemala, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia. This will also happen to the presently weak peace movement in Palestine/Israel, when the USA can't afford any longer to pay the Israeli war bill and the conflict really turns out to be local [39].

[37] A.D. Prasad, *Jai Prakash Andolan 1974 – an eyewitness account*, Janaki Prakashan 1979. – I have inquired for literature on Indian peace movements in the Swedish university library database Libris, at Google, and with the Indian peoples' movement center Lokayan, but it seems not to exist.

[38] Global protests against war on Iraq, Wikipedia

[39] Reuven Kaminer, *The politics of protest – The Israeli peace movement and the Palestinian intifada*, Sussex Academic Press 1996, describes the way the peaceful peoples' movement during the Palestinian intifada

And in global conflicts, the movement against the Vietnam war shows that peace movements may be active and strong when they are parts of a common anti-systemic movement against the ruling power.

Defence of the resource base

Another theme for general movements of the civil society, which have spread during the long post-war boom, is defence of the resource base, or environmental movements. Environmental movements defend the resource base against economically or politically motivated exploitation or pillage, which may take many different forms.

Pillage and over-exploitation are of course old phenomena. Roughly, one can identify three phases in global history when a new scale have been established and old pillage and old over-exploitation have been dwarfed by new developments.

The first was the establishment of states. They seem everywhere to be accompanied by deforestation and erosion, and sometimes like for example in Iraq and along the Indus by salinization. Cities, that accompanied states, were also unhealthy places where mortality always exceeded nativity. However, I have never found any indication of concerted resistance to these facts, perhaps because they were slow developments [40].

The second was with the introduction of the world market system, and colonialism. Soil degradation and deforestation were common consequences as were diseases and overwork. According to Jason Moore's sources the productivity of Polish soil decreased by half between 1550 and 1700 (and Poland was the main provider of grain to Western Europe). Indian forests were cleared. And the population of America fell from 50-100 million to less than 10 million. Resistance in this case took mainly the form of peasant defence of the land, see chapter 4 [41].

In both these cases, the main reason for environmental degradation was hierarchic power that ruled over distances. A ruler doesn't need to bother about environmental degradation because there seems always to be new nature to conquer, and in any case top-down rule has to simplify and ignore nature's too delicate functions [42]. In the second case a powerful reason for degradation was the growing monocentricity of money: when money and profit becomes the main mover of things the frivolities of rich people can always beat the existence of poor people and nature which increasingly becomes intertwined; as Jason Moore has pointed out, the elites of the early colonial world tended to regard poor people and nature as one and the same thing that could and should be exploited as thoroughly as possible. With good cause – when industrial processes begin to take root, economies of scale begin to tell, and the most ruthless exploiter is the one that grows and survives.

in the late eighties provoked a strong Israeli peoples' movement for concessions to the Palestinians, while the Israeli movement died when the mass movement on the Palestinian side did so.

[40] J. Donald Hughes: *An environmental history of the world*, Routledge 2001

[41] Jason W. Moore: *The rise of cheap nature*, in Jason W. Moore, ed, *Anthropocene or capitalocene*, PM Books 2016, Vandana Shiva, *Ecology and the politics of survival*, Sage 1991.

[42] Joachim Radkau, *Nature and Power*, Cambridge University Press 2008; James C. Scott: *Seeing like a state*, Yale University Press, 1999, points at the irresistible drive to simplify that rests with all top-down structures.

The third acceleration of environmental degradation was caused by the long postwar boom – the Kondratiev wave that built on mass production for mass consumption, see below.

Devastation of forests may be seen as the first environmental problem to be discussed as an environmental problem; it happened characteristically when European colonial powers clear-cut forests to establish plantations in tropical islands; actors were loyal colonial officials who feared ecological disasters and reduced economic yield, and the result was that all self-respecting European powers set aside reservations, partly with the motive to guarantee supply of timber for warships. And characteristically enough, the elitist approach gave rise to violent conflicts between states and the peasants who always had used the forests for grazing and subsistence wood and now were prohibited from doing that. In for example India, these peasants' defence against government environmental protection is seen as the real progenitors of the environmental movement [43].

Yet, it was reservations which were seen as the solution when a more general discussion about environmental problems began in the mid nineteenth century. The background was of course that the industrial production that had got speed at this time subsumed a much bigger part of the ecological cycle into the economic cycle than any economy had ever done before, and the reason why reservations was seen as the solution was probably that the discussion was pursued among people with industrial interests, in the European and North American industrial middle class with some additions from aristocratic land-owners. Except threatened countryside they wanted to protect wild animals – the first environmental actions in these circles was when women tried to stop hunting of birds to make plumes for hats of them. The first environmental organisation was established in Britain in July 19th, 1865, interestingly enough with the name Commons Preservation Society. The focus was wilderness, but the organization took also initiatives to parks in cities [44].

Meanwhile, the labour unions of the workers were early interested in “healthy workshops” as it was expressed in item 2 of the program for the Trade Union Central Committee of Stockholm in 1883 [45], and sometimes the interests could meet in a common engagement for healthier conditions. McNeill tells about how cities increasingly were supplied with water works and high chimneys which to be sure dumped the problem some other where but at least improved the health of the majority, an issue which become the overarching interest for the extensive peoples' movement family for a

[43] John McCormick, *reclaiming paradise: The global environmental movement*, Indiana University Press 1989; Philip W. Sutton, *Explaining environmentalism*, Ashgate 2000. About the colonial services' efforts see Richard Grove, *Ecology, climate, empire*, The White Horse Press 1997.

[44] Tage Lindbom, *Den svenska fackföreningsrörelsens uppkomst*, Tiden 1938.

[45] Colin Spencer, *The heretic's feast; a history of Vegetarianism*, University Press of New England 1995 gives a somewhat messy account for British conditions with some European outlooks. Christoph Conti, *Abschied vom Bürgertum – alternative Bewegungen in Deutschland von 1890 bis heute*, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag 1984, tells amusingly about alternative movements a hundred years ago whose ideological equipment was strikingly similar to the present ones. Janet Biehl & Peter Staudenmaier, *Økofascisme, Kooperativet Nisus* Forlag 1995, tells about extremely conservative groups using the ecologist critique against the liberal industrial society; it has however a heavy bias to ideology and tells surprisingly little about the social realities behind the ideologies. About *Naturfreunde*, see dewiki.de/Lexikon/Naturfreunde.

hundred years on. This found for example expression in common demands for reduced hours of work, or in common demands for subsidized health care and sewer treatment.

Sometimes it also found expression in suspiciousness against industrial, mass-produced food. Consumer cooperatives had early engaged for genuine products, but were content with that. Smaller groups in Northwest Europe and North America linked resistance against industrial food and chemical medicines with worship of nature and vegetarianism and, particularly in Germany, resistance to bourgeois culture. The program appealed to parts of the general middle class peoples' movement culture, but in Germany also to the arch-conservative landowners around Bund der Landwirte, see chapter 7, who needed a cultural corset against the growing power of the industrialists, as well as to the Labour movement which organized its own nature organization, Naturfreunde [45].

Thus was the situation when the long post-war boom – the Kondratiev wave that built on cars and mass consumption – caused a devastation in mass scale and for the first time forced a mass mobilization to the defence of the resource base and established the concept “environment” in the language.

What happened after 1945? Primarily, two factors have been highlighted as important.

Firstly, the greatly increased production, or with in this context more relevant expression greatly increased use of biological cycles into the economic ones. The post-war accumulation and integration model with mass production for mass consumption made it possible to increase tenfold the world's energy consumption in twenty-five years.

Secondly, the synthetic, non-biodegradable substances, which were taken increasingly into use at this time. Many times, these were used for economic reasons, but sometimes they were also motivated by health causes like DDT and CFC. Many of the post-war environmental problems were thus arguably caused by the successes of earlier environmental movements [46].

But other causes may be seen; not least certain organisational traits with the world market system, which create good preconditions for environmental degradation.

The system builds on competition. This forces exploiters to disregard the long run sustainability and only consider the short run profitability, lest they not be knocked out from the market by other, more economic exploiters. Something that favours industry where there are economies of scale but disfavors nature where there aren't.

The system builds on globalization of production processes. This releases the exploiters from dependence on the long-run maintenance of the local production processes while it makes them insensible to local protests against over-exploitation.

The system builds on the equivalence or interchangeability of all values, i.e. incapacity to differ between necessary and frivolous needs. This causes frivolous needs, for example rich peoples' needs for a fashionable luxury, may knock out the long run survival of a local community or a local eco-system, with no other legitimation that it can pay for it in cash.

The system builds on Roman law, i.e. that private property has a much stronger legal

[46] J.R. McNeill, *Something new under the sun. The connections were first highlighted by Barry Commoner, The closing circle*, Random House 1971.

protection than a commons. This means that in a conflict, the victory goes always to the private property except perhaps when strong political support is mobilized for the commons.

The highest regarded kind of knowledge within the system, so-called science, is traditionally segmented and reductionist and disregarded the effects of one segment on another and on the whole. If you want, this can be seen as the ideological counterpart of Roman law favouring the private to the expense of the common [47].

The first mass mobilization against an environmental menace after the war was the anti-nuclear movement, which was based in resistance to radioactive fallout in the atmosphere, see above. This was a kind of pillage that was inaccessible with reservations, and this changed forever the vision of an environmental menace. When scientific evidence began to be spread in the early sixties for the dissemination of synthetic substances in biocycles there was a preparedness to receive them far beyond the academic circles. Interestingly different dissemination effects were reported almost contemporaneously; the first was the report about accumulation of radioactive substances from nuclear tests in baby teeth in 1961, and the reports about DDT followed closely after.

While the scientific alarms quickly established a critical hegemony of the close connections between nature and health, a host of local citizen's groups organised themselves to protect local communities over the whole system center. For this was during the peoples' movement resurgence between 1965 and 1973; the established system power was hard pressed by anti-colonial independence movements, peasant movements for land reform, and Fordist labour struggles, and changes seemed easy to attain.

The environmental issues for the first struggles were local. They concerned industrial pollution, hydroelectric dams and not least motorways [48]. They were pursued by local action groups or citizens' groups who saw themselves as local victims of the greed of exploiters or bureaucratic excesses. They acted in the name of the local community [49].

The process can be studied closely in McKean's description of the Japanese environmental movement. Japan had advanced to the system center during the twentieth century through an aggressive state supported industrialization, while the costs were laid on nature and direct producers. Complaints were long seen as unpatriotic, but in connection with four great poisoning scandals an effective environmental movement appeared, which linked legal proceedings and claims of reparation with support for political opposition parties of all colours.

In West Germany, the most important environmental political initiatives were also

[47] Vandana Shiva, *Ecology and the politics of survival*.

[48] Resistance to car traffic has been a more constant core of the environmental movements in the North than is commonly admitted. More about this under Defence of the commons, below.

[49] Movements in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands during the first years are described by Andrew Jamison, Ron Eyerman & Jacqueline Cramer, *The making of the new environmental consciousness*, Edinburgh University Press 1990. Germany is described by Elim Papadakis, *The green movement in West Germany*, Croom Helm 1984. Hal Rothman, *The greening of a nation? – environmentalism in the United States since 1945*, Harcourt Brace College Publishers 1998 describes the USA and Margaret McKean, *Environmental protest and citizen politics in Japan*, University of California Press 1981, describes Japan.

taken by local community groups, so-called citizens' initiatives. They originated with middle class dominated district associations whose base had been amplified during the sixties, in protest against the one-sided concentration in economic growth and disregarding of social needs, which characterized West German politics. Gradually, focus was moved from housing and health care to industrial pollution and traffic.

Another actor which got a renewed lease of life during the new conditions was the nature conservation circles which had acted during the nineteenth century. Socially, they were the same kind of people as then and the focus also; i.e. wilderness. These groups were strongest in the USA and Britain, and they dominated the discourse in these countries for a long time. They took a struggle about hydroelectric dams which threatened the unspoilt wilderness and were able to win some victories. In the Nordic countries hydroelectric dams were also an early important issue, but the main actors there were local people who saw their material interests as threatened as nature.

The third actor was the middle class youth culture, which was able to point at destruction of nature as a consequence of the materialist consumption culture of the grown-ups. This tendency was early probably the strongest in Netherlands and Denmark, but played after a few years an important role in at least Western Europe [49a].

And a fourth were the peace movement circles as a critical milieu; the first initiatives against nuclear power were taken there.

The national traditions differed somewhat, primarily in one respect. The Japanese and German environmental movements emphasized expressly that threatening projects harmed the common people to the advantage of elites. They were, at least in the short run, very successful: Japan was in short time transformed into an environmental model country, at least at home. The American and British environmental movements assumed, in the spirit of the nineteenth century reservation movement, that people threatened nature; they scored few successes in the short run and provoked at least in the American case a violent backlash [50].

Generally there was a tension between the two; while the environment in the industrial countries was gradually improved, among other things by exporting the troubles to the south, the classless anti-human approach tended to get the upper hand and the environmental mobilization subsided.

In the periphery, environmental movements are more based among people and local communities suffering from environmental degradation and thus more safe against this kind of development. see below.

This early environmental wave got a kind of summary through the UN conference on the environment in Stockholm 1972, when the state representatives were challenged by both a semi-official environmental forum which gave the stage to environmental

[49a] The Dutch youth movement that first formed against smoking in the early 60s, Provos, is related in Richard Kempton: *The Provos, Amsterdam's Anarchist revolt*, 2003.

[50] In the USA the environmental issues seem to have been so linked to the early upper middle class character of its actors, despite countless local initiatives, that popular critique of environmental hazards have to dissociate itself as "environmental justice" to be taken seriously. See for example Andrew Szasz, *Ecopopulism; toxic waste and the movement for environmental justice*, University of Minnesota Press 1994.

activists from the South, and by the local peoples' movement scene. The system elites were here forced to abandon their attempts to blame the environmental crisis on the high natality of the South and prescribe technical solutions to the crisis, and also to treat the US warfare in Vietnam as an environmental hazard [51].

The issue that the accordingly liberated environmental movement built up a mass mobilization about was nuclear power [52].

Nuclear power was in the beginning a by-product of nuclear arms production and had during the fifties and sixties inherited its status as a technological spearhead, as a kind of compromise between peace movement and states. In 1973 most industrial states pursued nuclear power projects, and with the oil price hikes of OPEC this year, the programs got high priority. The nuclear power ventures implied establishment of dubious industrial complexes at new sites with well organised local communities, and over the whole system center there were initiated, in tested environmental movement manner, local citizen's groups to defend the integrity and resource base of the local community.

What set the nuclear power resistance apart from earlier local environmental groups was that it was able to organise itself internationally and globally, with a base in an established identity and a developed language. Partly, this was a matter of maturity within the environmental movement theme, but partly it was due to the scope of the issue. The protests concerned not only a disrupting factory or project, but the greatest and most central industrial project at all in the system center. The actors were not longer isolated local communities but these were also united by the anti-systemic youth culture which had acquired considerable political skill since it had failed in giving a direction to the American anti-war movement in the sixties. The basic attitude of these two categories – defence of the local sphere of life against bureaucratic elites, and resistance against the Fordist consumer culture in the name of the utopian collective, respectively – would to no small extent be united in the movement.

The tension between the categories, and the ability on each side to manage it, would also to a certain extent define the success of the movement.

The trigger for the breadth of the movement was the decision of the Swedish parliament in 1973 to postpone the nuclear power program, a necessary decision since several local communities had refused to accept a nuclear power plant, supported by a clause in the Swedish planning code. A consequence of this decision was, according to Björn Eriksson, that resistance to the whole nuclear project appeared legitimate, not only in Sweden [53].

However, the first steps to a national coordination of resistance were taken in France,

[51] Tord Björk, The emerging global NGO system, Department of Social Anthropology, Stockholm University, describes how a youth group was able to intervene and channel opposition against an event that was originally planned by an institute founded by the Rockefeller group.

[52] The anti-nuclear movement is described by Reimar Paul (hrsg) ... und auch nicht anderswo: die Geschichte der Anti-AKW-Bewegung, Verlag Die Werkstatt 1997, and Elim Papadakis, The green movement in West Germany (Germany), Alain Touraine, Anti-nuclear protest, Cambridge University Press 1983 (France) and Björn Eriksson m.fl. (red), Det förlorade försprånget, Miljöförbundet 1982 (Sweden).

[53] Björn Eriksson, Det var så det började, in Björn Eriksson m.fl. (red), Det förlorade försprånget.

the country of the most ambitious nuclear program. The trade union central CFDT decided to support the local protests as early as 1974, and the youth movements of the big cities joined wholeheartedly by organising demonstrations. But the promising resistance was broken in 1977 because of the inability to communicate between the partners. When the local resistance to a planned reactor in Malville in Val d'Isère reached its peak, the national anti-systemic youth culture organised a mass demonstration against the plans with the dominating message was to be "violence or not is up to each participant individually". Of course, the local community refused to support such a politically empty catchword which made it easy for the police to repress the demonstration. The confidence between the parties could never be restored, and France has still the most far-reaching nuclear program in the world.

The nuclear resistance had greater success in Sweden. The local resistances against new establishments had triumphed as early as 1973, and the issue had to focus on the existence of the whole program. Without strong organisation, primarily coordinated through yearly demonstrations against the nuclear plant in Barsebäck the movement was able to keep the issue hot without decision until it in 1978 began to pursue a demand for a referendum. This demand turned out to be so popular that all political parties had to accept it and also abandoned their original intentions and backed a 25 years phase-out. The environmental movement backed a shorter period but lost, according to its own analysis because it let itself be subordinated to the tactical considerations of their allied political parties. The deployment of new reactors was however stopped.

The movement made however its greatest impact in West Germany. The German local communities didn't have any power over establishment of new plants, so resistance to new plants carried the mobilizations until the end. The German movement succeeded better than the French to bridge over cultural difference between local resistance – sometimes consisting of ultra-conservative farmers – and the anti-systemic urban youth cultures, which often helped each other to manage violent, illegal actions.

The farmers of Wyhl in south Baden set the pattern when they in February 1975 occupied the site of the planned reactor. Gradually they got support from youth from nearby cities. Around the site, which was cleared and re-occupied several times, a resistance village was built with among other things a peoples' high school where the farmers rediscovered their own traditions from the peasant rising of the sixteenth century.

The continued dynamics of the movement consisted of demonstrations and occupations of new reactor sites and other nuclear plants – Brokdorf near Hamburg from 1976, Gorleben, Grohnde and Kalkar from 1977, and the Bavarian Wackersdorf from 1978. Focus on occupations, generally carried out by non-locals, tended to polarize the movement. For some, confrontations against an increasingly repressive state became a goal in itself. For others, peaceful infiltration into the state structures by "green parties" became an equal goal in itself. What kept the movement together was that locals sometimes were able to engage in the process and take over hegemony again in the movement. The most evident case was when the farmers in the Gorleben district occupied the site for a new nuclear waste storage in 1979, poured pig droppings over it and gave birth to the "Free Republic of Wendland".

Under the cover of the nuclear resistance the German environmental movement grew to the most dynamic in the world during the seventies and early eighties. Its occupation strategy was also directed against roads and airstrips like in Frankfurt and against the lack of housing, most notable in Berlin. An anti-commercial counter-culture was spread far beyond the youth generation and engendered cooperative production as well as a do-it-yourself mentality [54].

The German nuclear resistance was reasonably successful. Of more than a hundred plants less than twenty were accomplished. And the consequence of the global nuclear resistance was that the whole nuclear industry stagnated after 1980.

But also the environmental movement in the North stagnated after 1980. Partly because of the shrinking threat of the nuclear industry, partly because of its own successes – most polluting industries had been removed to the global South or been spread out in the atmosphere by high chimneys – and partly because of shifting focus. Like much of the base, the language, the energy, the traditions and the organisation patterns of the environmental movement had come from the anti-bomb and war resistance of the sixties; it was now made use of for the anti-missile movement of the eighties. For the movement's base, defence of the resource base was no exclusive interest; they protected the civil society and its commons against whatever. Instead, the environmental issue was increasingly taken over by professional NGOs and equally professional green parties, whose interest in mass mobilization was negligible. Instead, the responsibility for the resource base was taken over, if that expression is permitted, by movements in the system peripheries and semi-peripheries.

Semi-peripheries are territories which are peripheries to the centers and centers to the peripheries. In practice, this means that semi-peripheries receive outdated industrial technologies which can't pay the high salaries and social costs of the center but still are productive. Environmental movements in the semi-peripheries usually arise, for that reason, to protect themselves against ruthless industrialization [55]. Since industrialization often is considered as a national self-assertion project, defenders also have to defend themselves against charges of unpatriotic behaviour.

This was the focus in the Soviet Union, which pursued a national development project which was financed by pricing the resource base at zero as well as bleeding the farmers white; being worthless, nature could be wasted freely which was also actually done. It is significant that environmental protests were first sounded when the Soviet industrialization project had lost its appeal.

Also in the Soviet Union, the environmental critique was legitimated by being raised first by scientists who pointed at economic consequences, for example of the paper

[54] Josef Huber, *Wer soll das alles ändern?*, Rotbuch Verlag 1980.

[55] Russian and Brazilian environmental movements are described in Matthias Finger (ed), *The green movement worldwide, Research in social movements, conflicts and change*, JAI Press 1992. Russian movements are also described in *From below, Independent peace and environmental movements in Eastern Europe and the USSR*, Helsinki Watch Report October 1987; Duncan Fisher, Clare Davis, Alexander Juras, Vukasin Pavlovic (eds), *Civil Society and the Environment in Central and Eastern Europe*, Ecological Studies Institute/Institut für Europäisches Umweltpolitik/Eko-center, 1992.

industry destroying the Lake Baikal or the huge river redirection project in Siberia. But only when the government had begun to admit popular participation from 1985 on local environmental groups began to appear with the aim of reducing industrial pollution. Unlike their West European counterparts they were dominated by academic people with professional interest, and focus was often closing the polluting activities entirely, which generally didn't lead to success. But given the huge environmental hazards in the Soviet Union, environment appeared as an irresistible issue for all forces who wanted changes, and what might have developed into a popular movement was flooded by shadow movements. At the fall of the Soviet model all were ecologists, even Gorbachev profiled himself as such internationally, and the space for an independent movement disappeared. With the economic collapse in 1991-94 and the end of the national development project, the Russians got other issues to care about while the pillage is as great as ever.

The prerequisites were somewhat better in Central Europe; environmental mobilizations were there often bases for general opposition against the Soviet model of accumulation and the Russian supremacy. In Hungary 70.000 people protested against contamination of Danube. In Bulgaria opposition against the dictatorship of the party was focused to opposition against a nuclear power plant which thanks to tactical skill could be organised completely in the open, in Estonia the movement for independence was organised around resistance to a devastating exploitation of oil shale, in Poland, GDR and Czechoslovakia great parts of the democratic opposition was formed in mobilization for an alternative to the coal economy. In Central Europe, the environmental movements were democratically organised; the fall of the Soviet system implied a setback for environmental movements but not a complete halt.

The first environmental protests in Brazil concerned a Norwegian paper industry in Pôrto Alegre in 1972. Like the environmental movement in Russia, the action group AGAPAN was able to get a legal status and some successes during a severe dictatorship by criticizing technical imperfections in the core project of the regime – world market career by forced industrialization. Meanwhile the movement spread to São Paulo where a group began to protest against industrial pollution and grew to a state-wide movement. The Brazilian movements were dominated by urban middle class people and the scope was rather narrow in the beginning.

The most documented environmental movements in the system periphery are those of India, a country of strong peoples' movement tradition [56].

Focus for environmental protests in the system peripheries has been resistance to destruction of the resource base, and the driving force has been peasants defending their survival against exploitation of capitalists and state.

One focus is logging. The colonial empires expropriated forests which had no individual owner and established them as state reservations. Peasants have always resisted this since it has deprived them of useful resources, but only when the states began to

[56] Harsh Sethi, *Survival and democracy: environmental struggle in India*, in Ponna Wignaraja (ed), *New social movements in the South*, Zed 1993, and Gail Omvedt, *Reinventing revolution*, M.E. Sharpe 1993; Julie Fisher, *The road from Rio: sustainable development and the non-governmental movement in the Third World*, Praeger Press 1993 gives some overview over environmental movements in the system peripheries.

exploit the reservations for timber export, often arranged by transnationals, this self-defence took the form of environmental movements. Resistance to teak plantations played a part in the peasant movement in Jharkand in the seventies as one strand among others. But it was the Chipko movement in the Himalayan foothills in Garwhal who emphasized preservation of the forest as a main theme and got an international reputation for it. The background was the flooding which resulted from clear-cutting in the sixties and seventies; when the government prohibited forestry for subsistence on state lands while simultaneously renting it out to transnationals, the peasants began to prevent logging by putting themselves between the trees and the chainsaws. Different currents took part in the protests but successively Gandhians got an upper hand; they had been strong in the area since the time of the independence movement and they thematized the resistance as a struggle for subsistence against commercialism. This resounded in other peasant movements against logging all over India which united in a successful all-India campaign against a new forestry code in 1984. From there, resistance to logging has spread over South Asia, to Malaysia and Thailand where farmers have attacked eucalyptus plantations both legally and corporally [57].

Another focus has been resistance to dam construction, these “temples of the modern times” according to a completely non-ironic statement by Nehru. Each dam construction calls for eviction of all inhabitants in the submerged area, and early anti-dam movements demanded primarily justice to the evicted. But dams cause also salinization, waterlogging and other miseries for agriculture. Struggle around issues like these was the origin of the strong agrarian movement in Karnataka, and similar movements have occurred for example in Thailand.

Fishermen have also mobilized against industrial fishing. The most famous campaign was pursued by the Fishermen Union of Kerala in the eighties, against trawlers from Europe which emptied their waters so effectively that the fish never returned. The organisation grew from a liberation theology project in the sixties.

What was remarkable with these mobilizations was that they have consisted of people defending their livelihood as agriculturalists, meanwhile being able to generalize their critique against development and the world order. They have identified the enemy of the nature and resource base as commercialization, the transnational businesses and their corrupt henchmen in the national elites, and as the consumption of the rich. The gap between defence of the everyday commons and of “nature” or “the planet” you can see in the environmental movements of the North hasn’t played much part in the South. Primarily because the defence in the South has been organised by trade and cooperative organisations with no need for niche ideologies. The link between all the mobilization from the 80s on has for example been Third World Network, organized by the Malaysian Consumer Union. More about this in Chapter 10.

However, it was not the cumulative effect of many local environmental struggles that would put the environmental movements of the south in the leadership of the global defence of the nature; it was a coordinated campaign against the arguably most destruc-

[57] Larry Lohmann, Resisting green globalism, in Wolfgang Sachs, Global ecology, Zed 1993.

tive sacker in the world, the World Bank. The bank had been established after the second world war to finance reconstruction in Europe but was soon converted into a leading global financier of large-scale development projects in the South [58].

As such, it took immediately initiatives far beyond what local exploiters had imagined and became the leading advocate of post-war development despotism – “development” as metaphor, ideology and systemic demand rather than a better living for the majority, see chapter 2. In the early eighties it had caused enough human disasters like mass deportation, destruction of forest lands, waterlogging and salinization that global humanitarian organisations and environmental NGOs with some success were able to appeal to conservative American politicians to cut the supplies.

But the campaign against the World Bank was successful as a whole only with two great mobilizations in the South.

The first was the campaign against the Brazilian Polonoroeste project. This implied exploitation of vast areas in the Amazon and had been initiated by the military dictatorship as a way of getting rid of evicted peasants who were seen as a threat when they stayed in the center of the country. The exploitation threatened the livelihood of Indians as well as rubber extractors, so-called seringueiros, some 300.000 often indebted people living from selling crude rubber. Seringueiros had begun to organise, inspired by liberation theology during the seventies, and during the eighties they began to cooperate with labour, environmental and Indian movements to save the forests, while they stopped logging by going between trees and chainsaws in the Chipko manner. The resistance was also organised globally together with local people in Borneo in Rain Forest Action which agreed with town councils in Germany and other European countries not to trade with tropical timber in the early nineties.

The other mobilization was the campaign to save the Narmada River in Maharashtra, India against barrage. 300.000 farmers were threatened with eviction to get electricity for townspeople through the greatest and most prestigious development project in India, and the farmers began to organise in the mid eighties. In the beginning, mostly marginalized Dalits took part in the movement, emboldened by earlier successful mobilizations against local petty-exploiters. They sought cooperation with other agriculturalists and with Gandhian urban middle class people who were highly visible in the movement, particularly to an international public. Meanwhile, parts of the farmers threatened by eviction began to formulate a new agricultural policy together with the Maharashtra agrarian movement, based on farmer control of the resources, which was received enthusiastically in agrarian circles all over India, see chapter 7 [59]. Despite this, the movement ended in failure, according to Nilsen partly because the resisting communities had

[58] Bruce Rich, *Mortgaging the earth*, Earthscan 1994. While Rich mainly portrays the bank as a mechanism senselessly running ahead according to its own bureaucratic interests – the greater the loan, the higher reputation for the official in charge – one must not wink at the systemic rationality of the bank. The projects of the bank worked as hitmen for commodification, monetarization and privatization of relations where they were located; this was the reason why they were met with such resistance. See for example Philip McMichael, *Development and social change*, Pine Forge Press 2000.

[59] Gail Omvedt, *Reinventing revolution*.

so different interests and were unable to communicate, partly because there were other agricultural communities that desperately needed the water they were promised by the project [60].

In the late eighties, when the arms race had lost some urgency, the environmental theme returned as a focus for the broad movement for civil society commons in the North. The mobilization was shallower than it had been in the seventies, since elitist organisation forms as NGOs and parties had grown strong in the meantime, and involved mainly youth. Air pollution, forest death and traffic were the mainstays at the outset; these were tied together by the European Youth Forest Action, EYFA, the first organisation to coordinate struggles in East and West. EYFA used methods like summer camps and campaigns against industrial pollutions and motorway projects, but also against the development projects of the World Bank, and it also coordinated the first Climate Action Day in 1991 [61].

These three mobilizations were able for a time to, by stigmatizing the developmental model of the World Bank, put in question the legitimacy of capital accumulation. It was serious enough to provoke an attempt from the global rulers to integrate the environmental critique in the same way as they had tried before to integrate the critique of the land reform movement: redefinition of the environmental threats into a technical issue without social content, and cooptation of as many environmental NGOs as possible in a top-heavy bargaining machinery without aim. The latter was easy, since few of them had seen themselves as linked to any popular movement [62].

During the nineties, this counterstrategy has worked well, partly. The environmental theme has been moved out of focus and the commitments the states were forced to in Rio de Janeiro have on the whole never been fulfilled. On the other hand, the southern movements were never co-opted. Their hegemony within the peoples' movement family has prepared the ground for integrating environmental issues into a much broader program than northern environmental movements were able to do. This integration of environmental movements into the broad anti-Washington Consensus movement of the 90s will be considered in chapter 10.

Defence of the commons

Peace and environmental movements are two themes for defence of the commons which for good and evil have succeeded in establishing a distinct identity, irrespective of time and place. But besides, a lot of local and incidental popular movements have defended commons, without being aware of being, or being seen as, parts of any greater project. And many of them have been parts of labour movements, national movements or perhaps minority movements [63]. For the fact is that much of the assertion of category in-

[60] Alf Gunvald Nilsen: *Dispossession and resistance in India - The river and the rage*, Aakar Books 2010.

[61] From my own experience, and Tord Björk: *The history of the climate movement*, 2019.

[62] Andrew Jamison, *Miljö som politik*, Studentlitteratur 2003. The mechanism for domestication was the UN conference on environment and development in Rio de Janeiro 1992. This is described in a whole literature, for example Tord Björk, *The emerging global NGO system*, and Wolfgang Sachs, *Global ecology*, Zed 1993.

[63] During the seventies and eighties, when peace, environmental and local community movements eclipsed

terest which is called labour, national or minority movements has consisted in asserting commons which has not exclusively been used by the category in question, but by all.

What commons have been defended? And what is a commons?

I suggest in chapter 1 that there are three ways of distributing goods in a society – market, redistribution or tribute, and reciprocity or gifts. Market implies that goods and services are changed to equal value, generally money. Redistribution or tribute implies that goods and services are collected by a center and shared among the participants according to a norm decided beforehand. Reciprocity or gift implies that each participant gives and takes goods and services because culture or the spontaneous social responsibility tells that this is the right thing to do.

The commons is the sphere for exchange where reciprocity and redistribution rules, unlike the market which is private space. Since reciprocity and redistribution may refer to different, overlapping collectives, commons may also be “owned” by different, overlapping collectives. The agrarian society for example had village, parish and district commons and a complex market society has a host of commons for different kinds of collectives, except the commons that are used by all.

A commons may be a legally defined category, like a certain place, for example a square, or a system like the public health care. It may also be an aspect of something, for example in a worksite what the workmates decide behind the back of the boss, or the public debate of a society. One may differ between commons which are run by the implied collective without intermediaries (reciprocity) and commons run by public services of the state or municipality (redistribution) [64].

There are several reasons why direct producers need to defend commons, of both kinds.

The most trivial reason is that commons give a space or affiliation for all, while pri-

labour movements in the system center, the concept “new social movements” was used for such commons defences. They were supposedly characterized by 1. not representing any particular category or class, 2. not believing in the government power strategy but tried to realize their projects themselves, 3. having a narrow, limited thematizing and focus, and 4. being provoked by the ever-increasing penetration of market and bureaucracy into the private life of people, which made autonomy from these a more pressing need than material benefits and made “identity” more important than political reforms. See Chantal Mouffe & Ernesto Laclau, *Hegemony and socialist strategy – towards a radical democratic politics*, Verso 1985. Others who have taken part in this discussion with some weight are Alan Touraine, *Post-industrial society*, Butler & Tanner 1971 and other books, Jürgen Habermas, *Towards a rational society*, Heinemann 1977, and Alberto Melucci, *Nomads of the present: social movements and individual needs in contemporary society*, Temple University Press 1989. The concept seems a bit shabby today, perhaps because people have realised that this kind of mobilizations are not so new after all. See for example Craig Calhoun, “New social movements” in the early nineteenth century, *Social Science History* 17, 1993.

[64] The great theorist here is Karl Polanyi, for example *The great transformation*, Henry Holt 1944. The problems of commons are described by David Bollier, *Silent theft; private plunder of our common wealth*, Routledge 2002, with a short version in *Reclaiming the commons*, Boston Review 27/2003. Bollier describes how private interests because of indifference and/or increased patent and copyright rights encroach upon commons like nature, cultural inheritance, public debate, and science. A personal description of different aspects of commons and reciprocities and ways they may be used in political struggles is Olivier de Marcellus, *Commons, communities and movements: inside, outside and against capital*, in *The Commoner* 6.

vate property excludes many, probably most people. Communications in a city managed by cars exclude many as does a health care system financed privately. The more scarce the resource is compared to the needs, the more people are crowded out in a privatized system.

Another reason is that transaction costs would be prohibitive if everything should be traded in markets. If some of the functions in society instead would be organised as an infrastructure which everybody has a right to use – or in many cases contribute to – according to redistribution or gift principles, exchange would be made easier and more would be done. To these belongs for example science or the Internet, or our common culture. Tele lines were built once as public infrastructures for reasons of efficiency, and when patent rights begin to enclose science, the flow of ideas dries out and the products lose both quantity and quality [65]. Privatized public health would according to Douglass North be so expensive to monitor that it couldn't work [66].

A third reason is that he who in a market exchanges from a position of a relative monopoly, or only superior resources, is able to force himself into a better exchange than his counterpart, strengthen his monopoly and in the long run force others from the market. Unequal relations are no speciality for the market; they exist also in the other two exchange categories. But in the market, inequality is protected by Roman law of ownership while inequality in redistribution and reciprocity may be countered if the underdogs organise and assert themselves politically and socially.

A fourth reason is that the great advantage of the market and private property, the complete interchangeability, is dangerous to apply everywhere. The market is promiscuous and cares only about commercial value, and in the perfect market the luxury consumption of the rich may knock out the long term survival of the poor or the nature, with the only excuse that it is able to pay for it. Commons are zones where different needs are permitted to exist and be met, each in its own terms [67].

A fifth reason is that people who manage their own commons develop a better ability to understand society and their own interests than unorganised “consumers”, and a better ability to act in common and defend themselves against different oppressors and exploiters.

The perhaps most important reason is that people as a biological species are equipped with social responsivity and feel well by doing things in common and have things in common [68].

[65] There is, according to David Bollier in *Silent theft no research in malaria vaccine*, because the field is parcelled out on countless patent right owners, each looking after his rights and waiting for the others to sell their parts to him. Concerning gift economies, see Jacques Godbout, *The world of the gift*, McGill-Queen's University Press 1998.

[66] Douglass C. North: *Understanding the process of economic growth*, Princeton University Press 2005.

[67] Within economist circles a discussion is pursued about (ob)noxious markets, for example in Ravi Kanbur, *On obnoxious markets*, paper, Economics, philosophy and contemporaneous social issues, University of California 2001. As such he enumerates markets where the results are extreme, where the parties are unequals, or where the actors have little power over the results – “weak agency” in trade language.

[68] Christophe Dejours, *Souffrance en France*, Seuil 1998, quoted in Olivier de Marcellus, *Commons, communities and movements*. Dejours put the blame of the increasing petty illness in our time on the atropification

The market, as well as redistribution and reciprocity, serves important purposes and have advantages as well as disadvantages. But the commons which are the space of the latter are threatened by societal processes typical to the world market system. Firstly, of course, political attacks from those who gain from dividing them into private property and commercializing them. Secondly by exploitation by people with superior resources [69]. The world market system as a system favours private property at the expense of commons, because of its Roman law and its demand for competition and growth. For that reason, commons have been defended, not only by peoples' movements but also by conservative layers of the upper class who have seen it as destructive to let the market get a monopoly of resource distribution.

Sometimes common defences like these have been quite successful [70].

The typical peoples' movement repertoires of the early modern era, the tax rebellion and the bread seizure, respectively, were defence of the commons against the state and the market, respectively, see chapter 4. The tax rebellion defended the reciprocal property of the village against the king who needed money to make war with. The bread seizure defended the right of all to food against the right of merchants to decide the price according to supply and demand.

Gradually these two action forms, based in the local community, appeared as ineffective against the superior resources of the state and the inaccessibility of the world market system. Instead, the direct producers elaborated a new strategy during the nineteenth century – negotiation with the state about compensation for the ravages of the market, in the form of a social wage, or public financing of public consumption, particularly directed at public health and housing, combined with insurances against unemployment, illness and old age. The negotiation was backed up with strikes, cooperative alternatives, demand for universal suffrage and a national popular public space, and some support from factions within the ruling class who regarded a market monopoly as disruptive for the public order.

The principle of a social wage called for initiatives from the direct producers, to suggest themes, to speed up the development, to minimize those distortions that always are a consequence of bureaucratic administration and/or compromises with the liberal charity bourgeoisie, and prevent the costs of the social wage to be laid disproportionately on the direct producers themselves.

of commons and reciprocities in the worksites, due to more effective supervision. Except illness, this also leads to decreasing resistance – not only active resistance but also mental, according to Dejours. Suffering no longer appears as injustice but only as a natural calamity, theoretically impossible to oppose. Understanding decreases because of decreased common practice.

[69] There is a whole literature about the “tragedy of the commons” as it is called. The concept was coined by Garret Hardin, *The tragedy of the commons*, Science 162, 1968, who suggested that commons were always destroyed by people with superior resources, and this was immediately grasped upon by people with an interest in seizing the commons. Afterwards however an abundance of research has made clear that commons survive as easily as private property if there is a regime there to protect them or if people defend them, see for example Bonnie McCay & James Acheson, *The question of the commons*, University of Arizona Press 1996 and most famously Elinor Ostrom: *Governing the commons*, Cambridge University Press 1990.

[70] Karl Polanyi, *The great transformation*.

While there had been a broad agreement about a social wage focused on health and social insurance, and such commons had been introduced as an almost automatic consequence of the peoples' movement mobilizations of the nineteenth century, social housing had called for a particular attention from the direct producers. This is due to the fact that social housing clashes with a more explicit interest, the profit interest of landlords. On the other hand, social housing, i.e. unconditional right to a home for a decent price, has been necessary for direct producers who have flocked to the industries of the big cities and been met by a monopolistic housing market.

Claims for social housing were the driving force behind the Paris Commune of 1871, and rent strikes have been a method to break the power of the landlords. According to Manuel Castells, the agenda for European social housing was set by the great rent strike in Glasgow in 1916 [71]. The first to apply it on a great scale was the labour party of Vienna which built gigantic "workers' castles" in the twenties, in the city center unlike all subsequent social housing [72].

Initiatives for social wages have – perhaps because they to a great extent have been locally organised, and perhaps because they have reacted on imperfections of the local commons – been called "urban movements".

Urban movements, according to Manuel Castells who have written the most extensive work about them, three themes: they protect collective consumption, they protect their cultural identity, linked to the space they occupy, and they assert local autonomy against the state. They are not carried by any particular class but by citizens, although lower classes who benefit from commons are predominant in them. Women are often leaders because they are excluded from positions of the market and have to compensate in the commons [73].

What kind of commons that is defended of course fluctuates with the situation. Castells contends that urban movements protect commons whose destruction makes it difficult for the participants to organise their everyday life. Margit Meyer contends that the two main focuses for urban movements are social housing and defence against what she calls "city competition", i.e. project which are pursued to raise the status of the city within the world market system but disregards the immediate interests of the citizens [74].

It may be hard to determine the validity of this without empiry, and empiry is hard to systematize for local movements without a common identity. For me who have taken part in urban movements in Stockholm for forty years it is tempting to base an opinion in my own experiences and compare with other similar movements in other parts of the world, at least to show some latitude [75].

[71] Manuel Castells, *The city and the grassroots – a cross-cultural theory of urban social movements*, Edward Arnold 1983. Castells also tells about an equally bitter rent strike in Veracruz in Mexico in 1922; it ended however in defeat because there was no resources for social housing in the system peripheries at that time.

[72] Fredrik Wulz, *Wien 1848-1934, en arkitekturpolitisk studie av en stad i förändring*, Bygghörskningsrådet 1979.

[73] Manuel Castells, *The city and the grassroots*.

[74] Margit Meyer, *Urban social movements in an era of globalisation*, in Pierre Hamel et al (ed), *Urban movements in a globalising world*, Routledge 2000.

[75] The urban movement in Stockholm has been described by Ulf Stahre, *Den alternativa staden*, Stockholms

Stockholm of the mid twentieth century was a result of the successful alliance of labour movement, home market industry and liberal charity bourgeoisie who created the Swedish welfare state, see chapter 5. The Swedish welfare state built on a very high social wage, of which a very high part went to social housing; however, for deference to the charity bourgeoisie all new social housing had to be located in the periphery, far from the urban commons and public space, to counteract all threatening worker hegemony within the alliance [76].

During the post-war era the direct producers were prepared to pay this price for an otherwise fast living standard increase. The first eruption of urban movements in the mid sixties concerned a case of city competition – the conversion of the whole city center from mixed use to a pure central business district. The inhabitants threatened by deportation organised against this while two organisations – the City Environment Group, consisting of cultural elite people, and Alternative City, consisting of youth and originally organised on an anti-commercial platform – mobilized the citizens in general. Most of the project was realized while the opposition trusted meetings, demonstrations and newspaper debates, but in 1971 the proponents of the projects were shocked by the Alternative City youths occupying a popular outdoor park café, after a street fight with the police for a popular outdoor café and being supported by half of Stockholm. The year before, the Swedish welfare state project had been shaken by the great miner's strike; the ruling Social Democrat party couldn't afford a hard stance, and the CBD project petered out. About the same time, the authorities gave up a regional plan aimed at growth, where motorways were very conspicuous, after mobilizing by the urban movement alliance and many local town district associations.

After that – from about 1974 – focus was moved to a tenants' movement in the city core who tried to prevent landlords to renovate their flats to sell them to upper middle class people, so-called gentrification. This movement was rather unsuccessful, not least because the Tenant Association was dominated by loyal Social Democrats who didn't want anyone to disturb the welfare state compromise and did their best to thwart mobilizations, while the active were very reluctant to find other forms of organization. Some attempts to occupy houses in the late seventies were too late to do any effect.

Margit Mayer refers to “city competition” as if it were a modern, post-Fordist phenomenon, born out of the cut-throat competition of the nineties or the so-called globalisation. But as shown by the Stockholm case city administrations and states have tried before to “modernise” cities for the benefit of capital accumulation – we may also think of the ravages of Baron Haussmann in Paris in the mid nineteenth century [77] – and if

stadsomvandling och byalagsrörelsen, Stockholmia 1999 (about the seventies) and Den gröna staden, Stadsomvandling och stadsmiljöförändring i det nutida Stockholm, Atlas 2004 (about the nineties).

[76] Sven O. Karlsson, *Arbetsfamiljen och det nya hemmet*, Symposium 1993. See also, for some theoretical notes, Mats Franzén, *Gatans disciplinering*, Häften för Kritiska Studier 5/1982. Both make clear that the liberal bourgeoisie was scared of the workers and preferred to have it far from their own quarters.

[77] The prefect of Paris, Baron Haussmann, “modernized” Paris in the mid nineteenth century with boulevards lined with upper-class housing and offices, with technical infrastructure. He has become a myth in the town planning debate for friends and foes alike, see for example Leonardo Benevolo, *The origins of modern town planning*, MIT Press 1971.

people come in the way of modernization they may try to defend themselves, and defend the commons they are dependent on but which are destroyed by modernization.

The post-war city modernization in the system center was a result of the politics of social housing and of the struggle for the attractive central locations. The social housing was located in the peripheries, both because of fear of the masses and because of the real estate businesses' need for maximum increase of land value. This called for ample traffic links; since the leading industry of the age was the auto business this had to be motorways. The fastest growing profession in the growing big businesses and state administrations were the administrators, which called for a large quantity of office buildings; these had to be located in the center for the sake of control. Both demanded extensive clearances in the city cores which inevitably caused conflicts with those who lived there and depended on the city commons for their everyday life [78].

It was however difficult for the fragmented civil societies of the city cores to organize a resistance against relatively united representatives of capital and state. But like the early modern tax rebellions and bread seizures the urban movements forced changes in the modernization models of the cities, despite the fact that their failures were far more numerous than their successes [79].

One of the first successes was the victory over a combine office and urban motorway project in Manhattan in 1961; it was the inhabitants of Greenwich Village who mobilized local interest groups and churches on a program for defence of the local commons [80]. More mobilizations against motorway projects followed, the planners responded by localizing them to poor quarters where the resourceful middle class of Greenwich Villages didn't exist, and resistance to motorways would be one of the foremost reasons for mobilization among the black civil rights movement around 1970 [81]. However,

[78] Descriptions of the city clearances in the system center have been dominated by an ideologizing discourse which has seen the causes as one or another line of thought. Possibly there is some extensive work explaining it with interests; I have abstracted my explanation from some articles, primarily Pieter Terhorst & Jacques van de Ven, *The economic restructuring of the historic city center*, in Willem Salet & Sako Musterd (ed), *Amsterdam human capital*, Amsterdam University Press 2003, and Manuel Castells, *The city and the grassroots*.

[79] There is no history written of the post-war urban movements. Eddy Cherki et al, *Urban protest in Western Europe*, in Colin Crouch & Alessandro Pizzorno, *The resurgence of class conflict in Western Europe since 1968*, Macmillan 1978, gives a certain general view as does Hans Pruijt, *The impact of citizen's protest on city planning in Amsterdam*, paper, *The future of the historic inner city of Amsterdam*, Amsterdam 2002 (which nevertheless focuses on Amsterdam). Margit Mayer, *The career of urban social movements in Germany*, in Robert Fischer & Joseph Kling, *Mobilizing the community*, Sage 1993, deals with German cities and Ernst Stracke, *Stadtzerstörung und Stadtteilkampf in Frankfurt am Main*, Pahl-Rugenstein 1980 reflects a city unusually rocked by urban movements. For the US I have relied on articles, like Rachel Brahinsky et al, *Saving San Francisco*, *San Francisco Bay Guardian*, October 18, 2000, and Wikipedia, *Urban renewal*, and *Freeway and expressway revolts*.

[80] This struggle seems undocumented; there is however much to be read between the lines in Jane Jacobs, *The death and life of great American cities*, Random House 1961, particularly in chapters 6 and 18. Jacobs was one of the leaders of the movement and the book, which was written while the struggle was going on, is the best description up to this time about a city as an intricate web of commons threatened by state and capital in unison.

[81] Thomas P. Jackson, *The state, the movement and the urban poor*, in Michael B. Katz, *The underclass debate*, Princeton University Press 1993. – "City renewal is negro removal" was one catchword from this time

these movements can only report few unequivocal successes – for example city motorways projects in Boston, Toronto, Philadelphia and San Francisco were stopped by broad coalitions. Office projects were more difficult to deal with; the successful motorway resistance in San Francisco was for example powerless against the office plans.

In Europe, Amsterdam was the early center of urban movements. The same coalition as in Stockholm was mobilized – youth movements, cultural elites and the inhabitants of low income quarters – against a project which called for the deportation of the latter to give room for city motorways and office buildings in the late sixties. The movement went much farther than in Stockholm and occupied houses condemned to demolition to defend them with the occupants' bodies. The success was according to Pruijt guaranteed by the fact that all plans were condensed into one to make a good target for the movements, and that there was nowhere to deport people to. The latter alienated much of the welfare state alliance between labour movement and municipal bureaucracies, who joined the resistance and defeated the plans.

The practical alliance between youth movement and citizens threatened by deportation worked also more or less well in cities like London, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Berlin and Frankfurt. In German cities moderate, politically well ordered protests against office projects were aired by so-called Citizens' Initiatives in the mid sixties, particularly in Frankfurt which during this time turned into the finance center of West Germany, while youth without housing occupied houses being emptied waiting for demolition. Their successes depended to a high extent on the ability to cooperate between the two wings, but it was never as complete as in Amsterdam. In London a corresponding coalition was able to break the motorway plans but not the office projects.

Also the other side of urban politics, social housing, met with rising protests during the sixties. In most of the system center the same model was used as in Stockholm – cheapest possible investments in peripheral and cheap land. The first mobilizations about 1965 was directed against deficient technical equipment and for “right to the city” as it was expressed in France, that is, commons like public transport, meeting places and public services, like the informal commons and synergy effects created by multiple use. In Italy such mobilizations were an integrated part of the labour struggles about 1970 and were organised from the industrial worksites. In France tenant associations were established in the huge suburb complexes of Paris, the so-called *grands-ensembles*, with support from municipal politicians who saw the municipalities as a kind of citizens' trade unions against the state. The repertoire they used was primarily the rent strike [82].

Both kinds of mobilizations contributed to getting current urban politics into disrepute around 1975. The grand projects ended; to this contributed of course the Kondratiev B which began in 1973. The city as a necessary complex of commons began to be acknowledged at the same time as the state relinquished its responsibility to maintain

which has been more than confirmed afterwards, see for example Mindy Fullilove, *Root shock, One World/* Ballantine 2004.

[82] Manuel Castells, *The city and the grassroots*, describes France; Robert Lumley, *States of emergency – cultures of revolt in Italy from 1968 to 1978*, Verso, says something about Italy.

these commons. The disrepute of the townless social housing was eagerly grasped as one of the pretexts by those who wanted to terminate the contract of long-term integration of the direct producers and phase out the system of social wages. Most of the social housing politics was dismantled in the system center after 1973.

In the system semiperipheries and peripheries mobilizations for commons and social housing consisted and consist of securing the right to housing at all, often in the form of do-it-yourself settlements, and providing these with water, sewer, electricity and public transport [83].

The reason why between thirty and ninety percent of the inhabitants in the great cities in the South live in shantytowns is primarily the exploitation of the agriculture to the advantage of the cities; people follow the capital currents and the big cities grow with 3-5 percent a year. Due to the monopolistic real estate market of growing cities few dwelling houses have been built; it is more profitable to raise the rent in the existing ones. Instead new residential areas have been organised semi-illegally, in interplay between landlords eager to raise the value of their land, politicians aiming at an electoral base, municipal officials with access to land registers, and collectives chasing for housing.

Such paternalist organising for housing has been far more common than popular organising [84]. Only afterwards, the urbanites have organised in quarter committees to have a share of the city commons. Such organising has originated in the most shifting circumstances.

Sometimes the organising has been social-religious. In the working class suburbs of São Paulo liberation theology priests and lay preachers organised a struggle for urban commons like public transport, water and electricity in the sixties. The movement grew until it began to establish trade unions in the industries, which were the origin of the strike movement which overthrew the military government, see chapter 5 [85]. In North

[83] Asef Bayat, *Social movements, activism and social development in the Middle East*, in *Transnational Associations 2*, 2001, gives an overview of urban movements which are valid in the whole system periphery. Most of it has been written about Latin America – Joe Foweraker & Ann Craig (ed), *Popular movements and political change in Mexico*, Lynne Rienner 1990; Arturo Escobar & Sonia Alvarez (ed), *The making of social movements in Latin America*, Westview Press 1992; Susan Stokes, *Cultures in conflict: social movements and the state in Peru*, University of California Press 1995; David Slater (ed), *New social movements and the state in Latin America*, CCEDELA 1985; and Manuel Castells, *The city and the grassroots are examples*. South Africa is described by Tom Lodge & Bill Nasson, *All, here and now – Black politics in South Africa in the 1980s*, Hunt 1992.

[84] This was also the case of the well-published Chilean shantytown movement during the Unidad Popular era. It was led and ruled with iron-fists by the UP political parties, in sharp competition with each other; this was an important cause of their impotence against the coup of 1973. See Manuel Castells, *The city and the grassroots*. It seems still to be the case in many cities, see e.g. Martijn Koster & Pieter A. de Vries: *Slum politics: Community leaders, everyday needs, and utopian aspirations in Recife, Brazil*, *Focaal—Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology* 62 (2012). It has also been argued that the huge manifestations against the EU austerity policy in Greece were as great as they were because old paternalist structures recently had broken down, see Athina Arampatzi & Walter J Nicholls: *The urban roots of anti-neoliberal social movements: the case of Athens, Greece*, *Environment and Planning A* 2012.

[85] Nico Vink, *Base communities and urban movements*, in David Slater (ed), *New social movements and the state in Latin America*.

Africa and West Asia Islamist movements have played the same part, see chapter 6.

In other cases the first organising impulse has come from youth who have been thrown out from the universities because of political activities. Such was the case in Mexico where radical students organised the first township movements in Monterrey and in Juchatán.

Sometimes the impulse has come from trade unions; this was the case in Lima.

A special case is the townships of South Africa where organising for urban commons was the base for the anti-apartheid movement during the eighties, see chapter 8.

It seems that only when there is some kind of established tradition of organising, a further spread is possible, building entirely on the inhabitants themselves. This happened in Mexico when township organisations began to draw attention to themselves with national manifestations in the mid eighties. They began to organise in earnest after the earthquake in Mexico D.F. in 1985 when the support from the authorities was more or less non-existent; in this case the women took the lead, see chapter 8. These shanty-town organisations were the first organisations in Mexico that broke out of the paternalist structure of the governing party and created the public which the zapatists were able to appeal to later [86]. In Lima women's organisations took over the lead, with cooperative kitchens as a core, but they seem to have been repressed in the late eighties by a joint terror from the government and the Sendero Luminoso.

Illegal settlements due to the lack of social housing has been organised in the system center too, though at a smaller extent. In England there was a lively squatter movement in the sixties with the only demand of a home; for this end they occupied empty houses and business offices and they were rather successful as was also a counterpart in Paris in the early nineties [87]. But perhaps the most successful squatter movement and the most successful urban movement ever, happened in Spain in the seventies when the country just had arrived into the system center.

Spain was industrialized fast in the late Franco era, because American and European capital were attracted by a rigorous dictatorship and prohibition of trade unions. But with industrialization followed immigration to the cities, and since the real estate market was controlled by friends of the dictator big money was made out of the increased demand, without any particular needs to satisfy it.

According to Castells, the urban movement toppled the dictatorship. The backbone in the anti-Franquist movement was of course the labour movement and the regional opposition in the Basque country and in Catalonia. But the urban movement in particularly Madrid convinced the middle class which previously had supported Franco that a change was necessary.

The urban movement consisted of a motley collection of categories, all being in

[86] Vivienne Bennett, The evolution of urban popular movements in Mexico, in Arturo Escobar & Sonia Alvarez, The making of social movements in Latin America.

[87] Ron Bailey, The squatters, Penguin 1973 about London; Margit Mayer, Urban social movements in an era of globalisation, in Pierre Hamel et al (ed), Urban movements in a globalising world, about Paris. Hans Pruijt, Squatting in Europe, about Europe.

conflict with the real estate speculation of the Franquists. Newly immigrated workers living in shanty-towns and speculative built high-rise buildings without water and sewer, schools, buses or health care got support from professional people. Middle class people in the city core and in older residential districts tried to stop office exploitation and motorways. In their struggle for publicity and support they broke the enforced silence of the dictatorship, they arranged street parties and organised local associations for innocent ends and demanded the right to speak for themselves. The driving force was often members of prohibited political parties, and these would after the fall of the dictatorship kill the movement as a dangerous competitor. But seen from the viewpoint of the demands, the movement was successful. The shanty-town people got their real homes, often built by themselves in their own quarter so that their social cohesion could be spared. And the city clearances were stopped. And without being a part of the movement's demand, a priority of commons was established, for example in the form of subordination of car traffic under the need of public transport and local feasts. The real estate speculators were defeated and it was possible to build towns – new blocks in Spanish towns are not isolated enclaves, they are added directly to the old town and parts of it.

The social movement resurgence between 1965 and 1975 sought to widen the space for commons everywhere. In the system center the aim was to go beyond the welfare state compromise, in the system periphery it was to at least achieve it.

Meanwhile, it tried to defend commons which were threatened by the post-war boom and its claims for commercialization of what earlier had built on relations of reciprocity. This was a main theme of the youth cultures; particularly the middle class based ones: they tried to escape from the Fordist monetarization of life into work and consumption and sought for more collectivist, reciprocity based forms of life. For example they attacked the commercialisation of Christmas, they occupied empty houses to live in collectively or remake to cultural centers. Such occupied houses were mobilization centers for neighbourhoods trying to defend themselves against exploitation in cities like Amsterdam, Berlin, Milano and Copenhagen [88], as they are still mobilization centers for movements against privatization, see below. No doubt, a striving for a life based in reciprocity is also the base for recruitment to sects; they also build on tight relations internally and condemnation of the sinful world around them.

But new commons in organised forms were not restricted to oppositional youth movements. What is in Sweden called “byalag”, local communities, was an international phenomenon: local residents got together to bargain for the right to organise amenities which were not supplied in another way. What they created was sometimes converted to business, sometimes to authorities, but sometimes also to symbols for local autonomy and local glory, something to defend like the adventure playground in Nørrebro in Copenhagen which was defended in three days of street battle when the city tried to close it in 1980 [89].

[88] Pierpaolo Mudu: Resisting and challenging neo-liberalism - The development of Italian Social Centers, *Antipode* 36/5, 2004.

[89] Things like these are related in Susan Fainstein, *Local mobilization and economic discontent*, and Margit

Post-Fordist movements for the commons

After the breakdown of the post-war boom, defence of the commons has grown more urgent. For the strategy of the rulers to reach a new crisis-free capitalism is to commercialise all relations, also those that were left alone by the welfare agreements of the 19th and 20th century. Firstly, the commons administered by states and municipalities were attacked, and the social wage systems of the 1900s begun to be phased out. Secondly, legal means were developed to privatise nature, culture, ideas and knowledge that earlier had been seen as commons and been managed within the gift economy [90].

The first to feel the weight of the new strategy were people in those system peripheries that had sought advancement by means of loan financed investments. In the mid-70s, the banks increased the interests and used their bailiff IMF to recover the debts. The condition, pursued by an obstinately pigheaded IMF, was that the indebted states had to sacrifice all national development programs and all public commitments in order to pay their debt services [91].

The ex-beneficiaries of the abandoned social services reacted with so called IMF riots, beginning in Lima in July 1976 and continuing with about ten per year in different parts of the world. They have been most numerous in the parts of the world that lost most in the neo-liberal era, i.e. Latin America, Africa and West Asia.

IMF riots have had slightly different bases and been organised in slightly different ways in different countries.

Most typically, the revolts have been carried by the urban poor, living in the slums that have grown tremendously after the breakdown of the national development programs, and broken out when the government has signalled that it has yielded to IMF demands and increased the price for public services. The great IMF revolt in Venezuela in 1989 was triggered by increased bus fares, and implied that underclass people from the shantytowns occupied the buses and used them as barricades, and then sacked the shops, with strictly applied quotas for the lot of everyone. The IMF riot in Argentina the same year worked much the same way.

The initiatives have as a rule come from district associations, housewives' leagues, co-operative canteens and churches in the shantytowns. These bodies haven't "directed" anything though; the activities have developed spontaneously and ended after a few days or a week of clashes with the police. Larger formal organisations haven't been involved, trade unions have been too weak to play any part, and as a rule the result has been that the government has cushioned its policy somewhat. Sometimes, particularly discredited governments have been forced to resign, for example after the so far most comprehensive IMF riot in Argentina 2001 when it was supplemented with factory occupations,

Mayer, *Restructuring and popular opposition in West German cities*, both in Michael Smith & Joe Feagin (ed), *The capitalist city*, Basil Blackwell 1989. The latter lays the emphasis in the way the state may use popular striving for non-market solutions to cut their budgets.

[90] An overview is given in Philip McMichael: *Development and social change; a global perspective*, Thousand Oaks 1996. David Bollier: *Silent theft*, Routledge 2003, describes the consequences.

[91] John Walton & David Seddon: *Free markets and food riots: The politics of global adjustment*, Blackwell 1994. Mike Davis: *Planet of slums*, Verso 2006.

self-organising of the working-class quarters and even local currencies instead of the national one wrecked by the IMF.

In some instances, IMF riots have inspired more continuous resistance against abolished commons. Primarily in those three regions where the long recession has hit hardest – in Latin America where Indian movements have grown out of them, the Islamic Zone where protests have been organised by the Islamist movements [92], and Africa, where the South African anti-privatisation movement is globally leading.

The resistance against the Apartheid regime had been sustained by trade unions and community organisations, the latter organising the whole households. The settlement between ANC and the Nationalist Party in 1990 implied that little should be changed except the race barriers, and the black middle class rushed to place themselves in privileged positions in the most inegalitarian country in the world. The new ANC government welcomed enthusiastically the privatisation model Washington Consensus as a method to substitute class differences for race differences; water, electricity, health care and education was privatised, fees were increased, and the lower classes were disconnected.

Meanwhile, the Apartheid state's modest attempt at import substitution was liquidated and unemployment rose to 50%. Therewith, the black townships were mobilised anew to defend their living standards, or rather survival, interpreted as defence for the commons threatened with enclosure [93].

According to Ashwin Desai, the resistance began in Chatsworth, a township near Durban, in 1999. Important factors in the early mobilisations were that the local ANC made common cause with the inhabitants rather than with the government, and that the majority were Indians, with modest veneration for ANC's exile politicians. But when Chatsworth's inhabitants had repulsed heavily armed bailiffs, coming there to evict unemployed tenants for unpaid rents, and got a court injunction that they were right to do so, the protests spread rapidly. Another Chatsworth-reinvented repertoire – mass demonstrations with payment of the “just” rents, water fees and electricity fees – added to the protests.

Focus for this township movement is rents, water and electricity. While municipal authorities delink the township inhabitants, the movement's electricians and plumbers relink them again. This is combined with demonstrations and, like in Soweto's Operation Khanyisa (enlightenment), delinking of authorities offices, and payment of the “just” rent 10 Rand and participation in municipal elections. At the UN conference on racism in Durban in 2001 the different township movements met for the first time in joint demonstrations against the remaining apartheid practices and discussed the Washington Consensus as an expression of global apartheid, with activists for the commons from the whole world.

In the system center defence of the commons have been organised primarily by trade unions, like in France and Italy where general strikes against cuts in social insurances

[92] Asef Bayat: Social movements, activism and social development in the Middle East, in *Transnational Associations* 2, 2001.

[93] Ashwin Desai: We are the poors – community struggles in post-apartheid South Africa, *Monthly Review Press* 2002, for the South African central Anti-Privatisation Forum.

have been common since the late nineties, or by student organisations that have organised school strikes against commercialization of schooling. This kind of movements for defence of social services is only beginning and hard to survey when this is written.

Urban commons have been asserted with more continuity. That they were acknowledged didn't imply that the rulers took any responsibility for them; since few parts of the cities had any commons to speak of a struggle about these broke out where solvency was set up against peoples' movement organising. Struggle against gentrification is an important theme since the seventies. Primarily in countries where earlier social housing has taken place in the form of suburbs with poor commons, like in North America, Britain, the Nordic countries, and Paris, and where the demand gap was the biggest [94].

But three other facts also contributed to demand: that the numbers (and the financial power) of the upper middle class has grown, as had also its extremely increased pretensions during the seventies and eighties [95], and that the position of real estate business has grown in an increasingly financialized economy. During the Kondratiev B after 1975 speculation, in real estate among other things, has as usual been increasingly more important than production. David Harvey points out, for example, in the spirit of Jane Jacobs, how any collective value city dwellers can create in a neighbourhood risks being capitalised by the real estate industry, which uses it to raise land values, demolish and rebuild and/or renovate for the upper middle class, while the creators of value are evicted. [96].

And in this zero sum game, competition among cities has grown. City governments have seen it as increasingly more important not to belong to the losers, and to that end support its own profiteers and financialists.

As mentioned, the resistance against gentrification was weak and politically incompetent in Stockholm. It was more successful in Copenhagen. There, the city administration appointed the old working-class district Nørrebro to an urban renewal area for

[94] The concept of gentrification is analysed by Tom Slater, *What is gentrification*. He sees it as a confluence of interest between real estate owners who want to get rid of poor payers, and a solvent upper middle class wanting to mark territory in the form of culturally separated residential areas. He bases his opinion in Bourdieu's theories about cultural separation and seems little aware of the utility value of commons. Another approach is forwarded by Talmage Wright, *Out of place – homeless mobilizations, subcities and contested landscapes*, SUNY Press 1992, StadtRat (hg), *Umkämpfte Räume*, Verlag Libertäre Assoziation 1998, and Neil Smith, *The new urban frontier, gentrification and the revanchist city*, Routledge 1996. They take their stand in the fact that the upper middle class has grown and become so strong that it for the sake of self-assertion has to mark itself out in separate quarters. Not only in old lower class centers but also in "gated communities" in the suburbs; these may have extremely poor commons but they are at least far off from threatening lower class people.

[95] Robert Reich, *The work of nations : capitalism in the 21st century*, Knopf 1991, and Emmanuel Todd, *L'illusion économique*, Gallimard 1998, have written about the upper middle class, its growth and its pretensions.

[96] The literature on financialization is limitless. Some examples are José Gabriel Palma: *The revenge of the market on the rentiers*, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0927, 2009; Brett Christophers: *Rentier capitalism*, Verso 2020; and Mariana Mazzucato: *The value of everything*, Penguin 2018. Saskia Sassen: *The global city – introducing a concept*, Brown Journal of World Affairs XI Issue 2, 2005 points at the relevance for cities and urban movements. . So does David Harvey: *Rebel cities*, Verso 2013.

“more affluent groups”, while the inhabitants got ready for defence [97].

Youth groups who had occupied empty houses in the area since 1965 were a core in the resistance; they had got right to temporary contracts from 1971. A first aim for common organising was very practical: to establish a common playground for children in one of the empty lots. A number of organisations and individuals gathered for that end, succeeded with it, and decided to deepen the cooperation in the Nørrebro Beboeraktion, or tenants’ action, in 1973.

They kept their focus on concrete projects and actions during the seventies, and developed it into an art, attacking landlords selling flats in the black market or, as I was a witness to, organised a support action for a new bus line in twenty minutes, involving the drivers’ union and local shopkeepers. The price for the dexterity was a growing elitism which gradually ran a wedge between the active youths and people in general. In 1976 the Beboeraktion cracked for irrelevant academic quibbles about the role of the elites and disappeared soon thereafter. But Nørrebro has still the same composition of its inhabitants as in the seventies, the “more affluent” people has kept out, new housing has kept within reasonable prices, and a tradition of effective popular civil society has asserted itself well.

The Nørrebroers had luck in timing; when they acted the welfare society was still alive. But after that successes have according to Neil Smith been fewer. During the eighties and nineties, a polarization has occurred, with a growing sub-proletariat of unemployed and casual labourers, often immigrants without citizen’s rights, and the solidarity between direct producers has deteriorated. Among the militant activists against gentrification the sub-proletariat has predominated with occupations, often repressed violently, while those who still have incomes and risk to be pushed over the edge have succeeded to act only in rare cases, primarily through institutionalised organisations; Smith mentions Paris as a site for this [98].

For the direct producers, and particularly their adolescent children, the Kondratiev B phase implied diminishing job opportunities. The sub-proletariat grew, even in the center, particularly among the young [99]. For many, no option seemed to matter except groping together in “identities” protecting eachother in an increasingly precarious labour market [98]. For some, this implied finding derelict or otherwise empty buildings to live in, together, defending them as well as they could [100].

[97] Bolette Christensen. Fortællinger fra Indre Nørrebro, Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag 2000.

[98] Neil Smith, The new urban frontier: gentrification and the revanchist city.

[99] Guy Standing: The precariat – the new dangerous class, Bloomsbury 2011.

[100] Bart van der Steen, Ask Katzeff & Leendert van Hoogenhuijze The City is Ours, PM Press 2014; Squatting Europe Kollektiv: Squatting in Europe, Minor Compositions 2013; Claudio Cattaneo & Miguel A Martíñez: The squatters’ movement in Europe, Pluto Press 2014; Stefan Kipler, Urban politics in the 1990s, notes on Toronto; and Marvi Maggio, Urban movements in Italy, the struggle for sociality and communication, in Richard Wolff et al (ed), Possible urban worlds, INURA/Birkhäuser Verlag 1998. – Several chapters in van der Steen’s as well as the Squatting Europe Kollektiv’s book indicate that the squatting movement in the 80s through the 00s were, contrary to the earlier ones, highly secterist, keeping strict controls that members wore the same kind of cloths and listened to the same kind of music etc. Perhaps necessary to keep up internal solidarity but doubtless making unnecessary enemies in the society around.

For most of these groups keeping the authorities at arms' length would have been enough. But meanwhile, their numbers and collective organization in cities like the old squatting metropolises Copenhagen, Amsterdam and London as well as others coming into focus after 1975 like Berlin, Zürich, the North Italian cities, Barcelona and Athens have helped galvanizing a broader resistance against projects typical of the neo-liberal era. We know thanks to Mayer that urban movements in Germany have also been successful in their struggle against conspicuous Olympic Games projects, thanks to polarization between the needs of the homeless and peoples' needs for commons, against city competition. The urban movement in Toronto which had defeated the motorway plans in the seventies got a certain cultural hegemony during the eighties and was during the Washington consensus of the nineties able to unite with the labour organisations into general strikes against cuts and for social housing, blocking the entrances to the city as an auxiliary. Together they made Toronto to one of the Northern centers for the global justice movement of the early 2000s. Occupied houses surviving in Italy since the seventies have established themselves as local culture centers, been joined by more occupied houses, and been converted into resistance centers for example for the peace movements which got support from the trade unions to block supplies to the Iraq war in 2003. And in general, dropouts and casualized workers around occupied houses were a powerful – if sometimes troublesome because of their focus on identity and counter-culture, and because of their often sectarian priorities – backbone of the movement wave of 1992-2001, at least in Europe.

But in some cases, ordinary underclass areas have also performed well, says Eleonora Pasotti, who has compared some such cases and tried to identify what is most successful [101]. In Lavapiés, Madrid and St. Pauli, Hamburg, the inhabitants have with some success used cultural city competition tactics and launched themselves as cultural creators and in that way clung to their homes. In San Telmo, Buenos Aires, residents have taken advantage of their neighborhood's bad reputation and further highlighted this by organizing petty thieves and prostitutes, thus scaring away exploiters. But the most successful of her examples was the residents of Yungay, Santiago de Chile, who, despite Chile's angry neoliberalism, were able to mark territories through what Pasotti calls "experimental tools," a kind of institutionalized and culturally distinct every-day activities, that strengthened the solidarity among the residents to such an extent that the city council gave up.

But the most extensive and influential movement for the commons in the system center during the nineties was the motorway resistance in Britain.

The resistance against motorways was successful early, and many projects were abandoned in the seventies. But in the late eighties the government launched what it boasted as "the most ambitious program since the Romans" and resistance was also brushed up [102].

[101] Eleonora Pasotti: *Resisting redevelopment – protest in aspiring global cities*, Cambridge University Press 2020.

[102] Patrick Field, *The anti-roads movement*, in Tim Jordan & Adam Lent, *Storming the millennium; the new*

The first road project, in Twyford Downs in south England in 1991 was combated with fortifications which took months to remove. The tactics was to make the project more expensive, and it was inspired by the movement against the unpopular so-called poll tax, which aimed at making the tax unworkable rather than outvoted in parliament. The activists were in the beginning young radical environmentalists with a platform of defending nature, but they were gradually reinforced with local people and the platform gradually changed.

Next project was in the northern suburbs of London. The tactics was the same – when the first house was emptied it was occupied and fortified – but a new discourse began to shape. Except environmental impacts of car driving the resistance began to focus on social issues – the way car traffic eats the spaces of the city, spoils the urban commons and forces us into antisocial routines where transport to some otherwhere is always valued higher than what is going on locally, and capital accumulation is always valued higher than social intercourse and other spontaneous manifestations of life [103].

Around Claremont Road, the central space of demolition, the action group began to organise street parties as a protest against the dictatorial claims of car traffic. The action idea of Reclaim the streets was born out of this, spread out in London, and in July 13, 1996 activists occupied the urban motorway M41, broke the tarmac and planted trees under cover of ten thousand dancing people [104].

What characterised the British anti-roads movement was that the program was much broader than resistance to roads. It was a defence of commons per se. It polarised between the poor prospects of lower-class youth and the government favoured car-commuting middle class. It organised common manifestations with striking dockers and metro drivers and reached far beyond the middle class youth who increasingly had become the core of environmental movements in the nineties.

The government announced as early as 1994 that the roads program was abandoned and most projects were scrapped. New Reclaim the streets actions all over the world have focused on other aspects of the destruction of commons in the nineties and contributed to thematizing of the concept of commons, and create a common program for the emerging global justice movement.

This thematizing has also emerged from other quarters. The Indian movements for defending forests in the eighties polarized between “commons for subsistence and private property for exploitation”. American internet communities and scientist milieus began to think in terms of commons when they protested against extended digital copyrights about the millennium shift [105]. The catchword of the south Indian agrarian

politics of change, Lawrence & Wishart 1999; George McKay (ed), DiY culture; party and protest in nineties’ Britain, Verso 1998. DiY stands for Do it Yourself, a term for the British anti-commercial counterculture.

[103] The theme is of course age-old and was first raised by the situationists in the fifties. But for some reason it has very rarely been converted into popular politics. “Noise and pollution” has always been easier to thematise, despite the fact that activists always have been aware of the place-destroying effects of car traffic.

[104] People occupied streets already in the seventies in London, Stockholm and other places, but probably at a too small scale to spread as an global movement.

[105] According to private e-mail with David Bollier. See also Lawrence Lessig, The future of ideas; the

movement when it protested against genetic patents was “knowledge must be free”. Defence for commons may be the unifying perspective for all who defend civil society against the exploitatative world market system in the early 2000s [106].

The popular movement strategy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to safeguard the commons – to bargain with the state about social wages to compensate for commons destroyed by the world market system – had its strengths and weaknesses. It worked as long as the rulers of the system wanted to integrate the direct producers to get a peaceful labour market. But it could not compensate for all lost commons. From the fifties and sixties too many commons began to be threatened by commercialization, exploitation and privatization to be covered by the social wage. And when the integration policy crumbled in the seventies and eighties the strategy lost its precondition – the existence of a counterpart willing to bargain.

So it is no coincidence that the peoples’ movement strategy which begins to form now is more interested in safeguarding commons administered by the users themselves according to principles of reciprocity and gifts than has been the case during the twentieth century. For the movements of the twenty-first century it will probably be more important than safeguarding commons administered by the state according to principles of redistribution.

Not because of inclination or principle. But because it is likelier to succeed – provided that it is linked to a focused struggle for hegemony.

fate of the commons in a connected world, Random House 2001; Eric Kluitenberg, Constructing the digital commons, De Digitale Balie 2003, or Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, artefacts and facilities, Information as a common-pool resource, paper, Conference on the Public Domain, Duke University School of Law, November 9-11, 2001.

[106] The opinion of Naomi Klein, Reclaiming the commons, New Left Review 9/2001.

Chapter 10.
The peoples' movement system

IN THIS BOOK, THE DEVELOPMENT of the social movements after the French Revolution has been related classified according to different themes. The different chapters from 5 through 9 have dealt with conflicts between wage earners and capital owners, between periphery and center, between food producers and the market, between the culturally subordinated and superordinated, and between the civil society and the coercion machinery of the state or the accumulation forces of capital. The everyday discourse speaks of labour, national, women's, minorities', peace, environmental or commons movements.

The everyday discourse is not wholly wrong, but it isn't very precise either.

Firstly, a theme (the chapter headings) seldom corresponds fully to the identity of a movement. Even if a conflict between e.g. a periphery and a center is articulated by a national movement, many movement identities are usually drawn into the conflict, and the more who are drawn into it, the more successful it is. During the heyday of the anti-colonial movements, labour movements and agrarian movements were drawn into the anti-colonial struggle and contributed to it in crucial ways. And labour movements have been most successful when they have been able to articulate all direct producers' aspirations, as they were able to do to a large extent in Scandinavia in the 30s.

Secondly, the notion of fix movement identities, with individual development histories, is somewhat suspect. To be sure, there is some truth in it; as I contended (with support from Veit Michael Bader) in the section The social movement cycle – which is further developed in the Appendix –, there are identities because collectives articulate and work out a common language that keeps the collective together as an identity when it organises and acts [1]. It is useful for them to do so. And instead of having to invent a new language, some collectives may use an existing one (despite the risks), and join a successful practice and claim successful allies from other places and times.

But there is also a point in seeing beyond all these time-honoured and hypostatic theme-identities and theme-families. For the articulations is only a part of the social movement cycle, and a quite late part of it at that.

There is no reason why the result of the articulation should dominate the understanding of a social movement so much that we don't see other parts of it.

The social movement development before 1789 shows a very marked common history; in the system center an emphasis on tax rebellions followed by one on bread seizures; with time data depending on time data for the centralisation of the states and the commercialisation of food distribution, respectively. In the system periphery the time data followed data for the penetration of colonial empires.

But there is also a common history after 1789, that cut across the identity borders, not only touching organising and activity forms but also the diffusion of the political results.

The period after 1789 is possible to divide into four epochs, common to all social

[1] Veit Michael Bader: *Kollektives Handeln*, Leske & Budrich 1991.

movements within the world market system: the epoch of the democratic bread seizure, the epoch of mass organising, the epoch of professionalised mass organisations, and the epoch of campaign organising.

Each of them has had its dominating form of popular politics and its form of result. The shifts from one into another have all been provoked by powerful advances of many, contemporaneous social movements, and the following collapse of these advances [2].

1. The epoch of the democratic bread seizure, (1760s-) 1789-1848.

The popular politics of the 18th century, i.e. bread seizures or local risings provoked by market prise for food, tax protests, and land occupations, survived the French Revolution. But the intense period of popular politics in Western Europe and North America had created a whole series of new repertoires.

The organised boycott was created by the North American colonists in 1764. The first long-term organisation for political aims was invented with the Yorkshire Association in 1779, with the aim to get an end to the colonial war in North America. The organised petition campaign was invented by the British anti-slavery movement in the 1770s. The organised pamphlet campaign was invented in Paris in 1788. The mass meeting declaring itself to be the people in a town demanding their rights was invented in Grenoble the same year. The demonstration was invented by the British democracy movement in 1819. The permanent mass organisation with paid functionaries and membership fee was invented in Ireland in 1823. The barricade was invented in Paris in 1830 (or rather reinvented; it had been used in the 15th and 16th centuries against horsemen). Together these repertoires were much more flexible and copyable than earlier repertoires, and they were usable in many more contexts than bread seizures or tax rebellions. For that reason they were spread quickly [3].

But the contemporaneous revolution in France and Haiti had also created a tradition of popular claim for hegemony. The demand for a public guaranteed subsistence level didn't appeal only to a paternalist ruler but to a popular seizure of power. This was increasingly necessary since the rulers were increasingly market oriented and increasingly refused to take paternalist responsibility for the security of the direct producers.

The Parisian artisans had popularized the citizenship as a demand, i.e. a popular and egalitarian partnership in a "republic". The republic according to this concept was not the same thing as the state – it was a union of local communities, a generalized civil society characterized by reciprocity relations or solidarity and a publicly guaranteed

[2] The dating of the social movement advances are given by André G Frank & Martta Fuentes: Civil democracy; social movements in recent world history, in Samir Amin (ed): Transforming the revolution, Monthly Review Press 1990.

[3] Sidney Tarrow, Power in movement, Cambridge University Press 1994; Charles Tilly, Social movements 1768-2004, Paradigm Publishers 2004. Tilly contends (without telling why) that the concept "social movement" should only be used by movements using this kind of repertoire. About republican movements in its core country, France, one can learn from Jill Harsin: Barricades; the war of the streets in revolutionary Paris 1830-1848, Palgrave 2002, Maurice Agulhon: The republic in the village, Cambridge University Press 1982, and Ronald Aminzade: Ballots and Barricades, Princeton University Press 1993.

subsistence level according to the demands of moral economy. To a considerable extent these popular claims of hegemony were accepted by the rulers – they had increasingly to legitimate their pretensions of power by presenting themselves as the representatives of the people or the nation. And this created new opportunities for the direct producers to present claims.

Somewhat paradoxically, this new relation between rulers and direct producers would arrange the new action repertoire into a new form of political culture. Instead of the traditional form of “direct action”, display of popular attitudes towards the rulers was often conceived as enough. An effective display of respectability, numbers, unity and commitment in different forms of campaigns over time was the new standard form of peoples’ movement – let be with direct actions up one’s sleeve if this wasn’t enough – and a standard form which was slowly spread over the world concurrently with the increasing need for governments to support themselves on the popular will.

The collective actors were of different kinds [4].

Like before 1789 it was the quarter or village which acted in bread seizures, organised in clubs, religious confraternities and friendly societies. But there were also an organising with an increasingly regional, national or even international reach. Journeymen’s companionships had partly been politicized by the Parisian example and acted more and more like trade unions with democratic aims. Radical movements – social Christian revivals, owenites, chartists – raised issues of female equality, collective living and abolition of slavery. There were republican or revolutionary brotherhoods who dreamt of making the French revolution anew – they were usually manned by artisans doomed to extinction by technical development, who demanded big changes so that nothing would change. And in the upper middle class there were “philanthropic societies” with Christian or liberal overtones who dreamt of making life better for the poor by their enlightened rule. All these forms of organisation shared a common public through the press, a creation of them, a common discourse and to some extent persons. The base for the common interest was that the political power still was hoarded within a relatively small number of landowning families, and that the bourgeoisie were outsiders like the direct producers.

The events above may be called the republican tradition. But there is also another tradition, the evangelical.

The republican tradition, with its roots in the medieval commune movement and the mobilizations leading up to the revolutions in America, France and Netherlands, assumed that it represented “the people” and demanded that government should also do

[4] Journeymen’s companionships and other lower class organising are described in Charles, Louise & Richard Tilly, *The rebellious century*, Harvard University Press 1975. The radical movements and their likeness with movements of today are described by Craig Calhoun, “New social movements” of the early nineteenth century, in *Social Science History* 17, 1993. Calhoun has also written a book about what he calls “conservative radicals”, who demanded a revolution for their life forms to survive; *The roots of radicalism*, University of Chicago Press 2012. Middle class organising is described by W.H. van der Linden, *The international peace movement 1815-1874*, Tilleul 1986.

so, and govern in a way that was good for the people. The evangelical tradition, with its roots in medieval anti-clerical movements, strived for personal perfection and saw as its duty to bear witness against sin. The republican tradition was strongest in the European continent and Latin America; the evangelical tradition was strongest in the English-speaking world with some radiation into Scandinavia; if you stretch the concept however, it had much in common with popular movements in Asia too, like Bhakti and Islamic movements, while the republican tradition there was an import following the colonial powers [5].

The republican tradition informs (mostly) labour and agrarian movements and to a great degree national movements. The evangelical tradition informs women's movements, peace movements, and through them much of environment movements in the center. Mixtures appear often, though, and may be highly productive [6].

In the English-speaking world, the evangelical tradition in the era rather immediately went from self-perfection to perfection of society. Activists focused prostitution, poverty and alcoholism; while the first two took the shape of charity towards others, and sometimes could look rather priggish, a movement against alcoholism was effective first when alcoholists themselves engaged in it as the first did in the US in 1840. Education of the poor, and a humanitarian mental health service were natural parts of a struggle for a better society, while radicals within the milieu experimented with agrarian communes, literary collectives and equality between the sexes. The base of the movement was the small town middle class in the northern US; the base this movement had had in the south melted away when anti-slavery became the core of it.

The anti-slavery movement was created by non-conformist British in cooperation with equally non-conformist freed slaves in the British West Indies in the 1790s, with a demand of prohibition of slave trade, and when this demand succeeded thanks to the slave revolution in Haiti, with a demand for total abolishment of slavery in the West Indies. But this movement was not very extensive, despite its successes, and despite the fact that it was the inventor of the paid membership principle [7]. The anti-slavery movement in the USA was a broader affair, thanks to the flourishing peoples' movement culture in this country, and perhaps to having slavery nearer at home. However, the slave economy of the Atlantic was a common space for both, and they shared ideology, political language and sometimes individual actors [8].

[5] Michael Young: Bearing witness against sin, University of Chicago Press 2006, tells about the evangelical tradition in the US.

[6] One may recollect the self-perfectionism in British and Scandinavian labour movements which resulted in a movement of self-education, see Jonathan Rose: The intellectual life of the British working classes, Yale University Press 2002. One may also recollect Gandhi's genial harnessing of Bhakti traditions to Indian national republicanism.

[7] The slave revolution in Haiti and the almost successful revolt in Barbados in 1816 had greater impact in convincing the planters that slavery was unprofitable in the long run. And British capital was at this time less interested in slave trade than in exploiting West African palm oil which called for a labour market in West Africa.

[8] Louis Filler, Crusade against slavery, Reference Publications 1986; Julie Roy Jeffrey, The great silent army of abolition, University of North Carolina Press 1998. Peter Linebaugh & Marcus Rediker: The many-headed

At the time of the Haitian revolution and the North American independence movement, the North American slavery seemed well on the way to its extinction. Blacks took part in the struggles and got their freedom as a reward, and slave owners organised associations for colonisation of independent black family farmers. But the growing demand for cotton in the early nineteenth century made slavery profitable again, while the decreasing economic weight of the southern states and of agriculture in general made slavery a necessary crutch for a landlord class threatened by lost power.

The abolitionist movement was created by Quakers in the late eighteenth century, in a climate of general benevolence. The evangelical, perfectionist thrust in the early 19th century saw slavery as an evil, as an obstacle to salvation of the blacks and as an incitement to sin [9]. Struggle for liberation of the slaves became a center in a Christian peoples' movement milieu

It was within this milieu the movement for women's liberation became a mass movement. It seemed natural that women took on charity; the female character was seen as particularly suited for compassion. When charity towards slaves became political, the women were also politicized, although the first generation of anti-slavery activists took care to keep within the bounds of the accepted. All anti-slavery activists didn't like the activism of the women; this was the cause for a split in 1840, and most of the women never asked for power in the movement. But the participation in agitation, political petitions, financing by markets and other businesses, and smuggling of runaway slaves to Canada made it increasingly untenable to maintain that women were unsuited for politics and business. Particularly as women in many cases led the development, like Grimké sisters in agitation and Harriet Tubman in slave smuggling.

While anti-slavery had been a minority issue even in the north in the 1820s and 1830s, concern grew after 1840; the agitation had provoked politicians to introduce censorship and political persecution. But what made anti-slavery a mass concern in the north was the competition for land and work; the slavery institution, and the militant defence of it, appeared to threaten the economic survival of family farmers and artisans. While anti-slavery became an election issue and a way for northern politicians to assert the system career of the USA against the English-dependent south, parts of the anti-slavery women networks began to assert the rights of women in society.

The high tide of the era of republicanism was of course the French revolution, which created a sea change in the world, with citizens as the formal owners of the state, with at least a beginning of making the middle classes the real owners, and with the elites beginning to take a responsibility for the economy with investments in canals and textile industry, inaugurating the first industrial Kondratiev A phase.

hydra – sailors, slaves, commoners, and the hidden history of the revolutionary Atlantic, Beacon Press Books 2000, focuses on what anti-slavery movements had in common, not least the common roots in 17th century English religious radicalism.

[9] It never appeared to the abolitionist movement to appeal to the economic and political self-interest of the non-slave owning majority in the southern states to challenge the power of the planters. Liberation was and remained a moral concern. For that reason, the movement was easy to co-opt into the north side of the conflict against the south, instead of becoming a part of a popular self-assertion against the upper class.

The high tide for cooperation between republican and evangelical traditions were the 1820s up to 1848, when society was still dominated by the old elites and there was still a natural affinity between all people in “the third estate”, and when the first Kondratiev A phase had broken down and a new era of speculation and non-production had dawned.

2. The era of mass organising (1825-) 1848-1905.

The peoples’ movements of the era culminated in an offensive which has been called “the revolutions of 1848”. It changed the scene in several ways.

First, the rulers realized that their power base was too narrow. They began to let in the middle class and give it “citizenship”, with the consequence that its common interest with the direct producers cracked.

Second, the now extended elite decided that they had to be more serious, abandon the speculative economy of the 1830s-40s and begin a new Kondratiev A, in this case built on railways and steam, to incorporate as many as possible of the direct producers into the system.

Third, the activists of the direct producers’ popular movements concluded from the relative failure that a revolution was difficult to achieve, and that preparations and organisation was needed for it. For half a century mass organising in permanent organisation was to be a standing theme in the peoples’ movements.

Furthermore, the repertoire of the popular movements shifted at this time. Strike for higher wages, and cooperation, began to appear as more successful than bread seizures. The shift occurred first in the most industrialized center and moved outwards with time. The last bread seizures occurred 1847 in France, 1917 in Sweden, and they still happen in e.g. Bolivia, Ghana or Pakistan.

Meanwhile, display of respectability, unity, numbers and commitment before a public continued to grow as a repertoire.

The first mass organisation according to the criteria of the nineteenth century – paid membership for all in the conflict category and elected and/or full time functionaries in responsible positions – was the Irish Catholic Association 1823. But it was the labour movement in the system center that made the model permanent and dominating in the peoples’ movement system, and their inspiration was probably taken from the protestant sects, particularly from the Methodists.

The permanent mass organisation beat the local community as leading form of organisation because of both push and pull. The common interests of local communities disintegrated because of national and global markets. And the state strengthened its political and administrative presence during the nineteenth century and made it an increasingly important actor to influence. And the national arena could only be managed by big actors [10].

There was a big dispute about how to construct the mass organisation model. The First International split on this issue – a majority wanted to organise all while a minority wanted to organise only the activists. But participation of the whole conflict category in

[10] Charles Tilly, *Capital, coercion and European states 992-1992*, Blackwell 1992.

at least some form of formal organising was the norm within the labour movement from the 1870s, the agrarian movements from the 1880s, and the anti-colonial movements from the 1890s – despite the fact that it took some generation before the norm was realized.

The model turned out to be extremely forceful in the long run. The direct producers really succeeded in playing a prominent part in the national arena from the late nineteenth century, and even force through real concessions. So great concessions that the rulers saw it necessary to expand the system peripheries with amazing energy after 1873 to afford paying and retaining their hegemony. This created after some generation national movements there also, which organised in formal mass organisations.

When the first great tide of unionizing and building organized anti-colonial movements began in the late 1800s, the effort paid off at once in one important way. The elites of the system decided that they had to abandon the speculative economy of 1873-1895 and organize a new Kondratiev A phase, this time built on steel and electricity. It was necessary for them to integrate as many direct producers as possible into the system, and also convince the middle layers that they were serious, lest not these begin to sympathise with the popular movements.

3. The era of professional mass organisations 1905-1970.

The era of mass organising culminated during the decade 1904-1914 in a series of mobilisations in the whole world. General strikes in West Europe, revolutions in Russia and China, and the first mass movements for independence in India forced through a new scene change.

One way to describe the scene change is that the forceful peoples' movement mobilizations, together with the decline of the British hegemony and the all-encompassing monetarization of all relations resulted in a systemic chaos which among other things resulted in two world wars. This created a strong need for order, which the rulers responded to by establishing authoritarian regimes. The peoples' movement system responded by almost everywhere uniting for a goal in the middle-run: to take government power, to foil these authoritarian thrusts. Only the protected USA wasn't affected by this change.

To the action model of the social movements this goal implied that mass organising of militant action was replaced by mass organising of support for candidatures of movement functionaries as government officials. Strike was replaced by election or revolution, dependent of what appeared most practicable, or in the increasingly important system periphery building of a state. In practice of course, strike was the most effective instrument to strengthen the power of popular movements, but the focus of the strategy had been removed.

There were three different versions of this strategy, and another following another strategy [11].

[11] Tord Björk, *Folkrörelser ur ett tredje världen-perspektiv*, KRUT 103/104, 2001. He emphasizes the similarity of the first, second and fourth model – professionalization – while the third appears as unique.

The first was the West European model, focused on elections. This implied usually a certain autonomy for the peoples' movements in tactical issues and certain opportunities for different groups to pursue their own issues. But strategically, they were subordinated to the attempts of the functionaries to take government power, and when this was achieved in most places after 1945, the movement functionaries did all they could to demobilize the movements.

The second was the semi-peripheral model, focused on revolution. This implied generally that the whole movement was subordinated to a professional revolutionary elite and that no autonomy was tolerated. The reason for this choice was primarily that the mobilized direct producers had inferior leverage on society than in the system center, because of less urbanization. When the goal was attained, the policy was focused on maximum system career – so-called development – and the whole country, the whole social movement, and the whole movement language was subordinated despotically to this goal. In this case, the demobilization was of course even more absolute than in the West European version.

The third was the Indian model, focused on autonomy through universal peoples' movement mobilization. In this version, the space for autonomous mobilizing was comparably the greatest, and in practice, the official leadership had no control over what was done. When the goal was attained, the functionaries-as-government had no power to demobilize, so the autonomous peoples' movements continued to mark history.

The three models are of course ideal types; in reality there were also mixtures.

There was also a fourth model, the North American model, which was not focused on government power. In the USA, the defeat of the agrarian movement, see chapter 7, and the difficulties of the labour movement to cope with labour immigration had opened up for middle class groups to dominate the peoples' movement scene. They had generally a narrow focus and worked through limited professional campaigns, focused on giving advice to rulers. Not even during the thirties, when the movements of the direct producers recovered their strength for a while, they were able to establish hegemony, and narrowly limited focuses and professional campaigners continued to dominate the North American scene. On the other hand, absence of government power ambitions implied that the independence of the movement base was complete.

The era of mass mobilization was at its most productive in the 30s. Huge mass mobilization went on in India and China, and the world's probably most encompassing labour movement ever shook USA. This was also the first epoch one can talk of a truly global movement family which also felt as such. This thrust succeeded in ending the speculative Kondratiev B phase of 1914-1945 and force the elites of society, over the whole world this time, to be serious. The Keynesian era, with its focus on mass production for mass consumption was set in stage.

Regardless of model, mass organisation implied the emphasizing of working methods which increased the differences between functionaries and lay people and made them difficult to bridge. Despite this, the model was extremely successful in the short run. Integration of the direct producers was swift. States based on citizenship was accepted even in the system periphery, according to the demands of the national

movements. The moral economy in the form of social insurances and a social wage was accepted to a wide extent in the system center. The welfare state, and socialism in one country, respectively, was to some extent realized during the era. The living standards of the direct producers increased in quantitative terms in the whole world, and so did equality – which is unique in the history of the world market system [12].

But yet, the successes were modest indeed compared to what had actually been the aims of the peoples' movements – liberty, equality, fraternity, and the republic of the egalitarian citizens, founded on moral economy. During the decade 1965-1975 peoples' movements over the whole world made a contemporaneous thrust to realize these aims. And like the peoples' movement mobilizations around 1848 and 1904-1914 this thrust changed both the scene and the movements themselves.

The scene changed so far that the rulers abandoned their three hundred years strategy. Since the English revolution 1640 and even more since the French revolution they had invested, in the long run, in buying peace and quiet by conceding to some of the movements' claims, at least such claims which had a broad support and at least in the system center. But since the movement resurgence 1965-1975 was world-wide, concessions appeared more and more utopian. For the first time, the rulers had no unintegratable sub-proletariat to shift the cost for integration at. For the first time in three hundred years, the inevitable progress began to seem doubtful [13].

The regimes which were promoted by the peoples' movements during the age of the government power strategy were for that reason faced with an impossible task. The inherent impossibility of the strategy was not enough – to sponsor a layer of functionaries who, except representing the state interest under global competition, also should represent the interests of the direct producers although these were prohibited from mobilizing for them – it also had to be carried through while the representatives of the system routines began to call in question if the direct producers had any rights at all. From 1973 the movement supported governments began to lose the grip on things. The national development projects in the system peripheries cracked. And the welfare states in the system center began to be rolled back.

4. The era of campaign organising (1955-) 1970-?.

Faced with this scene change, popular movements began to reconsider their strategy of 1904-1914. The reconsideration has been fumbling and is still not accomplished, particularly not with the circles that were most successful during the era up to 1973. It may be characterized that using the government power as an instrument for achieving the good society is hardly seen as realistic anywhere. But what should replace it is very uncertain.

What actually has replaced it after 1973 is so much more obvious. That is campaign

[12] Volker Bornschier, Changing income inequality in the second half of the 20th century, Preliminary findings and propositions for explanations, in *Journal of World-System Research* VIII.1, 2002.

[13] This process is described in many articles by Immanuel Wallerstein, for example *The Insurmountable Contradictions of Liberalism: Human Rights and the Rights of Peoples in the Geoculture of the Modern World-System*,” *South Atlantic Quarterly*, XCIV, 4, 1995, and *Globalization or the age of transition? – a long-term view of the trajectory of the world-system*.

organising according to the American pattern. The inspiration for the social movement mobilizations of the last forty years are found, if I am permitted to overdo it a bit, in three places:

The black civil rights movement in the USA, whose pattern of mobilizing formed the anti-war movement at home and inspired pariah movements all over the world, including South Africa, and also the women's movements of the seventies and eighties.

The European anti-war movements of the fifties, which was a pattern for the environmental movements of the seventies and for that reason also much of the growth of the NGO society of the nineties.

The Indian agrarian mobilizations of the thirties, which were never incorporated completely into the government power strategy but remained a living tradition through the whole era. This tradition has been weaker globally than the other two, at least up to the millennium shift, but is now meeting an awakening interest.

Those of you who have followed this book recognize that all three have been inspired by M.K. Gandhi's model for peoples' movement mobilization. But the peoples' movement mobilizations after 1973 have developed a lot of traits which are typical for them and have not so much to do with the Indian independence movement.

They have almost all abandoned the model of the permanent mass organisation with paid functionaries. There are many permanent organisations, but they are almost all small. There are some mass organisations, but few of them have been permanent.

They have almost all had a limited focus. They have pursued far-reaching goals for a limited conflict category, or limited goals for a big conflict category. But they have almost never pursued far-reaching goals for big majorities, like the peoples' movements of the early twentieth century.

They have often, despite or because of, their limited focus, been broad class alliances rather than downright class mobilizations.

While the movements of earlier eras have been based in a class interest and been able to use the strike as a movement repertoire, social movements after 1973 have been forced, because of their broad but diffuse or thin character, to rely on other methods like demonstrations, boycotts and occupations – primarily Tilly's public displays of respectability, unity, numbers and commitment.

In these broad class alliances the middle class interests and content has had hegemony. This has been so much more marked as the older class based peoples' movement organisations increasingly have been dominated by functionaries who increasingly have identified with the middle class. This is however more marked in the system center than in the system periphery.

Despite attempts during the peoples' movement resurgence 1965-1975 to reduce the gaps between leaders and rank-and-file, the differences have rather increased after 1975. Instead of a gap between members and employed there has grown a much wider gap between sympathisers and actives, often aggravated by the actives being organised in NGOs – organisations without members able to lay claims on the leaders, and financed through market mechanisms and government subsidies [14].

The thin organising has also implied that it has been easy for state and business to

co-opt representatives for the movements into a lobbyist role, i.e. the role to give advice to the rulers in limited issues instead of mobilizing the movement base for action. The thin organising has also resulted in that the alternative to lobbying has often taken the form of ideologically pure and self-righteous sects who have not cared about mobilizing either, but rather have demonstrated their own splendid qualities with actions, sometimes violent [15].

The difference between the original Gandhianism and its imitator is arguably that the Gandhian peoples' movement strategy emphasized the interest of the farmers and middle classes who were its social base, while the middle class movements which have been inspired afterwards have emphasized the good conscience rather than interests. They have followed the evangelical track of bearing witness against sin, rather than the republican of "we, the people".

A trait with the peoples' movement scene is that more issues have been thematized after the sixties than before. This is a result of the fact that the development is more unclear and unsettled than it was before. There is no self-evident agenda for development as there was during the high tide of Fordism. This has in academic parlance been summarized in the term "new social movements", which is somewhat improper; no theme is really new. All of the themes which have been considered new after 1973 – environment, peace, gender, the aim of production – were highly topical during the mobilizations around 1848 and 1905, as the flat organisation forms and the focus on identities and alternative society reminds strikingly about the peoples' movement society before 1848 [16].

This increasing plurality of themes has been managed very differently in the system center and the system periphery.

In the system center the organisations which have been formed to articulate class conflicts stiffened in forms which have been favourable in a perspective of government power strategy; the organisations which have thematized the "new" issues have been thin

[14] About NGOs see for example Michael Edwards & David Hume (ed), *NGOs, states and donors – too close for comfort*, Macmillan 1997; Terse Ted, *Angels of mercy or development diplomats: NGOs and foreign aid*, James Currey 1988; Ian Smillie, *The alms bazaar: altruism under fire*, Intermediate Technology Publication 1995; David Sogge (ed), *Compassion and calculation, The business of foreign aid*, Pluto Press 1996, and William Robinson, *Promoting polyarchy*, Cambridge University Press 1996. The last is about the way northern states promote NGOs to avoid confronting with authentic peoples' movements. Alejandro Bendaña, *Which way for NGOs?*, Centro de Estudios Internacionales, Managua, sums up the problems: 1. Narrowing of the perspectives. 2. Blurring of political conflicts. 3. Focusing on the small instead of the big. 4. Unrepresentativeness and unaccountability. 5. Over-emphasizing of theory. 6. Disempowering of the majority who learns to trust NGOs instead of dealing with problems themselves.

[15] Hanspeter Kriesi et al, *New social movements in Western Europe*, University College of London Press, 1994, describes the way popular movement waves during the eighties have been broken by coopting parts of them as lobbyists while those who have protested against this have resorted to violence which a majority of the movements' base have seen as illegitimate, which has killed the movement entirely. Michel Wieviorka, *The making of terrorism*, University of Chicago Press 1993, describes "terrorism" as a sterile reaction against opportunism in a part of a popular movement.

[16] André Gunder Frank & Marta Fuentes, *Civil democracy: social movements in recent world history*, and Craig Calhoun, "New social movements" of the early nineteenth century.

and only touched superficially on class. In the system periphery class organisations have generally not been involved as deep into the government power strategy – primarily carried by national movements – so they have been able to play a much more important role in the broadening of themes. Labour and agrarian movements in the South have for that reason a much broader focus than labour and agrarian movements in the North.

By the turn of the century one may possibly foretell a new synthesis. But first something of its preconditions.

Future peoples' movements

Even if peoples' movements are chaotic (in the meaning of chaos theory) and difficult to trace in beforehand, it is possible to assess their requirements and from that guess, within broad measures, what their opportunities are. It is also possible to guess which identities and themes that will be important and which mobilization forms that may be realized.

The aim of a social movement is to guard civil society, reciprocity and peoples' opportunities to satisfy their spontaneous expressions of life. Their successes or failures have to be measured against that, not against their power to move dust or leave myths and legends in the history books.

During the era this book has attached the most space to – the period after 1789 – the net result of the peoples' movements have probably been positive. The government power strategy was effective. The living standard has increased, at least up to 1973, i.e. until social movements had captured government power in many countries. But after that date the results have been rather dubious. The traditional social movement mechanisms seem to have lost their teeth. The average living standard didn't increase any more, particularly not for the poor. More and more people lost their subsistence and were marginalized, which the peoples' movement system seemed unable to counter the development. The consequence of this was that the earlier foundation of mass organisations disintegrated without being compensated by anything nearly as strong – the classic mass mobilizations were supplanted by middle class dominated NGOs while the real popular movement mobilizations appeared local and powerless. One can speak of a crisis in the peoples' movement system, of that old methods didn't seem to work.

What didn't work? It was easy to see that one thing that didn't work was the government power strategy of the twentieth century. The state was no instrument to protect civil society with, and the peoples' movements had no power over the development of society although they appointed and dismissed governments. But the crisis seemed to be deeper than that.

Earlier, shifts in the environment provoked by peoples' movement mobilizations have quickly been followed by new effective methods and organising forms, but after 1973 there were no such methods in view. The organisation and mobilization forms which have replaced the government power strategy have been even less effective than the strategy they replaced.

The shift seems more fundamental than earlier shifts for peoples' movement strategies after 1500.

I think this is a consequence of that the shifts of the world, the scene, is more fun-




Fig 10:1. A statistical measure of the peoples' movements' failure: the share of the global incomes -- the so-called Elephant Curve. The richest hundredth of a percent have earned most of the growth since 1990. So have also some of the then poorest -- the Chinese who now belong to the global middle class. Most of the others have lost. Source: Alvarado et al: World Inequality Report 2018.

damental than any of the shifts the world market system has periodically gone through since it appeared in the late fifteenth century; that it is of a new kind.

In chapter 2 the development of the world was described as composed of on the one hand long-term trends, on the other two kinds of cycles.

The first kind of cycle is the Kondratiev cycles – about fifty-years business cycles carried by one of more highly monopolized “leading businesses”, which is broken when the monopolies in these businesses are broken. We live by now near the bottom of such a cycle, since the earlier leading businesses auto and electronics lost their leading role and been relocalised to the system periphery, while capitals in the center is primarily interested in speculation, earning money from money rather than organizing production.

Such cycles have proceeded during the whole history of the system and is nothing new. We should have expected a new fifty-year cycle to begin very soon, tentatively carried by biotechnology and information. The problem is that while earlier leading businesses have been able to integrate more people into the system it seems that the topical ones can employ only a small, highly educated elite while the rest is written off as superfluous. In the public debate, this is described as an unemployment crisis [17]. Another

[17] F.ex. Richard Layard, The unemployment crisis, Oxford University Press 1994.

problem is that a new Kondratiev A phase of buoyant upswing can't be seen anywhere. While the elites were scared into one A phase by the French revolution, another by the revolutions of 1848, a third by the trade union organizing and budding anti-colonial movements, and a fourth by the mobilizations of the 30s, the Russian revolution and a world war, nothing of the kind is there to scare them now.

The other kind of cycle is the so-called hegemony cycles – considerably longer periods when one violence/finance alliance dominates the system based in a certain political course of action, until the strain this implies and the opposition it meets with from other actors wears down its abilities. We live in an age when the US hegemony is increasingly strained, and the political stability in the world as a consequence of this is increasingly shaky. One consequence of this is that the economy is increasingly speculative and increasingly unproductive. Another is that the ability of the state system to control the situation falls in pieces. In the public debate this is described as globalisation [18], or the fall of the welfare state, or even the fall of the national state [19].

Such hegemony crises aren't new either in the history of the system. "Normally" we should expect a new hegemonic power to succeed the USA, possibly after a world war. The problem isn't only that world wars is probably not a feasible method any longer, it is also that such a successor should have more resources, both concerning violence and finance, than the retiring power, and also offer something to the most important popular movement of the age. And it seems that no power is able to do this under a foreseeable future.

The long term trends are described by Christopher Chase-Dunn as

- increasing commercialization of all human relations
- increasing capital intensity in production
- increasing concentration of ownership to fewer owners
- increasing internationalisation of investments
- increasing power for the routines of states and capital to the expense of the spontaneous expressions of life
- increasing part of the world covered by the world market system [20].

We can see ruptures here also.

The most trivial one is that it is impossible to expand the system to new areas. The whole world is covered. So far, such expansions have been the security valves of the system when the direct producers have enforced better conditions. The businesses have then moved to new, politically less sensitive areas and employed new workers without unionist experience. It is this custom which has created centers and peripheries in the system. If no new peripheries can be attached to the system, it has to find new methods to manage challenges from the direct producers, coming from anywhere within the system. If they don't, labour movements will be enormously strengthened.

[18] The discussion about this is abundant. One example is Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and its discontents*, Allen Lane, 2002.

[19] For example Samir Amin, *Maldevelopment – anatomy of a global failure*, Zed 1990.

[20] Christopher Chase-Dunn, *The world-system since 1950 – what has really changed*, in Charles Bergquist (ed), *Labor in capitalist world-economy*, Sage 1984.

A less evident rupture is perhaps that commercialization is reaching the limits. Firstly, commercialization of the ecosystem is creating an environmental crisis which not only makes the life and local communities of the direct producer suffer but also their productive abilities. Secondly, and more uncertain, one may ponder on the extent commercialization of the word and the life may free-ride on the reciprocity of the civil society without wrecking it. Since the impending Kondratiev wave concerns communication and genetics as leading businesses, this question must at least be posed.

Every sign says that we are approaching a time of systemic chaos, going deeper than ever since 1450. But except that this offers great opportunities for popular movements – an unstable system is easier to affect than a stable one – it also causes trouble. For the instability affects also the popular movements themselves, in the form of strategic hesitation, lack of great extensive popular identities and lack of popular reliance on the possibility to achieve great things [21].

It is not sure that this is a great trouble however. The peoples' movement system has earlier been able many times to achieve great things without intending to do so. The peasants in Morelos who raised the issue of land reform on a global scale had the intention to take back a stolen field while the army was busy handling another revolt. The workers who started the First International, giving rise the strike wave which established the labour movement in Europe, had the intention to deal in a practical way with strike-breaking. A determined action for small ends has sometimes carried with it considerable society changes, which meanwhile let the participants grow as conscious actors and makes them attempt greater ventures. Perhaps these not at all being as consequential as the original small attempts were.

So the presence of subjective intentions or subjective consciousness is a quite ambiguous clue if one is to predict the development. It is probably better to take a stand in the development of the last thirty years of peoples' movements, and from this, and from other global tendencies, conclude what the nearest future will be.

The movement wave of the 1990s

The most visible peoples' movements during the last decades of the twentieth century were clearly middle class based movements, in one or another way protecting commons and/or what they considered to be general human rights. Such movements were, as mentioned, rather thin – their focuses were generally narrow and their mobilizing force was small. They were often dominated by NGOs, professional campaigners, who in their own interest kept the thinness intact.

However, some initiatives were taken in these circles which would be productive [22].

One of the first was IBFAN, International Baby Food Action Network in 1978, a global low budget network of activists struggling about Nestlé's unhealthy infant

[21] Terence Hopkins, Immanuel Wallerstein et al, *The age of transition*, Zed Books/Pluto Press 1996.

[22] Tord Björk, *World Social Forum and popular movements confronting globalisation*, 2003. Håkan Thörn has also argued that also the Anti-apartheid movement did a lot to create a transnational social movement culture, at least in the North, see Håkan Thörn: *Anti-apartheid and the emergence of a global civil society*, Palgrave Macmillan 2006.

formula. By swiftness and minimal bureaucracy this cooperation was successful and stimulated to other similar networks like the Rain Forest Movement and PAN, Pesticide Action Network. The new with these networks was, except the flat structure and the bid on fast communications, that many of them were ruled from the South.

There was an earlier attempt in nearly the same spirit, the international campaign against the union busting methods of Coca-Cola, started in 1977. It was however built on existent hierarchic organisations like churches. Amnesty and the International Federation of Food Workers, and was strangely sterile despite initial successes [23].

Another movement of much greater importance was the global movement against debt. This may be said to have begun in 1976 with a series of what would be called IMF riots – spontaneous mass protests against cuts decided by international finance organisations – from Argentina and Peru over Mali and Ethiopia to Pakistan [24]. In 1984 Third World Network was founded as a typical middle class NGO but also an expression of a genuine southern interest with good ties to southern mobilizations, and it was immediately an established mouthpiece on this and related issues.

The movement which TWN, and later also the church-organised Jubilee 2000, gave a voice to would be one of the main strands within the present global justice movement. It would take longer time to establish the issue in northern peoples' movement cultures. Nordic peace movement circles around Kvinnor för fred, Women for peace, made an unsuccessful attempt during the eighties peace movement resurgence, see chapter 9. Instead, it was the Spanish environmental movement which used the cooperation with the South American Indian movement during the quincennial festivities in 1992 and the fiftieth anniversary of the Bretton Woods institutions two years later to organise actions together with Spanish trade unions, European environmental organisations and activist solidarity organisations around the catchword *ya basta!*, it's enough. The breakthrough for this movement was in 1998 when it stopped the MAI agreement, a global trade agreement which would have give businesses the right to sue governments if law changes reduced future profits. In this case it was also cooperation between many different groups and organisations, to a great extent on the Internet, which was successful.

The movement with the most mobilizing force during the late twentieth century was however the global family farmer movement [25].

The agrarian movements of the late twentieth century were released by the agrarian crisis of the seventies, which has been described in chapter 7. The organisatory impulses for global action came from different quarters of which four were particularly important.

One was the mobilization in Central America against the structural adaptation programs of the IMF in the eighties. Peaceful mobilizing in Honduras, Costa Rica and Panama made impression against a backdrop of civil wars in the neighbouring countries, and the new agrarian organisations were able to use lavish aid money to organise net-

[23] Peter Waterman, *Globalization, social movements and the new internationalism*, Continuum 1998.

[24] John Walton & David Seddon, *Free markets & food riots, the politics of global adjustments*, Blackwell 1994.

[25] Marc Edelman, *Transnational peasant and farmer movements and networks*, in *Global Civil Society*, Yearbook 2003; Annette Aurélie Desmarais: *La Vía campesina*, Fernwood/Pluto Press 2007.

works with organisations in Latin America, USA and Europe. During the resurgence of the Indian movement in the early nineties new networks were created – in countries like Ecuador and Bolivia family farmer and Indian are almost synonyms.

Another was a number of North American family farmer organisations which began to organise an international resistance to the food businesses and in 1983 gathered the First International Farm Crisis Summit in Ottawa. The efforts were later focused on NAFTA, the North American free trade agreement.

A third was the campaign of Karnataka's farmers' organisation against "intellectual ownership" or patent rights of seeds. They both destroyed properties of food businesses and organised successfully in an international level.

A fourth was the European resistance to free trade in food products, written into the Uruguay Round of GATT in 1986. It was this mobilization which was the first to organise great demonstrations at a trade summit, in Brussels in 1990. The leaders were the strong organisation of the French family farmers. This mobilization also sought and got global participation in their demonstrations.

These mobilizations found in the early nineties a common ground, thanks to the Washington consensus and its codification into trade-friendly treaties canalized by WTO. In 1993 the family farmers founded Via Campesina as a global organisation, built in the same flat way as IBFAN coordinated from an office in Tegucigalpa, later moved around the world, and with a common program for family farmers in center and peripheries based on food sovereignty, i.e. the agriculturalists' control over their product. A strong focus against the oil-based, subsidized agriculture of the Fordist era has contributed to an understanding with the environmentalists' movements [26]. Some fifty unions from America, Europe and South Asia take part with African organisations linked in a looser way. The family farmers in Chiapas have also been linked in a looser way although they have contributed to much of the organising language in the family.

Via Campesina has played a conspicuous part both in public and behind the scene during all great summit protests since, and have also contributed to shaping the program of the South states which cracked the proposal for a global trade treaty in 2004.

The odds are that family farmer mobilizing will continue. Since capital has invested so much in genetics as one of the foundations of the next Kondratiev wave, the mobilization of the farmers both sensitive to the world market system and necessary for the farmers, like a similar threat to the artisans of Europe in the early nineteenth century gave rise to the labour movement tradition. But will they get any assistance?

Movements with other focuses and identities have met more difficulties to assert themselves during the period.

This is most evident concerning the labour movements. In North America, West Europe and Japan, labour movements have found difficulties in asserting themselves since the industry began to be relocalised on a grand scale in the seventies. In the countries where it has been relocalised to, labour movements have flourished and often kept

[26] Joan Martinez-Alier, The EROI of agriculture and its use by the Via Campesina, *The Journal of Peasant Studies* Vol. 38, No. 1, January 2011.

its strength, but so far growing strength in the South has not compensated fully for the enfeeblement in the North.

Brazilian and South Korean labour movements may have kept some of their militance since the eighties and the South African labour central may have toppled the regime in 1992 and introduced majority rule, Indian strikes may have been successful in preventing privatizations, North American labour unions may have begun to organise again after twenty years of sleep, and Chinese labour movements may even occupy towns – but such possible successes have not been possible to translate into global strength in the same way as the agrarian movements have done. Not even the de facto global mass strikes against the Bretton Woods organisations in June 2001 when more than 50 millions took part were perceived as a global event.

It is easy to put the blame on organisatoric deficiencies – that the labour movement organisations in the north are stuck in the casually effective government power strategy of the twentieth century, trust the benevolence of governments and see member mobilization as more of a threat than a promise, and that the labour movements of the South have not yet got a global breakthrough for their lower-class solidary forms of struggle or in the organisations of the labour movements [27].

There is probably much in this. But as Beverly Silver has shown there are also structural reasons for the weakness of the labour movements around 2000 [28].

Capital has four different ways of combating labour movements: to move production to new sites, to organise production to loosen the workers' grip on it, to move the resources to new businesses, and to not bother about production at all and indulge in speculation. Workers generally succeed to find counter-moves to the first three. When production moves to new sites – from the USA to Western Europe in the fifties, and from Western Europe to Brazil and South Korea in the seventies – new labour movements compensate for the weakening of the old ones. When production is reorganised to weaken the workers' grip on it – assembly lines in the tens and twenties to loosen the artisans' grip and just in time production in the eighties and nineties to loosen the grip of the assembly lines workers' – the workers learn to use the bottle-necks of the new technologies. And when old businesses decay and new ones arise the labour mobilizations move to the new ones. Such movements and new mobilization techniques may take time to develop, so for that reason statistics over labour mobilization shows up- and down-swings over time.

But if production in general loses its importance for capital accumulation to the benefit of speculation and usury, the workers lose their grip in a much more fundamental way. And this happens now. Such shifts between production phases and speculation phases are properly speaking a periodic phenomenon, see chapter 2, but the changes take a long time. And it also seems that a shift from speculation to production is dependent

[27] This is the assessment of Peter Waterman, *Globalization, social movements and the new internationalisms*, or the Norwegian trade union leader Asbjørn Wahl, *Social dialogue, social pacts or a social Europe?* in Kolya Abramsky (ed.): *Diverse Voices of Resistance*, London 2001, and other articles by the same author.

[28] Beverly Silver, *Forces of labor – Workers' movements and globalization since 1870*, Cambridge University Press 2003.

not only of strong popular movements scaring the elites into seriousness, but also on a shift to a new hegemonic power able to administer it. And this seems unlikely today. This may indicate that labour movements for a foreseeable future will be less forceful than they have been during the twentieth century.

Moreover, it seems that the growing businesses today, counted as amount of capital and as employees, are not as easily organised as the assembly line industries for durable goods in the twentieth century. Some, for example transport, are indeed but in others, for example real estate and education, the labour movements will have to compensate for lack of grip in the production with better organisation in the local community and political alliances, so-called social movement unionism [29]. And this is not easy, particularly not for the old industrial countries which are stuck in a bureaucratically run insurance business. The militant and successful labour movements in Brazil, South Africa and South Korea won their successes by being strong in the civil society; they have not least been forced to that because of the high frequency of casual work and informal employments, and they have much to teach others [30].

But the odds are that labour movements will escape the present deep depression when the proletarians of the South have learnt to manage their situation, because of the spread of unionist techniques, according to Silver. Not least because the opportunities for capitalists to move their capital is running across the limits. Perhaps the strength will not be as big as the system center in the sixties. But the Chinese labour movement mobilization in the twenty-first century should nevertheless be a forceful one.

Strangely enough, women's and pariah movements seem fairly absent (with the exception of Indian movements in South America!), despite not having any of the limitations of the labour movements. Perhaps the weakness is the dominating attitude – the focus being on marking identities and claiming separate rights, rather than taking part in the formulation for common claims and utopias concerning all.

It is striking that pariah movements which are not suffering from this limitation, like the Indian movements of Ecuador and Bolivia, don't have any difficulties at all to take part in the present demonstrations of strength. The same is apparently the case with women's movements. The movements in the South seem less fixated at identity and culture and seem more capable of cooperating with a starting-point in an interest, more present and more forceful, see chapter 8. But the women's movements of the South have so far not been able to take the struggle for movement hegemony I think is necessary to break the upper middle class grip in the North and make women's movement more effective [31].

[29] The trade unions of the South have made this a starting-point and are to a great extent general class organisations in the civil society. Interestingly enough there is a strand in the new unionist organisation thrust in the USA following the same way, see for example Kim Moody, *Workers in a lean world: unions in the international economy*, Verso 1997, or in *Labor Notes*.

[30] Ashwin Desai, *We are the poors; community struggles in post-apartheid South Africa*, Monthly Review Press 2002, tells about a struggle between workers and the biggest oil business in South Africa, which was won by the workers despite a weak organisation on the worksite, because they organised well in the civil society.

[31] Some examples of failures are given by Peter Waterman, *Globalization, social movements and the new*

Finally, it seems that the states of the South/system peripheries are beginning to get a capability to cooperate against the dominance of the North. The broken negotiations of extended free trade in Cancún in 2003 was the first occasion since decolonisation when the South has acted in unison, inspired by Via Campesina, and ambitions of cooperation should continue despite the shortcomings of this first attempt. We can't tell if they will be successful, and of course it would never have happened in Cancún either were it not for the struggles of family farmers and middle class mobilizations around Third World Network. But all the same, it is remarkable, against a background of earlier constant fragmentation of the system peripheries.

In all, there was during the years 1992-2001 a certain modest peoples' movement resurgence with victories and disappointments, nevertheless able to change the scene somewhat [32].

The initiatives came from several sources.

Southern churches began, pushed by the IMF riots, to demand from their Northern counterparts joint campaigns against the destructive praxis of IMF and against the notion of the South as indebted. In 1996 this engendered the Jubilee 2000 campaign for cancelling the debts – but this initiative was somewhat blunted by defection of many Northern NGOs as soon as Northern governments started trading promises.

Another mobilisation with the same aim was the campaign by South American Indian movements against the celebration of Columbus in 1992. Two years later they took part in the campaign against the 50 years celebration of the Bretton Woods institutions in Spain.

Via Campesina, with affiliated small farmer organisations, have mobilised against the free trade doctrines of the Washington consensus since its conception in 1992.

Southern NGOs like TWN and Focus on the Global South began to cooperate with anti-NAFTA organisations in 1993, under the umbrella International Forum on Globalization. The campaign against MAI, the Multilateral Agreement on Investments, in 1996 was its first huge and successful mobilisation, when also European environmental and solidarity organisations were involved. The next great mobilisation was the counter-summit in Seattle in 1999, when also the cooperation with Via Campesina began in earnest, manifesting itself in the network Our World Is Not For Sale.

The great Lacandón meeting in 1996, organised by the Zapatists in Chiapas, inspired the activist network Peoples' Global Action, which began to cooperate with Via Campesina on coordination of campaigns against banks and others in 1998.

Finally, groups in the Brazilian Labour party and French Attac made an attempt to coordinate the whole movement surge into great Social Forums both on a regional and a global level from 2001. There had been campaign coordination before, but this initiative created on one hand an intense visibility – but on the other a top-down control from well-financed but unrepresentative NGOs which in the end contributed to a suffocation of the movement, see below.

internationalism.

[32] The best attempt at depicting these confluent networks is Ruth Reitan: *Global activism*, Routledge 2007.

Has this movement upswing had any consequences?

First it must be owned that the consequences are not as important as those of the upswings of 1789-95, 1845-48, 1880-95 or 1930-40. The rulers of the world have not been compelled to be serious and channel resources from speculation into production. Even in the epicenter of the upswing, in Latin America, the rulers confined themselves to bribe the movements with some of the proceeds of the speculation economy [32a].

In all likelihood, this was due to the limited economic weight of the upswing's actors: Indians and family farmers in Latin America, family farmers in India and other south Asian countries, environmental movements and movements for the commons in Europe, and perhaps some others.

But the gains were not paltry. The attempts from the traditional center states to institutionalize their hegemony into a global constitution was thwarted. Meanwhile, the leading power is increasingly enfeebled and a world more full of conflicts is appearing. And the outer limits of the system are also approached.

What will this imply for the movements?

The evident answer to this is that to a fascinating extent depends on ourselves. But the successes of peoples' movements are indeed to an extreme extent depending on strategic choices, skill, luck and good theories, and this is even more true in the uncertain era we are moving into. Are there any systematic weaknesses in that respect in the global social movement family?

Summary: how to make peoples' movements effective?

There are many bids on what these weaknesses are. Frederick Buttel and Kenneth Gould suggest that the weakness is that the resource advantage of the NGOs over popular movements, and their inherent tendencies of lobbying for small reforms [33]. Jai Sen and others point at the attempts of "shadow movements" in the form of lukewarm reformist parties and NGOs to co-opt the movement by disgracing all who don't conform to their norms [34]. Immanuel Wallerstein points at the difficulties of all the disparate movements within the global justice movements to get together about any common project [35]. Walden Bello suggests in an admittedly time-bound article that the counter-forces to the corporate globalization are so different that they don't even acknowledge each other's legitimacy [36].

[32a] José Gabriel Palma: Why has productivity growth stagnated in most Latin American countries since the neo-liberal reforms, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1030, 2011. According to Palma, the upper and middle classes of Latin America spend all their gains on consumption articles and refuse to invest, while the state wouldn't dream of compelling them – or to invest itself.

[33] Frederick Buttel & Kenneth Gould, Global movements at the crossroads, in JWSR X:1, 2004

[34] Jai Sen, A tale of two charters, at Choike, or The World Social Forum and the struggle against "globalisation", Aspects of Indian Economy 33. They point at the fact that Peoples' Global Action in practice has been crowded out from the social forums because the zapatists don't "dissociate themselves from violence" – while on the other hand reformist politicians are welcomed although they accept that states have armies...

[35] Immanuel Wallerstein, Porto Alegre, 2002.

[36] Walden Bello, Falluja and the forging of the new Iraq. The great trouble of communication is of course between the progressists around the World Social Forum and the nationalists/islamists.

Can the issue be settled? Is it possible to judge which way social movements may become effective?

Such questions are generally answered by “ideologies”, languages which have been formulated in a particular situation but with time hardened into eternal truths, often in completely new situations they are unfit for. This is the most common way of managing issues in the third problem level, the complete mess where everything depends on everything else [37].

To transform the problem to one of the second level where there are rational answers “depending on”, one should compare many peoples’ movements/mobilizations systematically, investigate possible reasons why it happened as it did and try to find patterns. This is without the scope for this book, and it has never been done [38].

An easier (and more unreliable) method would be to go through Bader’s peoples’ movement cycle from chapter 1 – and see the Appendix for a closer look – point at the occasions when a movement has to make a choice, if possible give some clues to the criteria the choice should fulfil to be “right”.

Since all peoples’ movements have in common that they are mobilizations by people in the non-favoured end of an inequality relation, with the purpose to assert themselves and their spontaneous manifestations of life, there ought to be some common criteria for success (even if one should not overstress the similarities).

Step 1, the existence of an exploited, repressed or discriminated category, offers no problem. The corporate liberalism of the Washington consensus and its more tired successors adds to the inequality gaps over the whole world. I have pointed at specific conflicts – the emergence of a wage labourer proletariat on a grand scale in the system periphery, the threat of turning earlier autonomous family farmers into subcontractors for the food industry, the difficulties for indebted peripheral states to make contracts of integration with their majorities and the difficulties for not so indebted center states to maintain their contracts of integration with their majorities. These are important reasons why a movement have emerged and grown as far as it has.

Step 2, the exploited, repressed or discriminated category develops a common habitus. Sometimes this is no problem; in South Arica at the time of Apartheid for example. In chapter 5 I have maintained that workers in Europe during the nineteenth century seem to have consciously dissociated themselves from the farmer majority and had to

[37] As pointed out by Russell Ackoff there are three problem levels: 1. The riddle, the well defined question that has only one answer. 2. The problem, the well defined question which have many answers “depending on”. And 3. The complete mess, where nothing is defined or well formulated. In principle, it is always possible to remake a problem of the third level to a problem of the second. See for example Tom Ritchey, Morphological analysis, a general method for non-quantified modelling, in Regulation management – new tools for the process of lawmaking, IT-kommissionen, Seminar, 25 October 2001.

[38] A first step has been taken by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of contention, Cambridge University Press 2001. They compare mobilizations pairwise to detect what mechanisms are at work. Much more can be discovered this way, particularly if one start from the need for knowledge in social movements rather than academic traditions which the authors unfortunately do. They assume for example from that all conflicts are the same, and that internal quibbles of elites are the same thing as peoples’ movements’ contention against structural inequalities, which makes the conclusions somewhat schematic.

take much beating for that, and in chapter 8 I have expressed misgivings that different pariah categories define themselves so narrowly that they end up in wars among themselves.

In the world as a whole it is of course impossible to develop a habitus for all disadvantaged. There are far too many categories. The founding idea of the Social Forums, not to establish any common strategy, is an acknowledgement of this impossibility, even if I think it was driven too far. To be sure, there are examples of movement alliances able to do great things acknowledging internal differences, like CONAIE in Ecuador. Perhaps it is more meaningful to speak of peoples' movement contemporaneousness, of the same kind as the contemporaneousness between movements for land reform in the South, labour movement in West Europe and youth revolt in the North between 1965 and 1975. This way of looking at it implies that movements, particularly in the system center, have to be better at articulating their own issues and problems to play ball, instead of only focusing on the global immediately. And this implies more of politics of interest, less of politics of conscience. More of the "republican" kind of movement, less of the "evangelical".

Step 3, the hardening of the habitus into a common identity, and step 4, development of a common interest, are of course also impossible since the interests of categories may be formulated in different ways and may even come into conflict with each other. Those who have small privileges – for example most of the direct producers in the North – may ally upwards and kick downwards to protect their small privileges. Or they may ally downwards and kick upwards to abolish the big privileges and win the world.

But there is more in it than that. Against whom should you hit, and what should you demand? Is the interest to keep a privilege, or to abolish all privileges? Are only the long run interests worth anything or are also the short-run ones? Are the farmers of Karnataka right when they blame the food businesses for the plight of the country-side, or are the farmers of Maharashtra right when they blame the state?

Of course the aim of a social movement is up to themselves. But some aims are more rational than others, even if it is not self-evident.

One criterion may be that the best is the broadest possible relevant identity – interests which make it narrower should have very strong arguments for it not to be wrong. Interests of the nimby type – "not in my backyard" – or which call for privileges narrow the identity and are probably wrong if the group behind it is not very strong.

What social movements choose depends probably of what seems most accessible from case to case. And what they choose affects the strength and direction of the peoples' movement contemporaneousness.

Step 5, developing of a common language, is nothing near a solution. The Bretton Woods institutions, the government of the USA and the EU, and some very visible transnational corporations have obligingly offered a common enemy and also presented an obvious common bogeyman, corporate liberalism. This doesn't mean however that the alternative to this is equally obvious. The corporate liberalism of the empires of the nineteenth century provoked not one counter-language but several, and the inability for workers and peasants to cooperate made it possible for the upper classes to survive

as upper classes. Today we can also see different counter-languages – fundamentalist religion, introverted group-asserting or nationalism, and the diversity-accepting equality ideology of the global justice movement – and as the rulers in the nineteenth century were able to play off their opponents against each other it will be possible today. Probably the ability of peoples' movements to succeed in this respect will be a result of their finding a less neurotic attitude to the so-called modernity than did the movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – their finding a base in interests for cooperation between movements using old languages and movements using new ones, and avoiding to make language into the principal thing to fight over. Some theorists have even suggested that only the kind of language which is still in the budding phase can be used by a popular movement [39].

Step 6, development of common organisations, proceeds irregularly. The trade union organisation in the South has gone far concerning the family farmers, and less far concerning workers. But the least organised are the direct producers and local communities protecting commons in the North. Some authors, for example Alberto Melucci, seem to suggest that it is inevitable and even good that popular movements of today only are able to construct habituses and identities but not organisations [39]. But only small mobilizations can survive that way, and only during a short time. Popular movements need institutions to pool resources, facilitate communication between participants, accomplish effective action planning, carry a presence between mobilizations and assert the ownership to victories. This despite the fact that institutions will create their own problems.

Step 7, resource mobilization and step 8, action, was demonstrated well enough during the movement wave of 1992-2001. But, as many have pointed at, movements must be much better at creating cultures of interest struggle repertoires, local or by all means global, which are easy for new mobilizations to adhere to. Like the labour movements of the twentieth century were constructed around the strike and the national movements were constructed around the boycott, contemporary movements will have to invent easy means of scaring elites without scaring or hurting the majority. Only to rely on public displays of respectability, unity, number and commitment – as is suggested by Charles Tilly [42] – is not enough in a world where the rulers fell less and less committed to the will of the majority.

I can not anticipate the established repertoires of action of the twenty-first century, but again it may be illuminating to refer to the criteria. Which actions leads to the broadest possible relevant identity of the movement, and which action puts the decisions

[39] A wise popular movement keeps several competing languages in constant discussion – constructive disunity, or unconcluded ideologies (Thomas Mathiesen, *The politics of abolition: Essays in political action theory*, Martin Robertson 1994). Unconcluded, or immature is what is in the process of being but not yet hardened; it can be used differently for different practical needs, and it keeps the discourse going.

[40] Alberto Melucci, *Nomads of the present : social movements and individual needs in contemporary society*, Temple Univ. Press, 1989

[41] Veit Michael Bader, *Kollektives Handeln*, Leske & Budrich 1992. The theories are related in chapter 1 in this book.

[42] Charles Tilly: *Social movements 1768-2004*, Paradigm Publishers 2004.

on fundamentals within the movement base? Which actions maintain the mobilizations within the category and its self-reliance as actors?

The problems for the contemporary movement alliance against corporate liberalism may be summarized as follows:

Peoples' movements in the system center have to be better at organising and articulating from interest.

Peoples' movements in general have to be better at cooperating out of an interest and making differences in language to a secondary matter which can be addressed later when common experiences may make a common building of a language possible.

Peoples' movements generally have to build a culture of interest struggles locally and globally which may be a pattern for new movements to join in.

It isn't easy to tell how possible this is. Much of the abovementioned may change rapidly and make this whole section out of date; probably much already is. Peoples' movements are like the weather. Small mobilizations for small aims may lead to big changes within the whole system if they are successful. Many apparently small events in the history of peoples' movements have become mythical for this reason. The bronze founder strike in Paris in 1867, the sowing of maize in Anenecuilco in 1910, the demonstration for bread in Petrograd in 1917, trade unionists' organized potato seizure in Västervik in 1917, the student demonstrations against Japanese economic demands in Peking in 1919, the salt march in the Indian west coast in 1930, Mrs Parks's refusal to leave a bus seat in Montgomery in 1955 – all can be described as catalysators, as small events giving expression to long-cherished needs by big categories of people, and a pattern for continued action which quickly makes earlier patterns for subordination as well as mobilization outmoded.

This may be enough. I don't expect to have exhausted the possible criteria, I am not even sure the suggestions above are right. But it is at least a way of making questions that doesn't emanate from ideologies of what ought to be right. A more pragmatic discourse about appropriate means to achieve reasonable aims would probably be beneficial for the peoples' movement scene of the twenty-first century.

If this book can contribute to this, and to setting the aims high, it is worth to have been written.

Appendix.
The popular movement cycle

IT IS PROBABLY SIMPLEST TO DESCRIBE social movements if you follow Bader's sequence from the stricken category the whole way to mobilization/action, result and recreation of the category [1]. We may call this sequence a social movement cycle.

For every step of the cycle there are pitfalls and risks for the movement, pitfalls and risks the movement has to get through.

It is important to bear in mind that it is a cycle – not a linear sequence.

When you have reached the end you begin anew. Rick Fantasia describes in his book *Cultures of solidarity* a cycle of a few hours, which explodes another time a few months later [2].

It is not necessary to read the following with an intention to memorize all concepts that are mentioned. But if you see how many pitfalls and obstacles there are, you will probably appreciate the movements that have actually surmounted them, and you may possibly also be more attentive to the problems that arise in your own social movement practice.

1. There has to be a stricken category

Conflicts and collective action is a result of the fact that power relations are unequal, and that a category can't protect its civil society in another way. The unequal relations can be

- class relations, or relations of exploitation through the societal organisation of production; one example is the conflict between workers and capital owners;
- elite relations, or illegitimate power relations within organisations; one example is the conflict between colonizers and colonized; and
- prestige relations, or depiction of certain categories as less respectable or "fashionable"; one example is the conflict between "races".

With a simple expression one could call it economically, politically or culturally grounded power abuse. Bader calls it exploitation, repression and discrimination, respectively.

Nothing prevents all these to be parts of the same relation. And in reality all these forms are parts of one and the same process: inequality. Inequality, or unequal distribution of rewards between people on different sides of a category border, arises according to Charles Tilly through three different but combined processes:

- opportunity accumulation; a co-operating group of actors, or a category, jointly claims an asset they try to exclude others from – if they succeed to a high degree one can speak of monopolization;
- exploitation; when the same group uses other people's labour to work this asset without paying the full value of the labour;
- adaptation; when the two categories – the in-group and the out-group – develop social

[1] Veit Michael Bader: *Kollektives Handeln*, Leske+Budrich 1991.

[2] Rick Fantasia: *Cultures of solidarity*, University of California Press 1988.

and cultural patterns to make life easier during these unequal conditions, and these patterns are spread to new social relations [3].

The stricken category may be small or big – a local community, a youth set, a subculture, a class. The important thing is the subordination.

While collective action may be released as soon as there is a reasonably homogenous exploited, repressed or discriminated category, only the structural exploitation, repression or discrimination can make the conflict, and the potential for action, permanent and a basis of peoples' movements in Raschke's sense. Most researchers seem according to Bader to agree that "modernisation", or in other words the dispersion and intensifying of the world market system, see chapter 2, is the conflict creating structure valid for our time. This implies that its carriers states and capital is the actors that peoples' movements face most.

Bader doesn't tell when exploitation, repression or discrimination reach the critical limit. Other researchers have emphasized the cultural qualification of this; primarily, conflicts are provoked by breaches of what people consider just and reasonable [4]. And this is ruled by tradition. Most probably, conflicts arise when exploitation, repression or discrimination suddenly grows worse, if an old ingrained exploitation, repression or discrimination appears out-of-date and without reason because of changed circumstances, or if the opponent suddenly appears weak and challengeable. The Russian revolution broke out when the government lost the war, and the great mine strike in Norrbotten 1970 broke out when the company, LKAB, sharpened its authoritarian management when development in general favoured softer methods.

2. The stricken category develops a common attitude and a culture or habitus

A habitus is a socially shaped disposition for a human being to act, think and feel, according to certain patterns. It is a way of performing, feel and think that is peculiar within a group, compared to others, and that is considered "natural" within the group. Habitus comprise sense of justice, aesthetic preferences, language patterns, posture and ways of doing things. People with similar habitus feel at home with each other (without always being able to explain why), while they feel strange together with people with different habitus.

Habitus is shaped through experience. If experience tells that conflicts are natural, a habitus tolerant to conflict is shaped. If it is given time, a group culture is developed, manifested in a lifestyle. The shaping takes time, several generations, and the result takes time to change. But much points, according to Bader, to a quicker historical rhythm nowadays, making it easier to change a common habitus. In our time, habitus has become a battleground where the world market system tries to commodify and exploit habituses while scattered movements try to keep away in non-commodified reservations through lifestyle movements, and where popular movements' creating of reservations

[3] Charles Tilly, *Durable inequality*, University of California Press 1998.

[4] See for example James C. Scott, *The moral economy of the peasant*, Yale University Press 1976. He emphasizes that it is particularly encroachments of certain culturally important minimum levels that provokes conflict. See also below under Interest.

and the world market system's exploitation of them happen at an ever-growing pace.

A group-specific habitus is a great asset for a peoples' movement. For it is a kind of common reference within the movement, a resource for the "we" that keeps the movement together.

3. Potential conflict categories can become movements only when they develop conscious collective identities

The participants in a movement have to see themselves as a category, a "we", posed against a "they" with at least a partially contrary identity. Such identities work as a defence against the hegemonic worldview of the opposite party, and is constructed under experiences of conflicts with categories of opposite identities. Those conflicts initially express themselves as everyday resistance. Everyday resistance is all the unorganised forms of resistance that exploited, repressed and/or discriminated categories use against their opposite parties – go-slows, slipping away, pilfering, botching, faked ignorance, and moral stigmatizing – too keep the exploiting, repression and/or discrimination at an endurable level without challenging too much [5].

The constitution of an identity is made easier if the conflict category has a common, homogenous condition of life and habitus, and the collective identity is usually grounded therein. It is also made easier if the group has a dense social network, and if the conflict with the opposite party is polarised. It is made particularly easy if it is impossible for members of the category to leave it. This may be used by the opposite party through cooption, that is, handpicking of key persons and giving them privileges, which has always been a powerful ruler's strategy.

Identities are strengthened by common martyrs, heroes, symbols, actions and rites, and by a common habitus and mutual solidarity. Such means are consciously used by many social movements to strengthen their base's collective identity. But they are also invented spontaneously by the participants, because it strengthen them as persons to belong to a collective with a strong identity.

But given all this, identity building is difficult, and it has been difficult for many potential people's movements to start because repressed, exploited and discriminated categories have failed to develop their identities. Collective identities – "we" – demand a "they". But it is not obvious what "we" and what "they".

For example, it is difficult to leave an old, obsolete identity. According to E.P. Thompson it took thirty years for the English workers to see themselves as workers instead of splitting themselves up as artisans, farm workers, industrial workers and general workers. To make the fusion possible, and to get the workers to realise that they had something in common, the most ruthless repression was needed – a political apartheid according to Thompson [6].

Moreover, conflicts may arise about several possible identities. They can be constructed about objective conditions of life – being crystallized about classes, elites/

[5] James C. Scott, *Weapons of the weak*, Yale University Press 1985.

[6] E.P. Thompson, *The making of the English working class*.

non-elites, and in- and out-groups – but they can also be built about habitus, lifestyle and even ideologies. Identities may be built around all these simultaneously and create a somewhat chaotic situation. With whom should for example a black American Muslim female worker identify and look for solidarity?

Peoples' movements have often had problems with conflicts between different possible identities, and tried to solve them with declaring all conflicts they are not thematizing themselves as irrelevant. National movements have tried to suppress class identities, labour movements have tried to suppress gender identities etc – with slight success because identities can not be talked away but are rooted in real experiences of conflict.

But the reason why peoples' movements try to suppress identities they see as irrelevant is that conflicts of identities create real problems. Divided identities obstruct mobilizations and may at worst induce categories to be increasingly repressed because they can not deal with their own identity conflicts. The most obvious example is the lower classes of the US, always quarrelling among themselves. Which is a hint that diversity, so extolled by liberals, may be a quite mixed blessing.

On the other hand, strong, heavily fortified identities may also be problematic. A classic example is the pre-industrial village, where the members were ready to die for each other but almost never could cooperate with other villages. Another is the European labour and agrarian movements in the nineteenth century; they were always unable to cooperate against common foes but always ready to ally against each other on cultural issues. Categories with too strong identity will find it difficult to reach beyond themselves and may even be unable to see that it is needed.

Apparently, peoples' movements have to learn to manage partial identities, or alliances of different "wes", cooperating against a common "them". This is not impossible. This is shown by the Indian movement in Ecuador, always very generous in conferring the title Indian to anyone that opposes the urban cosmopolitan upper middle class [7].

4. The conflict category develops an interest against the others, against "them"

The participants in the category have unmet needs. But a need, material or not, becomes an interest only when there is a real or a constructed scarcity, because "they" have monopolised a resource or manipulated the societal structures in some other way to "our" disadvantage. Needs are individual, but the interest is collective, because the scarcity has been collectively organised. The individual third world farmer's need for land is his own, but since there are indebtedness, terms of trade, corrupt bureaucrats and/or other results of impersonal power relations that force him into the urban slums, the interest is collective for all third world farmers.

The interest may be perceived as individual or collective. To perceive it as individual, however, presupposes – if you are going something to about it – individual resources which makes it to an unreasonable alternative for people living under scarcity. And for the conflict category as a whole, it is of course more rational to assert its interest

[7] Another master of managing composite identities was Mao Zedong. His concept for it was "main contradictions" and "secondary contradictions" – but then we are perhaps touching the section about interests.

collectively [8]. A developed habitus and a strong collective identity make a collective perception easier, but it is not enough.

5. The conflict category articulates its situation and an alternative

The antagonism of interests has to be articulated to be possible to act upon. A collective has to answer question like Who are we? What do we want? What stops us? Why? and What shall we do? It has to formulate what some people call an ideology and what Bader calls a common language.

To construct a common language is not easy, particularly as such languages have to struggle against other, more or less completed languages, which for a long time have been exposed to the influence of the category's opposite parties.

The opposite party wants that the world should be perceived in such a way that structural inequalities should be invisible, or results of chance or the stupidity or evilness of poor people. That is how the rich see it, and thanks to the structural inequality they have many ways of propagating their view. But before the collective sees the structural inequalities it can't act. To see it, and to see how it should be remedied, requires several steps [9]. It has to

- identify the common interest from the often diversified interests within the collective; this is generally done with common mobilizations for common goals;
- select a few themes that are the most important to work with;
- select somebody to be the responsible for the plight of the collective; the responsible persons must be outsiders;
- when there is a structure that is responsible, one has to choose some human adversaries to represent the structure;
- select goals that imply that the structural inequalities are attacked, at least to some degree;
- chose a strategy and a tactic;
- integrate all this into a program.

A program has many functions. It should contribute to understanding of realities. It should be a guidance to the participants and contribute to their integration and socialization into the movement. It should be a tool for mobilization. It should tell which aims are more important and which are less. Primarily, a program should be a vaccination against

[8] Opponents to peoples' movements have argued that individual needs never can be satisfied collectively, and that a rational person never takes part in collective action (most famously stated in Mancur Olson, *Logic of collective action*, Shoken 1971). The proof is built on game theory, but since game theories never consider peoples' dependence of a social surrounding, this is a weak argument. For example, real people know that psychology is as important as logics in social games, and that the reactions of the public are as important as the reactions of the opposite party. And the concept "collective identity" presupposes that there is a "we" acting as well as an "I". Perhaps the weakness of Olson's contention the final proof that the "rational individual" doesn't exist because all our acts are socially defined?

[9] Two authors who contends that a social movement is this step from false ideology to a liberating utopia are Daniel A. Foss & Ralph Larkin, *Beyond revolution: a new theory of social movements*, Bergin & Garvey 1986. They call it "disalienation", but they could as well call it "revival" – the sudden insight that the old familiar routines could be completely different, which releases immense energies.

impractical, counter-productive and generally bad reaction pattern within the movement. Without a program, a continuous movement can not survive as a collective, democratic movement with a common direction. A program of course doesn't need to be written.

Some people, f.ex. Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison, consider this articulation as the very core of any social movement [10]. Through its creation of a new understanding of the true nature of society the participants not only build a social movement but also contribute to the transformation of society, they think. I find their contention somewhat reductionist but I agree that it is a productive way of thinking for the movement itself – far more productive than only seeing a string of confrontations with the authorities, performed by occasional people directed by a semi-professional campaign leadership.

A program may often cause troubles, however.

Its aims are incompatible. Understanding may be contrary to mobilization – one must often exaggerate to arouse people from passivity. Mobilization may be contrary to integration – to reach outsiders one must sometimes express oneself in a way that alienates the radicals within the movement. Programs are compromises between these demands.

Programs are often dogmatic and disregard that real actions are always depending on context. More than once, movements have done worse than possible because they have gotten over-ideologized, got such a strong, queer and impenetrable language that they can't communicate with possible allies and even have seen them as enemies. Christianity, Islam, Liberalism and Socialism may all have been formulated as proclamations about the equal value and dignity of all, but have shown themselves to be equally usable as confusers of language and means of rallying people behind routine-maintaining elites. While identity in the beginning of a peoples' movement arises from the belonging to an exploited, repressed and discriminated category, the language construction tends to form a new identity that arises from the language itself. The socially defined conflict category is made invisible for the benefit of an intellectually defined one. Environmental movements become Ecologism, labour movement becomes Socialism – with all opportunities for disruption of real interests this makes possible.

This has brought some peoples' movement theorists to contend that only immature programs work as communicative languages for a collective. It is during its process of formulation a language fills a function, when it is completed it hardens into dogmas and prevents new insights [11]. Others rather see the hardening process as a result of an attempt to freeze a social process at a stage that is advantageous for somebody. Anyhow, it is probably possible for a creative conflict category to constantly reformulate its language and keep it alive, and it is certainly necessary.

Over-ideologization, or the development of languages unintelligible or disgusting for outsiders, may on the other hand be due to the necessity to develop at least some language and identity that is original, new and the collective's own, different from the one attributed to it by the system. This need is strong, without it one can not act at all. And

[10] Ron Eyerman & Andrew Jamison: *Social movements – a cognitive approach*, Polity Press 1991

[11] Thomas Mathiesen, *The politics of abolition: Essays in political action theory*, Martin Robertson 1994.

not any ideology is free to use. One may have to use what remains when others have taken theirs.

Bader doesn't mention anything about the difference between anti-systemic and system-compatible programs, or the fact that a program may be more or less concordant with the interests of the opposite party and the system in general. Given that the direct producers, who organise peoples' movements, have needs different from the states and capital owners who dominate the system, peoples' movements' aims may be perceived as independent from, different from or even contrary to the opposite party's needs, in a short or a long run. All options may have advantages and disadvantages.

The advantage of playing down a conflict is obvious: it isn't that dangerous to take such conflicts. If you aim at a broad audience – which is an advantage for a peoples' movement – it may be good to minimize threats of punishments and claim that changes may be easy. Sometimes these advantages may be perceived as so great that all disturbing greater conflicts are swept under the carpet; all interest is focused on the immediate, on what is "realistic", and all challenges beyond that are turned away as "utopian".

The strategic advantage of an anti-systemic approach is less obvious. It is connected with the more enthusing nature of grand aims. Awakening, revival, enthusiasm and devotion – qualities that is more probable in a movement that doesn't forge its position with glancing at the opportune – are valuable resources, exactly of a kind that may determine a conflict with a seemingly superior adversary. According to generally accepted business managing principles, it is better to set the aims according to what you really want, rather than according to what is "realistic". In the later case you have begun compromising before you have made your own standpoint clear, after which other compromises will be done. The more you do like this, the lower level you set for what is "realistic", and the worse will the ultimate compromise be. A labour movement that sets its aim at "we want a little slower rise in unemployment" will probably not even reach that; nobody will sacrifice anything for such a paltry goal [12].

As it for a human being is the first experience that is most important, for a social movement the first articulations are strongest. The early experiences often make such deep marks that it may never change its understanding of its problems, at least not completely. The language becomes a part of the identity. This implies that it is difficult for an outsider, for example the adversary, to manipulate the language of a collective, for example through media. Another reason for this is that for the collective it is the everyday language and the everyday theories that are fundamental, while the intellectually constructed special theories that adversaries may spread are of less importance. It is from the everyday language ideologies and new patterns of interpretation can be built.

Of course, the same factors may cause that the collective/movement get stuck in an outdated interpretation. This is often caused by an explosion of outdated conflicts. Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe didn't break out in earnest until long after the Jews had lost their role as merchants and peasant exploiters and been weakened – to the advantage of those who succeeded them.

[12] Peter F. Drucker, *The effective executive*, Pan Books 1967.

6. *The collective has to organise*

Short and incidental movements can do with minimal organisation. But a peoples' movement of any length of life needs permanent networks, that is, more or less permanent groups with dense contacts between the participants. Some of the networks belong more to the civil society while others are explicit conflict organisations, that is, organisations whose aim is to come to grips with the adversaries of the collective.

This organisation is necessary for several reasons.

- It is necessary for articulation. Much organised communication between the members is needed to make them able to jointly articulate the identity and aim of the movement, get an ample and correct information about the situation, and meet the disinformation of the adversary.
- It is necessary for mobilization. Great, assembled resources are needed to reach the potential support, and also a social context that can carry a movement over momentary reverses.
- It is necessary for planning of actions.

Organising is the resource of the poor. But it isn't easy to organise.

Organisation is facilitated by earlier organizing. The more and denser networks there are within the conflict category since earlier, the easier it is to build new ones for new purposes. This is also true for networks that are so informal that they may rather be called "social spaces", for example workplaces, neighbourhoods and local communities; the denser these are, and the more independent they are of adversaries' spaces [13], the easier they are to organise. Labour movements have for example found it easier to organise and be efficient in big industries than in small workshops. Local urban movements find it easier to organize if they have for example a house of culture as a base. And, on a higher level, it is easier to act if there are old identity-strong networks that fit; for example, during the whole twentieth century workers over the whole world have been able to link up with a common labour movement identity, thus short-circuiting a movement cycle that otherwise might be drawn-out. Organising is also made easier by homogeneity. The more of common habitus and common identity there is in the conflict category, the easier it is for it to organize.

The organising of a movement is always heterogeneous. There are the potential conflict group, the collective action, different movement organisations and networks, and conflict organisations with formal and real leaders, and these overlap so that none is a simple subset of the other. Greater movements make intricate networks of organising where different centers live in rivalry, cooperation and conflict with each other, and where the influence of different centers over the movement depend on their mobilising capability and strategic eye.

Organising may be more or less formal, that is, consist of networks with more or less developed routines and roles (in everyday speech only the less formalised ones

[13] The latter is explored by Sara M. Evans and Harry C. Boyte: *Free spaces*, University of Chicago Press 1986. For example they deal with the Black American movement's dependence of Black Christian churches. Also Margaret Kohn: *Radical space: Building the house of the people*, Cornell University Press 2003.

are called networks, the other are called organisations). The advantage of routines and roles is clear: they contribute to stability and efficiency, one knows that something is being done at a big scale, which is needed should a mighty adversary be defeated. As sociologist Randall Collins has discovered, a collective “we” is not easy to imagine. A whole repertoire of meetings, collective rites and a shared collection of sacred things are needed, not least a shared locality [14]. A facebook account is not enough.

But, as many activists have discovered, there is a snag tied to it.

Each formal organisation is a step away from the spontaneous expressions of life, and with that also a step away from what the peoples’ movements are there to defend. Particularly, four problems or dilemmas have been observed, dilemmas of the “ends are corrupted by the means” type.

- The conflict between democracy and quick decisions. In a peoples’ movement democracy isn’t just a means – the lay members know best which is their goal – but also a goal in itself, as a model of the “good society”. But meanwhile, power to decide has to be centralised so that the organisation be able to use its complete strength swiftly in a conflict. This centralisation has often as a consequence that creativity decreases – too few people become key persons, monopolising attention and choking all ideas from others. This is a conflict that has no obvious good solutions. Bader suggests that different balances within the framework of a complex participating democracy may minimize it, with “centralisation of the necessary” coexists with autonomy for participating groups and extreme attention to horizontal communication and direct democracy in the key decisions. In practice, a great deal of the conflict is also settled in competition between organisations in the broad peoples’ movement network [15].

- Power concentration. The aim of organising is to manage communication between the participants, and inevitably the people in key positions can gather illegitimate power in manipulating the communication to their own profit. This has in liberal as well as anarchist tradition become an argument against all organising. But much experience suggests that the suspicion is exaggerated. Other forces produce opposite effects. The power of ordinary members is strengthened against the key people because they have access to many networks, because key people often quarrel among themselves, and because nothing forces members to stay in organisations they find repressive.

- Bureaucratization. This is a special case of power concentration, implying that employed functionaries get more and more influence. Remuneration of certain functions is often unavoidable. But here lies a real and important trouble. Firstly, remuneration quickly causes high fixed costs, forcing constant mobilizations of resources for no particular aims. Secondly, and more important, an employee have other aims than the lay member – good employment and fixed organisational structures become more important

[14] Randall Collins: Sociological insight, Oxford University Press 1992.

[15] An older attempt of reconciling the need for democracy with the need for effective decisions was “democratic centralism”: free discussion up to decision, then disciplined unitary accomplishment. This attempt failed, because it was too easy for the functionaries of the movement to refer to the disciplined accomplishment and choke the discussion also in the discussion phase.

than the official aim. Since the employees have more time than the lay members to deal with the organisation, they will over time get a power out of proportion to influence the policy of the organisation to the profit of their particular interest. This problem is of course the biggest where NGOs are influential. Bader offers no solutions to this trouble. It has also been the greatest long run trouble for social movements – confer, for example, how the Christian movement’s functionaries converted themselves into an irremovable clergy – and there are probably no remedies. Lay members ought in any case be very clear that the trouble exists, and pose very strict limits to the scope of functionaries in an organisation.

- Organisational division. The heterogeneous organisations of peoples’ movements has often been seen as a weakness. Internal bickering and the opportunity it gives to the adversary to divide and rule have often been emphasized, and lately so called niche behaviour has been observed from small, secluded NGOs that pick the best plums without taking responsibility for the whole [16]. Probably, organisational division is rather a consequence of the heterogeneous composition of the conflict collective than a sign of political weakness. Moreover, organisational division may be a source of strength (“constructive disagreement”) – mobilizations can be broader if particular interests within the conflict collective have an opportunity to organise separately, the democratic discussions can be more open, and there is even an opportunity to create a useful division of work where radical groups frighten the adversary to meet the demands of the moderates. But constructive disagreement calls for a conscious effort to work, and a certain political maturity if the constructive is to prevail over the disagreement.

These organisational weaknesses imply that an organisation is not identical with a movement. It is a tool, that may sometimes be useful, that may sometimes be unwieldy, may be blunted and need replacement. According to Sartre, a rising movement, a “fusion group”, forms an organisation to keep the internal communication, thereafter becomes “serialised”, and falls victim to employees that get into the way of the lay members next time the movement is mobilised [17]. Not least for this reason, a vigorous peoples’ movement constantly creates new organisations instead of using the old ones – but sometimes an even more vigorous one may reconquer old organisations. The Brazilian labour movement could in the seventies even conquer trade unions that had been organised by the Minister of Labour, and use them to the profit of the workers.

7. Mobilization of resources

Mobilization aims at making the combined resources of the collective available for the peoples’ movement in its conflict with its adversary. Everything usable can be counted as resources – competences, knowledges, information, money and other wealth, time, formal positions of power, social relations, prestige, social organisation, and not least

[16] This is also related to the particular interests of salaried employees and with the growth of NGOs as a career path for intellectuals. Both are primarily interested in their own survival with only a lesser interest in solving the conflict category’s troubles once and for all.

[17] Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of dialectical reason, NLB 1976.

collective habitus and identity, articulated programs and organisations and leadership [18].

The resource base of a peoples' movement is by definition often smaller than the resource base of its opponent. This may be compensated for in two ways.

Different resources are not comparable. They are not equally easy to acquire – for example, it is often politically awkward for a state to use its military resources against an internal opposition. They can not be used simultaneously in the same strategy – the military resources can not be used simultaneously as a state appeals to democratic legitimacy in appealing to the electorate. They are not equally costly to use – a business enterprise can't use its total stock to subdue a strike. All this means that the imbalance doesn't need to be equally great in practice as it is in theory. And the most important resources, those that by military experts are called "moral factors" – solidarity, courage, trust, energy, motivation and perseverance, decided by habitus, identity, program and organisations, may be possessed by peoples' movements as much as by their adversaries.

Peoples' movements may compensate for its smaller resource base with better mobilization. They may be able to acquire a greater part of their potential resources, they may be able to use a smaller part internally as costs for the mobilization, and they may use a better strategy. They may particularly use swiftness and surprise, and get the conflict settled before the adversary can bring his force to bear. This was the secret behind the swift successes of the environmental movement in the early seventies. But this also means that all action patterns that are dragging on tend to restore the advantage of the non-popular party. This is why institutionalized conflicts are so difficult to manage for peoples' movements.

Peoples' movements may also use external resources, for example in the form of alliances with and contributions from other actors that have the same interests as they or at least the same enemy. But the more important the external resources are, the less is the freedom of action for the movement. In extreme cases, the movement may find itself exploited for very strange purposes – one such case was the German agrarian movement that believed it was possible to cooperate with the nazis (see chapter 7). And social movements today that try to cooperate with academic, governmental or business NGOs may get the same kind of trouble. The trouble is grounded in the fact that these partners are often well established and identity-strong – this is the purpose of allying with them – while the peoples' movements are in their inception and for that reason formative. The enemy of the enemy is not necessarily a friend.

Finally one may try a bluff – "attack with dust". But this is easier for someone with a resource advantage (resource differences are liable to overestimation), and an exposed bluff is devastating.

But the resource disadvantage of peoples' movements is an important factor to consider. Among other things, it decides greatly their strategies.

Peoples' movements tend to choose demands for concessions rather than popular control, because it is easier to achieve and doesn't call for unwieldy institutions. They

[18] Charles Tilly, *From mobilization to revolution*, McGraw Hill 1978.

tend to choose punishing strategies rather than encouraging ones because they don't have much to encourage with. They tend to choose direct, short run actions "against" rather than indirect, long run "for" since the latter calls for extensive planning resources – peoples' movements are "reactive" rather than "proactive", as it is termed by political-ologists. And they tend to choose collective action rather than individual, although this is inopportune in the present political climate, because this is the only resource they have got. I have also pointed at peoples' movements dependence of swiftness. Their limited resource base is cause of an equally limited repertoire, as Charles Tilly has called it [19], a set of traditional methods of struggle that is changed slowly over time, see point 9 Action. Yet: the great successes in the history of peoples' movements is caused by a break with these limitations, and a creative understanding for how the limitations should be surmounted. This is the theme for this book.

8. The conflict category develops relations to the surrounding world

A social movement has to consider, when mobilizing in a conflict, the present "political field" or "opportunity structure". A political field or opportunity structure consists of everything that a movement has to relate to: opposite party, other parties, power distribution, and not least the political culture or climate, that is, what people in general think is legitimate and acceptable ways of doing things.

I will consider the adversaries under point 9 Action. Among third parties the state is perhaps most important. It is the particular function of the state to maintain the stability of the system, which implies among other things that it will engage in every bigger conflict, not only in those itself is a protagonist in. It can do that either in trying to obstruct the movement or support it [20]. The first is certainly the most common, historically; support, or integration as I have called it, is found only in rich countries or under economically successful and optimistic eras – or if the social movements are strong.

This is a strong motive for social movements to influence the state, if for no other reason to prevent the opposite party from influencing it too much. Methods are playing different authorities against eachother, playing different elites against eachother, goading the state into unpopular actions and depriving it of means through tax strikes and boycotts. A historically important method has been to infiltrate or invade the state through political parties – an ambiguous method as we shall see.

There are also other control institutions discouraging people from action and supporting status quo, and they vary from one culture to another. Sometimes the church or organised religion may by such an institution. Sometimes the family is. Schools are, not

[19] Charles Tilly, *From mobilization to revolution, and The contentious French*, Belknap Press 1986.

[20] Among direct methods for obstruction are withdrawal of contributions, delegitimation of aims, themes and actions, criminalization and direct military repression. Among indirect methods are passivisation of the whole society through "education", control of everyday life and withdrawal of civil rights. Each of these has a price, not least in legitimacy, which is a card a movement could play on. The purpose of supporting a movement may be to divide a movement through favouring certain factions of it, but the purpose may also simply be to buy peace. Support can be given materially, through cooption of leaders and organisations and through public conflict regulation, see below.

infrequent. Businesses/workplaces are very often. Sartre has shown how society's material assets as a whole in a certain regard directs our actions and oppose against regeneration, and others have suggested that this is intentional [21]. But an ingenious peoples' movement can exploit all these institutions, easier than it can exploit the state.

There are also the conventional mechanisms of mediation, highly autonomous, privileged institutions whose aim it is to articulate interests and formulate the agenda of society: political parties and the media.

Political parties are problematic for peoples' movements. Even when they in some sense "represent" peoples' movements, their articulation is from the outset gauged at compromises. In the first place, because parties are potential governments, a compromise with the state, but also with other interests they regard as potential voters. Moreover, they can thanks to their privileged position maintain that their version of the interest is the correct one. For that reason, peoples' movements have to struggle against them to get the space to formulate autonomously. This is not easy, particular when movement and party share the same people and the same organisational space.

Media are perhaps less problematic because there are other institutions that may play partly the same role for the movement, for example mass organisations and local communities. The problem is related to the fact that media influence the language or program; this is perverted by the language and program of media, which in its turn is influenced by owners' and journalists' interests and by so-called journalistic evaluation of facts [22].

Most political parties have their origin with a peoples' movement, and so has media which to a high degree is a creation of the nineteenth century civil rights movements. This is why they are still, by many, perceived as "almost" peoples' movements, and this is maybe a reason for their strength and their capacity to confuse.

Lawrence Goodwyn has, a propos the US agrarian movement and its troubles with party politics in the late nineteenth century, coined the concept shadow movement [23]. It stands for an organising that act as a parasite on a peoples' movement, that tries to ally with it by force of its participants' often high social status, in order to kill what is anti-systemic in the movement and also kill its vulgarly democratic culture. The subjectively perceived intention is probably to win some sympathy for the aims of the movement with the middle class and/or the state. The objective result if a shadow movement wins hegemony over a peoples' movement is that the latter loses its cultural identity, its language and its capacity of self-regeneration.

[21] Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of dialectical reason, NLB 1976. Modernist city planning as a disciplinary action has been analysed by Mats Franzén, Gatans disciplinering, Häften för kritiska studier 5:1982. The argument is that a functionally divided city impedes all actions that are not foreseen and approved by the planning authorities.

[22] Journalistic evaluation of facts are affected by the fact that media are in showbiz and have politics as a side-line. Its characteristic is that elite views are more important than views of direct producers, that the new, the freakish and the violent is uprated, that form is more important than content, and that the simple is played up against the complicated.

[23] Lawrence Goodwyn, The populist moment, Oxford University Press 1978. A Swedish example is shown

Shadow movements are inevitable consequences of successful movement mobilizations; it is the form of participation the middle class is able to. Peoples' movements must learn to live with them and find out counter-strategies; a source of strength is that shadow movements are dependent of peoples' movements through their base in the mediation and therefore sensitive to threats, while the peoples' movement does well without the shadow.

Other states may be of consequence for peoples' movements, either as subscriber or as a threat of military intervention. We may just think of the Soviet Union's significance for the anti-colonial movements, or the USA's for the French revolution. Other movements usually play a more important role. As allies, of course, but perhaps more important as participating in the same resource base, the same infrastructure, the same interpretation pattern, the same social organising and the same adversaries. Other movements may play a great part in a peoples' movement's mobilization. A positive one, as informal teachers and contributors, and a negative one, since they easily drag them into their own quarrels and conflicts.

Finally, the situation plays a great role for peoples' movement's mobilizations. Politologists have particularly focused on the importance of other political actors' acts for movements [24]. Politics is always a matter of take advantage of the opportunity, and use them, and other people's actions to their profit. The opportunity may consist of disunity within the elite, emergence of a new actor, or change in the political culture.

Emergence of new opportunities are important for upswings of peoples' movements. Social movement mobilizations are visibly cyclical and follow a self-produced pattern of booms and busts. In the years 1966-1975, there was boom of peoples' movement in the whole world. Such booms can't be related only to for example economic cycles but are also created within the peoples' movement system itself.

The boom is usually set apace by strategic quarrels within the elite, which induce some privileged categories to mobilize for their interests. Successes for them trigger others to mobilize; many contemporaneous mobilizations against the same adversaries enfeeble the latter and make them incapable to withstand in new conflicts. This rises expectations and entices new social movements. All mobilizations together create a strong social movement culture where it is easy to formulate identities, themes, ideologies, strategies and programs; this make things easier for new social movement mobilizations, etc. In the end, the boom is broken through countermobilizations from the elites, according to new strategic principles, linked to rash errors by the popular movements, and not least disagreements about strategic principles. Usually you can see clearly when

in Björn Eriksson et al, *Det förlorade försprånget*, Miljöförbundet 1982, dealing with the referendum about nuclear power in 1980. A classic Swedish description about a successful struggle of a peoples' movement against a shadow movement about the right to express its own thoughts is August Palm, *Ur en agitators liv*, 1905 (Prisma 1970). Palm is considered the founding father of social democracy in Sweden..

[24] There is a whole literature on this. As the classic among them is considered Sidney Tarrow, *Power of movements – social movements, collective action and politics*, Cambridge University Press 1994. Most of those I have read are however limited to the "opportunity structure" that is formed by state and political parties.

the reverse is set in: it is when movements begin to quarrel about "further advance" or "consolidation".

For example, the boom of the sixties was created by contemporaneous anti-colonial movements, agrarian movements, and labour movements, each conditioned by the economic and political environments, but that were more effective together than they would have been alone. They were broken around 1970 by internal movement conflicts between "moderates" and "radicals" and by a forced internationalisation that made it easy for those in power to create unemployment and starvation, thus breaking the courage among the direct producers, the base of the peoples' movements [25].

9. The resources are used for actions

The actions of peoples' movements are of two kinds: to force the adversary to adapt to the demands of the movement, and to realize by their own hands the desired aims in the civil society they represent.

The trouble is to do that in spite of the disadvantage the social movements have by definition.

The actions against adversaries, the confrontations, aim at destroying the adversary's order of obedience and increase his uncertainty and costs, and consist of a rather stable repertoire that changes slowly over time. During the tax rebellions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the action was to prevent the sheriffs of the king to collect taxes. During the bread seizures of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the action was to seize bread and flour and sell it on the market for a fixed low price. During the time of the industrial society the used methods are strike, demonstration, mass meeting and occupation, to some degree boycott, and participation in elections [26]. The stability of the repertoire is not only a disadvantage – both the adversary and the public should understand what one is doing, and confusion among the supporters isn't good either.

The mode of conflict have to be chosen so that the whole collective can be used to the utmost – which was, by the way, the reason behind Gandhi's insistence on peaceful means; violence tends to shrink the numbers of participants, and thus also one's resources. This is why a stable repertoire and a familiar terrain may be to prefer. But new, unexpected repertoires may be created out of the familiar terrain. It's the creative innovations that bring the greatest successes. For example, only when the US workers learned to occupy the factories in the thirties, they came to grips with the strike-breakers and could force the enterprises to write collective agreements and the state to acknowledge unions legally. The principle is to create maximum uncertainty for the adversary while keeping total control for oneself [27]. New repertoires raise the level of uncertainty for the adver-

[25] More about this in the chapters of this book.

[26] Charls Tilly, *From mobilization to revolution, and The contentious French*.

[27] Familiarity is one the things insisted by Saul Alinsky: *Rules for radicals*, Vintage Books 1971, the best "activist handbook" ever written. That is, of course, familiar for the participants; if possible the adversaries should be taken by complete surprise. Alinsky tells about a few such examples in his book; another more academic account is Eric Batstone, Ian Boraston & Stephen Frenkel: *The social organization of strikes*, Blackstone 1978.

sary, and consequently also his costs.

The aim of confrontations is to force the opposite party to concessions. The aim of war is peace, as the military theorists say; peace on one's own terms. But there is a particular dynamic in confrontations that cause them to develop in a way nobody has thought of beforehand. There is a whole theoretic tradition about this: conflict theory.

Bader has a rather low opinion about conflict theory. According to him it always seems to operate with too few variables and disregard that real collective conflicts always are mixed: there are many parties, themes, aims, strategies, means etc that combine over time. The conflicts of social movements are played out in a society, not in the kind of logical schemes that conflict theorists use to work with.

Yet, there are certain cores of conflict theory that always apply.

Firstly, the parties define the character of the conflict, no matter how stupid they may seem. This implies for example that what applies is the subjective perception of the parties about the conflicts' costs and proceeds. The party that first thinks that the costs exceeds the proceeds is the first to sue for peace [28].

Secondly, there are objective limitations for what strategies that are possible to choose.

One is the internal movement conditions – the less resource potential and the weaker collective identity, the more narrow are the limitations. Moreover, the opportunities are limited by earlier articulations; it isn't possible to change articulation overnight.

Another is the relation between the parties – the more they have to do with eachother in the everyday life, the greater is their opportunity. For then, they are also dependent of eachother and may exert pressure on eachother. It is easier for a collective of workers to act against the management than it is for a colonized people to act against the colonizers.

A third is what is thematized in the conflict – qualitative themes entice to harder conflict than do quantitative ones, irreversible themes entice to harder conflict than do reversible ones. Fifty cents more an hour don't entice to as much effort as does a threat of laying down the only working-place of a region [29].

A fourth is the culture of the society in general as well as sub-cultures of the collective and its supporters – it establishes fixed significations to different actions, and it is preferable that both the adversary and third parties – not to speak of all sub-groups within the conflict collective – read the action as it is intended. If for example violence against person is unacceptable in a culture it is bad strategy for a movement, regardless of other considerations. There are, as stated above, general political cycles to consider,

[28] Pau Puig i Scotoni, Att förstå revolutionen, Zenit 1980. He considers a conflict as a kind of bookkeeping, where the parties minimize costs and maximize proceeds to make bigger "profit" than the adversary. This may seem exceedingly abstract – but may explain why the resourceless Vietnamese could beat the Americans: the Americans were the first to think that the conflict didn't pay, although the "real" costs were higher to the Vietnamese.

[29] It is for this reason "conservatives" are always more radical than "progressives", according to Craig Calhoun. For example, the great revolutions of the 20th century have all been managed by peasants who have wanted to return to a past golden age, while labour movements almost always have preferred steady, small advances rather than revolutions. Those who feel their existence threatened by development are more likely to use radical means than those who feel flowing with it. See Craig Calhoun: The roots of radicalism, University of Chicago Press 2012.

as are expectations of an action's consequences. It is easier to act in a movement boom than in a movement bust.

Thirdly, confrontations have a tendency to escalate and drag along new parties, themes and aims, meanwhile making the parties less apt to compromise about a reasonable peace. As time goes, the parties invest resources they want dividends from, the collective identity is strengthened, radical utopias and aims are formulated, the conflict organisations tend to be taken over by militants who see the conflict as an end in itself and a base for their own power, and the limits for the culturally accepted means are widened. There is however also possible that it becomes clearer what divides the parties; real adversaries appear and false conflicts disappear.

Escalation may have advantages as well as disadvantages.

To the advantages belong of course the prospect of substantial advance. To the disadvantages belongs the distortion of the participants' perception of the conflict, that may increase while the conflict escalates. Conflicts are always risky. So the images of the adversary that the participants make are not always accurate; they tend to be black-and-white, and since the communication between the participants are made up of threats and damages, they interpret everything the adversary does in these terms. Even serious offers of compromises tend to be written off as malicious tricks. And the conflict is escalated far beyond what is rational, to the detriment of the civil society that the social movement was intended to protect [30].

Against this, the Gandhian tactics helps [31]. But it tends unfortunately to contribute to a freezing of the relation between the parties and impede the underdog from upping the ante. It is a tactic for a movement that can afford waiting, as Gandhi himself was well aware of.

Few conflicts go on escalating until the parties exterminate each other, because there are also deescalating mechanisms in conflicts. Firstly, both parties exhaust their resources. Secondly, the escalating mechanism may be broken by conscious initiatives from any of the parties. Some may change from threats to promises to make the adversary's worldview less black-and-white, more complex, which may lead up to a more realistic apprehension of what level of conflict that is the most reasonable.

A third deescalating factor is the conflict regulating mechanisms that are usually built into society. Other parties, particularly the state, engage in confrontations that threaten its interests, and expectations about that may contribute to cautiousness from the original parties. Such conflict regulation tend to develop to become tenacious in long conflicts,

[30] To judge the level of conflict that favours the peoples' movement most and the adversary least is an art. Generally, a peoples' movement loses in escalating a conflict to a level where personal injuries is natural; generally states and capitals are the strongest at that level. But there are exceptions – they are called revolutions.
[31] According to Arne Næss, Gandhi and group conflict, Universitetsforlaget 1974, the principles of Gandhian conflict are rather being for something than against, to concentrate on the core of the conflict, to keep there during the whole conflict and not rise demands with the time, to be prepared to compromise about trifles, to find aims that are common for both parties, always to act in the open, to be prepared to sacrifice something to reach the aim, to protect victims of the adversary, never to be afraid of the adversary, never to see the adversary as a personal enemy, and never to exploit the adversary's irrelevant weaknesses.

and this may be both advantageous and disadvantageous for peoples' movements. Peoples' movements are usually better at politics than at violence, but on the other hand they are usually not good at long-winded conflicts.

There is also a logic for the end of a conflict, that is not only a consequence of the character of the conflict. An end is also a kind of interaction process between parties.

Most important is that both parties consist of heterogeneous collectives, who firstly are not identical with the conflict organisations that take initiative to end the conflict, secondly may have different interests and different aims. For example, a party that loses face in an ending tend to renew the conflict at any opportunity, and a disadvantageous peace accord tends to be broken by minorities within the losing party. Such things may break a social movement, at least temporarily – the violence of radical small groups in Germany and Italy in the seventies and eighties have been explained as desperate actions by minorities against majority leaders' peace accords implying cooptations of these into the elites [32]. It is easy imagining the same forces being played out in Palestine or Syria today.

Peoples' movements' efforts to create by themselves the new society within the civil society, or building an order of obedience of their own, is sometimes called alternative society. Perhaps one's thoughts go to the utopian societies Christians built in the form of monasteries or to the archipelago of colonies the utopian socialists built in the USA in the nineteenth century. But this view is too restricted. Labour or agrarian movements' cooperation as well as the popular culture that is bred in social movements are also alternative societies. And when the Swedish temperance movement introduced universal suffrage within its own organisations two generations before it was introduced into the Swedish state, it was another expression of the same. Living as if the desired changes were already there may make the changes inevitable. In carrying through the reforms they struggle for within the civil society, the participants strengthen their own faculties – practical and spiritual. And in working out public bodies according to the norms of the civil society – according to reciprocity rather than hierarchy and market – the movements contribute to the strengthening of the civil society at the expense of state and business. And to be sure, this is the aim of peoples' movements.

Research about the working of these mechanisms is scarce. Social movement research has in the main inquired into confrontations with the adversary; this is more dramatic than alternative society mechanisms and perhaps for that reason more attractive for historians and sociologists to follow.

One of those who have investigated the alternative society, or civil society mechanisms initiated by peoples' movements, is Josef Huber [33]. His conclusion is that such organising has a value as long as they have a direct relation to mobilizations in conflicts. As soon as they don't, they are conquered by market or hierarchies and become resources for business or state, that is, they end up as ordinary business enterprises or a part

[32] According to Hans-Peter Kriesi et al, *New social movements in Western Europe*, University College of London Press 1994, and Michel Wieviorka: *The making of terrorism*, University of Chicago Press 1993.

[33] Joseph Huber, *Wer soll das alles ändern*, Rotbuch Verlag 1980, deals with the German alternative society of the seventies.

of the welfare bureaucracy. Swedish readers easily think of the impressive alternative society of the social democrat labour movement – housing cooperatives, building enterprises, publishing houses, newspapers, insurance companies etc – became resources for the state in the fifties and resources for capital when the welfare state was downsized in the nineties.

Jonathan Rose's investigation of English workers' self-education told much the same story: when the labour movement mobilized, the self-educated were good organizers. But when mobilization peter out, the self-educated get into other careers, ending being workers at all [34].

The same conclusion was drawn by UNRISD in its investigation into peasant cooperatives in the South. Only when they were linked to movements against landowners, wholesale dealers or other exploiters, they were a liberating force. In other cases these adversaries will soon dominate the cooperatives and use them for their own ends [35].

However, their conclusion seems somewhat rash. If the civil society is the end of peoples' movements, and the purpose is to protect it from damages by state and business routines, all alternative society mechanism created by peoples' movements have to be a reinforcement. Some reinforcements may last longer than others, but no reinforcement lasts forever. The Danish farmers' producer cooperatives and folk high schools were able to gain hegemony in the country at the end of the 19th century before submitting a few generations later to the market dictatorship of the European Union, see Chapter 7. The English workers' consumer cooperatives were at least able to maintain a popular culture for some decades before falling victim to internal party political controversies over which organisational form would be the most important in liberating the working class [36].

For a peoples' movement to be successful it needs both ways of working. A peoples' movement that doesn't try to force its norms upon state and business abandons the struggle for hegemony and ends up like the American alternative society movement, as odd isolates of no importance. A peoples' movement that doesn't itself build the good society lose more and more of its own resource base, not least spiritually, and ends up as a weak, unoriginal and subaltern pressure group. A movement that does both, like the Scandinavian labour movement, may win hegemony in the nation.

10. The result refers both to the movements themselves and their environment

Confrontations between social movements and their adversaries change both themselves and society at large. The most obvious result is the concessions they can force upon the adversaries, but other results are rather more interesting.

The conflict affects the peoples' movement itself, positively and negatively. It is only in the extremely rare cases when it is completely annihilated or wins a complete victory

[34] Jonathan Rose: *The intellectual life of the British working classes*, Yale University Press 2002.

[35] *Rural cooperatives as agents of change: A research report and a debate*, UNRISD, Report No 74.3

36. Peter Gurney: *Co-operative culture and the politics of consumption in England 1870-1930*, Manchester University Press 1996.

that the movement ceases to exist. When the conflict ends in a compromise, which is almost always, the movement wins a developed collective identity, increased experience, developed solidarity and often a widened array of themes that strengthens the movement in subsequent conflicts and makes it a peoples' movement according to Raschke's definition.

But the movement is often forced, as a part of the compromise, to accept a certain degree of conflict insitutionalization. Such things imply certain advantages insofar as the routines the category lives under and the conflict has dealt with are made somewhat less repressing. But it also carries with it some questionable secondary effects.

The institutionalization has two sides. Firstly, the managing of the conflict is formalized in laws, government agencies and more marked by mediators like political parties and media instead of the social movements themselves. Secondly, the peoples' movements' organisations are forced to manage the evermore intricate institutionalized conflict management through formalizing and labour-divisioning themselves; this formalization and labour division will with the time kill what makes the movement organisations to social movements in Raschke's sense, and also in Sartre's [37]. Moreover, institutionalization tends to give mediators and shadow movement the role as interpreters of the movement's demands.

Both imply that the articulation of the conflict is adulterated – the institutions steal the language of the movement and misrepresent it according to the insitutionalizing functionaries self-interest, which makes the peoples' movement organisation less usable in further conflicts.

The most dramatic example of this is perhaps the rise and fall of the welfare state. The welfare reforms were prompted by peoples' movements, were institutionalized in both government agencies and petrified social movement organisations, began to crumble when the base of the peoples' organisations had demobilized and lost grasp because all conflicts were swept under the carpet.

A less dramatic example is that industrial agreements, which to be sure compel the adversary to show consideration for the workers' human nature but also trap the conflicts of work into a recalcitrant legal strait-jacket [38].

A peoples' movement has to accept this, and relate to it. In practice this means that a movement continuously creates new organisations as a replacement for those that have been institutionalized and forced the peoples' movement to work under awkward conditions. For example, the initiatives in the labour movement upswing in the seventies were usually taken not by trade unions but by rank-and-file committees, and the new environmental movement was not formed within the old nature conservation organisations but in new local citizens' groups.

This tension between institutionalization and new initiatives is what characterizes the life of peoples' movements.

[37] The high symbolic solidarity and weak role specification of Raschke, the fusion group of Sartre.

[38] Per Forsman, *Arbetets arv, Arbetarkultur* 1989.

The results on society are according to Bader impossible to say anything about in general. It depends too much on all the processes and part processes that have been described in this chapter. Confrontations are struggles where different parties try to force through their often incompatible interests and positions under constant uncertainty, and the outcome depends on the resultant of forces, external circumstances and the choice of actions.

This is why you can say that peoples' movements are not routines, that they because they are answers and challenges to routines are chaotic and unpredictable. At each of the steps in Bader's sequence it is possible to do "right" and "wrong", that is, answer more or less adequate and effective to the demands of the situation. This choice will then affect the following sequence including the final outcome.

The first choice is when one decide about the collective identity: who are "we"? The more possibilities, the more uncertainty, and the greater risk that the following mobilization will be smaller and more ineffective because of the ensuing quarrels between the possible identities. But on the other hand, the greater the opportunity for a really broad mobilization, if the identity is defined as broadly as the habitus and the interests allow and becomes a concern for many without being perceived as artificial.

Next choice appears when articulating interest and alternative. Here, the possibilities are still more extensive, and what one chooses affects the enthusiasm and spirit of self-sacrifice, the adversary's inclination to compromise, and the opportunity of alliances with third parties.

The organisational form is also a result of choices. And different forms of organisation may be more or less effective in the given situation.

So are different mobilizations, conflict actions, and alternative society constructions. These choices are called strategies, and here there is more understanding that there is really a matter of choices. Nevertheless, an unusual creativity is usually demanded to stretch the limits of time-honoured strategies or create new ones, more adapted to the present situation.

"Right choice" gives a better outcome than "wrong choice". "Right choice", of course together with favourable circumstances, creates a self-strengthening spiral where the peoples' movement cycle grows, the movement becomes stronger, more efficient, capable to ever more commanding challenges to the economic, political and cultural hegemony of the state, business and upper classes. The "wrong choices" may lead to bitter internal conflicts and to the ruin of the movement, or to the abortion of an incipient movement.

All impulses to see the outcome of a movement's ambitions beforehand is for that reason unwise. Peoples' movements are, because of their relative independence of routines, sensitive to the quality of its choices, in relation to the opposite party.

No social movement wins its confrontation completely, and its success can not be measured in relation to a best possible result in a hypothetic total victory. It is measured in relation to how well it maintains the civil society it is there to protect, and the values the civil society consider priceless. And in that regard, peoples' movements may be successful, even if they have to pay for their successes, sometimes rather dearly. Sometimes so dearly that they only see the defeat.

In the confrontation new structures, or routines, are built up for the civil society defended by the peoples' movement. If the mobilization is extensive, a multifarious democratic alternative society grows, which may give the conflict category more power over its everyday life than before, and a more extensive resource base for further conflicts, at least until the mobilization recedes. Peoples' movements create openings for the civil society to use, irrespective of what institutionalization the immediate mobilizations result in. The successful labour mobilizations in Sweden in the twenties and thirties created a political and cultural space, possible for environmental movements to use in the seventies, irrespective of the relations between those two movements, since they created respect for direct producers as actors, not least a self-respect among the direct producers themselves. And peoples' movement principles affect the culture and language in the civil society, as for example when sports organisations in Sweden say they are peoples' movements and maintain that equal right to physical exercise for all is more important than victories for a few.

Such things even happen to some extent irrespective of success or failures of confrontations.

For the result is not only a matter of real actions but also threat of actions, threat of conflicts. A realistic threat may induce an opposite party to behave in another way than in a situation with no threat. But the threat has to be credible. And this depends on the courage to act sometimes even if it is possible that the action results in defeat. Even "failed" actions may be worth their price if the opposite party thinks twice next time. Such were the peasant rebellions of old: they were almost always beaten, but the cost of beating them was so great that kings and barons thought twice before they raised taxes and corvées next time [39].

[39] E.P. Thompson, *The moral economy of the English crowd in the eighteenth century*, Past and Present, 1971

